Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

Renault, Jérôme and Scarlatti, Sergio and Scarsini, Marco (2007) Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals. [Working Paper]. p. 36. Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole (No. 2371).

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We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. (2005), who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a nitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payos Hausdor-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to innity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.

Item Type: Report / Paper (Working Paper)
Research documents and activity classification: Working Papers > Refereed Working Papers / of international relevance
Divisions: Department of Business and Management
Additional Information: The definitive version of the paper has been published in "Mathematical Social Sciences", Vol. 56(1), Pages 44-74, July 2008.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Repeated games. Imperfect monitoring. Public equilibria. Private equilibria. Pareto-efficiency. Discount factor.
MIUR Scientific Area: Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-S/01 Statistics
Deposited by: Maria Teresa Nisticò
Date Deposited: 21 Dec 2010 09:59
Last Modified: 22 Apr 2015 00:13

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