GLOBAL JUSTICE
BETWEEN
JUSTIFICATION AND FEASIBILITY

Ph.D Thesis
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ABSTRACT

The aim of this dissertation is to address the problem of global poverty and inequality through a philosophical defense of what I take to be the most appealing normative view with respect to these problems, namely global egalitarianism. As a first task, I outline the theoretical essentials of a theory of distributive justice and defend an institutional or practice dependent approach to global egalitarianism.

Global egalitarianism has been subject to various philosophical challenges. I address the challenge from the domestic scope thesis, according to which duties of egalitarian distributive justice are confined to members of a nation-state due to the normative features underlying the scheme of domestic social and political institutions, the so called, basic structure. I address three different variants of this critique: 1.) the bounded contribution view, 2.) the bounded constituency view and 3.) the bounded cooperation view. I argue that none of these critiques warrant restricting the scope of justice to the domestic context.

As a third contribution, I make an inquiry into the appropriate form of justification a global egalitarian conception requires. Global egalitarianism has been most notably justified through an extension of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, by grounding global principles of justice in comprehensive liberal commitments. I challenge this view, by demonstrating that global egalitarianism, so construed, would fail to appeal to a global justificatory public, characterized by doctrinal and religious disagreements. I argue that a global egalitarian conception of justice must rest on global public grounds.

Finally, I address the feasibility challenge to global egalitarianism, according to which the normative ideal it promotes or the institutional scheme it envisions is infeasible. Feasibility critics challenge global egalitarianism at the level of application and institutional design. Conceptualizing the fact pluralism as a feasibility constraint on a theory of justice, I aim to show that part of the feasibility challenges can already be accounted for at the level of justification. I argue that public justification is able to account for pluralism as a feasibility constraint, and brings a normative political ideal closer to a feasible ideal.