Strategies of Disarmament: Civil Society and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

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Declaration

I confirm that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

Parts of this thesis have been published by the author:

Abstract

This thesis explores the ideological bases of the global governance of nuclear weapons by analysing the role of civil society, an actor generally left aside by nuclear scholarship. Here the question of nuclear order is tackled with an unconventional approach that combines critical works in nuclear studies, critical constructivist works on security, and Antonio Gramsci’s theory of civil society. Such approach brings civil society to the forefront of analytical attention in order to show the cultural domination exercised by the bomb by inquiring into the common sense nature of nuclear discourse. This rests on the assumption that uncritically accepted ideas about what nuclear weapons do have been instrumental in generating the current nuclear order that, although under mounting challenges, remains based on a hierarchy between states protected by the bomb and all the rest.

To understand how civil society challenges and reproduces that order, this thesis analyses the calls for nuclear disarmament advanced by organised collective actors and inquires, in a Gramscian way, into the common sense ingrained in those calls as well as their ability to constitute a united front. As a result, the thesis problematises the notion of disarmament, marking the importance of a struggle on its very concept between reductionist and abolitionist frames. It indicates that while the latter are involved in a radical opposition, the former are culturally dominated by the system of deterrence, thus coming to represent two distinct historic blocs: a counter-hegemonic opposition, on one hand, and an unwitting part of the hegemonic apparatus, on the other. This thesis concludes that 1) civil society is far from having created a unity of intent; and 2) the bases for the reliance on nuclear weapons are deeply entrenched, because of the pervasiveness, even inside civil society, of a common sense view of the nuclear threat.
List of Abbreviations

ABACC – Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence
AFCONE – African Commission on Nuclear Energy
ANZUS Treaty – Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
ASEAN – Association of South-East Asian Nations
CD – Conference on Disarmament
CND – Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CNS – Center of Nonproliferation Studies
CTBT – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ELN – European Leadership Network
END – European Nuclear Disarmament
EURATOM – European Atomic Energy Community
FAS – Federation of American Scientists
FRS – Fondation pour le recherche stratégique
HINW – Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
IALANA – International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
ICAN – International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICJ – International Court of Justice
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
IKV – Interchurch Peace Council
INF – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INGO – International non-Governmental Organisation
IPPNW – International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
IR – International Relations
LTBT – Limited Test Ban Treaty
MAD – Mutual Assured Destruction
MERCOSUR – Mercado Común del Sur
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAC – New Agenda Coalition
NAM – Non-Aligned Movement
NAPF – Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
NNWS – Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NPDI – Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPT PrepCom - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee
NPT RevCon – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
NSG – Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS – Nuclear Security Summit
NTI – Nuclear Threat Initiative
NWFZ – Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWS – Nuclear Weapon State
ODA – Office for Disarmament Affairs, see UNODA
OEWG – Open-ended working group
OPANAL – Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PGA – Parliamentarians for Global Action
PRIF – Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
PSI – Proliferation Security Initiative
PSR – Physicians for Social Responsibility
RCW – Reaching Critical Will
SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SANE – Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SWP – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
TAN – Transnational Advocacy Network
UNDC – United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR – United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODA – United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
WILPF – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO – World Trade Organisation
Chapter 1

Introduction: Global Civil Society and the Nuclear Order

Since the end of the Cold War nuclear weapons’ relevance in international security has dwindled, yet they are still in the arsenals and postures of a few nuclear-armed states continuing to threaten the destruction of the whole world. The most powerful weapon ever invented, the atomic bomb – or for short ‘the bomb’ – is a remit of a very small fraction of world states, and even for them it often does not (or no longer) constitute the centre of national security. The bomb is indeed suffering a legitimacy crisis, illustrated by the fact that defending it and its role in protecting national security is slowly eroding, while calls for eliminating them are on the rise. It was April 2009 when the President of the United States pronounced his vision of nuclear disarmament. ‘So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,’¹ a freshly elected President Barack Obama announced to a cheering crowd in Prague; just a few months later he would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, largely on the basis of these words.

The anti-nuclear advocates appear to have been increasingly successful at convincing world leaders of the importance of disarmament. Ten years before Prague an influential critical scholar of nuclear politics, Ken Booth, had argued that the anti-nuclear proponents were winning the debate.²

During the Cold War, when nuclear deterrence was the ‘common-sense’ strategy of the day (in the Gramscian sense of being hegemonical and the only option for a reasonable person), the onus of proof in terms of moving from the allegedly tried and tested strategy of nuclear deterrence was firmly seen to be on the side of the anti-nuclear critics - those wanting change. The latter’s task was to try and persuade those in power in the West of the rationality of moving away from a nuclear policy which they (those in power) believed virtually guaranteed peace as long as a robust MAD posture was maintained in the face of Soviet ambitions and military power. Today, this common-sense is facing unparalleled challenge, in that a significant body of its hitherto predictable expert constituency has now broken ranks. So although pro-nuclear governments on the whole can rely on public nuclear amnesia to continue to allow them to pursue business-as-usual for the time being, it is now the anti-nuclear advocates who are at the cutting edge of the debate for the first time, and the pro-nuclear advocates who are the ones pushed into the corner.³

If the anti-nuclear advocates are really winning why is it that we have not witnessed a change towards disarmament? From this puzzle the project takes off in an exploration of the crucial juncture identified in Booth’s excerpt: expert communities’ role in the cultural domination of nuclear weapons. However, this should be broken up in two distinct questions: 1. Is the common sense of nuclear weapons actually shifting? 2. Are the anti-nuclear advocates truly attempting to transform this common sense? Let us assess them in turn.

This thesis sides with Booth, among others, in conceiving of the nuclear condition as first and foremost a cultural issue.⁴ The social order in which

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nuclear weapons are rooted does not simply depend on technological developments; instead, ideational factors are the underlying drivers of the evolution of global nuclear weapons rule. ‘Well before any physical bomb had been built, science had created the bomb in the mind, an intangible thing. Thereafter, the bomb would be as much a mental as a physical object.’ In the same way as *laissez-faire* is not an automatic expression of economic facts, deterrence is not a predetermined consequence of security realities.

A culture of nuclearism, however, has made sure that nuclear deterrence remained the prevalent way to conceive of the nuclear weapons technology. It has been an inability to think of radically alternative strategies that led to the continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence by the nuclear-armed. The nuclear culture had indeed rendered the tenets of nuclearism incontestable, relegating civil society to a subordinate position of radical critique. Booth established that a transition from a system of deterrence to one of disarmament can happen through a transformation of the common sense, or the taken for granted nature of a system of meaning. This concept, taken from Antonio Gramsci, will be crucial in this work, which at heart wants to offer insights on whether nuclear common sense is changing, and with that the cultural basis for the reliance on the bomb.

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6 The idea that deterrence works is examined here as a social construction that became taken for granted because the conviction in its effectiveness was so widespread. This is not to say that deterrence is not real, but that there are issues for which it does not work, which tend to be forgotten or dismissed. Similar arguments have been made by many. For one of the most convincing cases, refer to Tannenwald’s work as Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

This project is not devoted to a systematic recollection of nuclear common sense in its various aspects, but rather to illuminate how that is expressed and employed by a particular actor. Following Booth, and Gramsci, we should expect the intellectual community of nuclear civil society to have a role in the perpetuation and change of a certain system. Indeed, Booth had argued that the pro-nuclear experts turning into anti-nuclear advocates were testament of a shift away from a culture of deterrence. Only two years before Obama announced his disarmament commitment, four former senior US officials had famously published an op-ed titled ‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,’ which is often credited for changing the debate. The so-called four horsemen, after all, had undergone a significant change of heart given that these novel anti-nuclear advocates were former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, one-time Defence Secretary William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn. For Booth that would be a tremendous demonstration that nuclearism is getting increasingly contested, but here we want to critically question that notion. Therefore, this thesis’ underlying question: is anti-nuclear activism expressing a revolutionary project or is it contributing to the permanence of the current system?

This thesis is interested in the connection between anti-nuclear thinking and the expert constituency of global civil society, which will be better defined later in this chapter. These actors are indeed key in the maintenance or change of common sense and analysing the ideological character of their anti-nuclear advocacy a promising perspective on nuclear studies. Following

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Gusterson’s work on the pervasiveness of a nuclearist ideology in the US laboratories (the conviction that producing nuclear weapons is positive and that there is no risk of failure in nuclear deterrence)\(^\text{10}\) we should inquire into the pervasiveness and variety of ideologies in the nuclear civil society sector. While the great majority is in favour of disarmament, there appears to be a degree of internal variation. Nuclear-free world, global zero, nuclear weapons abolition, the model convention – all of these have become general terms to refer to the prospect of eliminating the bomb. But what is actually meant by these terms and do they all represent the same idea?

Asking such questions can enlarge our understanding of nuclear governance because deconstructing the ideologies of civil society gives us a handle in understanding the most stable bases of nuclear thinking. *Strategies of Disarmament* examines the ideological apparatus of civil society involved in nuclear policy at the global level and the varieties of disarmament calls, in order to demonstrate how they contribute to constitute the thinking behind the value of nuclear weapons. Here we will historicise their struggle to change the terms of the debate while also subject them to critique as a way to understand their relation to the culture of nuclearism. Reading the current situation through Gramsci one is taken to conclude that the old is dying but the new is failing to be born: nuclearism is declining and a disarmed world cannot start yet. To better understand this nuclear interregnum it is crucial to assess the forces behind each camp.

This introductory chapter will outline the conceptualisation of the thesis highlighting the motivations for the theoretical and empirical choices, in two

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\(^{10}\) Hugh Gusterson, *Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War.*
steps. Firstly it is necessary to clarify the foundational question of the research by engaging with existing accounts of the reality studied here: civil society in the nuclear order. The research will thus be placed in relation to previous works on civil society in nuclear politics, providing the motivation for the prioritisation of the global level and for the theoretical reliance on Antonio Gramsci and related critical constructivist works. Secondly, this chapter will give a brief overview of the research design employed. To that end it will firstly contextualise the argument and contribution. It will also discuss the empirical object of attention by briefly defending the selection of the case study. Thirdly, a summary of the methodological approach will explain how the research was conducted. Finally, the last section will draw a summary of each chapter of the thesis.

1.1 Civil society and nuclear struggles

In the field of nuclear politics studying civil society is always subject to raise some eyebrows, given the state-centrism of this literature. This is not surprising as, for most of its life, nuclear scholarship has been the domain of rational choice theorists for whom states are the sole authority and whose interests are exogenously given. Precisely when dealing with the bomb, they argue, states need to be the unit of analysis. While long underestimated by a nuclear literature that has paid overwhelming attention to material factors and disregarded the role of actors that were not generally considered powerful, civil society has been one of the players in the nuclear policy game.
Researches on social movements, civil society, epistemic communities and the like have shown that agency also resides in other actors. A broader engagement with the nuclear literature will be carried out in Chapter Two to contrast this thesis approach to the mainstream. If that typically entails rationalist accounts, skewed towards the US context, and engaged in problem-solving theorising, this work is interpretivist, global in outlook, and critical.\footnote{This argument will be deepened in greater detail in Chapter Two. The problem-solving vs. critical theory divide comes from Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,’ \textit{Millennium - Journal of International Studies} 10 n° 2 (1981): 134.}

This thesis wants to investigate what the role of civil society is in the governance of nuclear weapons by making the case for paying attention to its discursive contribution to transnational policy debates. This approach builds upon studies of nuclear weapons politics that depart from the conventional, positivist, strategic studies that so much have pervaded the literature on the topic. Some scholars have highlighted the efforts of civil society in pursuing policy changes. This literature, however, is still quite sparse and theoretical works have not been many. In this section some of the most important contributions will be reviewed highlighting the lack of a truly global outlook as well as the need to further their theoretical depth. Secondly, the critical research project will be examined as a way to show the contribution of a Gramscian-inspired approach. Thirdly, it will clarify the activities and inclinations of global nuclear civil society, which are the object of this study.
1.1.1 Methodological nationalism in nuclear civil society research

A first division can be established between researchers who have looked at the domestic level and those who focused on the international one. The former, however, is much more developed than the latter, in a reflection of the methodological nationalism of nuclear scholarship in general, where attention to single countries has overshadowed the study of transnational dynamics. Anti-nuclear activism in the US context is an interdisciplinary subject of inquiry, which has been tackled by perspectives ranging from history to communication studies as well as anthropology. It is relatively well studied and various locations have been brought into the framework, from the localised movements around the nuclear weapons complex to the political circles of Washington’s decision making.12

The most encompassing work is Lawrence Wittner’s monumental oeuvre published in three volumes under the title of The Struggle Against the Bomb.13 His writings trace the origins and various developments in the community of activists against nuclear weapons, from the origins with the calls by prominent scientists, to the emergence of an organised movement in

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12 An example of the former is the already cited Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War. An example of the latter is David S. Meyer, ‘Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement,’ Sociological Forum 8 n°2 (1993).

the 1950s, its decline and rebirth during the 1980s at the peak of the arms race. The importance of Wittner’s historical recollection is complemented with a powerful argument for the agency of these non-governmental actors, for instance showing the impact of figures such as Linus Pauling. The Nobel Prize winner had gathered about 10,000 signatures of scientists concerned about atmospheric testing in a petition submitted to the United Nations in 1958. The initiative is credited for the pressure it put especially on President Kennedy, leading the way to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

The world movement against nuclear weapons, according to Wittner, is to be credited for the fact that arms control and disarmament measures were agreed upon. This claim is extremely powerful and, reading his extensive material, often convincing. However, in his analysis the US movement remains the main focus and what happens elsewhere seems to be confined in a ‘rest of the world’ category. Even beyond him, almost no work has been conducted on activism in states other than the US or European countries while democratic societies have been prioritised.¹⁴

Which mechanisms make one movement more successful than another is also matter of debate among scholars of nuclear civil society: the political opportunity structure is the prevailing explanation, but other ideas have been put forward. Matthew Evangelista in his *Unarmed Forces* focused on Cold War-era exchanges between individuals and groups from the US and the Soviet Union by relating their political structures to the opportunities and

constraints presented to civil society initiatives.\textsuperscript{15} His work certainly demonstrates an attention to the international dimension of nuclear civil society; however, he concentrated on the conditions of domestic political systems that impinge on the movements’ effectiveness globally. In most cases of transnational activism, though, drawing a line between the two levels can be hard, as they actively influence each other.

Important sociological work has been conducted, especially in the US, to demonstrate the importance of representation practices in the success of a certain campaign. Benford applied logics of framing to the nuclear disarmament movement, inquiring into what makes actors join movements.\textsuperscript{16} He identified the vocabularies of motive, or discourses which provide movement actors with compelling rationales to take action on behalf of the movement and/or its organizations. The internal divisions within the movement were also object of his attention, with a review of inter-organisational frame disputes.\textsuperscript{17} Though focusing on organisations opposed to nuclear energy rather than weapons, Gamson and Modigliani made a significant contribution to this literature.\textsuperscript{18} They have studied media representations of nuclear power since its invention, historicising the interpretive packages that contribute to constructing the meaning of that technology. The crucial importance of the media in framing a certain issue was demonstrated both in the case of the UK’s Campaign for Nuclear

\textsuperscript{16} Robert D. Benford, “‘You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey’: Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive Within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement,” \textit{The Sociological Quarterly} 34 n° 2 (1993).
\textsuperscript{17} Robert D. Benford, ‘Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement,’ \textit{Social Forces} 71 n° 3 (1993).
Disarmament (CND)\textsuperscript{19} as well as in Germany for a series of security issues.\textsuperscript{20} As Chapter Three will clarify in more detail, a discursive approach similar to the one proposed by these constructionist sociologists will guide this analysis. These contributions are all highly valuable, but they fail to consider the issue of nuclear weapons technology in their global character. Certainly the same level of detail could not have been achieved in other cases, and this thesis does not aim to chronicle the various national civil society movements in non-Western contexts. Instead, it wants to pinpoint the commonality in the transnational reactions to nuclear weapons. The study of transnational nuclear activism, in fact, remains sparse. This is problematic because, although domestic decision-making is crucial in understanding nuclear politics, these are never just national.\textsuperscript{21} It was argued in fact that, even with its limits, ‘an international society is in the process of being created with its own transnational culture – a shared set of norms and meanings that facilitate and constrain interactions across national boundaries’.\textsuperscript{22} The international institutions that have produced and sustained multilateral agreements and practices are, as for others,\textsuperscript{23} a central focus for this thesis. It is indeed important to purposefully engage with the global level to have an exhaustive outlook on nuclear order and the different types of actors it involves. To be

\textsuperscript{20}Alice Holmes Cooper, ‘Media Framing and Social Movement Mobilization: German Peace Protest against INF Missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO Peace Enforcement in Bosnia,’ European Journal of Political Research 41 n°1 (2002).
\textsuperscript{22}Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War, 6.
sure civil society is not the only transnational non-governmental actor that deserves attention; however, for the purpose of this thesis, multinational corporations and the like will be excluded from the analysis.

1.1.2 A transnational phenomenon: global nuclear civil society

The transnational per se has not received much exploration with regard to civil society despite being a central point of reference for most analyses of the nuclear order. Jackie Smith and her colleagues, however, did devote some attention to the topic. Transnational mobilisation and networking of nuclear-concerned civil society were catalysed by the First UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. Since then, transnational civil society has increased tremendously, especially during the 1990s when, following a broader trend, the number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) skyrocketed, but it also deepened its involvement in formal institutions of nuclear politics with the review and extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While participation in global fora has continued and often strengthened since the 1980s, not all nuclear campaigns have acquired a transnational dimension: the Nuclear Freeze movement, for instance, remained a parallel but distinct struggle on the two

24 Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
sides of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{26} Yet, periodic reunions of the NPT have been key in bringing together the various national movements and allowing for common campaigns.

As it has been argued, ‘certain institutional settings allow for the participation of non-state actors, reflecting an organised part of civil society and establishing a transnational public.’\textsuperscript{27} From the NPT to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), from the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)\textsuperscript{28} to the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS),\textsuperscript{29} most fora of nuclear diplomacy include civil society. This is usually done either through the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consultative status\textsuperscript{30} or on an ad hoc basis. Global conferences see the participation of NGOs and social movements, but also of think tanks and research centres, all of whom absolve some information and advocacy functions, conjugated in varying degrees, as will be seen later. In their effort to influence the negotiation process at these global events, civil society broadly defined engages diplomats from the various national delegations to convince them to take on board their views, which generally translates in a specific wording in some official text. The linguistic

\textsuperscript{26} David Cortright and Ron Pagnucco, ‘Limits to Transnationalism: The 1980s Freeze Campaign,’ in \textit{Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State}, eds. Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco.
\textsuperscript{29} This was preceded in 2016 by an NGO Side Summit. For details see \textit{Solutions for a Secure Nuclear Future}, http://ssnf2016.org/ (last accessed 1 October 2016).
element of this specific type of activism should be kept in mind in this study, as it is one of the drivers behind its attention to discourse.

Beyond being involved as independent entities, civil society has a particularly interesting relation with the state. Indeed, on the one hand, transnational activists have often partnered up with like-minded states producing positive results for both: ‘while NGOs gained access to negotiations, states could point to the legitimacy of their efforts by relying on the support of civil society.’

Civil society sometimes acquires even greater access to multilateral negotiations by participating in national delegations. These experts are generally researchers working in academia or think tanks who serve as consultants, in cases for several review cycles, gaining higher levels of expertise than their colleagues in the delegation. Such a practice not only allows big states to have an extra set of hands and an external opinion, but also feeds the thin ranks of delegations that do not have national experts in the field.

The literature has been rather concerned with the effectiveness of transnational civil society. According to Atwood, anti-nuclear activism success depends not only upon its ability to provide an innovative contribution, but also on its professionalism, credibility, and basic understanding of the system. This project is not interested in assessing the effectiveness of civil society, firstly because it believes it cannot be inferred from a set of variables and secondly for it simply wants to raise different

31 Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 308.
33 David C. Atwood, ‘Mobilizing around the United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament.’
issues. A campaign, group, or call should be placed within its historical context in order to assess the conditions of possibility to which they are subject. Instead of focusing on their activities or constituencies, an avenue that promises to shed more light on the politics of civil society is analysing their ideological orientations if we are to assess the construction of a movement that could help transform the meaning of nuclear weapons.

In the nuclear civil society research programme much more should be done in terms of empirical investigation at the transnational level. The methodological nationalism of nuclear studies has long been recognised as a problem, which will be addressed here. While there has been work on transnational movements – both at the sub- and supra-state level – as well as on discursive practices, the two approaches have thus far not been adequately integrated. The present project aims to rectify this through a dialogue between the literature on nuclear weapons and transnational civil society that finds its theoretical scaffolding in the thought of Antonio Gramsci\textsuperscript{34} and the critical constructivist approach. Though the specifics of the analysis of discourse, frames, and ideological representations will be further detailed in Chapter Three, the next section starts diving into the relevance of Gramsci to this theoretical approach by contrasting it with competing accounts of a rather similar reality.

\textsuperscript{34} The most widely cited Italian political scholar outside of the country, Antonio Gramsci’s thinking holds an important place for this project, as will be further expressed in Chapters Four and Five.
1.1.3 **Locating a critical approach to global nuclear civil society**

A vision of the discursive dimension of civil society working on nuclear politics at the global level is far from being well explored. However, this has been done to a certain extent in a few works that draw upon different critical theorists raising a number of valid points but also, each in their own way, lacking in some respect. By examining them in turn, it will be argued that the insights of another philosopher, Antonio Gramsci, hold the potential for a reappraisal of some of their arguments.

Among global nuclear civil society, this thesis is concerned with the groups involved in the NPT, an approach taken by only one book so far. In *Civil Society and Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, Claudia Kissling assesses the 2005 NPT Review Conference based upon the potential for these groups to contribute to deliberative democracy by applying concepts drawn from Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Kissling tested the prospects for regime building and democratization of civil society participation in multilateral decision-making by looking at collaboration mechanisms involving international organizations and civil society groups. She expected to find that, by being part of the process and having a say, civil society could potentially succeed in advancing its agenda if it made sure that its priorities get included in the policy process.

Following Habermasian social theory, the ability to produce an acceptable frame becomes front and centre of the analysis. More theoretically rich work on this was conducted by other German constructivists, including prominent

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nuclear scholar Harald Müller, arguing that rationalist analyses of bargaining had to be complemented with a focus on the process of arguing.\textsuperscript{36} Surely rationalists’ avoidance of communication did leave a logical gap that had to be filled, given that not all situations could be ascribed to a rational bargain among actors. However, the discourse ethics approach based on Habermas does not represent the best option because it misleadingly leads to look for an ‘ideal speech situation’ that constitutes precisely an ideal, rather than a reality. It is indeed important, like these scholars recommend, to inquire into the content of the discourse, but much more should be done to understand the context in which it is produced.

To go back to Kissling’s argument, of her four criteria – access, transparency, responsiveness, and inclusion – she found that none was truly in place, thus hampering civil society’s ability to affect the 2005 NPT Review Conferences (NPT RevCon) negotiation. ‘There is no guarantee that an equal exchange of arguments took place by which at the end the best argument carries the day,’\textsuperscript{37} she argues, demonstrating something that hardly needed any empirical proof: the NPT (among other diplomatic fora) is not an equal playing field and the best argument often fails. On the one hand, access is not always granted because of the mainly intergovernmental nature of the NPT and because of the secrecy surrounding nuclear and security decision-making. On the other hand, Kissling’s assumption that deliberation could prevail over bargaining, and thus actors would attempt to seek the truth instead of advantages, demonstrates all its problems. Establishing such a


\textsuperscript{37} Claudia Kissling, Civil Society and Nuclear Non-proliferation, 174.
division in the modalities of diplomatic interaction simply brings her to deny her starting assumption when finding that ‘several States were reluctant to open up to true deliberation’.  

Deliberative democracy is not a good basis to start observing the NPT, because it is very far from being a democratic practice. The Habermasian framework she employs is in fact ill-suited for such a situation where positions of power are not checked at the door, as the Frankfurt scholar posited. What is lacking in Kissling’s account is precisely the attention to the power dimension of civil society, whose communicative actions are not linked to the materiality of their position within the system of other actors at the NPT RevCon. Beyond realising that a certain public sphere does not conform to the ideal standard of deliberative democracy dictated by the theory, this gives little indication of the politics that happen within it. Both accounts based on Habermas and on Gramsci would agree that the public sphere is a site of interaction, whether primarily consensual or conflictual. Yet, a Gramscian reading is better suited to reveal the power at play in such rhetorical encounters because it combines the study of representational practices with the analysis of institutional bases of power. Both are needed if we want to assess the political role of a certain player, in this case nuclear civil society.

A different perspective has been advanced by Senn and Elhardt, who employed yet a different discursive perspective, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s

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38 Ibid., 175.
social theory. They have shown ‘how powerful actors can shape our thinking and policies in the realm of nuclear weapons’ by looking at the so-called four horsemen initiative. Since their first call for nuclear disarmament in 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, with their high-ranking past in the national administration, have been uniquely able to spread their message. Accordingly, not all disarmament calls are the same, as much depends on the Bourdieusian concept of ‘symbolic capital’. Moreover, they argue, a ‘doxic battle’ is in action, between alternative conceptions of the value of nuclear weapons in which certain ideas are taken for granted. Dominant discursive patterns, in fact, are not a fixed field, rather animated by struggles over conceptions. While their symbolic capital makes George Shultz and his colleagues heard in the doxic battle over the value of nuclear weapons, what makes them understood is the provision of an appealing narrative that combines established and new discourses.

It is precisely this combination that is of interest for the present study, in that it follows the assumption that the ideological apparatus plays a significant role in the endurance of a certain system. The taken-for-granted ‘doxa’ tends to replicate itself, while the spontaneous inclinations rooted in a certain habitus feeds those practices that strengthen and sustain it. The superior status of certain actors and their narratives is thus recognised here, in contrast to Kissling’s work. Bourdieu, however, does not provide conceptual tools to understand transformation, lacking a theory of change. In fact, his assessment of cultural domination led to a pessimistic outlook on collective

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41 Ibid., 317.
action. Whereas for Bourdieu all working class consciousness is false consciousness, Gramsci sees potential for emancipation in the production of counterhegemonic narratives. Importantly, Gramsci shows that counterhegemonic struggles hold the potential to challenge the dominant common sense with alternative conceptions and institutions, which can only develop in civil society. According to him, the ideological construction that replicates the structure of forces with its mechanisms of domination can be overcome through critical thinking. Gramscian common sense is the channel of cultural domination, yet actors can realise it and overcome it, which allows for agency and transformation.

Through a conceptualisation of cultural domination drawn from Gramsci, we can come to a better understanding of civil society as the site of discursive perpetuation, but also of metamorphosis. If in this site hegemony finds its discursive fuel, it is also where counter-hegemonic movements emerge. Going back to the issue of nuclear discourse that means that the pronouncements of public figures like the four horsemen should be examined to see not only whether their discourses are relevant to a certain constituency, as done by Senn and Elhardt, but also and most importantly whether they are for or against hegemony. A discourse analysis that is centred on the domination of a certain frame of mind makes way for criticism of those positions that are most aligned with the prevailing order. At the

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43 Ibid.
45 This point will be further clarified in Chapter Four. A comparison of Bourdieu and Gramsci can be found in Burawoy, ‘Cultural Domination.’
same time, it is necessary to identify the emerging alternatives and assess their strength.

To be sure, critical works have generally noted nuclear civil society’s lack of autonomy and radical potential, thus denying the possibility of transformation. In fact, it was argued that the discursive system would be closed to challenges. Those who are more critical will lack access and resources, while organisations advocating marginal improvements should be the majority – what Deudney calls ‘the legions of state-supported and state-supporting experts.’\(^46\) To shed light on this issue it is interesting to turn to the insights by Craig and Ruzicka on what they call the ‘non-proliferation complex’.\(^47\) They argue that the array of non-governmental groups backing non-proliferation are a source of support for misguided global nuclear politics, having accepted the dominant concept of nuclear regulation with a strong emphasis on non-proliferation and nuclear arsenals’ reductions.

