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Cycle XXI

Summary of the Thesis

‘On The Possibility, Grounds and Limits of International Toleration: An Analysis on John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas’

This dissertation aims to answer the question whether there is a place for toleration in our thinking on the international realm and if so, what it is. It is stated that we can argue for the possibility of international toleration by pointing out the characteristics of and the possible reasons for toleration as an international issue. In order to support this argument, first, a conceptual map is developed which lays out the structure (make-up) of toleration along with a list of various possible justifications of the concept. Then, this conceptual map is employed to investigate how one might think of international toleration. The characteristics of and reasons for toleration are applied to the international realm with the aim to show in which way we might refer to toleration as an international issue. Particularly the outlooks of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas are investigated as two theories that constitute proof-cases for the possibility of international toleration.

In this summary of the thesis, first, I will lay out the motivation (justification) of the research topic to answer why it is significant to investigate toleration as an international issue. Secondly, I will explain how I conducted the research by specifically focusing on the content of each chapter briefly. Then I will lay out the conclusions that were reached out of the whole work.

This dissertation has two basic justifications. First motivation is a theoretical one: the aim is to contribute to the contemporary literature on toleration in political philosophy which developed almost no interest in the international aspect of the
concept. We find a vast literature on toleration as an intra-state matter whereas much less has been written on the topic of international toleration. This lack of interest might have certain reasons behind, yet I claim that these reasons are not plausible enough for disregarding international toleration.

Second justification is an empirical one. The motive behind this dissertation is that toleration has always been both an intra-state and inter-state matter. When it emerged in Europe after the so-called religious wars, it was already an issue between the Kings from different faiths rather than an issue merely between the Kings and their subjects inside the boundaries of specific territories. This is not to say of course toleration is solely a Western Phenomenon. One might find the sources of toleration in many other cultures such as Near Eastern and Asian. However, the attempt to look for non-Western sources of toleration is beyond the goals of this research since it needs a separate endeavor. The point here is to draw attention to the fact that historically, toleration is both a domestic and international phenomenon.

This dissertation also claims that in contemporary world politics, it is still significant to investigate the place of toleration. It is argued that indeed we observe instances of toleration and intolerance all the time within the global political and social contexts. States and other international actors such as international organizations do enter into relations of toleration by way of refraining from intervening in the affairs of one another. The opposite act of intolerance is up to observation when matters of intervention, war and other influences of states on each other’s conduct are at the agenda in the international realm.
Nevertheless, there is also a normative motive behind this dissertation in focusing on toleration as an international issue: Toleration is needed as an attitude if we have to share the same world in peace and stability as people coming from different cultures, civilizations and societies. We might even say that the ongoing presence of religion and its effect at the global level makes toleration more necessary as a moral principle. This means, responding with toleration to each other’s differences at the global level (be they religious differences or not) seems to be significant for peace and stability. Yet, this does not mean that toleration is considered without limits. Substantive limits of toleration, what to tolerate and what not to tolerate, depends on the characteristics of each context in which a question of toleration arises. In this manner, it is important to note that toleration is not addressed in absolute terms in this work. It is only to address the motivation that toleration as a moral principle is a requirement of peace and stability.

Rawls and Habermas, as two figures on which we concentrated in this research, even go beyond this minimal requirement of peace and connect the idea of toleration to international justice. In their theories, toleration comes to the fore as a requirement of justice at both the domestic and international level. That is one of the reasons why I picked on particularly Rawls and Habermas in arguing for the possibility of toleration as an international issue. Rawls and Habermas constitute strong examples as providing a normative moral ground for toleration. Moreover, they also provide relevant reasons for toleration which is in line with the requirements of contemporary global political condition. In their emphasis of ‘respect’ as a reason for toleration, they recognize the significance of reciprocal
and democratic dimension of toleration which is certainly the characteristic of citizen to citizen relations in contemporary democracies.

Chapter 1- Mapping Toleration and Its International Aspect

This dissertation consists of six principal chapters. The first chapter, which lays out the argument of the whole dissertation, is divided into two main parts. The first part of Chapter 1 aims to generate a map that points out the main conceptual features of and various possible reasons for toleration. It is the goal to come up with a general conceptual schema which can constitute a reference ground when constructing the dimensions of international toleration as well as analyzing the theories of Habermas and Rawls. It is commonly accepted that toleration means to put up with an action, belief, habit and so on that one dislikes/disapproves. In this sense, characteristics of toleration were mentioned: agents and objects of toleration, diversity coupled with disapproval, power, demands, scope and limits of toleration. These characteristics were pointed out as conditions of possibility of toleration as a concept. Thus, they are the conceptual components that allow us to talk about toleration.

By agents and objects, I mean the tolerator and tolerated. One might imagine quite a variety of agents such as individuals, groups, political parties and associations as possible agents of toleration. With respect to the objects of toleration, I pointed out various attitudes, actions, values, traditions and beliefs of individuals and different groups. I also mentioned diversity as a condition and characteristic of toleration. Toleration does not come to the fore under any circumstances of diversity but diversity that is the source of disapproval. Hence, sheer diversity is not a condition in itself for toleration to be possible. Furthermore,
condition of power was also noted as a characteristic of toleration. It is commonly accepted in the literature that X needs the power to act otherwise (not to tolerate) to tolerate Y. However, I pointed out that actual power is needed only for a tolerant conduct. For a tolerant disposition, it is enough for X to claim she would still put up with the conduct she disapproves/dislikes even if she had the power to act otherwise. Lastly, I cited the scope, demands and limits of toleration. By scope, I mean if the sources of the disapproval are moral or not. Demands refer if toleration means refraining from persecuting or something more than that such as assisting, aiding and fostering. Limits identify what can be tolerated and what cannot.

Secondly, possible reasons for toleration were laid out: non-moral prudential reasons, moral consequentialist reasons, moral principled reasons and skepticism. These were mentioned as possible answers to the question why we tolerate. Non-moral prudential reasons refer to reasons that are motivated solely by the self-interest of the tolerator. Moral consequentialist reasons identify justifications that are motivated by the goal that is to be archived out of the tolerant conduct. These reasons are other -regarding unlike non-moral prudential reasons. Moral principled reasons were noted as reasons that provide principled justifications in recognizing toleration as a moral value. I specifically noted ‘respect for persons’ as a moral principled reason for toleration.

In the second part of Chapter 1, I applied the conceptual map that was developed to the international dimension of toleration. Each item was pointed out to imagine how toleration as an international issue is possible. Hence, I laid out the possible dimensions of international toleration conceptually and what reasons one might offer for the justification of international toleration.
Chapter 2- Toleration in Rawls’s Political Liberalism

Chapter 2 is devoted to the analysis of toleration as a domestic issue in the theory of John Rawls. Although this research focuses specifically on the international aspect of toleration, a considerable amount of effort is also put to the analysis of toleration as an intra-state matter in the theories of Rawls and Habermas since a proper understanding of their outlook on international toleration requires a firm knowledge of their standpoint on the issue of domestic toleration. First, I start with the examination of Political Liberalism in which we find an elaborated account of Rawls’s theory of toleration. When interpreting Rawls’s view on toleration in Political Liberalism, I make references to the conceptual map that was developed in the first chapter concerning the characteristics of and reasons for toleration. I use this theoretical frame to analyze the dimensions of toleration as an intra-state matter in the theory of Rawls. I also point out the parallels and differences between his domestic account of toleration in Political Liberalism and the Law of Peoples where he developed an international account of toleration.

First, we observed that toleration comes to the fore as a requirement of justice in the theory of Rawls. Toleration is necessary for establishing the fundamental principles of a political conception of justice. By being freestanding and political, justice as fairness refrains from imposing any comprehensive doctrine on others. It does not base its principles on any comprehensive view either.