According to Craig and Ruzicka this results from a practice started during the Cold War when the non-proliferation complex did not feel able to discuss nuclear disarmament, given the status of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the post-Cold War period there was an attempt to bring the discussion back to the need for the NPT-recognised Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to eliminate nuclear weapons, but in order to maintain the treaty this was swiftly dropped. Shy of supporting atomic abolition these groups focus on more proximate aims such as ‘ensuring nonproliferation

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among the smaller states that appeared interested in acquiring the bomb, and stabilising and even reducing superpower arsenals by means of treaties. In doing so they have refrained from criticising nuclear weapons modernisation projects and applauded initiatives that were far from revolutionary, while at the same time managing consistent sums of money often granted by NWS or powerful mainstream foundations. The result of this, they maintain, contributes to making the problem unsolvable:

by refusing to challenge the interests of the nuclear haves, and hence advocating policies that cannot succeed, it is helping to entrench the permanent nuclearization of international politics—precisely the outcome that the original founders of the NPT were so determined to prevent.

Their approach is extremely valuable for a set of reasons. Firstly it is very relevant to put the issue of nongovernmental support for dominant mind-sets regarding the natural and desirable route of nuclear governance, something that this thesis also does. Moreover, the types of nuclear regulation that they identify are broadly consistent with the ones that guide the present analysis of the structures of nuclear order. In particular, tracing the distinction between reduction and abolition of nuclear weapons, as will be seen later, is a critical cleavage that deserves more attention, notably as it is an issue that still seems to be confused by practitioners and academics alike. Finally, one can certainly agree with the need to criticise even those actors that would at a first analysis seem the most worthy of appreciation, with a view to understand the real character of their activism.

What is troubling in their analysis, however, is the unproblematic lumping together of all ‘academic programmes, think tanks, NGOs, charitable

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49 Craig and Ruzicka, ‘The Nonproliferation Complex,’ 337.
foundations and government departments' committed to reducing the nuclear danger. While the points Craig and Ruzicka make surely apply to a certain subset of these organisations, it is surprising that they do not acknowledge the internal variety of the non-proliferation complex. There are several issues to be taken with this community and this thesis aims to contribute to this emerging discussion, but there is a need to look more closely at the different groups to understand whether what they do supports or challenges the prevailing order. It is with this intent that this thesis will attempt to map what Ruzicka and Craig have called the non-proliferation complex, or what could be termed global nuclear civil society. What Gramsci would add to their perspective is a differentiated analysis of its hegemonic character.

In sum, a critical Gramscian-inspired approach can provide a view of nuclear civil society attentive to the politics of its discursive struggle, mindful of inequalities in power relations, but also open to the possibility of transformation. In order to unravel the struggles of global nuclear civil society it is important to explore not only its historical roots but also the main divisions cutting across the community more broadly.

This long section has embedded the current approach in some of the most important contributions on the theme of global nuclear civil society. Despite being actively present in nuclear politics both in the domestic field and in diplomatic negotiations, civil society’s role is relatively unexplored. This

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Craig and Ruzicka, ‘Who’s In, Who’s Out?’, 37.

There are a number of exceptions but their number and comprehensiveness pales in comparison to works that looked at governmental actors. Some of them are the already cited Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War; Wittner, Confronting the Bomb.
section has first made the case for a transnational approach. Secondly, it has identified the contribution of approaching the issue from a Gramscian perspective. Analyses of civil society in nuclear politics would benefit from an increase in their theoretical depth, and particularly from a more thorough engagement with constructivist and critical scholars who have provided insights into the normative, identity, and discursive elements of nuclear politics. Such is the approach taken by this project. Furthermore, although certain works have touched upon civil society’s ideological dimension, this remained a superficial endeavour and authors have not detailed its internal differentiation.⁵²

1.2 Research design

This thesis aims to locate the agency of civil society within the global governance of nuclear weapons. It does so by taking an enlarged outlook towards the regulation of nuclear weapons, one that exceeds the prevalent notion of the non-proliferation regime, and through a critical constructivist approach influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s thought. On the one hand, conceiving of nuclear order as a complex system differentiated according to the reliance on nuclear weapons allows focusing on the varying attitudes of

actors as well as understanding the sources of potential shifts. On the other, the theoretical approach employed builds upon existing debates in nuclear studies, security studies, and civil society research that focused analysis on representation practices. As such, this thesis primarily contributes to studies of nuclear civil society, but its contribution also rests on the dialogue it engages among different literatures.

The innovative reading of nuclear civil society provided here builds upon an understanding of the nuclear condition influenced by critical nuclear scholarship and critical constructivist approaches to international security. Both have employed to a certain extent insights borrowed from Antonio Gramsci to make the case for the cultural nature of domination and a need to be attentive to discourses, narratives, and ideologies. The analytical framework of Chapter Five will further detail how those approaches are consistent with one another, but for now it is important to state that such a conjunction allows us to make a double move that: (a) escapes the economic centrality of Gramsci through the recourse to critical constructivist work on security and (b) overcomes the latter’s prioritisation of elite discourse thanks to a view of civil society inspired by Gramsci. Taking up Stuart Hall’s invitation to think in a Gramscian way, this thesis argues that researching civil society is crucial to understand the bases for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.

This thesis will thus ask what role global nuclear civil society plays in the maintenance and contestation of the nuclear common sense. Such a perspective promises to give a deeper understanding of the multiple ways in

which civil society intrudes in global nuclear governance as well as to escape some of the limitations with similar works on the subject. Through a prioritisation of the global level, it will inquire into a nuclear reality that is broader than a sum of national policies. Moreover, a Gramscian reading of civil society with a solid critical constructivist theoretical framework will bring attention to the issue of public acceptance of subordination. Critically inquiring into nuclear disarmament calls by global civil society groups can shed light on the complicity of some non-governmental actors to the prevailing system.

The next sections will show how that question has been answered by this thesis so as to guide the reader in navigating this text. The first section clarifies the argument and contribution, the second explains the case study selection, and the third outlines the methodology employed. Finally, a chapter outline delineates the various phases through which the argument is built.

1.2.1 Argument and contribution

The thesis seeks to empirically demonstrate that behind global nuclear civil society lies a deep division in the assessments of the value of nuclear weapons. Indeed, civil society’s struggle for nuclear disarmament hides an internal struggle over the same meaning of nuclear disarmament, which for some refers to reducing stockpiles, while for others to abolishing them altogether. The varying construction of disarmament adopted by civil society is illustrative of the overall global domination of a culture that sees nuclear
weapons as a security enhancer, what Booth would call nuclearism. By analysing those portrayals of disarmament we can find how far they are from representing its logical opposite, deterrence.

An ideological analysis of civil society along the deterrence-disarmament continuum is an important perspective on nuclear order more broadly, because it encapsulates the same central cleavage of global nuclear diplomacy. That is to say that, like states that occupy a place in the nuclear order according to the value they see in nuclear weapons, this same division occurs at the level of civil society, in which certain counter-hegemonic groups challenge the nuclear common sense while others contribute to reinforcing it.

What will be argued here is that the support basis for nuclear deterrence goes well beyond the usual suspects – so much so that it includes many representatives of civil society, even some of those who advocate disarmament. That promises to show that, beyond the immediate coercive nature of nuclear deterrence, there is an important consensual component that lies in the common belief in its necessity for the maintenance of nuclear order.

The argument of this thesis is that civil society is not, as one might expect, a dominated actor within the governance of nuclear weapons, but rather it is enmeshed in an unequal relation of forces, which it contributes to symbolically reproducing. Civil society comes here to be seen as an integral part of the state, crucial for its material but also ideological configuration. This project contests the notion of civil society as an inconsequential actor of nuclear politics. Instead, here it is conceived of as that part of the state which

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54 Ken Booth, ‘Nuclearism, Human Rights and Constructions of Security (Part 1).’
legitimates and replicates the dominant social relations, while also holding the potential for radical change.

1.2.2 Case study selection

This thesis seeks to find the place that civil society and its intellectual apparatus have in the governance of nuclear weapons in constructing, challenging, and debunking its ideological architecture. The struggle that interests this project is the one happening at the transnational level involving civil society’s effort to shift the discourse around what nuclear weapons mean for security. A way of looking at the interplay between governance, ideas, and civil society is to analyse the diplomatic process and the extent of contestation present therein. Whilst analysing a national reality allows for a deeper understanding of the nuclear ideology in its various faces, one that includes the direct voices of the nuclear industry, military ranks, etc., the preference for a transnational approach rests on the intent to highlight a global dynamic.\textsuperscript{55} Therefore, the object of this study is not on the various types of private actors active on nuclear politics, but rather those organised groups that work on those issues transnationally.

In an effort to debunk the prevailing conceptualisation of nuclear order as centred on the non-proliferation regime, the empirical focus of this thesis is on its very heart, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which we aim to locate global nuclear civil society. The NPT is in fact one of the oldest and

\textsuperscript{55} Studying a diplomatic practice entails a concentration on the narratives of states as formulated by the governmental bureaucracy through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a process on which the interests of the military and of influential private actors can weight, though often that input is unacknowledged.
most subscribed institutions of global nuclear regulation, which established the norm of non-proliferation since its entry into force in 1970. Since the nuclear order’s central cleavage is between the haves and have-nots (or those with or without the bomb), the NPT is the best location to study it given its role in establishing that divide. Setting a clear distinction between states that were permitted to have nuclear weapons and all the others that were expected to abstain, the NPT established the main roles of the struggle for nuclear order. It mandated the former NWS to keep the bomb technology for themselves, while all the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) commit not to seek it. In exchange the NWS promised to encourage cooperation on the peaceful applications of nuclear technology and to eventually disarm. Such an unequal commitment has held through more than four decades, and its subscribers grew ever more numerous. At the time of writing only five states are not parties to the NPT: four whose nuclear capability is not recognised by the treaty and one of recent independence.

The NPT’s centrality as a legal instrument, despite those significant outliers, is compounded by its crucial role as a deliberative forum. The NPT holds Review Conferences every five years and yearly Preparatory Committees, where there is an established tradition of scholars engaged in participatory observation researches. These periodic conferences provide an opportunity

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57 These are India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan for the former and South Sudan for the latter. As of October 2016, 191 states are parties to the NPT, see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Status of the Treaty,’ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last accessed 9 October 2016).
58 Some examples are the many works by participants in multiple RevCons and PrepComs, Harald Müller (one of the latest being Harald Müller, ‘The NPT Review Process and Strengthening the Treaty: Disarmament,’ EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers 10 (2012)) and Bill
for the NWS and NNWS to discuss and deliberate the future of the treaty, potentially deciding on ways to favour its implementation. It seems useful, in fact, to conceptualise the meetings of the NPT as the reunions of a community of practice that contributes to the permanence of the treaty and its associated norms. Those negotiations are taken here to be a key analytical opening into the establishment, permanence, and transformation of those armed and disarmed subject positions. Through their rhetorical encounters state representatives contribute to crystallise the meaning the bomb has for their security as well as its intersubjective global meaning. The NPT meetings can indeed be seen as a ritualised stage where agents act off their identities gaining a sense of ontologic security, as conceptualised by Jasper.59

The world community of professionals of nuclear policy brought together at the NPT is crucial in the definition and constitution of the NPT and of what is meant by it. This community is composed of national diplomats, UN officials, and, importantly, non-governmental representatives, all of whom tend to travel from one to the other venue of global nuclear diplomacy. To be sure the NPT is not the only space in which the same interaction can be observed, with other options including the afore-mentioned fora where nuclear diplomacy is made. However, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the Vienna-based IAEA summits suffer from limited representation, which makes them worse options. The UNGA First Committee and other UN bodies, moreover, do not mandate anything that is legally binding, thus reducing to an extent the heat of the debate. Further

alternatives like the Nuclear Security Summits and the Humanitarian Initiative conferences were also considered, but ultimately discarded for the excessive specificity of their focus.

The NPT is an optimal place to look, in a Gramscian way, at hegemony in action, or the ability to command consensus without the exercise of coercion. The study of consensus is particularly appropriate to the analysis of multilateral diplomacy given the importance that finding solutions that are acceptable to everyone has there. The creation of consensus within the nuclear governance structures can be taken as a measure of the minimum shared understandings of that mechanism’s states parties. In the case of the NPT reunions, as with most negotiations, this means reaching a solution that no state would block, because everyone can live with it. In the NPT, justificatory discourse is put forward and the deliberation process is aimed at producing consensus documents which can be seen as mutually accepted sources of authority.

At a deeper level, however, common sense cannot be established exclusively within diplomatic practice and discourse. If we are to look at the established policy of a state, it would make sense to look at the discourse of its key decision makers. Indeed, it has been remarked that ‘[n]uclear weapons politics and discourse provides an excellent subject for study.’ Policy discourse by elites has always been taken to be relevant for nuclear studies, but recently scholars have also investigated popular culture representations, as in Mutimer’s comparison of cinematographic depictions of the bomb with

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the more traditional discourse uttered by policy makers, or Taylor’s analysis of post-Cold War nuclear iconography. As Ulla Jaspers maintains, ‘non-official societal sources such as newspapers articles or statements by influential pressure groups and even pop-cultural representations also contribute to and shape the larger discourse by making particular modes of thinking and acting intelligible’.

In effect, to reveal common sense one cannot keep within bounds of official pronouncements, but should enlarge the gaze to the wider, popular interpretation instead. This does not mean looking for cultural products that reference the NPT, as hardly anything would make the cut; rather, it requires looking at all those actors that are not decision makers, all the rest of the state that is not its bureaucracy. Civil society representatives attending the NPT are definitely ‘actors that possess expertise central to the act of governing’. In that spirit this project privileges the analysis of civil society discourses and practices. The groups examined here are many and highly diversified, including, among others, international campaigns, social movements, NGOs, religious movements, professional associations, think tanks, foundations, and prominent individuals. This is taken to be a significant sample of the transnational movement lobbying for some changes to nuclear governance, thus the most relevant actors for the kinds of diplomatic-cultural shifts discussed here.

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63 Ursula Jasper, The Politics of Nuclear Non-proliferation.
The NPT does include a strong civil society participation, making it possible to pinpoint their narratives and practices, so as to assess the extent of their norm-building potential but also, crucially, of their counter-hegemonic nature. Although the involvement of civil society there has its limits, it is interesting to study the ways in which it intrudes into the formal negotiation process. For our analysis the limitation will be to those groups and individuals that are active at the transnational level, and in particular within the NPT process. Due to the detachment between a disengaged public opinion and an organised civil society activism, applying to the nuclear sphere too broad a definition of civil society runs against the problem of including groups of actors that are incomparable. While clearly this very limiting view of nuclear civil society is problematic, it is also an optimal test for the efficacy of the analytical framework.

This project is concerned with those non-governmental groups and individuals that have an active role in the NPT by closely studying their behaviour at the 2015 NPT RevCon with an ethnographic approach. On a mild New York spring day of 2015 the Ninth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened its doors, starting four weeks of diplomatic wrangling concerning the ways to regulate the nuclear order. From the early morning of April 27, the halls and corridors of the United Nations building were crowded with the world leaders who delivered their countries’ opening speeches, but also with those diplomats, activists, and experts who in various corners of the world work on nuclear weapons politics. If John Kerry, Federica Mogherini, Javad Zarif and the like would
soon leave the stage, governmental and non-governmental representatives would stay on.

Those attending, indeed, included not only diplomats in charge of disarmament issues, but also hundreds of civil society representatives that, with varying perspectives, have a stake in global nuclear politics. Such a community is not entirely populated by the anti-nuclear activists one would generally expect. To be sure, there were marches for nuclear disarmament and a few demonstrations outside the UN gates, but most of the civil society involvement is in the room, shoulder to shoulder with diplomats and international public servants. Presided over by Ambassador Taous Feroukhi of Algeria, the four weeks of Review Conference saw the two attempting, each in their own way, to leave a mark on the negotiation and the ensuing Final Document. This transnational diplomatic process constitutes the central empirical preoccupation of the present work because, through that, it aims to say something broader about the place of civil society in the global nuclear order.

Building upon its author’s direct participation in the 2015 conference, this work provides original empirical material on civil society at the NPT. This is expected to contribute to the understanding, on the one hand, of the actorness of civil society in global nuclear politics and, on the other, of the NPT and its review process as an expression of the broader governance of nuclear weapons. After having identified what this thesis analyses, the next section is devoted to explain how the research was conducted.
1.2.3 Methodology

This work is inscribed in the tradition of studies of determined communities of practice within the nuclear reality. If Carol Cohn’s emphasis is on defence intellectuals\(^{66}\) and Hugh Gusterson’s research has concerned national laboratories’ employees,\(^{67}\) still more needs to be understood about the involvement of certain professional communities with a particularly prominent position in constructing the meaning of nuclear weapons and their associated policy options. Similarly to their approaches this thesis studies the discourses put forward by nuclear communities in order to understand the culture of the groups under examination. If culture is ‘a shared system of embedded meanings that shape and is shaped through interaction’\(^{68}\) it is necessary to get to the roots of those ‘meanings,’ but also to explore the ‘interaction’ from nearby. For this project that has meant an attempt to get close to civil society active on nuclear issues and to join it in participating in the NPT reunions.

The methodological choices of this project, in line with the interpretivist scholarship in which it is ingrained, are entirely qualitative, relying on in-depth research into the various organisations active at the margins of the NPT gatherings. This involved analysing campaign materials, websites, YouTube channels, and other kinds of publications, but most importantly getting to see them in action and speaking to them face to face. The main data gathering techniques employed are participant observation and focused

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\(^{67}\) Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War.

interviews. A quantitative toolbox would have been unfit to the task given the interest in the cultural environment of the NPT negotiations that civil society attempts to influence.

For the same reasons, it was deemed necessary to attend the deliberations and speak to as many representatives as possible adopting an approach that is heavily indebted to ethnographic research. The main fieldwork lasted over four months divided in two stays in New York to attend the entire proceedings first of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) and then of the 2015 Review Conference. Through this sustained presence the author managed to listen to the voices of a majority of NPT-registered organisations and interview representatives of over twenty organisations, or a total of forty people. Further interviews were also conducted in other parts of the North East of the United States in the same period. Moreover, the author participated in a host of other meetings, both sponsored and attended by global nuclear civil society throughout the course of the doctoral project. Owing to the methodology employed, this research poses some challenges, which should be unpacked.

This thesis relies on data acquired through participant observation and focused interviews because of the advantage they present in terms of understanding the issue at hand. In particular, as opposed to an archival work that would tell us something about the history of civil society activism,

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70 A list of the organisations registered for the 2015 NPT Review Conference can be found in Appendix A, along with some statistics provided by the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. In Appendix B is a list of the individuals consulted through interviews for this research as well as an anonymized reference to each interview directly cited in the thesis.
Participant observation and interviews document the struggles of today – for which there is not yet an archive – by recording live voices and practices. Though other methods could have been employed to gather the necessary data, for example oral history interviews, building an archive of the voices of nuclear civil society would have been a task too extensive for the time and resources available.

Participant observation holds multiple advantages in comparison to other methods of data collection. As Neumann has shown with his work, understanding the ‘microphysics of power’ that underlie the process of speech writing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway could not be done at the same level of complexity from an isolated academic position. There are processes in which a researcher needs to be immersed in order to ask insightful questions on identity, power struggles, and practices of collective action. The author observed global nuclear civil society in action by participating in dozens of meetings organised at the margins of the NPT 2014 PrepCom and 2015 RevCon, in which civil society had a voice, as well as witnessing first-hand their roles in the official process – as speakers, advisors, advocates, and more.

Furthermore, a direct and tailored contact with the agents under examination was revealed necessary to understand the reasons for certain strategic and rhetorical choices, through semi-structured in-depth interviews. Talking to

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72 Neumann looks at why nothing new emerges from diplomatic speeches and shows that the need of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to speak with one voice, to reaffirm its own identity, makes the production of such texts a collective project which values continuity and special interest at the expense of content and audience reaction. Iver B. Neumann, “‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand For,” or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New,’ *International Political Sociology* 1 n° 2 (2007).
representatives from civil society, national delegations, and UN officials was crucial to triangulate the answers provided and make sure that facts were not being misrepresented. While their semi-structured character makes comparison across interviews or cases somewhat challenging and the cacophony of the field at times overwhelming, it also allowed conducting different kinds of conversations with people who had disparate positions. As opposed to what could be learned by passing around surveys to selected leaders of civil society, in-depth interviews, accompanied by a sustained presence in the room where engagement happens, give a more accurate account of the very cultural processes that this thesis investigates.

The almost ethnographic methodology of this thesis appears to be the best way to gain an understanding of the cultural milieu in which civil society tackles nuclear issues. It is referred to as almost ethnographic because the personal experience makes the author an unlikely anthropologist of the community at hand.\(^73\) Having studied nuclear issues since 2005 and worked in this sector since 2010, the author cannot claim the level of ‘alien-ness’ that seems to be the golden rule of anthropological investigation.\(^74\) This would be

\(^73\) It is important at this stage to note that there is an ethical dimension in the present research, which deserves some breaking down. This thesis has been written over the course of four years between 2012 and 2016, however many of the sources and interviewees were already known to the author before. In 2010 the author had served as a diplomatic assistant at the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations in New York, working with several disarmament and non-proliferation dossiers, including participating in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Moreover, the author worked during the period of the PhD with other organisations that are involved with nuclear politics, notably the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and had assiduous contacts with several more. If that allowed for an unprecedented access to diplomats, UN officials, and NGO representatives during the main fieldwork phase in 2015, it also created some unease as to the role that was played at that specific moment. To offset that, the author has strived to maintain critical distance from all the initiatives under examination, refraining from joining either of the main organisations discussed and only offering her work after her PhD scholarship had expired and most of her fieldwork had been concluded.

\(^74\) For a discussion on the themes of proximity and distance, see Chapters 5 and 6 in Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for Analysis (London: Routledge, 2014).
seen by some as a risky strategy that might make her blind to digging deeper in the meaning of things and deaf to the taken-for-granted assumptions that resonate in the community researched.

However, there are several counter-points that can be raised in terms of access, power relations, experience, and reflexivity. First of all, any investigation, but particularly those on secretive fields such as diplomatic communities, suffers from problems of access that can be solved if one is to focus on familiar spaces. In the case of this research it would have been nearly impossible to sit in meetings, interview people, and generally be present to observe civil society in its everyday diplomatic engagement without the network established through the years. Being known to the community allowed the author to ‘disappear’ in the crowd in a way that would not have been available to a ‘stranger’.

Secondly, when researching the behaviour of elites, it is easy to fall into power relations adverse to the researcher, given the advantage they tend to have in terms of economic, political, and social capital. One way to contrast this tendency is compensating in terms of intellectual capital by showing a deep knowledge of the issues at hand and an ability to speak the jargon required, as Carol Cohn’s path-breaking research demonstrated.\(^75\) As she has acknowledged, ‘the comfort of studying an external objectified “them”’\(^76\) is something that even an external researcher cannot cling to for more than a limited time.

Lastly, but most importantly, what makes any researcher distant from its object of study stems more from a reflexive attitude than from any provable

\(^75\) Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.’

\(^76\) Ibid., 688.
unawareness of the dynamics that are characteristic to the group under examination. The commitment to reflexivity is one that can very well be respected even when one is more familiar with a certain field – or that can equally well be defied even when alien-ness is ensured. There are many devices to maintain a reflexive gaze that have been consistently employed to avoid this pitfall, chiefly among them a continuous effort at acknowledging and questioning one’s own position with regard to the object of research. Indeed, undergoing this project made apparent the need to engage in continuous self-reflection in order to be considered by the interviewees as a reliable interlocutor and someone who would treat their words with care, even when not shared.

In sum, through a qualitative approach based upon participant observation of the NPT review process and in-depth interviews with key civil society representatives, this project produced empirical material to support its theoretical claims.

1.2.4 Chapter outline

After having laid out the research topic in this Introduction, Chapter Two focuses on the main concepts that have informed the study of nuclear weapons politics on a global level, with a view to identify the space covered by disarmament in nuclear governance. Through a review of the major insights on deterrence, non-proliferation, and arms control, the chapter makes the case that disarmament has been treated as a residual category whose implications and requirements have not received enough theoretical
attention. In criticising the rationalist paradigm for its belief in the existence of immutable laws regulating nuclear politics, the superiority of an interpretive theoretical toolbox will also be established.

As a way to escape the disciplinary black boxes described above, Chapter Three follows others in conceptualising the nuclear order as nuclear governance, but wants to go beyond them in theoretical depth. To that end a review of the literature on security governance allows for explaining this heuristic tool’s ability to capture agency well beyond the state while at the same time remaining open to the concomitant existence of cooperative and competitive forms of interaction. To construct this thesis’ vision of global nuclear governance, Chapter Three argues for an integrated view of nuclear politics that focuses on matters of order as a way to encompass the four dimensions of deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. That allows establishing the ideological space along which nuclear governance operates and over which civil society struggles.

If Chapters Two and Three introduce the exploration of the nuclear order, Chapter Four and Five will establish this thesis’ position in relation to nuclear civil society. At first, Chapter Four is dedicated to locate the study on the agency of civil society through its main currents and methodological choices. After demonstrating the limitations of the political opportunity structure model and of framing analyses, the chapter highlights the need for a critical approach and the relevance of applying ideas taken from Antonio Gramsci. His approach to civil society in fact stands in contrast from rationalist accounts that privilege institutional constraints and mainstream constructivist views that maintain ideas’ effectiveness in that both suffer from
mechanicism. Instead, Gramsci’s attention to the cultural domination and political movement formation not only integrates material and discursive elements but also recognises transformative potential, making it better poised for the subject at hand.

Chapter Five will further elaborate on that by establishing this thesis’ analytical framework through a combination of critical constructivism and Gramsci’s concepts. As such, firstly, it identifies the theoretical inspirations for this project, both in nuclear and in security studies. As for the former, critical nuclear studies have provided rich proof of the relevance of discourse for this intersubjective practice. The latter developed a fruitful methodology to analyse discourse in conditions of power inequality, which sees representation as key for understanding the conditions of possibility. Building on that and on the reflections on Gramsci, the analytical framework will be elaborated. Nuclear civil society is thus conceptualised in relation to the parallel processes of discourse and movement formation. The ideological continuum along disarmament and deterrence regimes of nuclear governance guides the analysis of common sense within a particular forum of nuclear activism. This closes the theoretical part of the thesis, which makes the case for an interpretive analysis of civil society as a way to understand the global nuclear order.

The way in which this will be developed empirically is twofold. On the one hand, Chapter Six sets the stage by describing the historical and institutional contours of the actor examined. On the other, Chapter Seven and Eight enter into the case of the 2015 NPT RevCon and provide the original material and analysis of the thesis. Chapter Six, firstly traces the historical development of
the anti-nuclear movement through its main waves and currents. Describing the present context of mobilisation the relevance of the transnational level, key for this project, is addressed. Secondly, the chapter unpacks the types of transnational groups that are active in the NPT context and the varying nature of their calls. The final part introduces the examination of the NPT and its review process as the critical arena to assess the agency of global nuclear civil society.

The analysis conducted in Chapter Seven builds upon the distinction, outlined above, between reductionist and abolitionist strands of civil society, and traces the varieties of each discourse. Through the critical constructivist methodology of discourse analysis it pinpoints traits in the articulation of their disarmament narratives that attach a particular meaning to the nuclear risk. An examination of the communities under threat and of the response required allows characterising these varieties of disarmament discourse. Moreover, an exploration of the rhetorical materials upon which each discourse is built grounds the ensuing discussion of the strength of the nuclear common sense. The aim of this chapter is to show that ideological divisions dominate the global nuclear civil society community and that this corresponds to the same cleavage among supporters and opponents of nuclear weapons reliance.

Chapter Eight looks through Gramscian lenses at common sense and historic bloc in turn. On the one hand it critically assesses the different discourses to reveal their relation to the prevailing common sense. That allows distinguishing between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic movements. On the other hand, it examines the configuration of forces for each position.
Some reflections on the construction of the alternative historic bloc can thus be advanced.

Finally, the Conclusion summarises the main arguments as well as weighing over the utility of the analytical framework. As a result, it considers what the limitations of the present project are, but also the contribution it has made and the potential to apply to other cases its insights.
Chapter 2

Nuclear Ordering Ideas:
Deterrence, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament

This chapter provides a critical review of the main debates in nuclear weapons studies with an eye to identify, on the one hand, the theoretical approach that is best suited for this project and, on the other, the complexity of nuclear governance. As stated in Chapter One, this thesis is concerned with the role of civil society in global nuclear governance, a notion that needs to be unpacked. Recently, in fact, there has been a rising awareness of the usefulness to think of global nuclear politics in its entirety, with a few scholars employing the word ‘governance’ in relation to nuclear issues.\(^1\) However, this was done mostly in passing, or with reference to either a

domestic process\textsuperscript{2} or a very specific side of the broader picture.\textsuperscript{3} Moreover, it remains still quite undetermined what the scope of nuclear governance is, something that this chapter seeks to address through a review of the literature on nuclear weapons.