Then, I continued with the analysis of the conceptual characteristics of toleration in Political Liberalism. It was observed that citizens come to the fore as agents of toleration in the theory of Rawls. In this sense, they, as holders of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, tolerate each other’s conduct. As for the
objects of toleration, it was stated that beliefs, values and conduct of citizens that were inspired by reasonable comprehensive doctrines are the objects of toleration. Secondly, it was mentioned that reasonable pluralism constitutes the condition of diversity as a characteristic of toleration. In line with this, it was mentioned we also find the feature of disapproval along with diversity since Rawls recognizes the conflict (reasonable disagreement) as part of the fact of pluralism. Thirdly, with respect to the condition of power as characteristic of toleration, I envisioned that Rawls’s theory satisfies this condition as well. Both regarding the tolerant disposition and tolerant conduct, Rawlsian citizens might be thought of engaging in relations of toleration. Yet, tolerant disposition is the core value that good Rawlsian citizens should have as far as the condition of power is considered.

I also analyzed the scope, demands and limits of toleration in Political Liberalism. The scope question deals with if the source of disapproval is moral or not. It was contended that one might refer to both moral and non moral sources of disapproval such as aesthetic, cultural etc. concerning domestic toleration in Rawls’s theory. With respect to the question of demands of toleration, I contended that Rawls’s toleration in Political Liberalism demands more than a merely negative attitude of non-interference. Reasonableness, together with the ideal of citizenship requires a more positive disposition and action from citizens of a democratic polity. As a last characteristic of toleration, it was mentioned that reasonableness constitutes the limits of what is tolerable and what is not in Political Liberalism. I noted it seems Rawls implies reasonable comprehensive doctrines fall within the scope of toleration since by being reasonable, they already demonstrate that they abide by the principles of political justice. Citizens tolerate
each other’s action because they know that disagreement does not give them the right to be intolerant given that all other people are reasonable.

I contended that ‘respect for persons’ as a principled moral justification comes onto the fore as a reason for toleration in Political Liberalism. Citizens, by being reasonable, grant respect to the free and equal status of other citizens who are also reasonable like them. They also do not impose their particular comprehensive doctrine on others, either alone or by using political power, due to their acceptance that others are reasonable as well. In this sense, the idea of ‘respect for persons’, tied with the idea of reasonableness provides a justification to citizens concerning the reason of their toleration.

Chapter 3- Toleration in Rawls’s The Law of Peoples

In chapter 3, I concentrated on The Law of Peoples to investigate the dimensions of international toleration. In doing this, I made references to both the conceptual map developed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 regarding the domestic toleration of Rawls. I mentioned that there is a parallel between Political liberalism and The Law of Peoples in considering toleration as a requirement of justice. In The Law of Peoples too, toleration is viewed as part of an argument on justice: Rights and obligations of a just arrangement among peoples makes toleration necessary. Well-ordered peoples (liberal and decent non-liberal) act out of the principles that they agreed on and that gives a reason to tolerate each other’s conduct as members of a reasonable society of peoples.

Secondly, I focused on the dimensions of toleration concerning the characteristics of and reasons for toleration in The Law of Peoples. Agents and objects of toleration were analyzed as the first characteristic as a condition of
possibility of toleration. It was stated that peoples -liberal and decent non-liberal- as corporate entities constitute the principle agents of international toleration in the theory of Rawls. It was also stated that peoples replace persons in the international realm in *The Law of Peoples*. With respect to the objects of toleration, we observed that different traditions, value systems, beliefs and attitudes of liberal and decent non-liberal peoples might be regarded as possible objects of international toleration in the theory of Rawls. I also mentioned that just like his domestic account of toleration, Rawls’s international toleration also satisfies the condition of diversity coupled with disapproval. I contended, we might talk about an international pluralism in the society of reasonable peoples and this can be regarded as the diversity condition of toleration. I also mentioned it might be anticipated that there would be certain disagreement between liberal and decent peoples as well as liberal and decent peoples among themselves which can satisfy the condition of disapproval for toleration. With regard to the condition of power, it was argued that mainly Rawls talks of tolerant disposition as an expected attitude from liberal and decent non-liberal peoples rather than a tolerant action in the international realm. This does not mean Rawls rules out the necessity of tolerant action, yet, he puts much emphasis and significance on attitude. This comes as a difference between his domestic and international accounts of toleration.

I also analyzed the scope, demands and limits of international toleration in *The Law of Peoples*. With respect to the scope, I claimed, like in *Political Liberalism*, we might refer to both moral and non-moral sources of disapproval on the issue of toleration in *The Law of Peoples*. Well-ordered societies - liberal and decent non-liberal - might disapprove of varied sources, both moral and non-moral such as
aesthetic, cultural, traditional, habitual etc. As for the demands of toleration, like in *Political Liberalism*, we observe both negative and positive demands in *The Law of Peoples*. Nevertheless, unlike in *Political Liberalism*, positive demands are mainly positive dispositions rather than positive actions. Last characteristic as a conceptual condition that was analyzed was the limits of toleration in *The Law of Peoples*. I contended that decency and human rights constitute the limits of what is tolerable in the international realm in the theory of Rawls. It was also mentioned that this is a difference between Rawls’s accounts of domestic and international toleration: in *Political Liberalism* reasonableness draw the limits of toleration.

I claimed, in a similar vein with *Political Liberalism*, we observe the idea of ‘respect for persons’ as a reason for toleration in the international realm in the theory of Rawls. Nevertheless, the idea of persons is replaced by peoples. This is important to mention since Rawls does not defend a cosmopolitan position on the issue of international toleration. Liberal and decent non-liberal peoples, as equal members of the society of peoples, grant respect to the equal standing of each other by abiding by the principles of the Law of Peoples.

**Chapter 4- Jurgen Habermas and Toleration as an Intra-state Issue**

After the analysis of the theory of Rawls regarding toleration, I devoted the Chapters 4 and 5 to the examination of the theory of Habermas with the aim to outline the dimensions of toleration in his theory both as an intra-state and inter-state issue. I applied the conceptual map that was developed in Chapter 1 to the theory of Habermas for pointing out the main characteristics and justification of toleration. I also drew attention to the parallels and differences between his and
Rawls’s outlook as well as between his domestic and international accounts of toleration.

First of all, I outlined that toleration is a central theme in the theory of Habermas as a requirement of political justice. In a post-metaphysical age, the principles on which political authority rests do not derive from any metaphysical or religious view. In line with this, principles of justice are autonomously grounded as being independent of any metaphysical doctrine. Thus, toleration comes to the fore as a requirement of justice under the conditions of a post-metaphysical age. It was mentioned that there is a commonality between the outlooks of Habermas and Rawls even though their understandings of political liberalism differs in certain respects.

In a similar vein with Rawls, I stated that citizens, as holders of various worldviews (religious and secular) are the agents of toleration. The attitudes, beliefs and traditions that are informed by various worldviews are the objects of toleration. Moreover, like Rawls, Habermas recognizes pluralism as a fact and this constitutes the diversity condition of toleration in the theory of Habermas too. Post-metaphysical age, which is an age of pluralism, is also not devoid of conflict. Like Rawls, Habermas recognizes that disagreement is inevitable even among fellow citizens who share the same political community. Hence, we observe the condition of diversity coupled with disapproval in the outlook of Habermas too. I also pointed out that what Habermas calls ‘irresolvable disagreement in the long run’ seems to be similar to what Rawls calls ‘burdens of judgment’ as far as disapproval and conflict dimension of toleration is considered.
With respect to the dimension of power, like in Rawls’s theory, in Habermas’s theory too, we might say that citizens can have both tolerant conduct and disposition. Even if they have the power to act on their disapproval, there can be cases that they should refrain to do so for toleration reasons. Furthermore, good Habermasian citizens should have tolerant disposition towards each other as members of the same political community who have equal status. This condition is valid between both secular and religious citizens as well as secular and religious citizens among themselves.