The literature on nuclear weapons is extremely rich and, since the invention of the bomb, has attracted contributions that benefited from debates ranging from the theoretical to the policy-oriented and including technical military analyses as well as legal works. Scholars have approached the matter from different theoretical perspectives: much rationalist work has been done, especially during the 1960s, but later contributions have also come from both constructivist\textsuperscript{4} and critical\textsuperscript{5} fronts. Methodological difference has also dominated the field: on the one hand, game theory\textsuperscript{6} constituted the basis of early deterrence theory, while psychological and case-study approaches\textsuperscript{7} grounded later contributions. On the other hand, process-tracing\textsuperscript{8} and discourse analysis\textsuperscript{9} have been preferred by interpretivist researches. The literature has also seen participation in the debate of a variety of

\textsuperscript{2} Born, Gill and Hänggi, \textit{Governing the Bomb}.

\textsuperscript{3} Findlay, \textit{Nuclear Energy and Global Governance}.

\textsuperscript{4} For example, Emanuel Adler, ‘Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era,’ in \textit{Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age}, eds. T.V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James Wirtz, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), and Nina Tannenwald, \textit{The Nuclear Taboo}.

\textsuperscript{5} A great example is Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.’


professionals.\textsuperscript{10} Extensive interchange has taken place with policy as well, with many diplomats and officials – former or current – contributing to publications and discussions.\textsuperscript{11}

Studies on nuclear weapons in International Relations, IR from now on, have asked various sets of questions regarding the politics surrounding this technology. The foremost question that has been asked is what do nuclear weapons do – and the answer given was for the most part a series of rational-based modelling on the ways in which deterrence would work to prevent nuclear catastrophe. Moreover, scholars have tried to understand what is that makes states want to have nuclear weapons and under which conditions they would be more likely to comply with the non-proliferation rule. Much work has also been devoted to the likelihood and chance of success of arms control agreements, paying most attention to the Moscow-Washington binary. Finally, the issue of how to disarm has always attracted those interested in ways to get out of the nuclear dilemma. These four thematic concerns will be reviewed in turn, not only because of their importance in the nuclear debate, but also as they are all crucial for the regulation and management of the nuclear risk on a global level.

These four main ways in which nuclear weapons have been conceptualised largely remain disconnected and, as has been observed, the different epistemic communities ‘often ignore or talk past one another.’\textsuperscript{12} If discussion

\textsuperscript{10} Various examples exist of renowned and insightful experts who are nuclear physicists by training (Pierre Goldschmidt, Patricia Lewis, James Acton) or who used to work as journalists (Mark Hibbs). Even more numerous are those with a background in diplomacy or international public service (Mark Fitzpatrick, Trevor Findlay, Laura Rockwood).

\textsuperscript{11} Some examples are Nabil Fahmy, Mark Fitzpatrick, Greg Thielmann.

on the causes of nuclear proliferation engaged a certain community, that 
would often not include those searching for the requirements of deterrence. 
Disciplinary divides have indeed reduced the wide literature on nuclear 
issues into many isolated silos of academic disagreement. A governance 
approach allows for an integrated view of nuclear issues in order to surpass 
the problems created by looking at its different components separately.

This chapter provides an argument for the conceiving of four elements as the 
central axes of nuclear governance: deterrence, non-proliferation, arms 
control, and disarmament. Moreover, Mutimer made the case that analysing 
the knowledge bases of nuclear weapons is crucial because, according to how 
the security problem posed by the bomb is constructed, different practices 
become possible.\textsuperscript{13} Accordingly, non-proliferation, deterrence, and arms 
control are not only entirely different lenses through which to examine 
nuclear weapons and their security implications, but also the foundation of 
policies that are all bomb-related but highly diversified.

Mutimer’s contribution is highly significant to this study, which starts off 
from his distinction and builds upon it. He defines the three images as 
follows:

1. Deterrence: relies on nuclear weapons with the potential for 
   extreme destruction.

2. Non-proliferation: addresses the problem of the spread of nuclear 
   weapons technology to more and more states.

\textsuperscript{13} David Mutimer, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security.
3. Arms control: addresses the problem of the numbers and sophistication of existing arsenals.\textsuperscript{14}

These three images have indeed been critical in producing a different assessment of the nuclear danger and providing the framework for alternative policy responses. Mutimer also makes reference to the image of disarmament, but does not give the concept the same thorough examination of the other three.\textsuperscript{15} This thesis attempts to do just that, placing disarmament together with deterrence, non-proliferation, and arms control and investigating their conceptual relation.

This literature review wants not only to inscribe the project into the wider framework of nuclear studies, but also to reflect upon the political consequences of knowledge divides. Through a review of the major insights on deterrence, non-proliferation, and arms control, the chapter clarifies the differences in the meaning that this inert object, the bomb, has acquired depending on the lenses through which it has been looked at. For each of the four, it examines the theoretical insights developed to explain that particular nuclear reality as well as giving a condensed overview of the history of the nuclear age. With that, the chapter makes the case that disarmament has been treated as a residual category whose implications and requirements have not received enough theoretical attention.

These four images of nuclear weapons will be the guiding elements of the present chapter, helping to structure the contributions that throughout the past seventy years have fed the thought process on nuclear arms. The chapter

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 43.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 40-41.
will thus be divided in four main sections: deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. Moreover, a few concluding remarks will support the argument for an integrated vision of the military dimension of nuclear weapons that focuses on matters of order as a way to encompass all four categories in an overarching global nuclear governance. Finally, in criticising the rationalist paradigm for its belief in the existence of immutable laws regulating nuclear politics, the superiority of an interpretive theoretical toolbox will also be established.

2.1 Deterrence: a dominant concept

The first nuclear attack on August 6, 1945 was a watershed moment for international security thought. Academics and the public alike were suddenly confronted with this new technology, and the challenge of making sense of it and devising its strategic utility. The unprecedented degree and immediacy of destruction achievable through managed atomic explosions had profound repercussions for the thinking on security and strategy, setting them apart from all other armaments. Possessing nuclear weapons held the promise of changing military strategy forever – the bomb ‘greatly raised the relative importance of threats to use force, while at the same time increasing the
restraint on the actual use of force in combat." This novel weapon that could be powerful even when not used needed interpretive keys.

The present section will look at this connection between threat and use of force by giving an overview of the main contributions on deterrence theory. It will also note how deterrence has been practiced, particularly in the largely more studied US context. Thereafter, it will expose the main criticisms levied at both the theory and the policy from different perspectives, assessing rationalist and interpretivist accounts in turn.

2.1.1 The theory of deterrence

The theory of deterrence, even though it is now treated as universal, was born in a specific time and place. The United States was the only state to possess nuclear weapons in the aftermath of World War II and was faced with not only building an extensive infrastructure to sustain the production of these new armaments, but also devising the ways to employ them. While the concept of deterrence is an old one (think of a parent threatening punishment on a child to avoid their misbehaving), deterrence theory was born after the explosion of the bomb and it involved mostly American strategists, particularly at RAND Corporation.

The first wave of deterrence theory\(^{17}\) saw contributions by a few analysts who had quickly grasped the underpinnings of the new technology and how different the practice of deterrence would have been with nuclear instead of conventional weapons. Nuclear arms, in fact, were considered deeply


\(^{17}\) Robert Jervis introduced this division into three waves in his ‘Deterrence Theory Revised,' *World Politics, 31 n° 2* (1979).
revolutionary. As early as 1946, Brodie’s book, *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, pioneered the study of deterrence.\(^\text{18}\) Being capable of inflicting incalculable devastation, nuclear use consequences can never be expected to be low. As a result, avoiding wars must be the central goal of national strategy, ensuring at the same time an ability to retaliate. ‘Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.’\(^\text{19}\)

Yet, these works had little impact on policy and amounted to only a handful compared to the so-called second wave, the golden age of deterrence studies. Between the late 1950s and the 1960s, in fact, numerous works helped clarify the notion and implications of deterrence. While a thorough examination of this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, and since several excellent literature reviews exist,\(^\text{20}\) some of the basic concepts, paradoxes, and distinctions of the theory will be briefly sketched.

One of the most prominent thinkers on these matters, Thomas Schelling, defined nuclear deterrence as ‘a threat […] intended to keep an adversary from doing something.’\(^\text{21}\) This is part of the broader category of coercive diplomacy, which encompasses both deterrence and compellence. Whereas the former aims at stopping another actor from undertaking an action, the latter’s objective is obtaining something. A decade later, George and Smoke

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specified that deterrence is ‘simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the
costs and/or risks of a given course of action [...] outweigh its benefits.’

War in the nuclear age would thus be irrational, as victory and defence lose
meaning. The doctrine of deterrence holds that nuclear war would never be
fought between two adversaries armed with nuclear weapons, because the
consequences of attack would be just as devastating for the attacker as for the
victim. Atomic weapons are therefore a great equaliser that reduces both
parties’ eventual desire to take advantage of power inequalities. Mutual
assured destruction (MAD) would create self-restraint, making sure that both
parties would never dare using these arms out of a rational self-interested
calculation. ‘The probability of nuclear war among states having nuclear
weapons approaches zero,’ Kenneth Waltz argued. If each state chooses the
option that yields greater benefits, war can never be the preferred alternative,
and there will be little incentive to start conventional wars for fear of
escalation.

What keeps states from attacking each other is the fear of a destructive
counterattack. In practice, only ‘if there are first-strike advantages, then there
is some chance of an unlimited exchange.’ Thus, states should endow
themselves with the forces needed to launch a retaliatory strike – a second-
strike capability – making sure that, even after having suffered a nuclear
attack, they would still be able to threaten the adversary with the same
destruction. ‘To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it’

22 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 11.
23 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Nuclear Myth and Political Realities,’ The American Political Science Review, 84:3
(1990), 738.
24 Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 130.
argues Wholstetter, and Waltz adds that ‘[f]or deterrence one asks how much is enough, and enough is defined as having a second-strike capability.’\textsuperscript{26}

Two main corollaries to the doctrine of deterrence were added, stability and credibility, both giving way to paradoxes. First, the ability to inflict significant damage to the adversary must be preserved for the deterrent relationship to remain stable. Stability is grounded in parity, and it disappears if the balance of power tilts towards one party. What’s more, vulnerability lies at the core of stability. Both opponents have an interest in the other being able to launch a second strike because, absent that, the aggressor could be tempted to attack under the logic of ‘use them or lose them’. Finally, for stability to be in place, deterrent threats must not provoke the other side, but need to presuppose high costs of war. However, that risks breeding instability in that it might encourage minor ventures.

Second, credibility is defined as ‘the perception by the threatened party of the degree of probability that the power-wielder will actually carry out the threat if its terms are not complied with or will keep a promise if its conditions are met.’\textsuperscript{27} Credibility is a function of one’s ability to carry out the threat and its commitment to do so. That makes the ability to communicate the commitments effectively crucial. However, how can massive retaliation be credible if an assailment is going to be met with a counterattack? How can mutual suicide be rational? This problem was solved by Schelling with the development of the ‘threat that leaves something to chance.’\textsuperscript{28} Even when the ultimate option of general war can be discarded as unrealistic, a response

\textsuperscript{26}Kenneth Waltz, ‘Nuclear Myth and Political Realities,’ 740.
\textsuperscript{27}Glenn Snyder, ‘Deterrence and Power’, 164.
\textsuperscript{28}Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence.
that implies the risk of war is conceivable. It was also suggested that one could ‘create an array of limited options each of which could serve to raise the risk of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war’ – a threat that would appear ‘much more credible than the threat to launch a massive retaliation intentionally.’

Realist scholars involved in this research, moreover, did recognise that not all deterrence relationships are alike. For instance, Snyder introduced a distinction between deterrence by denial (intended to prevent the opponent from taking advantage of a strategic option) and deterrence by punishment (the coercive threat that aims to terrorise the opponent to deter action). Morgan added a further distinction between immediate and general deterrence, where the former entails a relationship in which ‘at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it’; the latter, on the other, ‘relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack. Finally, deterrence can be aimed to protect different interests: not only the defence of one’s own territory (immediate or Type I deterrence) but also the protection of allies (extended or Type II deterrence). The latter is problematic for credibility: would a state really risk its own destruction to defend an ally? The debate continues to this day as extended deterrence has been practiced throughout the Cold War and even afterwards by the United States.

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30 Some key examples are Glenn Snyder, Patrick Morgan, and Herman Kahn, whose works are subsequently quoted.
32 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence, 30.
In sum, there are a series of problems with the theory of deterrence and the use that has been made thereof.

2.1.1.1 *A note on the practice of deterrence*

Especially in the US, the theory and policy of deterrence came to be progressively intertwined. However, there has often been a deep distinction between the theory and the practice of deterrence.\(^{34}\) ‘Deterrence became prominent in part because of its importance in avoiding nuclear war, but it also received a boost because it fit well with the larger U.S. grand strategy of containment.’\(^{35}\) Therefore, a momentous debate focused on the policy application of the concept of deterrence. Is it better to threaten a massive retaliation to any kind of provocation or rather employ a flexible response according to the interests at stake? And how to translate Schelling’s suggestion to rely on the ‘threat that leaves something to chance’? Finally, what are the quantitative and qualitative requirements to maintain deterrence (i.e. the value of superiority)?

Washington’s initial monopoly allowed it to remain rather vague on the strategic prevision of atomic use. However, the Soviet Union rapidly caught up and, faced with a nuclear-armed opponent, MAD became the frame of reference for strategic and operational developments. A deterrence relationship developed between the US and the Soviet Union after the latter’s first nuclear test in 1949, after which the two got involved in an arms race.


that brought them to fill their arsenals with ever more and increasingly sophisticated atomic weapons. The logic of second-strike capability, in fact, says little as to the quantitative requirements of deterrence. Being able to survive and retaliate was the push behind the arms race, with the US arsenal steadily increasing throughout the 1950s and reaching a peak in 1967 with over 31,000 warheads.\footnote{The US all-time high arrived in 1987 with over 23,000 warheads, while the world-wide peak would be reached in 1986 with over 64,000 nuclear warheads globally. See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear arsenals of the World,’ \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}, \url{http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia} (last accessed November 3, 2016).} In practice, both the US and the Soviet Union quickly acquired overkill, meaning enough capability to destroy each other several times over. It also spread across the so-called Triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and aircraft. With the rise of the arms race came the need to manage the nuclear relationship through a variety of arms control initiatives that will be discussed later.

The strategic posture to be adopted was also left an open question by deterrence theorising. The concept of massive retaliation was made policy by the Eisenhower Administration after the Korean War. Accordingly, any attack – even a minor conventional offensive – would be met with all-out nuclear retaliation, especially counter-city attacks.\footnote{For a criticism of massive retaliation, see William Kaufman, \textit{Military Policy and National Security} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956).} That, however, created huge problems for stability and credibility. Given the irrationality of nuclear war and significant escalation, states could end up being self-deterred from using their atomic arms, risking to pave the way for lesser confrontations. As Snyder put it: ‘The Soviets probably feel, considering the massive retaliation threat alone, that there is a range of minor ventures which they can

\textsuperscript{36}
undertake with impunity, despite the objective existence of some probability of retaliation.\textsuperscript{38}

Massive retaliation was substituted by flexible response by the Kennedy Administration, right after the Cuban missile crisis had put deterrence under pressure and evidenced the folly of risking a nuclear war.\textsuperscript{39} It relies on tailored counter-threats commensurate to the incoming menace, maintaining the ability to respond at different levels of violence with both conventional and unconventional means.\textsuperscript{40} However, problems of credibility came from the application of extended deterrence. That theory, in fact, gave no indication on how to operate a nuclear alliance, something that became evident in the case of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): how to ensure the credibility of collective defence under a nuclear shadow and how to extend a nuclear umbrella to Europe? Practical examples of answering those questions were Kennedy stating ‘Ich bin ein Berliner,’\textsuperscript{41} but also the deployment of troops to West Germany and the rest of Europe, as well as the basing of tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO states.

Both massive retaliation and flexible response were harshly criticised by Colin Gray and others, who insisted that a nuclear war might indeed have to be fought. Accordingly, any war would risk going nuclear, thus resting on the

\textsuperscript{38} As this quote shows, most works of deterrence theory have a US focus and offer policy prescriptions, even when they purport to offer universal theories devoid of normativity. Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 226.

\textsuperscript{39} This shift was more rhetorical than practical, as evidenced by Francis Gavin’s chapter on ‘The Myth of Flexible Response’; Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

\textsuperscript{40} On these and other strategies, see Paul Nitze, ‘Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,’ Foreign Affairs, 54 n° 2 (1976). For reasons of space, we cannot get into too much detail but it is worth mentioning minimum deterrence, which previews the sole purpose of nuclear arsenals as retaliation to a nuclear first strike.

\textsuperscript{41} Declaring to come from Berlin, Kennedy was stating his commitment to the defence of West Germany.
assumption that atomic attack is impossible makes for a dangerous strategy.

On this basis, Gray recommended the development of war-fighting capabilities to make sure that denial, and not just punishment, were components of deterrence.\footnote{Herman Kahn is a prominent representative of the war-fighting school.} A similar view has been put forward by Lieber and Press: ‘The most logical conclusions to make are that a nuclear-war-fighting capability remains a key component of the United States’ military doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States.’\footnote{Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, ‘The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,’ Foreign Affairs (March /April 2006).}

The position in favour of war-fighting, however, has been remarkably marginal, with academic discussion agreeing that nuclear weapons are primarily useful for war-avoidance and nuclear doctrine of President after President confirming that. Ronald Reagan would come to take only half of their advice: nuclear wars cannot be won, he maintained but primacy could be achieved by escaping the nuclear riddle. On that basis, he initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative, designed to protect from ballistic missiles and thus eliminating the mutual vulnerability that is so crucial for deterrence.\footnote{However, also rejecting the idea of living under the threat of nuclear weapons, he pursued disarmament talks, although the Reykjavik Summit between him and Gorbachev ultimately failed.}

The connection between nuclear and other weapon systems, indeed, created further issues for the operationalization of deterrence. A nuclear retaliatory attack, for instance, has been sometimes proposed against attacks using other weapons of mass destruction – a proposal that was turned into policy under President Clinton.\footnote{Patricia Lewis, ‘A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Learning from International Humanitarian Law Success,’ ICNND Paper, 13 (2009). On this, see also Janne Nolan, An Elusive} With that came the concern that deterrence has been asked to do progressively more.\footnote{46}
As this section has outlined with some selected examples, the theory of nuclear deterrence created immense problems and disagreements when it came to putting it into practice. The examples have been drawn from the US case because of ease, but similar issues are conceivably present in other nuclear-armed countries.

2.1.2 Critics of deterrence theory: third wave and beyond

A fundamental problem with the literature on deterrence examined so far is that it rests on assumptions of rationality that hardly work in practice. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that deterrent relationships are different from each other – and have been shaped by social interaction, with a normative expansion that has led to the prohibition of possession and of many other nuclear-related activities (e.g. testing) for most states, which left deterrence all but alone in producing the nuclear order. Finally, the level of conflict assumed by this view is always very high, which clearly makes deterrence more attractive. All of this has been eloquently expressed in the so-called third wave of deterrence theory.47

Several works have contested the results of the earlier studies taking issue particularly with the shortcomings of the rationality assumption. The third wave of deterrence theory was set in motion by the 1974 book of Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). Although the notion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is contested, they are generally thought to include chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear.46 Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

47 For a review of the literature of this ‘fourth wave’ of deterrence theory, see Jeffrey Knopf, ‘The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research.’ See also Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence Theory Revised.’
and Practice. This strand’s main claim, summarised by Zagare, is that nuclear deterrence theory is ‘logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate and prescriptively deficient.’ Though it stopped short of producing a new theory, the basic shared contribution of the third wave lies in having unveiled that empirical testing often does not grant legitimacy to rational deterrence theory explanations. It did so through methodological innovation, challenging game theory models that assert an ability to identify the outcomes of certain relations and focusing instead on the painstaking historical reconstructions of case studies.

The empirical test showed that deterrence theory is indeterminate and irrational. First of all, it is hard to understand which actions fall under deterrence, as they can be confused with compellence, and threats are generally not made in such an overt way as to be uncontroversial. Moreover, the theory is silent on the practical difficulties of signalling. Finally, empirical testing often evidences much more risk-taking and less foreclosing options for credibility than expected, it highlights the importance of rewards as a complement to threats, and sheds light on the possibility that deterrence might fail.

Deterrence did not work in many instances, they emphasise, partly because of failures of rationality. Morgan contested the rationality assumption of

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48 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.
50 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence.
52 Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence theory revised.’
53 Aside from the ones already mentioned, other researchers of the third wave of deterrence theory are Robert Jervis, Patrick Morgan, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Either using
previous works, pointing to the fact that state actions are not necessarily the result of cold-blooded calculation. He argued that if both states in question were absolutely rational, deterrence would not work because no stakes can be high enough to risk the decimation of one’s own population. The deterrent threat, in fact, ultimately implies an irrational rationality.\textsuperscript{54} A further blow to the rationality assumption resulted from Scott Sagan’s investigation of domestic bureaucracy and military establishment.\textsuperscript{55} His argument is that the organisational behaviour of professional military organisations can lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war. In particular, these institutions display ‘bounded rationality’ and a multitude of conflicting goals.\textsuperscript{56}

Other works shared their same concern with the irrational, the psychological, and the country-specific dimensions of deterrence and criticised rational deterrence theory for failing to account for them. Opening the way to analyses in strategic cultures, Colin Gray maintained that each state is characterised by a specific ‘way of war’ that effectively changes the requirements of deterrence.\textsuperscript{57} Since cultural factors – shaped by historical experiences and perceptions thereof, geopolitics, political culture, and ideology – are affecting rational behaviour, the deterree could be more willing to fight than the theory would predict.\textsuperscript{58} Despite the problems with the psychological models or case studies, these authors engaged the theory of deterrence in its various pitfalls.

\textsuperscript{54} Patrick Morgan, \textit{Deterrence}.


\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{58} Colin Gray and Keith Payne, ‘Victory is Possible’, \textit{Foreign Policy}, 39 (1980). A similar argument can also be found in Keith Payne, ‘Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence,’ \textit{Strategic Studies Quarterly} 5 n°2 (2011), 17.
ethnocentric character of Gray’s work, it does point out an important side of the problem of deterrence.

Both Sagan’s and Gray’s points build directly upon what argued by Jervis and others on opening up the ‘black box’ of the state. They have pointed out that the state exercising deterrence does not enact a behaviour superimposed by the international structure, as hard-core realists would have it. Instead, variation happens because decision makers are subject to a whole set of psychological and cultural constraints that lead to choices sometimes inconsistent with rational deterrence theory.

The notion that since 1945 war was averted by nuclear deterrence has been challenged by revisionist historians. John Mueller, contrasting depictions of the bomb as the guarantor of the ‘long peace,’ maintained instead that they were ‘irrelevant’ – influencing discourse and budget more than the history of world affairs. Nuclear weapons, accordingly, had a much smaller role in preserving stability during the Cold War, as the threat of a repetition of World War II was enough to deter the US and the Soviet Union away from direct confrontation. Ward Wilson complemented that by convincingly showing that it was the Soviet entry into the Eastern war front and not the use of atomic bombs that caused Japanese surrender in August 1945.

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59 Gray’s argument was primarily aimed to expose the limits of Soviet rationality in Western terms, however these same terms also came under criticism, for example in Krause and Latham’s convincing examination of Western strategic culture. Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, ‘Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control’. Another contribution on the topic is Kerry Kackchner, Jennie Johnson, and Jeffrey Larsen, Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).


Moreover, scholars pointed out cases in which the possession of the bomb did not give the expected advantages. Wilson showed that nuclear possession did not prevent challenges to the US while it enjoyed a monopoly over the bomb (Berlin, 1948), it did not give an advantage to nuclear-armed states in case of war (US in Korea ended in draw, lost in Vietnam, USSR lost in Afghanistan) nor did it deter non-nuclear opponents (Israel in Yom Kippur, UK in Falklands). “The mutual caution of the Cold War is evidence that nuclear weapons are dangerous, not that they are effective weapons of war or useful for threatening.” 63 Similarly, Nina Tannenwald questioned why these armaments have not been used when retaliation was impossible and why they did not deter conventional attacks from non-nuclear to nuclear weapon states, making a powerful case that deterrence does not tell the whole story. 64 Tannenwald also raised the issue of proliferators’ motives asking why small countries have not felt that their security situation needed a deterrent and why so many states have not pursued them. 65 Her study, which makes the case that the norm of nuclear taboo has contributed to the restraint on nuclear use, is one of the most notable contributions to nuclear thinking from the constructivist tradition. Her view that deterrence practices are embedded in a set of norms that stabilise and restrain self-help behaviour provides a great basis to understand many other riddles of nuclear policy. Tannenwald’s widely referred contribution is highly interesting for several reasons, but the

65 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo.
most important one for the purpose of this study lies in the demonstration that deterrence is a norm, a social prescription for a certain behaviour.

Constructivists have pointed out the socially constructed character of nuclear deterrence and highlighted the historical and social contingency of deterrence practices. Accordingly, deterrence like all other practices is shaped by the context in which it is embedded and has been constrained by a normative structure. Alexander Wendt emphasised how deterrence is intersubjectively constructed and not a mere reflection of objective capabilities. For Washington, for example the British weapons did not represent a threat, whereas the Soviet ones did.66 Farrell, moreover, argued that military practices are influenced by culturally specific notions of appropriateness,67 further stating that a non-legal norm of deterrence can be ‘as powerful, if not more powerful, as international law in shaping the social reality of state behaviour’.68 Emanuel Adler, moreover, emphasised the importance of a community of experts for the development of the nuclear doctrines as well as the ‘invention’ of arms control during the Cold War.69

If constructivism understands deterrence as a norm, critical literature thinks of it more in terms of ideology and of the role of representation. Critical scholars, indeed, have not only examined what nuclear deterrence does but also what it does not do, taking issue with its limited usefulness and explicatory power but also with its normative implications. More will be said on their account in Chapter Four, but it is useful to remember for now that

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69 Emanuel Adler, ‘Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era,’ 92.
this project stands with these critical voices in being sceptical about the usefulness of rational models and of a scholarship that is set on producing solutions to policy problems. All these works have shown that deterrence theory’s empirical record is far from perfect by using historical material that shows that rationality does not always prevail and that not all deterrence relationships are alike. The next section will delve into the second image: nuclear non-proliferation.

2.2 Non-proliferation and its regime

The issue of proliferation, or the potential for spread of atomic technology, led to the development of a cooperative management of the nuclear risks. While US and USSR developed their deterrence doctrines and created ever larger arsenals of nuclear weapons, these arms started to gain the interest of other states. After all, getting the most cutting-edge military tool had been consolidated practice, with tanks, bombers, and submarines as only the most recent of many examples. Which would be the next state to get the bomb and what to do about it? Although the beginning of the atomic age was characterised by efforts at regulating the nuclear risk through disarmament proposals, such as the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report and Baruch Plan, these attempts soon faltered and the idea of managing nuclear relationships took hold.
One of the highest priorities for the United States, and later for the other states that joined the nuclear club, was to limit the spread of these arms to other countries. In the 1950s, at a time when the bombs were becoming more common and numerous, the fear was that states such as Sweden, Italy, or Australia would bring their scientific advances in nuclear physics to the extreme consequences, acquiring the bomb. The idea of proliferation, in fact, significantly diminished the value of any existing arsenal and threatened the armed states with more potential MAD situations. In the meantime, three more states had developed and tested bombs – the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964 – making the management of nuclear weapons a multi-lateral issue.

Global nuclear governance emerged in the 1960s. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which brought US and USSR, and perhaps the whole world, to the brink of nuclear confrontation, provided the momentum to go forward with regulatory efforts. The first treaty to be signed was the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, which prohibited atmospheric nuclear explosions. Moreover, a turning point appeared with the conclusion of the NPT in 1968. Almost all of its parties committed to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons technology while maintaining the right to its peaceful uses. In contrast, five of them were allowed to retain their arms, but had to negotiate in good faith on how to get rid of them. A great number of analyses have concerned themselves with the diplomatic history and politics of the treaty, many of them emphasising its discriminatory character.