In Chapter 4, lastly, I mentioned scope, demands and limits of toleration as characteristics and conditions of possibility of toleration for analyzing the theory of Jurgen Habermas. As far as the scope is concerned, it is stated, there is a parallel between the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas: for both of them, sources can be both moral and non-moral. For Habermas, as long as a disapproval is not a prejudice and counts as ‘subjectively good, then it can be either moral or non-moral. Nevertheless, the distinction between ethics and morality plays a role in this manner. From a Habermasian view, disapproval can stem from our ethical judgments which do not have to relate to morality. In this case, for Habermas, a disapproval or dislike is either ethical or moral regardless of its specific nature. In other words, non-moral disapproval stands for ethical disapproval in the theory of Habermas. In this way, what Habermas calls ‘ethical’ would fall in the realm of ‘moral’ in the theory of Rawls.

As for the demands of toleration, I also pointed out a parallel between the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas. In both the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas, toleration comes onto the scene with positive demands in the sense of both actions
and dispositions. In Habermas’s theory, a hermeneutical self-reflection, openness to understand the other and openness to dialogue can be pointed out as positive demands from citizens of the same political community having different worldviews. I also mentioned ‘translation requirement’ and ‘complementary learning process’ as two highly demanding requirements of toleration from citizens of both religious and secular worldviews. In this sense, it was stated that Rawls’s toleration in *Political Liberalism* does not necessarily exclude such a hermeneutical self-reflexivity, yet it is not explicitly stated as in the case of Habermas.

With respect to the limits of domestic toleration, I pointed out that Habermas does not refer to any limits in the substantive sense (what should be tolerated and what should not). For him, the important thing is that the limits to toleration should be justifiable to all in a democratic constitutional regime. Citizens, as free and equal participants of an open and non-coercive discourse should decide on what is tolerable and what is not. In this sense, their open and non-coercive discourse defines justifiable limits to toleration. In this manner, I touched upon a parallel between Rawls and Habermas: in both of the theories, the question of limits comes onto the fore in terms of formal criterion; reasonableness in Rawls’s theory and deliberative will formation of citizens in Habermas. It was stated that these criteria, in being formal, guarantee that citizens view each other free and equal as members of the same political community. They do not provide any substantive answer to the question of limits. Nevertheless, Habermas’s discourse ethics appeals to a universal practical reason whereas Rawls’s reasonableness does not rely on such a moral core in the Habermasian sense of the term.
Lastly, I focused on reasons for toleration in Habermas’s outlook on toleration as an intra-state matter. It was stated, like Rawls, Habermas also subscribes to the idea of ‘respect for persons’ as a justification for toleration. Civic solidarity as part of the ethics of citizenship supports ‘respect for persons’ as a reason for toleration. By being fellow members of the same political community, we grant respect to the status of each other as free and equal.

Chapter 5- Jurgen Habermas and Toleration as an International Issue

Chapter 5 is devoted to the analysis of the dimensions of international toleration in the theory of Habermas. Habermas does not refer to toleration as an international matter as explicit as in the case of domestic toleration. Yet, it is one of the goals of this dissertation to demonstrate that one might account for a theory of international toleration by way of interpreting his outlook on toleration as a domestic issue and international political theory. Furthermore, his latest writings on religion and politics in global realm provide much evidence for an international account of toleration in his theory. In analyzing the dimensions of international toleration, I referred both to the conceptual map that outlines the characteristics of toleration and reasons for toleration, and also the theory of Rawls for comparing the two standpoints on the issue.

First observation concerning toleration as an international issue in the theory of Habermas is that toleration comes onto the fore as a requirement of justice in the international realm. There is a parallel between Rawls and Habermas on that matter. It was mentioned that for Habermas, a world society which is peaceful and just can be possible with the endorsement of the principle of toleration. In other words, the principle of toleration should be endorsed by the participants of an
intercultural discourse on the principles of a political justice for a multicultural world society.