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70 Benoît Pelopidas and colleagues are working on a project on the global nature of the risks of the Cuban missile crisis.
71 The treaty has its origins in a proposal by Ireland, which in 1961 made its way to the floor of the General Assembly, which in turn adopted it as a resolution and called for the start of negotiations.
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is taken to be central in constraining worldwide acquisition of nuclear arms. While in the 1960s many states were interested in the bomb, and NATO was toying with the idea of a multilateral nuclear force, the conclusion of the NPT, made possible by cooperation between Moscow and Washington, significantly changed the structure of the nuclear order. The NPT is a particularly important site of nuclear politics, not simply because it is recognised as the main treaty establishing obligations for the majority of states, but also because it is the main locus of contestation of such politics.

Contestation is rooted in the normative ambiguity of the NPT, where several obligations for different categories of signatories exist concurrently, producing a variety of subject positions. In fact, the fundamental division between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ is legally enshrined in the NPT, which grants the five earliest members of the nuclear club (US, Russia, UK, France, and China) a right to possess nuclear arms, which, on the other side, is denied to the rest of its 191 states parties. Only five states are not parties to the NPT – India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Sudan – and all but the latter have nuclear arsenals. The NWS, or nuclear weapon states, are required by the Treaty not to facilitate other members in obtaining nuclear arms, which the NNWS, the non-nuclear weapon states, promise to forego indefinitely in exchange for the undertaking to receive cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The NPT’s well-recognised discriminatory character, whereby the right to possess nuclear weapons is granted to a handful of states, but denied to all the rest, constitutes its crucial cleavage. The possession of nuclear arms is only to be a temporary condition, as the NWS also commit to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.’ Accordingly, the NPT is based upon a grand bargain between the haves and the have-nots comprising three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses. However, ‘the NPT nuclear weapon states have never fully delivered on the disarmament part of this bargain.’ Most NNWS, instead, consider their adherence to the treaty fundamental to their credentials as responsible members of the international community. As a result, the treaty is in a state of crisis that has been getting worse since the end of the Cold War.

This foundational problematic of the Treaty and the wider non-proliferation regime appears in all its force in the NPT discussions and pulls the normative structure of the nuclear age in different directions. Agreement is made particularly hard by the consensus rule that gives each member state a virtual veto power. Disarmament has always been a concern in the NPT framework, making states unable to agree in three Review Conferences and causing considerable division and eventually becoming the object of compromise.

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77 William C. Potter, . ‘The NPT and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint,’ 79.
language.\textsuperscript{78} This is even truer after the 1995 indefinite extension: an NPT without ‘expiry date’ meant that its inequality could become perpetual, a prospect that troubles many.\textsuperscript{79}

### 2.2.1 Theories of proliferation

A whole research programme concerned itself with the determinants of nuclear proliferation and has typically asked under what circumstances states would pursue military atomic capabilities. The lines of this debate trace those of classical IR disagreements with different contributions from realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives as well as a few critical works.

If the most extended view opposes proliferation as a global danger, there are also contrasting ideas, famously heralded by Kenneth Waltz. Bringing the axioms of deterrence to their furthest extent, he claimed that the spread of nuclear weapons is a force for peace. He famously wrote that ‘more may be better’ since countries will be deterred from attacking each other if they know that their opponent possesses nuclear arms.\textsuperscript{80} Stability would thus result from proliferation. It is this promise of eliminating war from conflict situations that served as the most widespread explanation of nuclear acquisition practices. Waltz’s positive view of proliferation is not shared by most other realists, who have a general appreciation for the restraint introduced by the non-proliferation regime, though they agree on the security-enhancing character of these weapons.

\textsuperscript{78} Harald Müller, ‘The NPT Review Process and Strengthening the Treaty: Disarmament.’

\textsuperscript{79} The NPT, entered into force in 1970, had an initial duration of 25 years, after which the parties should decide whether to extend it and under which terms.

\textsuperscript{80} Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, \textit{The Spread of Nuclear Weapons}. 
Realist proliferation theories have questioned the reasons behind nuclear acquisition, both through quantitative and qualitative research, reaching the conclusion that security seeking is the prime motivation. ‘A state’s decision to build nuclear weapons is a result of its perception of the security equation it faces.’ The level of conflict – especially at the regional level – and the extent of security interconnection have often been viewed as the major determinants of proliferation. Coming from a realist perspective, Benjamin Frenkel maintained that extended deterrence has been at the heart of why states protected by a nuclear umbrella, such as Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, have not sought the bomb. Accordingly, a lack of this commitment, instead, led Israel, Pakistan and India to proliferate. Multipolar structures, moreover, would be more conducive to proliferation than bipolar ones: in the former scenario, in fact, alliances are more unsure and security guarantees would not be given by world powers, while middle powers would remain unable to take a commitment to defend allies with nuclear arms.

Aside from being contradicted by the reality of a world where proliferation has not taken place at an alarming rate, the realist concept is also excessively reliant on the structural conditions that would lead to nuclear acquisition,

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84 Benjamin Frenkel, ‘The Brooding Shadow’.

ignoring other levels of interpretation. Their proliferation dynamic ought to work regardless of which state is under examination, irrespective of the individual decision-makers and types of regimes: all states are supposed to be monolithic rational entities. While being deployed often as a way to offer policy prescriptions to the United States – for example with the huge literature on the nuclear program of Iran –, much of this literature has not been able to generate insights that apply to all states, despite realism’s claims to universality. In addition, it is methodologically questionable to apply large-N statistical analysis, given that nuclear proliferation has happened in less than a dozen cases.

Neo-liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, tried to compensate for such shortcomings, highlighting the role of international institutions in mitigating security dilemmas. In this view, participating in institutions such as the non-proliferation regime can be a powerful incentive to refrain from going nuclear, given the benefits that accrue to the well-behaved states. On the contrary, states that do not value these kinds of offsets will be more likely to seek the bomb. An insightful contribution by Glenn Chafez proposed a new theory of nuclear proliferation rooted in social psychology. His argument is that the US is the principal guardian of the non-proliferation regime also because it is seen as the defender of what he calls a ‘liberal security community.’ Chafez looked at compliance disputes through ingroup-outgroup dynamics pointing to the biases deriving from self-identification practices. However, this is a limiting view that gives the impression that only those defenders of the liberal order would support the non-proliferation

regime, forgetting that some of its staunchest backers are states that would not fall in his ‘liberal security community’ category.\(^8^7\)

Possibly the best example of liberal proliferation theorising is Etel Solingen, who complemented this thinking by adding a domestic layer. States governed by a liberal, outward-looking coalition would better appreciate the benefits of collaborating in the international system, whereas those ruled by nationalistic, inward-looking coalitions would be more attracted by the bomb.\(^8^8\) The economic benefits accruing from participation in the non-proliferation regime are, in her view, what was sought by those governments that exercised nuclear restraint. A convincing rebuttal of Solingen’s thesis came from Maria Rost Rublee’s constructivist work on non-proliferation norms.\(^8^9\) While she does agree that a move from authoritarian rule to democracy was associated with an increased acceptance of the non-proliferation regime, Rost Rublee argues that ‘these newly democratizing regimes wanted something larger than just access to foreign capital and markets, something that can be described as membership in the Western ‘club’.’\(^9^0\) Using insights from social psychology, she claimed that elite decision-making is influenced by the international social environment through mechanisms of persuasion, conformity, and identification.

Indeed, as with the theory of deterrence, constructivists appear most convincing in non-proliferation research than both realist and liberal

\(^{8^7}\) A case in point would be the Non-Aligned Movement. On the NAM a recent contribution of particular value is William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement*.


\(^{9^0}\) Ibid., 12.
scholars. The power of norms has been also outlined by Müller and Schmidt, who examined both the domestic and international pressures on decision-makers faced with the option to proliferate. They maintained that acquisition patterns have changed remarkably before and after the introduction of the NPT: states considering the bomb have been far more likely to stop weapons programmes after the treaty came about than before, and only a few started them since. The NPT, in fact, changed expectations as to what is an acceptable state behaviour, thereby altering the international normative constraints. These, however, are felt differently by different political systems, as pariah states are more likely to proliferate according to Müller and Schmidt, thereby tracing a causal link between the degree of democracy and the likelihood of proliferation.

Others shared the same turn towards domestic analysis of nuclear choices exemplified by Solingen. With his typology of national identity conceptions, Jacques Hymans tried to explain the decision to get the bomb. This, he contended, is not something anyone seeks: states that are likely to value nuclear proliferation are those that have an ‘us vs. them’ approach coupled with nationalist conception. Although Hymans thinks security is the main reason why states choose to proliferate, he argues that such a decision is essentially taken on the basis of emotions that depend on identities. Another scholar to focus on domestic dynamics is Peter Lavoy, who looked at nuclear ‘mythmaking’ as an antidote to the division between realist and ideational

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accounts.\textsuperscript{93} Proliferation is therefore explained by the domestic success at convincing elites by certain constituencies – they draw on the country’s insecurities and isolation to portray proliferation as the best corrective and a feasible one. The success of nuclear mythmakers depends on their ability to associate their arguments with the existing cultural and political realities, thereby convincing senior officials to accept their views.\textsuperscript{94}

Whilst for some nuclear weapons remain a boon, making proliferation an appealing way to improve the country’s strategic position, others have noted that these arms would not help in protecting everyone. For most, the global non-proliferation norm is an effective barrier and it is by this mutual renunciation that states have felt more secure. Moreover, it is not only the specific strategic situation of a state, but also country-specific cultural factors, that make the value of the bomb change. Far from believing in the existence of immutable laws dictating the choice to proliferate or not, many of these contributions highlighted the agency of different actors as well as the normative importance of international institutions.

\textbf{2.2.2 Second nuclear age}

If during the Cold War thinking of nuclear weapons was dominated by the paradigm of deterrence and East-West balance, after its end, proliferation became central. For the United States, the fall of the Soviet Union led to the reconsideration of nuclear policy in the post-bipolar world, where, some


\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ibid.}, 435.
maintained, conflict would be higher. That even led to advice that nuclear
proliferation be encouraged in the case of allies, though such
recommendation was not applied. Instead, the 1990s were a mixed period:
the NPT was strengthened by the accessions of two NWS (France and China)
and many NNWS and other agreements were signed, like the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, the 1990s, with the discovery of a nuclear
programme in Iraq and the atomic tests of India and Pakistan, also
challenged the non-proliferation regime.

The fear that lesser countries would get nuclear weapons and try to challenge
the nuclear status quo became a central concern, with a heightened
apprehension for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under the
Clinton Administration. All of this reached new levels with the turning point
of 9/11 and the rise of neo-conservative thought. After 2001 mainstream
consensus emerged on the new rising danger: terrorist organisations and so-
called ‘rogue states’ acquiring nuclear arms. This category was paramount
for the Presidency of George W. Bush, who used it to refer to the security
threats posed by the developments in the so-called ‘axis of evil’ of Iraq, North
Korea, and Iran, states not only intent on breaching the non-proliferation
regime but also supporting terrorism. As the global war on terror unfolded,
fears that Al Qaeda might pursue a nuclear capability also grew. The Bush

95 John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,’ International
96 Janne E. Nolan, An elusive consensus: Nuclear weapons and American security after the Cold War,
Brookings Institution Press (2001), Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s
Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Young, 1995).
97 An insightful exploration of the issue can be found in Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence, Rogue States, and
U.S. Policy,’ in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, eds. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan,
98 Alexandra Homolar, ‘Rebels without a Conscience : The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in
recipe held that preventive action was legitimate against rogue states and that counter-proliferation measures – to be undertaken unilaterally or in coalitions – were a positive way to escape the need for multilateralism. Against those threats, many feared, the NPT did not have an answer.\(^99\) The focus of both literature and practice, at the turn of the century, shifted from deterrence to proliferation.\(^100\) Deterrence thinking, in fact, had concerned itself with just one part of the strategic interaction panorama, focusing mostly on mutual deterrence between two nuclear-armed states. Can those tenets developed to make sense of the US-Soviet confrontation also give insights into unequal deterrence relationships such as the US-North Korea one? What does it say about deterrence against non-nuclear opponents or, as with respect to Iran, how can a state be deterred from proliferating? And how to deter a terrorist group?

The idea is that the second nuclear age presents new global challenges, where the bipolar nuclear confrontation is of little guidance. Because lesser states, and even non-state groups, possibly interested in getting the bomb are many and because they would allegedly be more willing to use it, the priority should be avoiding all further proliferation.\(^101\) Although scepticism with this view has been extensive,\(^102\) the issue has also been taken seriously by much of the academic community. Thomas Schelling’s position is that nuclear deterrence will probably play a much lesser role in maintaining security in the post-Cold

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\(^102\) Just as an example see Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*. 
War environment. Some have expressed even more concern about the second nuclear age. Thérèse Delpech defined the new era as one of piracy characterised by lawlessness and deception. She claimed that major threats would be small autocratic and reckless states as well as China because, accordingly, deterrence works better when practiced by risk-averse democracies that do not want to go to war.

However, authors from the critical camp took issue with the intentionality in the rise of this new narrative. As Krause and Latham put it:

> Faced with a threat vacuum and the anxiety it induced, Western (and especially American) policy-makers soon began to search for a new threat – one that would provide a clear guide to military affairs and at the same time furnish a powerful justification for the large, high-technology military forces that had been developed to fight the Soviets.

The risk of the second nuclear age, in fact, was not an objective fact, instead it was constructed as a threat. David Mutimer investigated the production of the ‘weapon state’ image and how this made possible the emergence of cyclical crises, such as Iraq 1991–1998. He pointed out that weapons proliferation was framed as a problem and that image has shaped and been shaped by the measures taken in response to it. This effectively moves the pole to a new research agenda: no longer what proliferation is but what proliferation does. Problematising non-proliferation practices has characterised academics from the critical tradition, an approach that is crucial for the current project, as will be seen in Chapter Four.

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105 Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, ‘Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control,’ 36.

As amply stated, nuclear proliferation is a sporadic event and, while it has been declining, it also failed to provide the security that some analyses would imply. With the NPT being the most widely subscribed treaty on armaments, the non-proliferation norm appears in good health. Whether convinced or not about the treaty’s effectiveness, it is still noteworthy that 191 are state parties and that only one has withdrawn since its entry into force, over four decades ago. The diminished proclivity to get a military nuclear capability has been accompanied by a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

This notion of ‘non-proliferation regime’ is often used to refer to the legal-institutional framework of nuclear weapons restraint in its totality. This is meant to comprise not just the NPT, but also a wide range of other agreements and practices intended to limit the horizontal spread of technologies useable in nuclear weapons. Indeed, a whole regime devoted to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both to state and non-state actors, developed throughout the years, coming to include a host of actors both in nuclear-armed states and not. This grew to include, among others, five regional treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) in the whole of the Southern Hemisphere and beyond, a CTBT, and IAEA verification safeguards, among other instruments. Moreover, initiatives have been launched to tackle the spread of nuclear weapons and materials to non-state groups, both in the UN (with Security Council Resolution 1540) and beyond,

chief among them the Nuclear Security Summits. Some have argued that nuclear security is an entirely different regime to prevent proliferation to non-state actors, but the view taken here is that it is one specific part of non-proliferation.

The existence of the non-proliferation regime is hardly in question, but as the preceding discussion has shown, there are issues with it. That is why many authors have questioned how the regime works as well as claimed it is undergoing a crisis. The non-proliferation regime as the encompassing system of global nuclear rule, however, suffers from two limitations. It is a regime and regards non-proliferation. Regime theory, while broadly consistent with the study of normative structures in the global order, is insufficient for understanding the current governance of nuclear weapons because of its overwhelming focus on states. Moreover, non-proliferation is only part of that regulation in that it is a norm that counts for most but not all states. As seen in the previous section, instead, deterrence is the norm for those nine that have the bomb.

In sum, non-proliferation is a paramount part of nuclear regulation globally that seeks to limit the spread of the bomb to further actors, be they states or non-state groups. The development of this norm can be traced to the NPT but since the 1970s it has expanded in obligations. While being broadly complied

with, there have been several proliferation concerns, which now can be seen as diminishing, given that the treaty is almost universal and that difficult cases such as that of Iran have been solved.\textsuperscript{112} The rationalist literature on proliferation fails to foresee this situation, but constructivists have correctly previewed the strengthening of the global norm against nuclear proliferation.

\section*{2.3 The contested field of arms control}

If a fixation for the non-proliferation regime institutes a discriminatory system and a focus on deterrence overestimates the relevance of such paradigm for the totality of states and other actors, it is now important to turn to the broader question of how the nuclear order is created and maintained. Arms control has often been used as the general term to define the whole spectrum of activities in the area of cooperation on nuclear (and other) weapons. This comes from the broad definition of arms control that Schelling and Halperin gave, which became of common use:

\begin{quote}
We use the term ‘arms control’ rather than ‘disarmament.’ Our intention is simply to broaden the term. We mean to include all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

Bilaterally the US and the Soviet Union started cooperating to stop the arms race, reaching their first accomplishment in 1972, with the conclusion of the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[112] One should qualify that by adding that the Iran case has been solved temporarily, but other reversals such as Brazil and Argentina, which had been worrying in the 1990s, are less provisional.
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (ABM) Treaty. Throughout the détente period, strategic arms limitation talks continued, resulting in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I of 1972 and SALT II of 1979. Arms control had thus become a component of American and Soviet nuclear policy. The goal was offsetting the risk of an unintended nuclear war by avoiding escalation and making the deterrent relation more stable.\textsuperscript{114} Arms control was reactivated with limitations on arms of shorter ranges through the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, and extending during those years to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties START I and II. After a setback during the Bush Administration, these practices were revived under President Obama with the New START of 2010. The issues of verification and how to ensure compliance were important throughout all those negotiation and implementation processes.\textsuperscript{115}

Using cooperative means to control nuclear weapons – what would generally be termed arms control – has been praised by most of the academic and policy oriented literatures. A contrasting perspective can be found in Colin Gray’s view that arms control is ultimately bound to fail because of what he calls the ‘arms control paradox.’ Such efforts are going to succeed only when they are least needed, thereby revealing themselves to be a mere reflection of the ‘temperature’ of international relations.\textsuperscript{116}

However, as Stuart Croft indicated, arms control has been interpreted in much too narrow terms focusing on superpower relations.\textsuperscript{117} Thus, the label has been tightly linked to the process undertaken from the late 1960s by the US and the USSR (and later Russia) of de-escalation of the arms race and numeric reduction of their strategic forces. This however is a very time-specific development that can hardly be applied to other occurrences. Arms control, in fact, implies a level of conflict that makes it inapplicable to a variety of situations where weapons have been regulated. For Henry Kissinger, ‘the objective [of arms control] should be to increase the uncertainty about the possibility of success in the mind of the aggressor and to diminish the vulnerability of the defender.’\textsuperscript{118} Indeed, neither this nor ‘military cooperation between potential enemies’ accurately describes the kind of rapport between say Mexico and Costa Rica when signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco that established a NWFZ in Latin America.\textsuperscript{119}

From the definition above and others, disarmament would appear to be a specific type of arms control.\textsuperscript{120} This view takes disarmament to be a more radical form of arms control, something that has been contested. It was the very Thomas Schelling who objected to arms control being included under the rubric of disarmament because it would be against the former’s endorsement of deterrence and belief in the stabilising effect of nuclear


\textsuperscript{119} The treaty eventually came to include the whole region, even the cases for many years problematic of Brazil and Argentina.

\textsuperscript{120} Donald Brennan, ‘Setting and Goals of Arms Control,’ in Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, ed. Donald Brennan (New York: George Braziller, 1961), 31.
Indeed, he saw the application of deterrence as just one alternative way to ensure an orderly nuclear world. He argued that the focus on disarmament did not allow thinking of the various ways in which Washington and Moscow could exercise restraint, cooperating on measures to safeguard against war. Through unilateral and cooperatives moves, in fact, arms control aimed at making deterrence more stable.

As a result, critics have argued that arms control and deterrence are to be considered twinned inseparably.

The transformation of inter-state relations via either nuclear disarmament or nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the superpower arms race was a sort of via media between those two Manichean visions.

Glaser agreed that arms control and disarmament are two entirely different matters – the former concerned with controlling ‘numbers and types of nuclear forces, and their operations [to] reduce the probability of nuclear war,’ the latter requiring a ‘radical and lasting political change’ before becoming desirable. While the amount of political change required for nuclear disarmament can well be greater than that needed for arms control, the first efforts at discussing limits to nuclear possession were also not easy.

As such, arms control is fundamentally different from disarmament and completely congruent with a deterrence posture. Building on Foucault, Mutimer considers arms control as an expression of governmentality, or the political knowledge focused on the mechanisms of ensuring regulation of the

122 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 27, emphasis in original.
population. He sees a deep difference between arms control and disarmament, and suggests that pursuing the former might bring us further away from the latter.\textsuperscript{126} This sustains his criticism of President Obama’s nuclear policy, whose stated aim (a world without nuclear weapons) stands in contradiction with the assigned instruments (more of the same bilateral warhead reductions).\textsuperscript{127}

In sum, arms control is a product of its time that lost memory of the past, rather than resting, as some claim, on immutable laws.\textsuperscript{128} It is thus misleading to describe the whole field of nuclear regulation as arms control.

2.4 Disarmament as the logical opposite of deterrence

A fourth way to conceptualise the bomb has been through the image of disarmament. The idea that eliminating the weapons would be the way to ensure security in the nuclear age emerged early on. Terrorised by the sheer destruction brought by nuclear arms, individuals started to develop arguments for their elimination. The disarmament literature, as a result, is mostly normative and tends to focus on the moral, legal, and strategic benefits of living without nuclear weapons. Although the term disarmament


\textsuperscript{127} Similarly, Futter and Zala lamented the lack of attention reserved to threats from systems such as missile defence and prompt global strike, which are generally considered conventional weapons. Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Advanced US Conventional Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament: Why the Obama Plan Won’t Work,’ \textit{The Nonproliferation Review}, 20:1 (2013).

\textsuperscript{128} For this argument see Neil Cooper and David Mutimer, ‘Arms Control for the 21st Century.’
is generally juxtaposed to non-proliferation, its logical opposite is instead deterrence.

The whole non-proliferation theory developed from these early stages to account for the variance in states’ decisions with regard to getting the bomb, asking mainly under what circumstances states seek nuclear weapons. A similar theory on the causes of disarmament, however, never fully developed. Researchers have investigated nuclear reversal but the paucity of cases of disarmament made all discussion highly speculative. Only South Africa eliminated at the beginning of the 1990s the nuclear arsenal they had previously built and never declared.\textsuperscript{129}

The NPT acquired an important space in the discussion of disarmament, as it is the only treaty legally requiring the NWS to disarm. This is exemplified in the debates about the nature of the NPT. While some interpret it as being solely about non-proliferation,\textsuperscript{130} others argue that its focus is also on disarmament.\textsuperscript{131} With the NPT grand bargain being a deal between states that wanted to ensure non-proliferation and states that sought disarmament, the two are often understood as opposing priorities. Indeed, one can be a great supporter of non-proliferation even while being one of the proliferators, a situation that does receive much attention in diplomatic circles but not as much in academia.

\textsuperscript{130} Anne Sartori and Leo Sartori, ‘Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Early 21st Century,’ paper prepared for the \textit{Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation}, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology (December 2011).
\textsuperscript{131} Lawrence Scheinman, ‘Disarmament: Have the Five Nuclear Powers Done Enough,’ \textit{Arms Control Today}, 35 n° 1 (2005).
The NPT, however, is about both non-proliferation and disarmament. Its goal was to regulate the possible uses of nuclear technology as well as the nuclear relationship between armed and disarmed states. The latter is key for the endurance of the treaty and for the configuration of the nuclear order as a whole. If reduced compliance on the non-proliferation front could well inspire a retreat from disarmament, at the same time it cannot be expected that non-proliferation would continue in the absence of disarmament. As pointed out by Sagan, the ‘future progress by the [nuclear weapon state] to disarm will strongly influence the future willingness of the non-nuclear weapon states to stay within the NPT.’ An interesting view on this was proposed by Anne Harrington de Santana, who argued that non-proliferation does not lead to disarmament, and is actually going to make it impossible because of its reliance on deterrence.

Disarmament is also conceptually related to deterrence. Critics have pointed to the impossibility of ‘uninventing’ the bomb, as well as the essential tendency to resolve controversies through violence. Although it is certainly true that mankind might always resort to force, one cannot deny that normative constraints, even concerning the use of force, have been an increasing feature of international politics. As Patricia Lewis argued, deterrence unhinges the claims of the disarmament camp by reminding them

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that nuclear weapons exist in order for them not to be used. \textsuperscript{135} However, even with deterrence, the possibility of their use remains an option, and actually needs to if the strategy is to be effective. As even supporters of deterrence concede, ‘[s]o long as nuclear weapons exist there will always be some chance of their use.’\textsuperscript{136}

Although nuclear deterrence theoretically promises to make war irrational, states have often preferred to refrain from acquiring it. Nick Wheeler has convincingly shown that security based upon fear (i.e. deterrence) is not the only, nor the best, way to regulate interstate relations. \textsuperscript{137} He argues with Waltz’s point that mutual security can be provided by deterrence and presents instead the model of security communities grounded in trust. By looking at the experience of Brazil and Argentina and their nuclear reversal, Wheeler makes the case for the establishment of a global nuclear governance ‘that will reassure states that others have disarmed and are not about to reveal a hidden arsenal to the world.’\textsuperscript{138} This attention to those states that made disarmament a reality is a refreshing expansion of a research programme that has often limited itself to the weapons holders. \textsuperscript{139}

Disarmament is not only the opposite of proliferation but also, crucially, the renunciation of deterrence. What drives apart the two is the reliance (or not)

\textsuperscript{135} Patricia Lewis, ‘A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament’.
\textsuperscript{136} Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph Nye, ‘Hawks, Doves and Owls: A New Perspective on Avoiding Nuclear War,’ \textit{International Affairs}, 61 n° 4 (1985): 584. Not all deterrence supporters would support this claim, though. As the authors recall, Herman Kahn was known for offering $1,000 prizes for plausible nuclear war scenarios between the US and the Soviet Union, on his conviction that there would be none. Although Kahn never judged any scenario plausible, others have.
\textsuperscript{138} Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Beyond Waltz’s Nuclear World: More Trust May Be Better,’ 434.
on nuclear weapons. That means that the important concepts of reversal, restraint, and others should instead be conceived as part of disarmament, in that they all reach the end-state of being bomb-free. Indeed, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus did not disarm in the same sense that South Africa did: the former never autonomously sought the bomb, but all have in common having taken a decision to renounce it. Indeed, the three republics did renounce the potential benefits of deterrence when they returned the parts of the Soviet nuclear arsenal that were left on their territories after the dismemberment of the USSR. It could be even argued that a similar dynamic was in place with the decision by Argentina and Brazil to roll back the nuclear programs they were involved in.\footnote{All of these developments took place in the 1990s, at the same time when the NPT had acquired almost universal status and had been indefinitely extended.}

The idea of disarmament pushed for by this thesis, however, is even broader. One further example is Mack’s usage of the ‘nuclear allergy’ metaphor to refer to ‘the idea that reliance on nuclear weapons to promote national security in the post-Cold War is neither wise nor morally appropriate.’\footnote{Andrew Mack, ‘The Case for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia,’ Australian National University Working Paper 8 (1992).} Building on that, Dalby dubbed New Zealand’s anti-nuclear choice the ‘Kiwi disease’ to explain the renunciation to the ANZUS treaty because of the reliance on a nuclear threat.\footnote{Simon Dalby, ‘The ‘Kiwi disease’: geopolitical discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the South Pacific,’ Political Geography 12 n° 5 (1993).} Indeed, if countries renounced proliferation because of a deep conviction in the inferiority of security based upon deterrence, that would be the ideal situation Wheeler referred to.

Pending that, it is useful to notice that disarmament at its core implies a renunciation to nuclear deterrence, which is the most decisive element in
understanding what it is about. This conception will be better clarified in Chapter Three.

2.5 Conclusion

The literature review conducted in this chapter has outlined the contours of some of the debates surrounding the security underpinnings of nuclear armaments. With a view to providing a more integrated approach to the field, this chapter has focused on the debates surrounding the four images of nuclear weapons. The discussion was thus divided among deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, trying to devise patterns and conceptions that characterise each. Studies on the history of deterrence were dominant throughout the Cold War and a focus on non-proliferation and arms control also emerged early on. Serious contemplation of disarmament, on the other hand, waned after a prolific early start and is now back in the debate. However, disarmament has been treated as residual category, a deviant phenomenon, while actually most states have adopted a ‘disarmed’ identity, a question that was left widely unattended.

On the theoretical level, rationalist explanations fared poorly, leaving much unexplained in both deterrence and non-proliferation theories. Realism’s indeterminate character and lack of explanatory power was a problem for both literatures as such theories were little guide when facing crises and overestimated the appeal of proliferation. As much of the literature
demonstrates, intersubjective practices are crucial to unravel nuclear weapons issues. Realist or liberal institutionalist approaches, in fact, have failed to recognise the ideational and normative factors that have worked to diminish the risk posed by nuclear arms both in terms of contributing to nuclear non-proliferation and a safer management of nuclear deterrence. Challenging these assumptions, interpretive work is breaking new ground in explaining nuclear restraint – both concerning the practice of deterrence and regarding further proliferation.

Going back to the introductory remarks, we can agree with Mutimer that much changes according to the lenses through which the nuclear order is assessed. What is striking, despite the different language used in the various traditions, is the commonality of themes and preoccupations. The chapter argued that the divisions within these literatures have prevented an analysis of the nuclear problem as a whole, something this thesis aims to do evocating the notion of global nuclear governance. This is established on the prohibitions enshrined in non-proliferation and arms control, but also on the crucial distinction between those states that rely on the bomb and those that do not. This will be referred to here as the deterrence-disarmament continuum, which will be further explained in Chapter Three. Conceiving of global nuclear governance as based upon the competing regimes of deterrence and disarmament, as well as on the regulations of non-proliferation and arms control, allows us to view them as a whole.

To better understand the advantages of a governance framework, the next chapter will highlight its relevant insights and apply them to the nuclear
reality in a way to contribute to the emerging notion of global nuclear governance.
Chapter 3

Towards a Definition of Global Nuclear Governance

In an effort to make sense of the current nuclear condition and of the reliance on the threat of mass destruction even in the face of global opposition, this thesis asks what the role of civil society is in the global governance of nuclear weapons. In Chapter Two we have identified the defining characters of nuclear order and started discussing what are the practices attached to each of those images – deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. We have also highlighted how some, dissatisfied by the traditional emphasis on the regime of non-proliferation and the field of arms control, have started developing the notion of global nuclear governance. This will be better grounded in this chapter, as well as throughout this thesis, by engaging a discussion between the literatures on governance and on nuclear politics.

At this point it is important to turn to the scholarship on global governance, and distinctly security governance, to assess whether this interpretive lens has something to offer to the study of the politics of the bomb. That allows building upon the specialist insights of nuclear scholarship by engaging a different research tradition, generally deployed to analyse somewhat
different global problems. It will be argued that, with its emphasis on diverse sources of authority and ample definition of power, governance is of high value as a heuristic tool to conceptualise the global dimension of the current struggle over the bomb.

In the second part of the chapter, we will proceed to defend the usefulness of the concept in the nuclear field, by proceeding in steps: (1) give a definition of global nuclear governance, (2) overview the variety of governance actors, and (3) identify and typify its associated practices. On the basis of the nuclear images from Chapter Two, a matrix of nuclear governance will visualise the distinction between regimes of deterrence and disarmament, on the one hand, and regulatory practices of arms control and non-proliferation, on the other. Through that exercise we will be better able not only to see the variety of nuclear relations, much beyond the usual attention to power-wielding nuclear-armed states or aspirants, but also realise the underlying tension within this global order. As such, we can start developing a conceptual map of the governance of the nuclear risk and of the various attitudes and practices that actors can enact.

### 3.1 Security governance

Throughout the last couple of decades, the term governance has become something of a buzzword, used often by both academics and policy makers to refer to different things: to the quality of domestic rule or to the structures
and processes of the global order, and deployed analytically by some and normatively by others. Fundamentally, governance is concerned with the idea that the act of governing has changed and should be considered as a process rather than an institution. The basic assumption is that the Westphalian state has lost its centrality as the world becomes more transnationally connected because of globalisation, new communication, and the spread of global threats. ‘Direct-dial telephones, nuclear fallout, global corporations and the like have brought the 'outsider' to the 'inside' as never before.'¹ Even the most powerful states are unable to tackle challenges alone; instead a system of heterarchy prevails whereby a multiplicity of authority sources shape outcomes through complex interactions in most areas of social life, from the economy to the environment and from health to security.

Governance study has not been part and parcel of one specific theoretical perspective, but rather pluralism has dominated as often realist, liberal, institutionalist, cosmopolitan, and Marxist perspectives are to be found together.² While several contributions over the past fifteen years have concentrated on security governance, the field is still quite limited and draws heavily on more general theoretical claims made by the global governance approach. The latter, however, has mostly focused on ‘softer’ issues such as trade and the environment giving only sparse attention to the troubling questions of order and cooperation under loaded conflict situations.

² A telling example can be found with a look at the table of content of the book edited by Held and McGrew, Governing Globalization, which includes chapters from all those traditions. Anthony McGrew and David Held, Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
Financial governance, labour governance, development governance and the like have received much more attention than security governance.

To any extent, it was found that the same structures, actors, and processes evidenced in economic and environmental matters, are at play also in the field of security, making governance approaches better poised for assessing the way security policy is organised in the 21st century. As this project is interested in exploring a security issue, and a hard one at that, the present section will review the most crucial works on security governance while drawing on the wider global governance literature throughout. The two research programmes, in fact, cannot be properly distinct and cross-pollination across issues has been successfully undertaken.

One of the most popular definitions of security governance states that it involves the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes.\(^3\)

This is basically a system of rule that structures multiple levels of human activity, as one of the most prolific scholars on the subject, James Rosenau, has put it.\(^4\) Whereas other approaches have focused on certain spaces – be they national or transnational – the benefit of governance lays in its accent on the global level of interaction in its complexity. Heterarchy is a crucial concept here, highlighting the absence of one predominant source of authority – in fact, whilst in certain cases it is still the state to be the keystone

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of the system, this does not apply to all circumstances. Instead of the traditional framework based on nation states and their interactions, the very conception of space in governance is distinctive: it works on a global scale and tries to trace back the disparate forces that animate it. The definition will now be unpacked so as to outline its complexity in terms of, first, the actors involved and, second, the processes subsumed under this framework.

3.1.1 The rise of transnational and non-governmental actors

Most crucial among the contributions of security governance are the insights into the diffusion of agency to different kinds of actors throughout multiple levels of the social world, thereby breaking open the dominance of the state. Governance is built on the distinction of this political system from that of government, as highlighted by the very title of Rosenau and Czempiel's seminal work, *Governance without Government*. Indeed, as some have noted, 'security governance is performed by multiple actors and is intended to create a global environment of security for states, social groups, and individuals'.

While one could argue that governance has always been a tendency, its emergence dates to two decades ago and is generally associated with globalisation. The transnational reach of the market had in fact disempowered states to a certain extent and actors were trying to rein in or

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5 Mark Webber, et al., 'The Governance of European Security.'
liberate the forces of globalisation through governance. The emergence of
globalisation made it clear that single states or alliances were no longer able
alone to address certain problems, such as terrorism, environmental
degradation, and the proliferation of arms. Subsequently, this reinforced the
need for interactions between communities of states and non-state actors,
NGOs, international organisations, and transnational corporations. Positing
a distinctive conception of political space that does not coincide with the
country state, governance is thus the system to rule globalisation, as noted
particularly by those concerned with global economic or financial
governance.8

For this thesis what is problematic in some, though not all, of this literature is
that governance is addressed as a by-product of globalisation rather than a
parallel process.9 While globalisation is a process that goes much beyond
mere economic forces, the emphasis on the market is problematic for
exploring the field of security. Aside from its material component,
globalisation also produced a ‘borderless space of social life’, with a move
towards localism and transborder identities accompanied by an opposite one
to renewed nationalism.10 Furthermore, globalisation is not the only
structural change that should be credited for the emergence of governance:
privatisation and deregulation, new technologies, and the end of the Cold

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8 Some examples are Joseph S. Nye Jr and John D. Donahue, eds, Governance in a Globalizing World
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Elke Krahmann, ‘Conceptualizing Security
Governance,’ Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 38 n°
1, 2003; Scholte, ‘The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World.’
9 Joseph S. Nye Jr and John D. Donahue, Governance in a Globalizing World.
10 Jan Aart Scholte, ‘The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World.’
War also contributed to make the world more complex through an increase in the number of its relevant units and of their interconnectedness.\textsuperscript{11} Multi-level is in fact the condition of political action in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, characterised by both significant autonomy and high interactions between different levels.\textsuperscript{12} Governing activity, in fact, has undergone a double process of integration and fragmentation, or the so-called ‘fragmegration’, whereby authority has moved not only beyond but also below the state.\textsuperscript{13} In fact, while the world was becoming increasingly integrated with institutionalised cooperation spanning several continents, it was also displaying a higher fragmentation as evidenced in the oft-mentioned ‘hollowing out of the state’.

As suggested by Anne-Marie Slaughter, we should think about the state in the same way we think about domestic governments, which we naturally regard as a set of separate institutions with different roles and capacities.\textsuperscript{14} The decentralisation of authority is evident in the multiplication of agents engaged in creating issues, setting agendas, producing norms, and monitoring their enforcement.\textsuperscript{15} New institutions, more fluid and flexible arrangements, changing coalitions, and private actors have characterised the transatlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{16} Actors can

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{13} James Rosneau, ‘Change, Complexity, and Governance in Globalizing Space.’
\bibitem{15} Deborah Denise Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell \textit{Who Governs the Globe?}
\bibitem{16} Elke Krahmann, ‘Conceptualizing Security Governance.’
\end{thebibliography}
thus be divided across the supra-national, national, and sub-national levels but they can also be classified as private, governmental, and third sector.  

The national governmental actor par excellence, the state, is still central, virtually everyone agrees, though it is increasingly intertwined with other depositaries of authority. The 1990s had seen more and more competencies being transferred to regional and international bodies like the EU and UN agencies, international courts, WTO, and MERCOSUR. Not only did NATO survive the end of the Cold War, but regional security fora have emerged elsewhere, as shown by ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The creation and interpretation of norms is increasingly transnational, most evidently when enshrined in international law or the creation of institutions.

Initial studies of governance can be considered as an extension of the literature on international organisations and regimes. This approach was epitomised in the work of the Commission on Global Governance, which considered it to be mainly about intergovernmental relations, but also in other contributions stressing mostly the role of the UN or other institutional frameworks. 

Regional governance has also received much attention as actors like the EU provided the most similar analogy to a national government with some roles being fulfilled beyond the states and others below it. Decisions over fields as diverse as finance and fishing must be reached in Brussels and national  

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17 Joseph S. Nye Jr and John D. Donahue, Governance in a Globalizing World.
governments need to cooperate to establish and enforce rules. Also, the EU expanded its involvement in security with peace-keeping and peace-building operations as well as conflict prevention. Christou and others went so far as to define it an ‘ideal-type of governance structures for several concerns, security included.’\textsuperscript{20} As with the broader global governance literature, in fact, the EU provides a good example of how politics are moving to a multi-level system where different actors have not only a stake but also a say in the process. While this certainly rests on the sheer array of tasks performed by EU institutions and non-governmental actors within Europe, it also detracts somehow from the wider applicability of governance theory – as maintained by Keohane and Nye, in fact, the domestic analogy holds quite well for the EU but not for other regions or fora.\textsuperscript{21}

Moreover, supra-national cooperation is only one side of the picture. It is definitely true that states remain central actors and that ‘intergovernmental governance’ or ‘governance with the state’ is crucial: states discuss and sign treaties, produce international law, and activate regulation. However, they are often not alone in that: ‘transnational governance’ or ‘governance without the state’ also bears importance.\textsuperscript{22} Authority has in fact spread below and beyond the state but also beside it: multinational corporations, the information industry, NGOs as well as domestic agencies are all in some ways governors.\textsuperscript{23} In the post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans, for instance, we can see not only NATO cooperate with the EU, the Organization for

\textsuperscript{22} Mathias Koenig Archibugi and Michael Zürn, New Modes of Governance in the Global System: Exploring Publicness, Delegation and Inclusiveness (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
\textsuperscript{23} Deborah D. Avant, , Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, Who Governs the Globe?
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN, but also with a range of non-governmental actors, from private contractors to the International Committee of the Red Cross.²⁴

Among those that looked at private governance some focused on all the governance practices happening inside states’ boundaries, while others emphasised the transnational dimension of political action undertaken by actors other than the state. Of the former, Hanggi examined security sector governance, or the management at the domestic level of all those involved with the provision of security.²⁵ In a field highly bound to sociology, many contributions addressed the politics of policing, paying also attention to transnational actors’ choice of response to insecurity.²⁶ As for the latter, Slaughter has emphasised the pervasive nature of interactions between government agencies across borders and how transnational networks are no longer the prerogative of diplomats but also involve national officials in dialogue with their foreign counterparts.²⁷ Similar networks are to be found for most business and advocacy activities as well. Thinkers influenced by Marxism have pointed to the emergence of a transnational capitalist class, responsible for the spread of neoliberal frames of mind and recipes, and of marginalized groups for whom globalisation offers no benefit.²⁸ While this is

²⁴ Mark Webber, Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, and Elke Krahmann, ‘The Governance of European Security.’
true of economic relations, a similar process of cultural subordination can be found in security as well.

Scholarship on NGOs and social movements is quite extensive and will be analysed in more depth subsequently. It has mostly asked how groups of advocates and activists can affect change in normative and social orders and developed models such as the boomerang and the spiral, explaining the agency of non-governmental groups in the acceptance of norms by states.29

Empirically it has been convincingly demonstrated that civil society activism had a role in the success of at least two disarmament regulations: the prohibition of chemical weapons and of landmines.30 Others, however, have problematized these occurrences criticising what is often taken to be resistance as another manifestation of governmentality.31

While these debates on civil society and the role and value of their contention will be analysed in the next section, it is worth mentioning now that the emergence of private governance has opened the way to discussions of democracy when sovereignty loses its traditional meaning. Can these new actors be legitimated even in the absence of electoral political representation? A variety of scholars have asked what it is that makes governance legitimate and distinguishing between input- and output-legitimacy and linking it to


internal and external accountability. The idea of broadening the pool of stakeholders taking part in policy-making and implementation promises to bring more inclusion, legitimacy, and ultimately democracy. Some even argued that only a legitimate system of governance can prove effective. As Wolf pointed out, however, the picture is not always so rosy, in that states often cooperate with one another to protect themselves against social pressures. After having given this broad overview of the actors of governance, we will now turn to the processes that structure their interactions.

3.1.2 Coordinated management and regulation

The management and regulation of a certain issue area through a wide array of instruments, actors, and sources of authority are thus at the heart of governance, as illustrated by the definition given above. After having looked at governance’s comprehensive take on actors and authority, this section will outline the ways in which coordination in the management and regulation of a problematic issue in world politics is structured. There can be said to be two main strands of research on this, which for simplicity will be termed conventional and critical. These two approaches differ on the place that the concept of cooperation holds in a system of governance. Whereas the former

approach has been more widespread, the latter has also received increasing attention.

Together with the initial focus on transnational institutions, conventional governance studies have had a tendency to consider governance as almost akin to cooperation. As hinted above, security governance is generally seen as a non-coercive system involving coordination, management, and regulation.\(^{35}\) This is based on the recognition that coercion is becoming less relevant in a number of social interactions, as demonstrated by the less frequent recourse to the use of force and threats in inter-state relations. It has been argued that ‘governance in the global system is about creating social and political order in the absence of modern statehood’\(^{36}\) and thus governance has been conceptualised by many as the set of rules, institutions, and arrangements that structure the world in an orderly way. Some have gone even further saying that ‘There can be no governance without order and there can be no order without governance.’\(^{37}\) This functionalist view tends to see governance problems as a matter of efficiency and effectiveness in fulfilling collective demands.\(^{38}\)

However, this understanding is quite limiting and only focuses on the most benign face of governance. An example of this view can be found in Kirchner and Sperling’s work on security governance.\(^{39}\) Not only do they take a mostly statist approach, dividing their edited volume along national lines, but they

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\(^{35}\) Emil J. Kirchner, ‘The Challenge of European Union Security Governance.’

\(^{36}\) Thomas Risse, ‘Transnational Governance and Legitimacy,’ 179.


also see institutions as the unique expression of security governance and a better integration of the regional and the international levels as the solution to pressing problems. As noted by Finkelstein, ‘although adopting rules may be a primary objective of governance, as of government, and may even be the most important service performed, it is not the only function of governance precisely because it is not the only thing governments do’.  

More fundamentally, the problem of this view lies in its more or less implicit liberal claim that solutions to shared problems of world politics are to be found in inter-state and trans-level cooperation. Conversely, critical contributions have doubted the feasibility of a normative consensus binding the international community: the process of creating order, far from equating cooperation, is indeed prone to create more subtle forms of domination and exploitation even in the absence of formally legitimated coercive power. 

That is the case of postcolonial analyses of security governance, which have looked, for example, into transnational companies active in the mining sector in Sub-Saharan Africa and the everyday security practices they generate. A similar line of thought has been particularly developed by authors from a Foucauldian and Gramscian perspective. In the rise of tasks fulfilled by civil society, Neumann and Sending do not see a movement of power from the state to the non-state, but rather a change in the governing rationality which might lead to co-optation. The notion of governance as provision of order can thus be maintained but in the sense of steering capacity and (informal)

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rule. For Bob Jessop, governance is the coordination of social relations characterized by different kinds of reciprocal interdependence, which are placed along a continuum from the ‘anarchy of exchange’, through the ‘hierarchy of command’ and the ‘heterarchy of reflexive self-organization’, and to the ‘solidarity of unconditional loyalty and trust’.

In the field of security, a similar but more parsimonious distinction of modalities has been presented by Adler and Greve who see governance as composed of two mechanisms of interaction: balance of power and security communities. They maintain that, despite being the remits of two opposed schools of thought, both modalities exist in reality, even overlapping in certain regional settings. Accordingly, these mechanisms should therefore be studied, together with their associated repertoires of practices, through a more comprehensive approach that overcomes the rationalist-constructivist theoretical divide. As such, governance does not entail the elimination of conflict or the emergence of a cosmopolitan federalism, rather it includes different modalities of interaction among actors. This means being open to recognise the effect of varieties of power: not only the material one but also the power of identities and narration.

Bringing this even further, Barnett and Duvall have looked for instances of four different forms of power, whether the compulsory kind favoured by realists or the power of institutions highlighted by liberals and

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45 Bob Jessop, ‘System Failure: Global Governance and Human Values,’ presentation given at the University of Warwick, 17 July 2013.
constructivists, the structural power of the Marxist tradition, or the performatively preferred by interpretivist approaches. Their approach, looking for evidence of the enactment of a certain type of power rather than the other, appears well-placed to recognize the dialectic and sometimes contradictory character of governance even in matters of security. Applying this framework, Johnstone has looked at the debate in the UN Security Council regarding NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to find the effects of interpretive communities, or those groups of experts, governmental and not, that define rules and norms. 47 He finds instances of productive, institutional, and compulsory power as legal discourse shapes the terms of interaction among the players, indirectly steers action in a certain direction, and can directly affect states’ positions if used effectively.

Like him, much interpretive literature has drawn from Habermas to develop propositions over communicative action and its role in producing and reproducing global governance. Risse in particular has looked at argumentative action within international negotiations noting its centrality in setting and implementing rules. 48 It is through social interaction that preferences and identities get challenged and changed paving the way for social learning and the internalisation of norms. In a similar vein, but coming from a media background, Castells used the notion of ‘global public sphere’

as the site where the opinions of society are shaped. Together they help us think of governance as the space where regulation is decided upon through a discursively constructed consensus.

This approach is consistent with critical constructivist commitment to prioritise identity, narratives, and representation that has been sketched in the Introduction. However, it needs to be complemented with a reflexive attention to the politics of power inequalities. Murphy stated that ‘Global governance is more a site, one of many sites, in which struggles over wealth, power and knowledge are taking place.’ This notion of governance as the space of struggle also resonates with calls by postcolonial authors to engage with ‘subaltern agency and the politics of translation, appropriation and resistance.’ The contestation of global governance has indeed been a central preoccupation of critical contributions. The same sensitivity can be found in this work, which takes an interpretive approach to examine the struggle over nuclear disarmament, as it is being brought forward by a governance actor that, at least in principle, is a subordinate voice of contestation.

About twenty years after the introduction of the concept, global governance remains a relatively undefined and indeterminate notion. The term has been used by a variety of authors who have given it connotations ranging from analytical to normative and from broad to narrow. In many works, moreover,

the usage of governance is instrumental to saying something else: a variety of authors do not even attempt to define what they mean by governance. In 1995 Finkelstein argued that “[g]lobal governance” appears to be virtually anything.53 Indeed, he has not been alone in criticising this research programme for being too undetermined and theoretically shallow.

However, it is more useful to think of governance as a heuristic tool or a conceptual framework – essentially as a perspective that leads to asking questions that would otherwise remain unanswered.54 It could be said that governance argues that less political actors and less political actions are integral to understanding the world. The emergence of governance is thus rooted in a reconfiguration of sources, sites, and practices of authority. On the structural level, it is interested in understanding or advancing the creation of global order from complexity generated by parallel processes such as globalisation, communication, and networking which made the world more interconnected and interdependent. While the concentration on market forces of much of the literature can help in analysing the nuclear order only to a certain extent, the increase of nodal structures and their interaction is quite important. Mapping the space of global governance and locating its regulatory structures is indeed a promising perspective to understand governing activity in the absence of legitimated coercion.

After having gone through the different types of power and actors involved in global security governance, the chapter will address the use that of this framework can be made in the nuclear field.

53 Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ‘What is Global Governance,’ 368.
54 Emil J. Kirchner, ‘The Challenge of European Union Security Governance.’
3.2 Nuclear governance

Attempts at conceiving of the nuclear order as a complex system of government have thus far been scarce, as foregrounded by the discussion of nuclear governance introducing Chapter Two. Harald Müller and his colleagues, for instance, refer to ‘common security governance,’ an attempt to unravel the spirals of security dilemmas through the norms ingrained in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.55 Similarly, Bruce Larkin refers to global governance as opposed to ‘sovereign unilateralism’.56 Also, Nicholas Wheeler mentions governance while criticizing the implications of a world shaped upon Kenneth Waltz’s presumption that nuclear weapons are a boon.57

All of these contributions only touch upon governance but they seem to employ a notion of it that is akin to cooperation, thus unnecessarily restricting their analysis to one modality of governance. The bomb has been governed not only through the rules imposed by agreements for non-proliferation or arms control purposes, but also by the decisions to disarm or exercise deterrence. As argued by Lebow and Stein, a full view of the nuclear situation must take into account the restraint induced by nuclear deterrence.58 Nuclear governance is not only a set of ‘international treaties,

55 Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, eds, Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control.
organizations, initiatives and networks\textsuperscript{59} but also coercive practices. Such sensitivity can be found in Ritchie’s category of ‘institutional/governance value’\textsuperscript{60} as one of the domains of nuclear value, with the UN Security Council permanent membership coinciding with the NPT-sanctioned nuclear weapon state status. All this work has been helpful in clarifying the contours of nuclear governance, but more systematic analyses are needed in order to understand the structures, actors, and practices involved.\textsuperscript{61}

On the basis of what said in the previous section, nuclear governance does not need to be synonymous with cooperative behaviour. Wheeler thinks of global nuclear governance as what will be necessary for disarmament to take place, here it is argued that governance is already in place – though its effectiveness and legitimacy have limits. Building on the definition of security governance presented in earlier, we can say that nuclear governance comprises \textit{all those formal and informal arrangements, institutions, norms, and discourses, situated at multiple levels and involving different kinds of actors in the coordinated management and regulation of nuclear arms and their sensitive technologies}. This thesis will try to conceptualise it instead as the whole of the practices as well as regulations on nuclear weapons and related activities, thus considering not only a potential disarmament end-


\textsuperscript{60} Nick Ritchie, ‘Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.’

\textsuperscript{61} Other projects are increasingly interested in exploring such issues so hopefully this research project will be able to engage with more contributions in the future. Some examples are the Crisis Leadership in Global Economic and Security Governance (CLiGG) at the University of Warwick, the 2014 ISODARCO Winter School titled ‘Nuclear Governance: Prospects for a Strengthened Nonproliferation Regime,’ and the 2013 training course of the European University Institute ‘Global, Regional and National Actors in the Governance of the Atom: A Focus on Europe and the Middle East.’
state, but also all the other analytical categories that were the backbone of Chapter Two: deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament.

In the following sections we will start mapping nuclear governance in terms of actors and practices. That grounds the case for the relevance of this approach in that it allows us to have a deeper understanding of agency in the nuclear world with its focus on what is non-state and multi-level as well as a broader analysis of the structure of nuclear order, more inclusive than the non-proliferation regime.

3.2.1 **Actors of nuclear governance: more than just states**

As there is not one single body dedicated to its various dimensions, nuclear governance works at multiple levels and includes both public and private authority. States are visibly important and often preponderant in decisions concerning nuclear arms and materials and their management, but by no means are they the only ones with agency in these decisions. The parallel processes of integration and fragmentation have been in place with competences migrating to higher and lower levels of government through formal and informal arrangements. International organisations and regimes have put limits on states’ nuclear practices and, although it remains a national decision whether to join them or not, there has been extensive support and compliance with their norms.\(^6^2\) Non-proliferation, for example, is now an almost universal norm and the related agreement, the NPT, is one of the most universal treaties. Of course the same cannot be said about all

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nuclear governance norms, and contestation is pervasive even for non-proliferation and its associated commitments.

In terms of ‘governance with government’, institutionalised multilateral cooperation among states is well developed in a variety of fora under the aegis of the UN: General Assembly, Security Council, UN Disarmament Commission, Conference on Disarmament. Formally separated but connected to the UN, several multilateral treaties and agreements have constrained nuclear activities: the NPT, LTBT and the CTBT, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the different forms of safeguards and nuclear cooperation administered by the IAEA. Less inclusive arrangements have characterised the export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.\(^63\) Interdiction activities have also been coordinated through the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). All these multilateral institutions and agreements absolve a function in nuclear governance even with their varying degree of resources, effectiveness, and consensus. Interestingly, networks of states with similar views have acted within some of these institutions to promote their common agenda, as highlighted by work on the NAM.\(^64\)

Moreover, it is not just globally but also regionally that governance acts, in fact treaties and institutions have dealt with non-proliferation and disarmament at that level. Treaties on the regional prohibition of nuclear arms (and certain uses of the materials) were concluded in all of the Southern

\(^{63}\) With 48 members the NSG is the most inclusive of these arrangements, as compared to the 38 of the Zangger Committee and the 41 of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Most member states of all three come from the Global North.

\(^{64}\) William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement*. 

Hemisphere and parts of the Northern, reaching a total of 115 states covered by the so-called nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs). These bind their parties to non-possession, non-stationing, and non-use of nuclear weapons and therefore go further than the NPT in important respects. Some of the NWFZs have established their institutions – The Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America (OPANAL) and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) – while Argentina and Brazil bilaterally created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to administer verification.

Another example of nuclear policy coordination at the regional level can be found in the NATO. As part of its commitments, nuclear deterrence has been from its origins central to the defence of the alliance and US nuclear arms have been stationed in Europe through the Treaty. Moreover, NATO conducts activities to limit nuclear proliferation and to secure materials in partner countries. As works on European security governance have demonstrated, the EU provides a good example of how politics is moving to a multi-level system where different actors have not only a stake but also a say in the process. In the nuclear field too the EU is an important component of regional coordination and regulation as shared agendas and practices emerge. Brussels' non-proliferation policy suffers from many shortcomings, first of all its inclusion of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states as well

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as countries hosting atomic weapons.\textsuperscript{67} Yet, it has a strong basis in the cooperative management of nuclear materials through EURATOM and started to increase the coordination of its external actions as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, from sanctions to common positions.\textsuperscript{68} This is a complex process that involves the cooperation of a host of institutions, from heads of states to local port authorities.

Other military alliances that involve deterrence sharing are the ANZUS or Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (though without Wellington after its denuclearisation), the Japan-US Security Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and South Korea. However, informality has often been preponderant, as demonstrated by the unclear status of the nuclear protection awarded by the US to its Middle Eastern allies. Much policy is also made at the bilateral level, especially, but not only, concerning Washington and Moscow. Since the 1970s, an array of treaties has bounded the two to cap their atomic warheads deployments and holdings, and to refrain from certain practices and accept mutual verification. More recently they also cooperated on securing Russia’s radioactive material via the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.\textsuperscript{69}

Aside from the international, the regional, and the bilateral levels, domestic dynamics and bodies have also come to shape nuclear politics as authority gets fragmented across sub-state entities. The US Congress, in particular, has

\textsuperscript{67} For an examination of that, see Benjamin Kienzle, Ideas, Interests and the Limits of Collective Foreign Policy Output: The Case of the European Union Non-Proliferation Policy, PhD Dissertation, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, December 2009.