Habermas’s account of international toleration is analyzed on the basis of the characteristics of and reasons for toleration that were developed in Chapter 1. As a first characteristic, it was pointed out that, although there seems to be an ambiguity on which of the international agents count as the agents of toleration in the theory of Habermas, it seems states, NGOs, international organizations, cultural groups, communities of faith figure as potential tolerators in the international realm. I also noted that individuals might be considered as agents of toleration as members of various cultural groups and communities of faith in Habermas’s theory of international toleration. In line with this, it was emphasized, the mention of states only refer to an actual possibility rather than an ideal possibility since for Habermas, individuals count as ultimate moral units. It was also emphasized that there is a difference between Habermas and Rawls on this point because for Rawls peoples come to the fore as agents of toleration. It was contended that Habermas recognizes a variety of possible agents as compared to Rawls’s insistence on peoples as mere agents of toleration. I claimed that Habermas’s view seems to be more compatible with the pluralistic and diverse nature of contemporary global realm. Nevertheless, having said this, I also pointed out that one might interpret the category of peoples in the theory of Rawls in a broader way to include civilizations as well. This is not to say that each people count as one civilization, but to argue that peoples can be members of different communities of civilizations.

As for the objects of international toleration, I mentioned that various beliefs, traditions, attitudes and action which are shaped through the world-view of
different civilizations can be regarded as objects of international toleration in the theory of Habermas. I also said that there seems to be a risk in falling into cultural essentialism when referring to civilizations in the international realm with respect to toleration and that risk has to be taken by Habermas too. It is to say that civilization seems to be a very broad and general category that it may not leave enough room for the diversity and pluralism inherent within each culture in the international realm.

With respect to the condition of diversity concerning the characteristics of toleration as an international issue, I said that, like Rawls, Habermas also recognizes pluralism together with conflict at the global level. Post-secular age as a global condition marks an intense diversity at the international level. World society, in its tendency to become a post-secular society, constitutes the condition of diversity as far as international toleration is concerned.

Like Rawls’s theory, Habermas’s theory also satisfies the condition of power in terms of characteristics of international toleration. I contended that states, NGOs, international organizations, religious communities and individuals might be exhibitors of both tolerant conduct and dispositions in the theory of Habermas.

It was pointed out that, regarding the scope question; there is a parallel between Habermas’s domestic and international tolerations. There is also a similarity between his and Rawls’s accounts of domestic and international toleration. I said, in a Habermasian account of toleration, one might refer to both moral and non-moral sources of disapproval; disapproval can be either ethical (non-moral) such as aesthetic, cultural, habitual etc. or moral.
In terms of the demands of international toleration, I noted that one might refer to not only positive dispositions of the agents but also positive actions such as ‘translation requirement’ and ‘complementary learning’. I also mentioned that this constitutes a difference between the perspectives of Habermas and Rawls on the issue of demands since for Rawls, toleration requires positive disposition rather than action in the international realm. I added that, in the theory of Habermas, we might appeal to an idea of hermeneutical reflection together with cosmopolitan solidarity as the source of positive demands of international toleration.

It was stated that human rights are significant reference points concerning the limits of toleration in the international theory of Habermas. I contended that for Habermas, human rights are viewed as legitimate rules that can potentially guide international politics in terms of defining what is tolerable and what is not. Having said that, it was also stated that Habermas thinks full legitimacy of human rights could only be possible in a democratic cosmopolitan world order. I also addressed the differences between Rawls and Habermas regarding the content and role of human rights. First of all, we observed that, unlike Rawls, Habermas does not go for minimalism by limiting the content of human rights at the international level. He considers a full set of basic rights as rights that should be appealed in the international realm. Secondly, for Habermas, rights require a democratic liberal institutional and legal framework to have full legitimacy both at the domestic and international level. For Rawls, there is no such requirement. Beside these differences, as a commonality, both for Habermas and Rawls, human rights have practical role in justifying intervention in the international realm within limits.
It was stated that idea of respect comes to the fore as a reason for international toleration in the theory of Habermas. In this manner, I claimed, different cultures, communities of faith, civilizations and individuals as members of these groups, in viewing each other as equal members of a reflective dialogue/discourse, grant respect to each other. I also said respect as a reason for international toleration does not base itself on a thick idea of citizenship like in the case of Habermas’s domestic toleration. Rather, respect is granted to the equal status of each other as communities sharing the same multicultural world society. This is a parallel between Rawls and Habermas: For Rawls, well-ordered societies grant respect to the equal status of each other as members of a Society of peoples subscribing the law of Peoples.

As a difference between Rawls and Habermas with regard to the idea of respect as a reason for international toleration, I pointed out that, unlike Rawls, Habermas would not see offering incentives to non-liberal societies for the purpose of helping them change towards a liberal democratic direction as an action against respect. It was claimed, this might be due to the difference between how political power is viewed by Habermas and Rawls. I contended that Habermas does not see power in inclusive terms as any kind of interference and influence would mean exercising power on the other.

Chapter 6- Further Reflections on the Possible Dimensions of a Theory of International Toleration for the 21st Century

Chapter 6, the last chapter, was devoted to further reflections on the comparison between the theories of Rawls and Habermas with the aim to address their weak and strong points as theories of international toleration. I contended that
both of the theories demonstrated the possibility of international toleration by outlining different dimensions of toleration as an international issue. They both provided strong cases for international toleration by offering principled moral reasons and recognizing global pluralism as a fact which gives rise to the question of toleration.

I also said that, the differences between the two theories are of principle: Habermas subscribes to cosmopolitanism whereas Rawls favors internationalism. In this respect, we identified differences concerning the possible agents and demands of international toleration as well as differences on the content and role of human rights. I contended, regardless of its ambiguity on the possible agents of international toleration, Habermas’s theory seems to offer room for a variety of agents which makes his outlook more compatible with the highly pluralistic nature of our multicultural world in comparison to Rawls’s outlook on agents of international toleration. In addition, I said, the requirements of international toleration that Habermas lays out are far from being unrealistic even though they bring a demanding notion of international toleration. On the issue of human rights, we gave credit to both theories in recognizing human rights as candidates for drawing the limits of tolerable conduct in the international realm. Nevertheless, it was mentioned, both theories suffer from certain ambiguities on the issues of content and legitimacy: Habermas does not specify clearly which rights are prior as far as international toleration is concerned and Rawls does not justify his minimalist set of human rights.

Lastly, in Chapter 6, I tried to give an account of what features a theory of international toleration should exhibit. I argued that first of all, a theory of
international toleration must be able to give room to all possible diverse agents in the international realm such as different international organizations, NGOs, states, communities of faith, cultural groups, various associations of different sort, individuals, organizations of social movements etc. Secondly, a theory of international toleration should recognize the highly pluralistic condition of the world and start from this fact in its conceptualization of conflict in the international realm. Thirdly, it must also consider the role of power in the sense that no actor is wholly immune from the power of the others and no actor is wholly incapable of exerting power on others.

Then, I claimed, as far as demands of international toleration are concerned, we can appeal to both positive dispositions and actions. I contended, we can see Habermas’s proposals such as hermeneutical self-reflectivity, openness to dialogue and understanding the other as necessary positive dispositions as well as ‘translation requirement’ and ‘complementary learning’ as necessary positive actions. Regarding the limits of international toleration, I stated that a theory of international toleration must recognize that human rights play a significant role as limits to tolerable action in the international realm. Nevertheless, minimalism in terms of content seems to be necessary if intervention in the name of human rights should be justifiable morally to others. In addition, it was concluded that seeing human rights as the outcome of an overlapping consensus in the international realm might be helpful in both justifying intervention and developing a tolerant account of human rights which does not impose any particular comprehensive doctrine on the others.
In line with the considerations on the limits of international toleration, it was stated that a theory of international toleration must also be able to distinguish between various possible types of justifiable intolerance. One can think of various types of influence and affect on an intolerable conduct of a state such as economic sanctions, public criticism, initiating a campaign against the conduct that is disapproved etc. depending on the character of the intolerable conduct.

As a last consideration, it was mentioned that a theory of international toleration must be able to provide principled moral reasons for international toleration. In this vein, I contended, the idea of ‘respect’ seems to be the best candidate in providing reasons on why we should tolerate each other’s differences in a multicultural world-society. Nevertheless, it was also stated that recognizing the relevant role of moral consequentialist reasons and skepticism is also significant for a theory of international toleration in its consideration for peace and stability.