\textsuperscript{68} Policy harmonisation was pursued through the European Security Strategy and the EU Strategy on WMD and facilitated by institutional evolution with the creation of a coordinating figure, the Director for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament as part of the European External Action Service.

\textsuperscript{69} The programme, also known as Nunn-Lugar because of the two Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar who advised President H. W. Bush on the issue, ended in 2013 but was partially renewed under a new framework.
proved several times to be a crucial player in nuclear decision-making and implementation as the following examples highlight: in 1999 it rejected ratification of the CTBT, it has actively pushed for more sanctions against Iran over the past ten years, and controlling the budget gives it leverage on the continuing layout of the US deterrent and its implementation of arms control treaties. The discussion around the repercussions of a potential Scottish independence for the British nuclear deterrent is another case in point, demonstrating how agency might matter at the local level. Threatening to leave London without a base for its nuclear-armed submarines, Scotland’s independence and nuclear renunciation would have involved far-reaching consequences in terms of disarmament. In a similar fashion, albeit at a smaller level, cities have sometimes rejected nuclear possession under the banner of nuclear-free cities. Particularly in the 1980s, as disarmament campaigners were strong in Europe, local municipalities ruled not to allow any nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. Although this opposition is possibly rooted more in a rejection of nuclear energy rather than weapons per se, its implications hinge on military matters as well. An example is to be found in Sir Michael Quinlan’s account of the UK Ministry of Defence’s inability to conduct exercises involving nuclear weapons in 1982 because of the local councils’ decision to declare themselves ‘nuclear-free zones’ refusing to cooperate with the central government.⁷⁰

Even though nuclear politics remains dominated by states, there are grounds to argue that ‘governance without government’ is also present as non-state actors are involved in a variety of respects: contributing to agenda-setting in

multilateral institutions, monitoring states’ practices, building networks to advance their claims. Non-state actors are thus involved in nuclear governance both with the provision of services and knowledge but also making their own politics. Not only do private and third sector actors have increasing access to resources, but they are often also given some voice in international deliberations. Moreover, they have been sometimes a source of strain: it is probably sufficient to recall the A.Q. Khan incident, the scientist who stole and sold nuclear secrets, to convincingly make the case that states are no longer the only actors that can affect nuclear governance. Nuclear terrorism has quickly risen to a major concern since 9/11, as demonstrated by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Also, the standoff surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme started with the revelation of undeclared facilities by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a political opposition group. Another example of governance without government is found in the nuclear energy industry, although a large part of it is state-owned. Nuclear corporations actively lobby for their priorities and have started establishing policy guidelines on nuclear proliferation and security.\textsuperscript{71}

Since the invention of the bomb civil society has been active campaigning for disarmament in different countries at the national and local level as well as transnationally, as will be further explored in the following section. Examples range from the historic Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) to the more recent Global Zero and from the Greenham Common movement to anti-testing Greenpeace activism

In sum, actors involved in the discussion, negotiation, and implementation of nuclear policy span from international organisations to civil society and from cities to continents. This complexity risks being lost in approaches that privilege the state or a certain level of analysis – it is the interaction among levels and between states and other sources of authority that often determines outcomes.

### 3.2.2 Regimes of nuclear governance

What nuclear weapons do to order is not an unproblematic unit, but a complex system of practices and social relations. Mapping the space of global governance and locating its regulatory structures is indeed a promising perspective to understand governing activity in the absence of legitimated coercion. On the structural level, the politics of the bomb can be divided into four relatively independent images, which have associated policy options and priorities as well as discourses. Contrary to other accounts this thesis maintains that nuclear governance is structured around the politics of deterrence, arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament, whose definitions have been put forward in Chapter Two. Table 1 summarises that discussion and seeks to highlight the differences across categories.

<table>
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<th>Table 1: Images of Nuclear Governance</th>
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| Disarmament | Eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons as a means of security | States that do not have nuclear weapons | - Cannot afford  
- Do not want to possess nuclear weapon  
- Reversal |
| Deterrence | Threaten nuclear weapons use to protect | Nuclear-armed states or that rely | - High-salience nuclear postures |
Arms control is an important way through which order has been brought to the nuclear age and often it is considered as the name of the field revolving around nuclear cooperation.\textsuperscript{72} However, the term has often been used to refer more to the bilateral process of nuclear arms limitation between Washington and Moscow than to an overall strategy. For this arms control has recently come under attack,\textsuperscript{73} however, it proved so powerful a frame that even when authors recognise that it is only one side of the issue, they have adopted it as an encompassing term.\textsuperscript{74} As such, nuclear governance encompasses the other dimensions of the provision of orderly solutions to the nuclear risk.

The regulation of nuclear weapons is also often associated to the idea of an expanding non-proliferation regime with treaties and agreements to limit the geographical spread of the bomb, to new countries or other actors. Significantly, non-proliferation is but one dimension of nuclear weapons regulation, as Chapter Two showed. Of course it is a very important component of agreements and institutions in this field including the NPT,

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\textsuperscript{72} The arms control community, for instance, is used to refer to the whole of those officials and experts involved with nuclear issues, a notion that is replaced in this thesis with the concept of global nuclear civil society.

\textsuperscript{73} Neil Cooper and David Mutimer, ‘Arms Control in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.’

\textsuperscript{74} Müller and Wunderlich, for example, regard arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation as serving the purpose of a ‘common security governance,’ but choose to include them all under arms control for the purpose of the book. Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, \textit{Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control,} 2-3.
NWFZs, export control arrangements, legally binding negative security assurances, and various activities by the IAEA.\textsuperscript{75}

This project uses the term nuclear governance, rather than the more widely used non-proliferation regime, because of its wider structural regard and of its recognition of agency different from that of the state. Nuclear governance, indeed, is composed of different regimes, as the creation of order has concerned much more than the geographical spread of the bomb. Treaties have been signed for the renunciation of certain activities (the LTBT and CTBT treaties on nuclear testing, India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement), to set quantitative limits of deployed weapons (SALT I, II, START I, II, New START), to eliminate altogether a category of arms (INF), but also to grant nuclear protection as in the NATO framework, or for cooperation such as between the UK and France.

All the four images discussed, in fact, have their limitations. Talking about deterrence, for instance, does not say much as to why states seek nuclear arsenals and disarmament is mostly a normative project with little theoretical development. Arms control, on the other hand, is generally a subject of historical discussion, and non-proliferation is dominated by policy-oriented accounts and an alarmist feel. This thesis proposes a more integrated view of the field, which goes beyond its fixation with the bilateral arms reduction process on the one hand, and the proliferation problem raised by special countries of concern on the other, and the avoidance of the problematic repercussions of deterrence. All of these elements speak to the security

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 52.
underpinnings of nuclear weapons and much could be gained from greater interaction.

Contesting the notion of the non-proliferation regime, the regimes of deterrence and disarmament give a better view of the normative variance of nuclear order. They coexist at the same time proscribing different roles to different categories of states. The relations between social order and nuclear weapons are essentially divided between a logic of disarmament and a logic of deterrence. Deterrence and disarmament could be seen of the remits of the opposing factions of strategic studies and peace research, and indeed from the very language used, they are highly different. Even more, they are one the opposite of the other. Disarmament, as conceptualised here, promises to weaken both deterrence and proliferation while being essentially not in contradiction with arms control.

This view of the nuclear order heavily builds on the division advanced by William Walker around two managed systems – deterrence and abstinence – with two complementary regulatory institutions – arms control and non-proliferation.\(^{76}\) In the system of deterrence ‘a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound’, while the other states in the system of abstinence ‘would give up their sovereign rights to develop, hold and use such weapons in return for economic, security and other benefits’.\(^ {77}\) The distinction between those states relying on nuclear arms and those states that don’t, indeed, goes to the crux of the matter because that is what creates differential obligations and status for states in nuclear

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\(^{77}\) Ibid., 706.
politics. It is not a matter of being pro or against proliferation but pro or against the possession of nuclear weapons. Rather than being the expression of one single non-proliferation regime, the nuclear order is regulated by different regimes for nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.

If for Walker what matters is the material possession of the bomb, however, this thesis takes an interest in the cultural relevance of nuclear weapons themselves. In fact, Walker’s category of abstinence, including among the states that do not have nuclear weapons those protected by nuclear umbrellas, creates problems. While formally correct, it leads to consider that states being protected by a deterrent they do not themselves possess are not actually acting in a system of deterrence. As such, it is reliance on deterrence, not material possession, that constitutes the opposite of abstinence for the purpose of this project.

On the other side, this project sees a regime of disarmament in which states would move away from deterrence conceptions. Disarmament here comes to represent something more than the elimination of a weapon system: it is the elimination of nuclear deterrence from a certain relationship. Nick Ritchie focused his attention on the process of devaluing nuclear weapons that he sees as crucial to make getting to zero politically, strategically, and socially possible. He made the argument that ‘disarmament occurs when the value assigned to nuclear weapons falls below a context-specific threshold such that nuclear weapons have insufficient intersubjective value to warrant continued possession for a polity’. In line with him, disarmament is taken here to be not what happens when numbers of weapons decrease, but rather when

78 Nick Ritchie, ‘Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.’
79 Ibid., 167.
deterrence is rejected. Social relations can be disarmed, in the sense that nuclear weapons are eliminated (materially or not) from the realm of possible use.

Accordingly there is a chasm between a regime of deterrence and a regime of disarmament, both existing in the present environment with differential roles and rules and in continuous conflict with one another. Recognising that the two systems of deterrence and disarmament coexist is crucial because nuclear scholarship has mostly focused on the armed and paid little attention to the disarmed. The assumption that deterrence is the interesting side of nuclear scholarship deserves re-examination. Also, it should be recognised that deterrence and disarmament are not discreet categories, but rather two poles of a continuum along which the ideas, discourses, and, more to the point for this thesis, advocacy material can gravitate.

*Figure 1: Scheme of Nuclear Governance Arrangements*

![Scheme of Nuclear Governance Arrangements](image)

- **Arms Control**
  - New START
  - INF
- **Deterrence**
  - extended deterrence
- **Non-Proliferation**
  - NWFZs
To briefly summarise, as Figure 1 shows, the governance of nuclear weapons is taken here to constructed along a continuum between disarmament and deterrence regimes which ascribe higher or lower value to nuclear arms. Arms control and non-proliferation, instead, constitute its regulatory systems. Treaties and arrangements can thus be categorised according to whether the aim is restricting activities on an already existing nuclear arsenal, arms control, or preventing its formation, non-proliferation.

As the two by two matrix shows, the arrangements making up nuclear governance can either belong to the regime of deterrence or that of disarmament and its regulatory institutions can be shaped on arms control or on non-proliferation. Arms control comprises instruments aimed to cap existing weapons, materials, or activities while non-proliferation, instead, to prevent their spread to new actors. As such, this creates four modalities that help us categorise the various arrangements included under nuclear governance. Four brief examples will be offered: within the arms control agreements (1) New START is the one that tilts towards deterrence, whereas (2) the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty promotes disarmament; (3) extended deterrence arrangements are aimed at non-proliferation but maintaining deterrence, while (4) NWFZs do away with it while sharing the same purpose.

1. Most of the arms control treaties between the US and Russia (earlier the Soviet Union), of which New START is one example, have put quantitative limits to the arsenals of the two, reducing numbers without actually impinging on their mutually assured destruction relationship.
2. On the contrary, some agreements previewed the total elimination of a certain category of weapons, thus eliminating the deterrent power assigned to that arm system – this was the case for the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty of 1987, which banned both from having missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km. The crucial difference between New START and INF is that in the case of the latter the value of the controlled arms sunk and could thus be physically removed, whereas the same did not happen for the former.

3. As for arrangements that prevent the spread of arms, extended deterrence is indeed a non-proliferation measure in that the guarantee by a nuclear-armed state reduces the protected states’ perceived need for nuclear arms. However, it does so while upholding the protector’s deterrent effect and is actually rooted in it.

4. Nuclear weapon free zones, instead, belong to the disarmament modality because they reinforce non-proliferation while eliminating deterrent relationships among the zones’ parties, but also vis-à-vis the nuclear weapon states. The extension of legally binding negative security assurances to states under an NWFZ, in fact, is an act of disarmament even if no warhead is dismantled because the option of a nuclear attack is removed from (legal) possibility.

Nuclear governance is thus much more than the non-proliferation regime: it is not only a matter of who is allowed to acquire the bomb but also how many can states possess and what they can do with them. Even more, nuclear governance is composed of two competing regimes, deterrence and disarmament, which classify actors according to their valuing of the
threatening effect of nuclear arms. As these four examples have shown, there are many ways in which nuclear relations can unfold and nuclear deterrence can either be utilised or rejected. In fact, not all states rely on the bomb or want to. Recognising that these two systems coexist is crucial because nuclear scholarship has mostly focused on the armed and paid little attention to the disarmed.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has put the theoretical foundations of the project through the discussion of literatures on security governance and the development of the notion of global nuclear governance. As we have seen, multiple and separate authorities, including both public and private actors, are the agents of governance. That means that the sovereign authority of the state is dislodged from its central position and opens the way for other forms of authority. Governance exists both with and without government as more competences flow to the private sector and to non-profit organisations. They interact in a multi-level system where spaces both local and transnational complement the national. The site of governance is fragmented in multinational (both universal and exclusive), bilateral, national, subnational, and transnational fora. Functional differentiation, moreover, leads the various actors to perform different tasks.
Governance does not only emphasise complexity through heterarchy but also because of the multiple modalities of purposeful coordinated management and regulation which involves both formal and informal arrangements but also discourses and norms structuring them. In the creation of order patterns of enmity, domination, cooperation, and identification can be found to steer relations among the various units. Having rejected a benign view of governance as cooperation, this project employs governance recognising the complex nature of power and accepting the existence of different simultaneous structuring mechanisms. Power is not only intended as power over others, but also in terms of normative structures and discourses that give meaning to social interaction.

Building on the definition of security governance presented in this chapter, we can say that nuclear governance comprises all those formal and informal arrangements, institutions, norms, and discourses, situated at multiple levels and involving different kinds of actors in the coordinated management and regulation of nuclear arms and their sensitive technologies. In order to break away from the dominant conceptualisations of the nuclear order outlined in Chapter Two, this project makes a case for the relevance of a governance approach in that it allows, firstly, a broader analysis of the structure of nuclear order, more inclusive than the non-proliferation regime. Secondly, because it grants a deeper understanding of agency in the nuclear world with its focus on what is non-state and multi-level. In terms of actors, in fact, the governance literature provides ample justification for studying civil society groups as sources of authority alternative to the state.
Such a view of nuclear order allows to comprehensively regard the various ways in which the bomb is being governed. What is crucial for this discussion, however, is that the continuum along regimes of deterrence and disarmament, beyond the normative structure of nuclear governance, is also a baseline parameter for the discourses that take place there. The competing regimes indeed have less to do with the legal and institutional arrangements and more with the strategic culture and operational plans of the various states. Even more, states (and other actors) can either rely on deterrence or disarmament as the two main modalities to structure their relation to nuclear weapons and materials. Indeed, the idea that wants to be probed in this thesis is that so long as the discourse of deterrence, with its corollaries of non-proliferation and arms control, remain prevalent, nuclear disarmament will remain a far-off objective.

The move along that continuum has crucial analytical importance for this project, which aims to identify the characteristics of the disarmament strategies of civil society. As mentioned in Chapter One, this thesis looks at global nuclear governance by focusing on a particular actor, whose relevance has been amply supported by this chapter's discussion of governance actors. A discussion of the main debates in civil society research is thus crucial now to lay down the foundations to understand that agency, within the structure defined here. That will allow a further grounding in the constructivist and critical research agendas, already started in these pages, as well as the crucial link to Gramsci’s theory of civil society. If this and the previous chapter have introduced the literature concerned with one side of this thesis’ project,
global nuclear governance, the next two will do the same for the other side, global civil society.
Chapter 4

Global Civil Society: Anatomy of a Research Programme

As made clear in Chapter Three, the governance literature provides ample justification for studying civil society groups as one of the sources of authority alternative to the state. The extent of participation and visibility of coalitions and organisations such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Occupy, and the peace movement have drawn much scholarly attention. This produced a wide literature that followed the waves and peaks of activism with works much reflective of their times – from the 1960s with the civil rights, students, and women liberation movements, through the 1990s rise of NGOs, and contemporary activism exemplified by the Indignados and Arab uprisings. On the basis of what said above, this section will highlight the contributions of the literature on civil society in order to find a definition that could be applied to the study of the nuclear world. Reviewing them will allow the reader to identify the analytical focus of the whole project and to put nuclear civil society in the context of similar movements and their scholarship.

The study of civil society broadly intended has included both analytical and normative studies while being highly interdisciplinary: sociologists,
anthropologists, communication studies experts as well as political scientists have come together around this theme. Moreover, the theoretical and methodological tools employed by various researchers markedly vary spanning from rationalistic to sociological approaches. Despite the overwhelming focus on domestic movements, increasing attention has been paid to what was alternatively defined as the international, or transnational, or global level of activism. What brings all approaches together is the idea of social change as the aim of mobilised communities engaged in collective action, be it for the rights of indigenous people, for the protection of the environment, or for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In fact, the desire to change the status quo and a more or less clear agenda to go about are essential to constitute a civil society actor. In essence, a variety of approaches have looked at global civil society whether they use the label or not.

The designations of processes of collective action involving non-state agents have multiplied: social movements, NGOs, transnational advocacy networks, civil society, and transnational coalitions among others. Tarrow argued there are significant differences among the various categories of actors that have been lumped together. Accordingly, works on transnational social movements look at social mobilization involved in contention across at least two states, thus paying attention to the movement’s interactions with states, institutions, and the economy. International NGOs, with a higher degree of professionalism as compared to movements, are not only committed to social change but also involved in service provision and in routine transactions that have a less contentious character. The notion of transnational advocacy

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network, finally, covers both social movements and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) but also governmental agents. Although each term has been employed to refer to a partially different reality, they all speak to the agency of organised individuals who propose modifications to the system of governance.

While collective action, even at the transnational level, is not an entirely new phenomenon, it is widely understood that contemporary movements have a different character from earlier ones. Nineteenth century labour and peasant movements, in fact, were not only much more localised despite the commonality of their cause, but also confronted a very different state apparatus. It is precisely the relation to the state that constitutes one of the main features of civil society and its scholarship. While thinkers such as Tocqueville and Marx had already investigated this relation, they conceptualised civil society as the private sphere, where market interests are at play.\(^8^1\) This project, instead, looks at civil society in a Gramscian way, as established in the Introduction, the implications of which will be seen at the end of this chapter.\(^8^2\) Therefore, it sees civil society as a public sphere, distinguished from political society, and located in the space between the state and the market.

Gramsci regarded civil society as an integral part of the state; in his view, civil society, far from being inimical to the state, is, in fact, its most resilient constitutive element, even though the most immediately visible aspect of the state is political society, with which it is all too often mistakenly identified.\(^8^3\)

Again to go back to the Introduction, this project’s concern is the global reality of collective action in the nuclear field. The term used in this study,


\(^{8^2}\) Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).

global civil society, is employed in the same sense as Lipschutz: to refer to the fact that ‘civil society is becoming global and therefore a political force to be reckoned with’.\(^{84}\) Such terminology is preferred in that it encompasses a reality wider than social movements and because of the emphasis on its global reach: indeed, it is not only the transnational stretch of its connections that make a group global but also its consciousness, or the ability to imagine itself as a community.\(^{85}\)

Looking at specific elements of the phenomenon of collective action at the transnational level, scholars have often made the case for more limited applications that take into consideration a specific aspect of such activism. As a result, the focus of study changes significantly, with some looking mostly at media depictions, others at micro-processes of mobilisation, and still others at the integration of claims in governance structures. This has been chiefly a difference in emphasis, though, rather than a fundamental distinction.\(^{86}\) The next sections will discuss the main approaches in turn – mainstream and critical – and clarify the author’s position with respect to them.

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\(^{85}\) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ‘Introduction,’ and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ‘Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society.’

\(^{86}\) Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
4.1 Mainstream perspectives

Researchers have asked under what conditions civil society mobilises and what factors aid its success. It was quickly noted that mobilisation alone is not sufficient to understand these processes and theories have thus been developed to explain under what conditions civil society is effective in accomplishing its ends. A major division can be seen between paradigms focused on resources-mobilisation and those that are identities-oriented, the former more popular in the United States, the latter in Europe.87 A lively debate flourished on these themes, with some arguing that the ability to gather resources is what makes social movements effective, while others concentrated on the features of the political opportunity structure to signal the relevance of openings and constraints. In opposition to these mostly rationalistic views, the framing perspective, emerged in the 1980s, has emphasised the capacity of non-governmental actors to construct messages that would be convincing for their counterparts, be they decision-makers, public opinions, or other movements. Still others, especially concentrating on the new movements of the 1990s, have put a greater emphasis on the cultural identity of groupings in both their internal and external dynamics.

Early analyses have been heavily influenced by the most popular theoretical currents of the time, both in sociology and international relations. Rationalist accounts thus dominated civil society scholarship between the 1960s and 1970s though their strength remains to this day. A first perspective is the so-called resource-mobilisation theory developed particularly by McCarthy and

Zald, who argue that a social movement’s success is dependent upon its capacity to mobilise resources and people.\textsuperscript{88} Employing an economistic model, this tradition sees civil society groups and participants as rational actors with claims on the political process, which they decide not to channel through traditional institutions such as political parties. The availability of financial resources is the determining criterion behind participation in a struggle, but also key to success. Accordingly, these scholars do not concentrate on the grievance itself, but on how, on its basis, an organised body strategically challenges institutional authority attempting to change norms and practices in their favour.\textsuperscript{89}

In this view social movements working much resemble interest groups. Tarrow has provided an institutional approach to transnational contention specifying four mechanisms through which movements’ action is performed: brokerage, certification, modelling, and institutional appropriation.\textsuperscript{90} Moreover, the involvement of specific actors is critical: adherents, or simple sympathisers, must be turned into constituents, i.e. those actively involved who provide the movement with resources.\textsuperscript{91} Rational choice theories have encountered serious difficulties in accounting for collective action however. Why should mobilisation occur if there are no prospects of material incentives? And how would the free riding problem be avoided? Furthermore, what is to be made of the relational and contingent character of contention?

\textsuperscript{89} Jean L. Cohen, ‘Strategy or Identity.’
\textsuperscript{90} Sidney Tarrow, ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics.’
\textsuperscript{91} John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.’
In a partially similar fashion, some scholars have emphasized the importance of domestic structures, which comprise ‘the organizational apparatus of political and societal institutions, their routines, the decision-making rules and procedures as incorporated in law and custom, as well as the values of norms prescribing appropriate behaviour embedded in the political culture.’\(^9^2\) According to the domestic structures paradigm, decentralized political systems and pluralistic societies tend to be more inclined to transnational activism. In fact, ‘it is mainly the social and institutional context rather than actors’ individual motivations which determine whether they can exert influence on negotiation systems.’\(^9^3\)

Given that civil society is seen not as a synonym of public opinion, rather of organised instances of social action, such organisation should be also located in the transnational or global space. According to Tarrow, the transnationalisation of a contention occurs via a scale shift, be it direct or indirect, through which a contention departs from its localised origins to become a transnational force.\(^9^4\) Transnational collective action is thus defined as coordinated international campaigns organised by networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international organisations.\(^9^5\) Transnational diffusion, the mechanism identified to explain the spreading of movements from a country to the other, however, is too simplistic. It is always through a negotiation of local and global instances that movements

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\(^{93}\) Thomas Risse, ‘Global Governance and Communicative Action,’ 313.


\(^{95}\) Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, ‘Transnational Processes and Social Activism: An Introduction,’ in Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*. 
coalesce around themes, which also come from different traditions. As rule becomes more and more globalised, transnational civil society exerts on global governance structures roughly the same effect domestic movements have on the state.96

If the literature described until now has mostly taken a positivistic approach, what follows comes from the post-positivist tradition and has, to varying degrees, tried to shift the focus of the question being asked from the why to the how. In opposition to an economistic and individualistic idea of policy-making as determined by rational cost-benefit analysis, constructivism has compellingly argued for the relevance of socialisation and of the logic of appropriateness. Policy options are assessed against a set of historically contextual cultural conceptions that render only certain choices politically viable.97 Interests should not be taken as given, but rather problematized as to see why certain issues induced mobilisation while others did not. Moreover, the strategies and tactics employed by movements are not always the result of a rational calculation. Strategic behaviour is in fact always embedded in a context that shapes what possibilities an actor can choose from, with both norms and identities playing a significant role.

From this perspective, Keck and Sikkink introduced the popular notion of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and traced their emergence, workings, and effectiveness as norms entrepreneurs.98 These groups of individuals connected across borders for the pursuit of principled ideas

96 Richard Price, ‘Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics.’
emerge when denied political access at home and, through ‘boomerang effect’, they enlist transnational activity to bring about international pressure. The emergence of TANs is more likely if networking is perceived to advance their campaigns, and if conferences allow personal networks to develop. TANs strategies may be divided in information, symbolic, leverage, and accountability politics: thanks to their networks, they acquire and spread information in a quick, credible, and dramatic way, they construct symbolic analogies, link to more powerful actors to weight on decisions, and monitor policies implemented by states.

Whether TANs will succeed or not, the authors have found, depends on both issues and actors – for example, success is easier for campaigns related to bodily harm and legal equality than other issues. The attractiveness of the model is testified by the range of followers it gathered and by the empirical validation it received, though there are cases for which this mechanism appears less convincing. In fact, domestic restrictions are not the only reason behind mobilisation and process of policy adoption results from pressures that appear more variegated than the model would imply, coming simultaneously from within and without.

Studies of civil society are not the only ones to have concerned themselves with the agency of sub-state collectives involved in collective action, as demonstrated by the literature on epistemic communities. This investigated the origins of certain ideas with a bearing on the practice of politics. Epistemic communities works have found that groups of experts with

99 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*.
significant access to decision-makers, and under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, can often successfully push for certain policies. ‘Through their authoritative knowledge in highly technical and complex issue areas, members of an epistemic community influence and persuade decision makers to subscribe to particular policy recommendations.’

This is not limited to the phase of policy selection but also attains to policy innovation, policy diffusion, and policy persistence.

In this strand, Risse-Kappen pointed out the similarities among these different strand of research developing domestic model based on institutional access and political culture to understand the differing acceptance of certain ideas transnationally. Bureaucratic politics are certainly needed to complement the structural theories of international relations, but so is cognitive psychology. Ideas, even in this context, have an impact because they are the factors accountable for the ways in which actors define their interests under given structural conditions. The ideas that were consequential for the end of the Cold War, Risse-Kappen indicates, have sometimes been introduced by local communities, other times by transnational ones. Looking at ideas as intervening variable, however, reduces the thrust of the argument making culture a neatly explainable phenomenon.

What some approaches miss, in fact, is the employment of less material means in the struggles of civil society, which are not only carriers of certain ideologies, but rather signifying agents involved in the production and

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104 Ibid.
maintenance of meaning.\textsuperscript{105} Instead, the existence of shared identities, into which actors are socialised, is taken to be crucial for collective action.\textsuperscript{106} This is particularly true for the literature on the so-called ‘new social movements’ that emerged out of cleavages other than the traditional class struggle, like the peace or the environmental movements. Logics of action explored by continental philosophers such as Melucci, Habermas, and Castells have in fact been based on ideology and culture.\textsuperscript{107} Collective identities result from the so-called ‘boundary work’, the reciprocal identification between group members, which includes emotional factors and develops at multiple levels.\textsuperscript{108} Della Porta has taken subjective ideological orientations as the unit of analysis to assess the cultural and symbolic forms in making and unmaking of political violence.\textsuperscript{109} Park, instead, looked at the influence of TANs on the formation of international organisations’ identities through micro-processes of socialisation.\textsuperscript{110} Transnational civil society actors seek to change not just the interests and identities (and thus practices) of actors but also the environment within which those actors operate – that is, the structures of power and meaning.\textsuperscript{111} Far from seeing civil society as mere organised collective action, these perspectives focus on its agency in terms of mobilisation of signs and symbols, thus looking at the social construction of collective action.

\textsuperscript{105} Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,’ \textit{Annual Review of Sociology} 26 n° 1 (2000): 613.
\textsuperscript{107} Steven M. Buechler, ‘New Social Movement Theories,’ \textit{The Sociological Quarterly} 36 n° 3 (1995).
\textsuperscript{108} Cristina Flesher Fominaya, ‘Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates,’ \textit{Sociology Compass} 4 n° 6 (2010).
\textsuperscript{109} Donatella Della Porta, \textit{Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
\textsuperscript{111} Richard Price, ‘Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,’ 583.
4.1.1 Frames

A significant innovation to the constructivist literature was brought by the application of the concept of frame drawing on the sociological tradition originating with Erving Goffman’s work on these ‘schemata of interpretation’. It is through frames that facts become meaningful, thus it is interesting to understand the development of patterns and evolution of shared meaning. Frames are employed to mobilise consensus around the diagnosis and prognosis of a certain issue but also to foster mobilisation. In their working, frames can (a) identify different problems and directions of attribution, (b) be more or less flexible and inclusive, (c) have a larger or smaller interpretive scope, as well as (d) more or less resonance. This last notion is crucial because it is what makes the theory truly dynamic. In order to be internalised, a message must be seen as both believable and important, thus resonance is a function of credibility and salience. As for the former, the frame should be consistent and have empirical support, but its articulators must also be credible. Concerning the latter, instead, the frame must be deemed central, be commensurable to experience, and have narrative fidelity.

Applying similar ideas to transnational mobilisation on a security issue, Richard Price considered the function of discourse in norms construction in

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113 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.’

114 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.’
the process of the Ottawa Convention banning landmines.\textsuperscript{115} For him transnational civil society can induce normative change through three techniques: generating issues with their information diffusion, establishing networks of supporters inside and outside governments, and grafting the new norm onto the ones that are already accepted. Similarly to the idea of resonance, the concept he employs, ‘grafting’, is a notion in which both structural and strategic elements are at play. Insisting on the indiscriminate nature of their effects, landmines were increasingly associated with weapons of mass destruction, which were already recognised as illegitimate, making the proposal of a ban more feasible. In order for a new norm to be grafted onto the existing normative framework one must be conscious of both context and strategic action. 'Discourses produce and legitimate certain behaviours and conditions of life as "normal" and, conversely, construct categories that themselves make a cluster of practices and understandings seem inconceivable or illegitimate.'\textsuperscript{116} This is not only a purposeful behaviour, but also influenced by the cultural context that defines the perimeter of possibility.

The most important problem with constructivism is that it did not ‘develop an analysis of how culture and strategic action might be related.’\textsuperscript{117} While they have investigated strategic action including cultural elements, they have stopped short of asking how culture acts through civil society. A major concern with part of the literature lies in its treatment of civil society as a

\textsuperscript{115} Richard Price, ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.’
transmission belt of norms between local societies and global institutions.\textsuperscript{118}

It is certainly crucial for many policy issues to see the effects of closures and openings at the domestic level and to correlate them with the global decision-making process, but it is not all that is happening. In particular, for certain issue areas it is not political repression in a local environment which leads to transnational coordination, rather the same character of the issue itself. Such is the case for nuclear politics, as it will be argued in the next chapter, a field characterised by an ingrained transnationalism.

\subsection*{4.2 Critical civil society research}

The benefit of critical civil society research is that it seeks to turn the mainstream concept upside down by taking issue with its normative implications. A whole debate has raged on the democratic potential of non-state actors, whose inclusion in the political process promises to increase the legitimacy of governance structures and practices, as briefly hinted at in Chapter Three. It has been argued that ‘[t]he main problem of transnational governance concerns the lack of congruence between those who are being governed and those to whom the governing bodies are accountable.’\textsuperscript{119} Legitimacy thus becomes crucial and appears to be advanced by the


\textsuperscript{119} Thomas Risse, ‘Transnational Governance and Legitimacy.’
involvement of civil society.\textsuperscript{120} The participation of organised civil society is seen as necessary for the democratic quality of international institutions in that it allows free, informed, and inclusive deliberation.\textsuperscript{121} According to this liberal conception, by representing a wider set of normative preferences, the participation of NGOs, social movements, TANs, and other groups could strengthen the foundations of social order bringing it more in line with the actual desires of populations.

However, it is not only in deliberate norm-making that civil society is involved and it would be limiting to see its effects only in that. While the insights of the conventional constructivist research programme are certainly ground-breaking and much remains to be explored on that side, there are also global dynamics that it fails short of recognising. In particular, it offers an unproblematic take on the nature of these movements, which are supposed to bear an innately progressive agenda. Conversely, much can be said as to the hegemonic and discriminatory character of much transnational collective action. 'NGOs and liberal scholars tend to ignore the dual meaning of civil society. They fail to understand adequately the sources of domination in play and are therefore ill-equipped to challenge them.'\textsuperscript{122}

Interesting points of criticism to the literature on global civil society have been resumed by Anna Stavrianakis, and are worth restating here – with the

\textsuperscript{120} Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Towards Greater Legitimacy in Global Governance,’ \textit{Review of International Political Economy}, 18 n° 1 (2011); Klaus Dieter Wolf, ‘Private Actors and the Legitimacy of Governance beyond the State.’

\textsuperscript{121} Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling, and Patrizia Nanz, \textit{Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance}.

understanding that she is not alone in making them.\textsuperscript{123} Two points concern the agendas and means of these organisations: traditional analyses of civil society have unproblematically regarded agendas as progressive and emancipatory, while limiting means to non-violent action. A rare exception, Clifford Bob has recently recognised the problem, finding fault with the limitation of the transnational advocacy literature to civil, Western, bourgeois civil society organisations characterised by liberal democratic or radical leftist principles.\textsuperscript{124} David Chandler made a similar point in his vocal critique of cosmopolitan readings of global civil society, taking issue with their normative super-imposition.\textsuperscript{125} By its same existence, civil society at the global level seems to be taken as a sign of progress, despite the fact that this is clearly not always the case (think of the National Rifle Association or the pro-life movement in the domestic US context). Moreover, the insistence on solely non-violent activism, tends to gloss over more subtle forms of violence that involve NGOs.\textsuperscript{126} In sum, the definition of civil society should be open-ended as regard to aims and means of collective action.

Furthermore, Stavrianakis takes issue with the unbalanced level of representation and funding of organisations from the South of the World,


\textsuperscript{124} Clifford Bob, ‘The Global Right Wing and Theories of Transnational Advocacy,’ Sidney Tarrow also made a similar point but had not followed up on the empirical level: Sidney Tarrow, ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics,’ \textit{Annual Review of Political Science}, 4 n° 1 (2001).

\textsuperscript{125} David Chandler, \textit{Constructing Global Civil Society} ; David Chandler, ‘Deriving Norms from “Global Space”: The Limits of Communicative Approaches to Global Civil Society Theorizing.’

\textsuperscript{126} Anna Stavrianakis, ‘Missing the Target: NGOs, Global Civil Society and the Arms Trade.’
resulting in power differentials which are lost when talking of *global* civil society. As Cox argued:

> The same kinds of hierarchy that are observable in the internationalizing process among states also appear in civil society-NGOs from the North have advantages in organization and finance over those from the South; their leadership can sometimes be turned by states and capital into an extension of established power. Effective democratization is much more than a simple inversion of the powers of states and civil societies.\(^{127}\)

Moreover, the widely used distinction of civil society from both state and market obscures the multiple ways in which the three categories are interrelated. This theoretical division, in fact, is functional rather than substantive, and tends to skirt away the structural constraints on NGOs. To analyse them, Stavrianakis proposes instead to consider agents as revolving around two *networks*: one made of state agencies and the arms capital, the other of less powerful elements of the state and NGOs. As for the former, the mechanisms of reciprocal influence are professional revolving doors and military advisory bodies, whereas for the latter it is state funding for NGOs as well as partnership on policy development.

Mainstream civil society research, in fact, has looked at the matter of resources mostly from the point of view of civil society, asking how obtaining them helps its agenda. They have however not been as effective in investigating the state’s direct funding and active encouragement of civil society’s participation in governance.\(^{128}\) It is indeed relevant to ask what the funding does in terms of changing the very priorities and practices of civil society actors. The risk of being co-opted is a central concern of critical scholarship, which has problematized the relation between political and civil

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\(^{128}\) Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power,’ 654.
society contesting rationalistic understandings of the 'power' of civil society – or the idea that power is transiting from the state to the non-state – to maintain that it is instead a shift in the practice of government. \(^{129}\) As noted by Sending and Neumann, the often-repeated claim that the state is losing power to civil society hides an important aspect of civil society politics, namely that it is often acted through by the state. The expertise and knowledge embedded in NGOs must be analysed in terms that also consider how different types of actors and organizations fit into and correspond to a more general rationality of government. \(^{130}\) Seeing civil society this way runs counter the mostly liberal theorising on global governance. The complexity of these relations, in fact, is lost in approaches that firmly distinguish between public and private institutions, which risk giving us an overly optimistic assessment of civil society activism. Instead, it is highly important to look at the power relations unfolding among the various agents, including when they are least visible.

More than seeing what a claim leads to, it is interesting to examine what is the meaning of the claim being made. Lipschutz concentrates on the productive power involved in the generation of global civil society and on the institutional power of its actions – which are often a manifestation of governmentality rather than an effective form of resistance. \(^{131}\) Knowledge is indeed another form of resource that groups may have and exchange.


\(^{130}\) Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power,’ 667.

Stavrianakis’ two networks, in fact, resemble the distinction between an inner and an outer circle in interpretive communities theorised by Johnstone. The former, including both governmental and intergovernmental officials, shares assumptions and expectation as well as developing consensual knowledge, while the latter is more amorphous and participates in deliberation in virtue of its claim to specialised knowledge.

4.2.1 Gramscian civil society

In order to better understand the points raised by critical scholars of civil society it is useful to turn to the thinking of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist philosopher who founded the Italian Communist Party and was imprisoned by the Fascist state for 11 years until his release in 1937, shortly before his death. The prosecutor’s peroration to the judge leading to Gramsci’s time in jail famously closed with ‘We must stop this brain from working for twenty years!’ That was perhaps a prophetic attestation of his significance for revolutionary change, both in theory and in practice. In his pre-jail activism and, most importantly, in his Prison Notebooks, The Sardinian author, indeed, was an activist at heart, who was puzzled about the situation surrounding him, in which the Marxist expectation that a

133 Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, xviii.
134 The texts by Antonio Gramsci consulted for this project are both in the original Italian version and the English translation but the latter will be preferred for citation purposes despite being limited to only some passages of the Prison Notebooks. For the former, see the critical edition by Istituto Gramsci curated by Valentino Gerratana: Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere (Torino: Einaudi, 2007 [1975]). For the latter see the version translated and edited by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith: Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).
revolutionary force could rise in the Italian context had failed to materialise. Instead, society was falling increasingly prey to fascism.

Gramsci laid out a vision of politics highly critical of the mechanicism that prevailed in Marxist circles and of the passivity it induced. Distancing himself from structuralism, he proposed instead a ‘philosophy of praxis’ that ‘does not recognise transcendent or immanent (in the metaphysical sense) elements, but bases itself entirely on the concrete actions of man, who, impelled by historical necessity, works and transforms reality.’ Instead of waiting for the objective conditions for revolution to realise themselves, he believed that collective action could alter the structure of social forces. Therefore, Gramsci’s famous motto ‘pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will’ posits that, while never ignoring the hard reality on the ground, one always remain open to the change that derives from crisis and action. Indeed, there was no mechanicism in Gramsci, rather a strong belief in the agency of the subordinate and the potential of revolution, what at other times would be called emancipation. While this is a significant departure from Marxism, it should not be forgotten that Grasmci’s theory is part of historical materialism and still recognises the decisiveness of the nucleus of economic activity.

Though the concept Gramsci is best known for is hegemony, it is important to note the treatment he gave to the issue of civil society and how the two relate to one another. As seen in this chapter’s introduction, Gramsci had identified civil society as all those spaces that are not a direct emanation of the political authority of the state drawing the equation ‘State = political society + civil

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135 Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, 248–249.
136 This is an issue for the current project, which will be further address in the analytical framework. For more on Gramsci’s relation to Marxism, see Norberto Bobbio, Gramsci e la Concezione della Società Civile (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1976).
society’. Whereas the former coincides with the state apparatus, the latter covers a wide range of actors: associations, churches, schools, movements, trade unions, intellectuals, publishers, and the entertainment industry among others. Accordingly, there are
two major superstructural “levels”: the one that can be called “civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”, and that of “political society” or “the State”. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and “juridical” government. As noticed by Buttigieg 'hegemony and civil society are interdependent concepts.’ Civil society is the arena where the ruling class seeks consent by extending its ideology, it is the site of hegemony.

With the term hegemony Gramsci meant to draw the attention to the cultural and intellectual basis for the creation and permanence of a certain social order. It is not only through direct domination, or coercion, that one could rule but also, more subtly, by inducing consent. Coercion and consent ‘balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent.’ The dominant class, he argued, cannot simply rule by coercion but instead needs to manufacture the consent of the subaltern.

The ability to obtain consent depends on a group’s capacity of portraying its own interests as universal, or to transition from the economico-corporatist phase to that of ethico-political hegemony. Given the inability of a group to dominate by simply pushing for their particularist interests, all attempts at bolstering or challenging hegemony must include a general ideology that

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137 Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, 263.
138 Ibid., 12.
140 Ibid.
accommodates various group preferences. It is only when particular corporatist interests stop being perceived as specific to a certain group and instead come to be ‘conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion’\(^\text{142}\) that hegemony can be said to exist. As a consequence, the strength of hegemony can be gauged with reference to the presence or absence of struggle and the degree of legitimation enjoyed by social order.\(^\text{143}\) This capacity to lead by creating consensual ideas is at heart an ideological matter, further problematized by Gramsci through the concept of common sense.

Common sense is defined as the ‘philosophy of the non-philosophers’\(^\text{144}\) or the ‘traditional popular conception of the world’\(^\text{145}\) providing the necessary logical step from hegemony to civil society. While deriving from the dominant few and administered by political society, it is in civil society that hegemony is fashioned and reinforced as certain ideas become common sense. What is crucial here is that common sense is a world-view that is accepted uncritically, it is the system of taken-for-granted assumptions, the spontaneous beliefs that appear as natural while being intrinsically cultural. ‘Common sense is not a single unique conception, identical in time and space [...], even in the brain of one individual, [it] is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential’.\(^\text{146}\) Political change happens when new ideas spread in these

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\(^{142}\) For the discussion of *laissez faire* as illustrative of the relative autonomy that the political moment has over the economic one, see Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 182.


\(^{144}\) Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, 419.


\(^{146}\) *Ibid.*, 419.
institutions until they become common sense, thus acquiring Gramsci’s version of hegemony, or the ability to be obeyed without having to use force.

Ideas do not become common sense naturally or by chance, rather they can only spread if there is a sufficient backing within civil society. For Gramsci ‘the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria.’

Hegemony, indeed, is never fixed, ‘hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. [It] has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own.’

Revolutionary activity, indeed, can only be rooted in civil society through the development of counter-hegemonic ideas. In essence, society is ‘the product of struggles – at once material and ideological – among concretely situated social agents.’

The potential of transformation is seen by Gramsci in the emergence of a coalition of forces that unite around an alternative hegemony, what he calls historic bloc. An historic bloc refers to the alliance of social groups that are not simplistically defined by class hierarchies; instead it is an unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity.

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147 Ibid., 182.
A social group can, and indeed must, exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power [...] it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well.\(^{151}\)

Civil society is thus a terrain of contestation, it is through its trenches that a war for the control of the state is fought, predominantly on an ethico-political plane. If a new ideology is to seize state power sustainably it cannot limit itself to launch a war of movement. That is only the very last phase of a longer, deeper process aimed to induce consent in the society creating a solid historic bloc, the war of position.\(^{152}\) Gramsci, in fact, argues for the study of the formation of subaltern social groups, their attempts to exert influence on dominant formations, and the consequences of such claims. He reminds us, however, that one must also be attentive to the birth of countervailing formations by the dominant groups and the various degrees of autonomy that subaltern actors may manifest.\(^{153}\)

Because the contest over hegemony is essentially an ideological one, Gramsci sees intellectuals as crucial for the mobilisation of an historic bloc. ‘[Intellectuals] perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and organisations which bind together the members of a class and of an historic bloc into a common identity.’\(^{154}\) Not only did he admit their importance analytically, but Gramsci also believed that revolutionary change could only happen through the mutual education of intellectuals and masses through the figure of the organic intellectual.\(^{155}\)

\(^{151}\) Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, 57–58.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., 235.


Being embedded among the group whose interests they sought to advance, organic intellectuals do not just preach from a removed position, instead they are key in sustaining hegemonic orders but also in constructing new historic blocs with a counter-hegemonic project.

Gramsci’s attention to the ideological component of social order is an important contribution for social theory and specifically for civil society research. In keeping with the Gramscian tradition, researchers have pointed to the pervasiveness of dominant *forma mentis* in the mutual influence of political society and civil society.\(^{156}\) Though Gramsci’s analysis was a Marxist study of class and economic power, his sociological insights and hermeneutical approach have found resonance beyond the study of the world economy. Gramsci was concerned with the political ramifications of different systems of meaning finding application in studies of linguistics\(^ {157}\) and pedagogy\(^ {158}\) as well as cultural studies.\(^ {159}\) Furthermore, employing Gramscian concepts to advance a discourse analysis has been the staple of the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.\(^ {160}\) An examination of their framework would burden excessively this discussion, but it should be noted here that the present approach is less post-structuralist than theirs.\(^ {161}\)

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\(^{161}\) For a convincing rebuttal to the thesis of Laclau and Mouffe see Peter Ives, *Ives, Language and Hegemony in Gramsci* (London: Pluto Press 2004), 144–160.
The ontological positioning of Gramsci, in fact, makes him interested in linguistics and narratives, but only insofar as they reflect material social forces.

So Gramsci agrees with some of the major themes around language that many scholars (both detractors and advocates) attribute to postmodernism; although we should make clear that for him this does not lead to some free-floating world in which meaning is somehow ephemeral or infinitely sliding. Rather, his emphasis is on the historical production of meaning and the interconnectedness of human history and ‘objective’ knowledge.¹⁶²

Indeed, it is possible to combine this attention to what was said in the previous section about framing and its working in the attempts to influence the practices of states. As will be further elaborated in Chapter Five, understanding the cultural and discursive dimensions of nuclear civil society is a productive research avenue. However, the approach taken by this thesis, following Gramsci, relies upon an analysis of both discursive and material elements.

Assuming that language is the medium through which facts and objects are rendered meaningful does not imply a precedence of discourse over materiality, rather the crucial role of analysing it. What is meant here is not that there is nothing outside of discourse, as some superficial readings of Foucault would have it, rather that only discourse can produce meaningful objects – or that all meaningful objects are discursively constituted.¹⁶³ Accordingly, there are substantial limitations to what can be achieved through discourse alone. Gameson and Ryan caution from reducing political change to the adoption of a different frame alone, pointing out that both the

¹⁶² Ibid., 137.
¹⁶³ This point was made by several scholars, both in cultural studies and in post-structuralist nuclear theory. For the former see Stuart Hall, ‘The Work of Representation,’ in Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, ed. Stuart Hall (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 1997), 44–5. For the latter see David Mutimer, The Weapons State.
framing strategies and the broader movement-building strategies should be taken into account.\textsuperscript{164}

To counter the assumption that the frame will set us free, framing strategies must not just address the content of the message or the style of debate but attend to base building and challenge the contours of the non-level playing field in which the contest is carried on.\textsuperscript{165}

Because competing claims are articulated in the midst of uneven and hierarchical social relations, it is not enough to pitch the right frame. The reason for employing a Gramscian framework is indeed his attention to social positioning of the groups that can initiate political change. As pointed out by Peter Ives, ‘Gramsci provides a Marxist framework that does not impose an unworkable separation of the ‘material’ versus the ‘non-material’.’\textsuperscript{166}

The reason for employing his ideas with reference to the calls to change the nuclear order lays on the fact that ‘Gramsci’s political theory was essentially founded upon the democratic empowerment of subaltern groups’\textsuperscript{167} Although the subaltern was described by him as the proletariat, this does not need to be the case. Gramsci ‘is not arguing that there is such a place as the economy, which is ‘prior’ to politics and culture and in which identities are defined or articulated.’\textsuperscript{168} In international political economy (IPE) it has become relatively common to link Gramsci’s thought with feminist or post-colonial


\textsuperscript{165} William A. Gamson and Charlotte Ryan, ‘Thinking about Elephants: Toward a Dialogue with George Lakoff.’

\textsuperscript{166} Peter Ives, \textit{Language and Hegemony in Gramsci}, 127.


\textsuperscript{168} Peter Ives, \textit{Language and Hegemony in Gramsci}, 159.
critiques of the exclusionary power of the market. However, the purchase of the Sardinian scholar goes beyond that, as this thesis will clarify. While civil society in Gramsci is hardly comparable to the one active in nuclear politics, thinking in a Gramscian way entails attempting to demystify cultural oppression by understanding how a subordinate group would consent to its subjugation. Gramsci’s contribution in highlighting the role of ideology, hegemony, and common sense allows for an understanding of civil society, the site separate from but interconnected to the state where struggles among alternative conceptions take place.\(^{169}\)

Reflecting upon the ambivalent position that civil society can have in relation to dominant conceptions and power is key here. In security studies, Neocleous quotes Gramsci in saying that to understand history we must study the intellectual apparatus.

What we are talking about, then, is the centrality of the security intellectual to the regimes of knowledge produced by and for the national security state and thus, given the importance of security knowledge to the ideology of security as a whole, the ways in which the security intellectual has provided a key role in establishing certain forms of discourse as the ‘common sense’ of politics.\(^{170}\)

The next chapter will further elaborate on the employment of Gramsci’s ideas in the field of security. What should be retained from now are two main ideas. Firstly, a scholar of nuclear civil society who thinks in a Gramscian way should inquire into what is common sense to reveal the cultural entrenchment of dominant conceptions and social forces. Secondly, the potential of counter-hegemonic projects can be gauged with reference to the formation of an alternative historic bloc. As a final note, it could be added

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that for Gramsci there was not to be a distinction between theory and praxis, rather the intellectuals had to be involved in political processes, as his very life demonstrated.

4.3 Conclusion

This project, in sum, is interested in civil society, intended as the sphere connected but separate from political society, or the state, but also from the economic structure, or the market. In addition, it is not the national component of civil society that will be investigated, but the transnational or global one because, even with its differences, anti-nuclear activism is a global phenomenon. It is particularly with reference to the normative and discursive potential of civil society that this thesis is concerned. As we have seen, civil society can become a powerful actor with leverage on the decision-making process. It was pointed out that, unlike national governments that can resort to military coercion or multinational corporations that command considerable financial resources, civil society can make use of more subtle forms of power. Understanding the foundations of consent should pass through an analysis of the discursive contestation of governance. Discussing the various theoretical positions it was made clear that framing and common sense are crucial concepts to examine the agency of civil society. Framing, or the capacity to spread a message that resonates with existing attitudes has allowed such actors to promote alternative agendas in multilateral fora. Moreover, critical perspectives that question the nature and context of civil
society and its power have pointed to the production of common sense, or the cultural-specific assumptions about the ‘natural’ functioning of societies. Integrating framing and common sense brings us to analyse the nuclear order as one in which civil society absolves the fundamental function of constituting the cultural foundations of governance.

To complete the theoretical framework of this thesis, the next chapter will provide an application to the nuclear realm of the ideas outlined in Chapter Two and Three. In light of the emerging notion of global nuclear governance, Chapter Five will advance a view of civil society as one of the actors involved in the nuclear order structured around the four images of nuclear weapons (deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament). By inscribing itself in the emerging critical nuclear studies literature, it will put forth an analytical framework inspired by critical constructivist approaches to representation. That allows for a coherent integration of the framing perspective of mainstream civil society research with the critical attention to hegemonic conceptions. The agency of civil society in nuclear governance needs to be better explored taking into account its politics of consensus-building and contestation that this reading of governance referred to. Together with an attention to nuclear governance, the study of civil society’s meaning making practices will provide the further parameters of the project.
Chapter 5

Analytical Framework: Civil Society’s Discursive Contribution to Nuclear Governance

Building upon the concepts of frames and common sense described above, we will now turn to examine how discourse is treated in this thesis. The present chapter will outline the thinking behind the analytical framework by summarising the main choices undertaken. The previous chapters have placed this project in the context of debates on nuclear weapons politics, security governance and civil society research, positioning itself somewhere between the constructivist and the critical traditions. To further develop this theoretical point this chapter will highlight the relevance of critical constructivist scholarship and of borrowing concepts from their approach to security as well as of Antonio Gramsci’s theory of civil society.

The aim is to show that a Gramscian-inspired critical constructivist approach has a lot to say about the question at hand, namely what is behind the numerous and highly varying calls for nuclear disarmament by global civil society. It will do so by explaining, firstly, its theoretical commitments and, secondly, the methodological route. At first, the project will be positioned in
the tradition of critical nuclear studies, an emerging trend in the mostly positivist and predominantly materialist nuclear literature, by highlighting this trend’s connection with debates in security studies that have occupied the ground between mainstream constructivism and post-structuralism. That allows for identifying critical constructivism as the overarching theoretical position and grounding the thesis in the critical nuclear studies literature to which it wishes to contribute, by providing an innovative Gramscian-inspired methodology. If these scholars have applied concepts such as common sense and hegemony, they have discarded significant portions of the Sardinian political theorist’s thought such as, crucially, the centrality of civil society and importance of constructing a historic bloc.

Through the help of the emerging critical constructivist insights in that field, the second section of this chapter will present the analytical assumptions of the thesis. On the basis of the Gramscian conception of civil society and discursive approach centred on common sense, one can acquire a view of the subordinate that takes its ideological positioning into account. The section moves from a general introduction in which the relevance of applying Gramsci’s insights is established to focus on this thesis’ analytical target, global nuclear civil society. This grounds the discursive and material study of nuclear disarmament expert communities undertaken in the second part of this thesis.
5.1 Theoretical approach: navigating critical approaches to nuclear discourse

The concepts of frames and common sense overviewed have a much larger importance in the wider field of IR, and their deployment has not been restricted to the study of civil society or other kinds of activism. The ‘discursive turn’ brought them to the forefront of academic research and, as of lately, the same is true for the studies of nuclear politics. This section clarifies the theoretical outlook in which this project is embedded by establishing a dialogue between the critical nuclear studies literature and the critical constructivist theoretical perspective. Based upon the former’s demonstration of the crucial role of discourse for nuclear politics, an argument will be made to complement that research program with an explicitly critical constructivist analysis inspired by the latter.

5.1.1 The emerging field of critical nuclear studies

The nuclear question and its consequences for international politics are tackled in this thesis in a way that can be broadly described as critical, an approach can be differentiated from both post-modernist and mainstream constructivist ones. Similarly to the approaches described in Chapter Four, which have made discourse the centre of analytical attention, a discursive turn seems to be overtaking the field of nuclear studies as well. To be sure, such sensitivity had started already in the 1980s with critical works challenging mainstream assumptions about the inevitability of nuclear
deterrence and proliferation. A few important works started early on to bridge disciplinary divides between security studies and communication studies, inquiring into the influence of the nuclear language in the permanence of the nuclear situation.

Post-structuralists, feminist, critical, constructivist and other scholars in IR have investigated the discursive elements of nuclear politics with a markedly sociological approach, whereas sociologists and communication studies experts have done much the same at the domestic level. All of them depart from the assumption – contrary to realist and liberal theories – that communication is of extreme importance in the contemporary nuclear era. Nuclear communication is a group of symbolic practices that ‘make the world meaningful and capable of being acted toward’.\(^1\) Discursive practices, in fact, establish identities and prescribe strategies.

What post-structuralist contributions attempt to do is unpacking taken for granted assumptions in order to demonstrate that they rest on shaky grounds. ‘Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalisable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding.’\(^2\) Armament practices, according to Derrida, are the product of a paradox by which we simultaneously believe and reject the idea of a nuclear referent. Further, in her analysis of the French involvement in the sinking of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior, Diane Rubinstein

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states that ‘deterrence is a textual as well as a rhetorical construct’.\(^3\) Her approach is more extreme than Derrida’s, in that she seeks lost meaning within words that do not seem to hold a special importance, especially because they were not uttered on purpose.\(^4\)

While it seems a worthy exercise to build alternative narratives that illuminate the inherently political character of nuclear developments, the post-structuralist approach is wanting. Firstly, because it remains unclear, beyond the deconstructive effort, why these authors’ specific reconstructions should be more worthy than any other. This problem, however, directly depends on the epistemological foundation of post-structuralism that rejects not only any form of positivist explanation but also of generalization and empirical claim.\(^5\) Secondly, what is lacking in several post-structuralist works is a firm grounding in the social reality that underlines the texts. Giving an object a name is not enough for a frame to be created, instead it is necessary that others share that naming. Resonance seems to be almost ignored by this outlook.

Without going so far as embracing poststructuralist accounts of nuclear policy, one can still see the merit of their contributions. The importance of the discursive nature of deterrence was indeed recognized by other scholars as well. Other post-positivist approaches to nuclear governance have been more successful at presenting a credible framework to study discourse that

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\(^4\) The name of one of the persons involved (Tricot), for example, is regarded as a key to understanding the mysterious events.

takes into account not only the ‘fabulously textual’ but also the inherently social nature of deterrence and other nuclear norms.

Attention to discourse has been displayed by a range of critical contributors as well, from feminist to Marxist and postcolonial perspectives. Language is crucial for nuclear politics because nuclear weapons ‘are not a clearly known ‘thing’, but a complex object discursively imagined and produced’. The ways in which certain political events are portrayed contributes to establishing practices that would otherwise be untenable. Jones, for example, shows 'how the connection between power relations and discursive practices produces conditions of acceptability for perceiving Iran as a nuclear threat without relying on material proof for support.'

By restricting what can be said or understood, a special nuclear tongue or ‘nukespeak’, constructed and reproduced by those in power, functions as a disciplinary device that reproduces the current order. Ken Booth further chastised deterrence’s static, time bound, and ethnocentric character and argued that it ‘led to a somewhat closed world, protected from politics and

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6 Jacques Derrida, ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives),’ 23.
morality by ‘mindguards’ and ‘nukespeak’, and a belief in timeless success’.  
By the same token, Carol Cohn highlighted the exclusionary and masculine character of the ‘technostrategic’ language employed in nuclear weapons issues.  
Practices of power are indeed crucial in precluding the possibility of dialogue among officials, citizens, and ‘counter-publics’ such as organised civil society.  
Employing metaphors limits what is and can be said. Frames in fact are not neutral – as David Mutimer convincingly demonstrated, framing a situation in terms of proliferation ‘reinforces the link between status and nuclear possession’.

Whereas the ‘proliferation’ discourse places the onus on recipients not to translate that technology into weaponry, a ‘disarmament’ image places the onus on armed states to reduce and ultimately eliminate the weaponry they possess.

In a similar vein is the critique by Hugh Gusterson, who investigated the ‘Western’ nuclear discourse and the distinction it makes between civilised and uncivilised possessors of nuclear weapons, considering less developed nations dangerously unable to manage nuclear arms and ultimately of little rationality. Western discourse has been disseminated with ‘gaps and silences in [the] representation of our own nuclear weapons and exaggerations in its representation of the Other’s.’ As a result, he contended that the ‘discourse on proliferation is a piece of ideological machinery that transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies’.

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12 Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.’
16 Hugh Gusterson, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,’ *Cultural Anthropology* 14 n°1 (1999).
Marxist interpretations have examined the symbolic economy of nuclear weapons and how it relates to their institutional infrastructure. On the basis of Baudrillard’s political economy of signs, Timothy Luke posited that it is not the objective form of the bomb that deters, rather the symbolic economy of thermonuclear power by which the superpowers circulate signs of threat and deterrence.\(^{18}\) Anne Harrington de Santana has gone so far in her exploration of the symbolic dimension of nuclear arms that she takes them to be a form of fetish in Marxian terms, concluding that ‘[n]uclear weapons are powerful because we treat them as powerful’.\(^{19}\) This means that objects such as nuclear weapons assume a sort of autonomy as carriers of certain meanings. Deterrence, for example, is taken to be not just a strategy, as per realism, or a norm, following constructivism, but also, in critical terms, an ideology.\(^{20}\)

Bourdieu’s idea of *habitus* equally provided a useful base to conceptualise nuclear communication in situations where knowledge is hardly challengeable. Nick Ritchie theorised that it is by analysing discourse that we can gauge the value that nuclear weapons have in a determined strategic culture because it reflects the interpretation of certain practices.\(^{21}\) Indeed, ‘habituated constructions of nuclear weapons’ value are not universal, but rather may vary across states.’\(^ {22}\) There are deep political consequences deriving from what frames are employed to conceptualise an object.

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\(^{19}\) Anne Harrington de Santana, ‘Nuclear Weapons As the Currency of Power,’ 327.


\(^{21}\) Nick Ritchie, ‘Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.’

Mutimer\textsuperscript{23} sees efforts at devaluing nuclear weapons as sign of a counter-frame that defines them not as weapons but as something else. Furthermore, Senn and Elhardt, as has been seen, have employed other Bourdieusian concepts such as ‘symbolic capital’ and ‘doxic battle’ to examine attempts to change dominant conceptions of nuclear weapons in the case of the four horsemen initiative.\textsuperscript{24} Those former decision-makers were uniquely able to spread its message because of the symbolic capital granted by their high-ranking past in the national administration, which endowed their message with a high resonance. Dominant discursive patterns, in fact, are not a fixed field, rather animated by struggles over conceptions and evolution takes place by combining old and new discursive materials.

The centrality of language was recognised also by less critically inclined scholars. Building upon constructivist research pointing to the socially constructed character of nuclear rule,\textsuperscript{25} various scholars have highlighted the role of discourse. At the very least this means that, as the employment of the bomb is mostly a virtual exercise, understanding its operation passes through an analysis of the declaratory policy of nuclear-armed states.\textsuperscript{26} Given that atomic bombs have never been launched since Nagasaki, the employment of nuclear arms is often a prevalently linguistic matter. ‘Strategic interactions of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} David Mutimer, ‘From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the Abolitionist Desire.’
\item \textsuperscript{24} Martin Senn and Christoph Elhardt, ‘Bourdieu and the Bomb: Power, Language, and the Doxic Battle over the Value of Nuclear Weapons.’
\item \textsuperscript{25} Nina Tannenwald, \textit{The Nuclear Taboo}; Maria Rost Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}; Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt, ‘The Little Known Story of De-Proliferation’; Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert, ‘Courting Controversy: International Law, National Norms and American Nuclear Use.’
\item \textsuperscript{26} Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Nuclear Narratives: Reflections on Declaratory Policy,’ \textit{Whitehall Report 1-10}, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (2010).
\end{itemize}
the most conflictual kind—as in compellence and deterrence models—are all about communication’. 27

As Harrington highlighted, 28 what could roughly be defined as a constructivist approach to nuclear studies is actually composed of two strands: American constructivism on the one hand and discursive and sociological history on the other. What divides the two is a different take on norms: a Wendtian social object for the former, and a discursive practice for the latter. As a consequence, constructivists take norms as intervening variables used by specific actors with agency over the nuclear political process, while critical scholars view them as practices that constitute the environment in which such agents act. Conventional constructivist research, it was noted, has neglected the ‘existence of oppositional normative concepts of order’. 29 If conventional constructivism misses a theory of politics, its critical strand fills this gap with its attention to domination and hierarchy. 30 That is precisely the reason why such an approach is particularly apt to the study of the highly hierarchical nuclear order.

Conventional constructivism misses in fact the dimension of state-society struggle needed to understand not only the origins of the normative changes that the nuclear order witnessed, but also the prospects for further modifications, regardless of our normative evaluation of them. While acknowledging the importance of norms in regulating nuclear weapons and

29 Carmen Wunderlich, ‘Theoretical Approaches to Norm Dynamics,’ in Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice, eds. Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 34.
their circulation (both material and non), this project takes ideas as the keykestone of nuclear governance and thus necessary to interpret political processes of cooperation and competition. It is indeed in this realm that narratives about ‘good’ managements are articulated, negotiated, and, if accepted, translated into norms. Far from being a given, what nuclear weapons are and how they should be regulated is a site of intense contestation, where certain definitions become dominant while alternative ideas of what is normal and legitimate are put forward.

The present work builds upon what has recently been dubbed ‘critical nuclear studies,’ an approach that has gained increased traction in the past few years. Critical nuclear scholarship, though its confines are somewhat blurry, could be seen as the body of work that uses interpretive tools to ask questions about nuclear politics with a more or less explicit normative positioning. Burke’s introductory essay in a recent special issue of Critical Studies on Security dedicated to the issue, presents a community of scholars that takes a critical approach to nuclear politics, a group to which this thesis wants to contribute. In the same line as others, this thesis investigates the ‘politics of knowledge around nuclear weapons.’ Requisites to be part of critical nuclear scholarship are the commitments to question received knowledge, to unearth its political content, and to highlight less visible aspects of the nuclear reality through unconventional methodologies.

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31 The term was used, most recently, in the 2016 special edition of Critical Studies on Security, Nuclear Politics: Beyond Positivism, 4 n° 1 (2016).
33 Ibid., 1.
34 Ibid., 3.
The following section will better explain the theoretical positioning of the thesis through a brief description of the critical constructivist research agenda and its connection to Gramscian concepts explored at the end of Chapter Four. If studying discourse is a well-established area of enquiry for scholars of social movement, this section has shown that a similar discursive turn has taken place in nuclear studies. In order to contribute to that literature this thesis will advance a critical constructivist analysis of the discourses of nuclear civil society.

5.1.2 Studying discourse: a critical constructivist approach

This project is inscribed into what might be termed the critical constructivist approach to security, which has contributed to the understanding of cultural factors in military policy. Departing from the assumption that ‘insecurities, rather than being natural facts, are social and cultural productions’ they are interested in the role of collective discourse in making dangers real. The analytical commitments of critical constructivism can be roughly summarised as follows: (1) reality is socially constructed, (2) social constructions reflect, enact, and reify relations of power, (3) dominant constructions should be denaturalised to reveal their constructed and contingent character. Or, to say it another way,

security is socially constructed: it is understood by different communities in different ways in different contexts; it is given meaning through intersubjective processes of contestation and negotiation between actors, in which

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35 Jutta Weldes et al., Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 10.
36 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 1999).
communication is central; and it is intimately related to particular narratives of who those communities are and what they value.\textsuperscript{37} Critical constructivism challenged mainstream approaches for their empirical indeterminateness and positioned themselves as a bridge across the constructivist–post-structuralist divide.\textsuperscript{38} Critical constructivists share with conventional ones the belief in the social construction of reality, thus favouring a move away from positivist ontologies proffered by both realists and liberals. Arguing that agents and structures are co-constituted, constructivists refuse to see actors’ behaviour as predetermined. What sets conventional and critical constructivists apart, as explained by Hopf, is that the former understand identity as ‘possible causes for action’ whereas the latter are rather interested in ‘how people come to believe in a single naturalized version of the truth.’\textsuperscript{39} Critical constructivists, in fact, refuse attempts to find causal links focusing instead on the process of constitution that leads to ask the ‘how possible’ rather than the ‘why necessarily’ questions.

The causal question assumes X and Y exist in the empirical world, as constant features, which may impact on each other in predictable ways. X and Y are examples of a larger pattern, which can be drawn on to explain the particular case. The constitutive question assumes that human action is not determined, that actors do exercise choice, and they do so within a world shaped by widespread shared understandings.\textsuperscript{40}

Both strands of constructivism share an interest in the communication process, believing that rhetoric is not epiphenomenal, but instead produces very real political consequences, though their conceptualisation differs. The process of framing explored in Chapter Three is also tackled by critical

\textsuperscript{37} Matt McDonald and Matt Merefield, ‘How Was Howard’s War Possible? Winning the War of Position over Iraq,’ \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs} 64 n° 2 (2010): 188.

\textsuperscript{38} Matt McDonald, \textit{Security, the Environment and Emancipation: Contestation over Environmental Change} (London: Routledge, 2011).

\textsuperscript{39} Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,’ 183-184.

\textsuperscript{40} Karin Fierke, \textit{Diplomatic Interventions} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 16.
constructivists, who complement it with an attention to power dynamics. According to this perspective, discourse is less the tool of the weak with nothing but the persuasiveness of ideas in the face of state power (as an unforgiving reading of mainstream constructivism would have it) – instead discourse becomes another arena for struggle. In analysing rhetorical action the main preoccupation of conventional constructivist scholars is the process of persuasion, distinguishing arguing from bargaining and finding that both can be subsumed under an encompassing logic of appropriateness, which would guide deliberation. According to critical constructivists, who pay more attention to power relations, persuasion may sometimes be only mimicked or a form of rhetorical coercion.

Looking at language patterns is an important feature of the emerging critical constructivist methodology. Fierke has argued that language ‘needs to be taken seriously because the “rules of the game” provide first and foremost a structure by which physical objects or acts are invested with meaning.’ Applying Wittgenstein’s concept on language games to the end of the Cold War, she further argued that language patterns ‘do not represent the interpretations of individuals but, rather, a public language that reappears again and again and, subsequently, constitutes the identities of NATO and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{42}}\text{Rodger A. Payne, ‘Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,’ European Journal of International Relations 7 n° 1 (2001).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{44}}\text{Karin M. Fierke, ‘Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations,’ International Studies Quarterly 46 n° 3 (2002):350, emphasis in original.}\]
the Warsaw Pact as well as knowledge of what they do. Instead, it is their socially shared nature and how culturally ingrained they are to make discourses relevant. ‘Outcomes reflect intersubjective interpretations, so attention should be directed at the communicative process by which mutual meanings are agreed.’ These public images and intersubjective interpretations are at the very heart of this project.

Critical constructivists have mobilised several philosophies, but the one who arguably contributed the most to their analyses is Antonio Gramsci, whose main concepts were previously reviewed in Chapter Three. Common sense in Antonio Gramsci’s work ‘refers to uncritically accepted conceptions of the world that are employed discursively, but which have practical and tangible implications for the distribution of power, resources and influence’. In her seminal work on the construction of the national interest in the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes juxtaposed the contrasting narratives and timelines associated with the same event in the US, USSR, and Cuba to show that the moment of representation is crucial for the adoption of policy responses, thus making a cultural analysis of discourse necessary for a deep understanding of political junctures. ‘Social constructions [...] become common sense when particular representations of reality are treated as if they neutrally or transparently represent the real.’ If a discourse becomes dominant, it is able to define the terms of the debate, it gets incorporated in

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46 Rodger A. Payne, ‘Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,’ 43.
48 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests.
49 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 226.
institutions, and it provides ideas and categories for actors that seek credibility.  

When a certain reality is constructed as natural, in sum, common sense can be said to exist. Similarly to the Gramscian contention that this intrinsically produces silences of the subordinate, critical constructivists affirm that ‘an essential part of the power produced through discourse, and a cornerstone of hegemony, is the capacity to construct silences within common sense.’ To transform politics it is necessary to intervene on the hegemonic ideologies that allow the prevailing system to be in place though this might be extremely difficult. As noted by Peoples with reference to the nuclear energy debate in the UK, alternative frames are constructed on the basis of the dominant one, hence they may be left without the rhetorical materials needed to craft a successful rebuttal.

In order to operationalize such commitments, critical constructivists have developed an emerging methodology, which will be employed for this project. ‘Discourse analysis therefore is particularly well suited for studying situations where power is maintained by aid of culture and challenged only to a limited degree, that is, what Gramscians call ‘hegemony.’’ It is this attention to shared meanings coupled with the sensitivity to relations of power that makes this perspective so useful if applied to nuclear politics. As pointed out by Laffey and Weldes, ‘overlapping and competing discourses seek

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authoritatively to define what is real, true or possible.\textsuperscript{54} An analysis of both discursive and material elements is what allows an understanding of the conditions of possibility.

Too many interpretive analyses have concentrated all their energy on identifying discursive twists ignoring the fact that not all discourses bear the same weight because the actors doing the uttering are different. What is crucial is not just to understand the rhetorical and cultural bases of the narrative that a group proposes, but also how much resonance this has. This is the division between articulation and interpellation in the critical constructivist version of discourse analysis.\textsuperscript{55} This distinction, elaborated by Weldes among others, allows for concentrating in turn to the analysis of how a certain narrative is constructed and to the examination of how it is made meaningful to a community.\textsuperscript{56} Articulation is the process through which meaning is constructed on the basis of linguistic and cultural resources that already exist.\textsuperscript{57} Interpellation serves instead to distinguish the phase in which subject positions are created and individuals hailed into them.\textsuperscript{58}


\textbf{55} Analyses of articulation are indebted to the work of Stuart Hall as well as Laclau and Mouffe. For the former see Stuart Hall, \textit{Representation: for the latter Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.}

\textbf{56} Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, ‘Methodological Reflections on Discourse Analysis.’


\textbf{58} Ibid., 103–107.

The process of construction of common sense should be studied through its two main phases of articulation and interpellation in that ‘[m]eaning is produced by neither the text nor the reader but by the interpretive community in which both are situated.’

Given that groups ascribe varying meanings to the same facts, critical constructivists are interested in unearthing dominant conceptions by showing that there are possible alternatives. Applying this theoretical approach, Matt McDonald inquired into the issue of climate change studying by analysing the various types of security discourse employed, or a ‘framework of meaning that defines the composition and nature of a group’s core values; threats to those values; and the appropriate means for protecting/advancing them.’ Matt McDonald developed a taxonomy of the different narratives on the connection between climate change and security concluding that ‘these discourses serve to legitimize some practices and the actors engaged in them while marginalizing others.’ He analysed discourses asking what particular policy responses each encourages, which actors are assigned legitimacy, and how the terms of the debate are defined. Chapter Seven uses a very similar set of questions because of the same nature of what is being searched for, the place of hegemonic forces in a certain contestation over the meaning of security.

It is this understanding that leads to research the struggle against the structures of nuclear governance as a way to problematize the normative

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61 Matt McDonald, Security, the Environment and Emancipation, 12.
63 Ibid., 49.
direction of the prevailing order. Investigating the different conceptualisations of a social object is a useful exercise because the frames employed inform strategies that get promoted and put in practice, not by causing a certain action but by constituting the social environment in which such action can be considered possible. This thesis follows McDonald’s, and more broadly the critical constructivist, approach in trying to delineate the contest over the production of nuclear common sense.

5.2 A Gramscian contribution to critical nuclear studies

In order to study that process of contestation, this thesis proposes to use the Gramscian lexicon for it allows us to think of the role of civil society in the ideological construction of the nuclear order. Surely an application of Antonio Gramsci’s analysis to the security field presents a number of problems, particularly the difficulty to ascribe the struggle over nuclear weapons to class relations. His understanding of society, although unconventional by Marxist standards, remains embedded in that theoretical tradition and identifies relations of production and class struggle as defining political moments. The “non-class” issues – peace, ecology, and feminism – are not to be set aside but given a firm and conscious basis in the social realities shaped through the production process. In an effort to understand the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism and the relevance of the transnational

capitalist class, neo-Gramscian scholars have not attempted to go beyond the confines of IPE.\textsuperscript{65} Such a move, criticised by some,\textsuperscript{66} has significantly limited the application and diffusion of Gramsci’s thinking to areas of security, making it all the more relevant to build a bridge between his theory and critical constructivist work on the construction of security.

Synthesising the two theoretical driving forces for this project can rely upon previous efforts by critical constructivists to employ Gramscian concepts of common sense and counter-hegemonic struggles to the field of IR in their empirical work.\textsuperscript{67} This is something that \textit{Strategies of Disarmament} also does, recognising that a clear link in fact exists between this Gramscian sensitivity and the research programme shared by many critical security scholars. It is recognised that Gramsci ‘contributed powerfully to critical theory; but he was \textit{not} a critical theorist.’\textsuperscript{68} A systematic application of the Gramscian theoretical toolbox would be difficult for several reasons, not least the fragmentary nature of his writings, and well beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather than employing the whole of Gramscian theory,\textsuperscript{69} this project will recur to some of his key concepts in order to investigate an area that is far removed from his object of analysis. According to Stuart Hall, rather than looking into Gramsci’s work for answers to our puzzles, we should think of

\textsuperscript{67} Jutta Weldes, \textit{Constructing National Interests} and Columba Peoples, \textit{Technology, Common Sense and Missile Defense}.
\textsuperscript{69} The English translation of parts of his \textit{Prison Notebooks} can be found in Antonio Gramsci, \textit{Selection of the Prison Notebooks}. 
them in a Gramscian way. This promises to raise important questions on the nature of state-society relations in a highly conflictual matter where consent is created and maintained through constant and often linguistic social negotiation.

The three analytical commitments of critical constructivism unpacked in the previous section are consistent with the Gramscian approach outlined in Chapter Four. Firstly, the social construction of reality has been advanced by Gramsci as well in his recognition that structure and agent (or political and civil society) mutually influence each other. Indeed, the Marxism of the latter is not incompatible with the social constructionism of the former, in that ‘Gramsci is one of the first modern Marxists to recognise that interests are not given but have to be politically and ideologically constructed.’

Secondly, the relations of power are reflected, enacted, and reified in those social constructions, or, in Gramscian terms, common sense is a means of cultural hegemony. The importance of language in replicating the dominant *forma mentis* and practice was certainly not ignored by the Sardinian scholar, who saw both material and non-material factors at play, as amply argued by Peter Ives. Finally, the third commitment, to destabilise dominant construction resonates well with Gramsci’s prioritisation for the study of the subordinates. His study of civil society opens up interesting questions on the strength of the status quo and on how to devise a strategy of transformation.

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70 Stuart Hall, ‘Postscript: Gramsci and Us,’ 129.
72 Peter Ives, *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*, 127.
In sum, the two approaches are highly consistent, but also promise to complement each other’s sensitivities well in that, at heart, both are interested in unearthing patterns of domination. On the one hand, whereas the economy must have central stage for a Marxist, even one sensitive to non-material elements, this is not the case for critical constructivists. Indeed, they have built upon feminist, post-colonial, and post-structural critiques that pointed to other forms of domination beyond the purely material one. Hierarchy, indeed, is well present in those security issues that critical constructivists have analysed and is propagated not just by material forces but also by those ideological ones outlined here. On the other hand, complementing the critical constructivist theoretical framework with a direct engagement with Gramsci allows to take on board his important insights on the centrality of civil society that has been obscured by those theorists’ focus on elite discourses.

Such an innovative approach can significantly contribute to the understanding of the current nuclear reality, in line with the prioritisation of practices of representation so central to the critical nuclear studies project. In the same way as laissez-faire is not an automatic expression of economic facts, deterrence is not a predetermined consequence of security realities. ‘Once a machine is built, we soon discover that it has ‘ideas’ of its own. Technology not only changes our habits, but also our habits of mind.’

74 As the preceding discussion has shown, the social order in which nuclear weapons are rooted does not simply depend on technological processes. Instead, it is involved in a process of mutual constitution with the actors subject to such

order, who try to shape it in their interest by constructing competing discourses.

While acknowledging the importance of norms in regulating nuclear weapons and their circulation (both material and non), this project takes ideas as the keystone of nuclear governance and thus necessary to interpret political processes of cooperation and competition. Ideas ground the narratives about ‘good’ managements that are articulated, negotiated, and, if accepted, translated into norms. Whereas “[n]uclear weapons and deterrence strategies have helped constitute the cultural identities of major (and minor) powers throughout the postwar world”, certain non-governmental actors have also constructed their identity in relation to them.

Far from being a given, what nuclear weapons are and how they should be regulated is a site of intense contestation where certain definitions become common sense while alternatives to dominant ideas of what is normal and legitimate are put forward. A dialectic process of argumentation and confrontation is what bears the potential for alternative forms of organisation. Narratives, however, draw from a repertoire of accepted discourses that is often limited and constrained by the prevailing nuclear culture. It is thus not only a matter of searching for the most effective ways of limiting technology, but asking what the bomb does to politics, order, and contestation.

What we have really to ask, about the full range of nuclear and related weapons, is what specific variations they have introduced into the shifting

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76 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,’ 134.
but always crucial relations between a military technology and a social order.\textsuperscript{77}

This project departs from the assumption that those relations change across time and space and advocates the need for always historicising nuclear relationships rather than assuming never-changing rules.

5.2.1 Civil society and nuclear common sense

It is now useful to briefly go back to the vision of global nuclear governance delineated in Chapter Three and the continuum along deterrence and disarmament regimes on which it is established. According to this view, countries can either operate according to the rules of deterrence or those of disarmament, with the value of nuclear arms for security being the decisive variable for moving along the continuum. Investigating how deterrence can come to be perceived as superfluous should indeed receive much more than the sparse attention it has so far received. What this project seeks to argue is that in this ideological shift civil society has an important part to play. Indeed, in Gramscian terms change should take place at the popular before than at the political level and could be traced through a hermeneutical approach.

The role of discursive moves on the part of non-governmental actors has been inquired in passing by Fierke in relation to the 1980s anti-nuclear movement.

While the central actions of the two superpowers—restoring, maintaining, undermining—are acts undertaken with military tools, the dismantling

\textsuperscript{77} Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament,’ 69.
actions of independent movements are directed more at the ideological structures in which the military actions of the arms race are embedded.\textsuperscript{78} Such ideological dismantlement is the same process lying at the heart of this thesis of nuclear weapons devaluation.\textsuperscript{79} Since the beginning of the nuclear age, its ideological milieu has undergone several turns and it is an analysis of ideological structures, both dominant and subordinate, that promises to give a more accurate view both of the status of nuclear relations and on the role of civil society therein. What Fierke calls ‘dismantlement’ roughly corresponds to what this project understands as disarmament, or any move away from a deterrence \textit{forma mentis}. This is not to mean that global civil society is alone what makes the shift from one mentality to the other. However, to understand this shift we must look at civil society in order to see how change can be possible.

Given the hegemony of deterrence explicated in Chapter Two, Gramsci would push us to look within civil society to assess the strength of the common sense, on the one hand, and whether counter-hegemonic forces are building a historic bloc. Civil society and its conceptions of disarmament are particularly interesting because they appear as the quintessential disarmed actor, those that would, more than any, ascribe no value to nuclear weapons. Bobbio suggests we need to recognise that those that do not have arms, and who even if they had them would not use them, are the majority.\textsuperscript{80} Marxists at other times pointed out that:

\textsuperscript{78} Karin M. Fierke, ‘Changing Worlds of Security,’ 237.
\textsuperscript{79} The work by Nick Ritchie deserves being reiterated in this context: Ritchie, ‘Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.’
Only an alliance which takes in churches, Eurocommunists, Labourists, East Europeans dissidents (and not only ‘dissidents’), Soviet citizens unmediated by Party structures, trade unionists, ecologists – only this can possibly muster the force and the internationalist elan to throw the cruise missiles and the SS-20 back.  

An analysis of the narratives of civil society based on the governance framework of this thesis, which recognises both deterrence and disarmament as competing regimes, helps demonstrate that these groups can either support disarmament or, more or less explicitly, undermine it. The analysis of this supposedly subjugated voice of nuclear politics, will show that civil society’s struggle with the global ordering structures is productive of emancipatory alternatives; but also that the extent to which this is true largely depends on the implication of civil society with the nuclear state and the ideology of deterrence.

A further reason for concentrating on civil society comes from the critical nature of this research, which takes issue with the dominant makeup of nuclear politics and proposes to reverse towards a more emancipatory route by giving voice to subaltern knowledges. Contestation and resistance in nuclear politics is a fertile ground for research because most studies have fallen short of asking their significance or have done so mostly descriptively. The great majority of studies related to nuclear issues have focused on states that have, had, or wanted nuclear weapons. This approach, regardless of its value, fails to explain the emergence of ‘disarmed’ identities by states and non-state actors that have renounced nuclear weapons possession or that criticise it, thus providing a limited take on nuclear relations. Moreover, it

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does not recognise their voice and agency in shaping the meaning attached to nuclear arms.

Civil society is relevant not only for the extent and quality of its activities, but also because of the complex relation that links it to other actors, namely states, institutions, business, and media. Moreover, it is the ideological component of such activism that results particularly well positioned to produce new insights. What kind of ordering ideas have been put forward? And what do these ideas do? Asking such questions promises to enlarge our understanding of the diplomatic process surrounding nuclear governance. In line with Gramscian thought, taking the perspective of the subordinate promises to denaturalise prevailing frameworks so as to make visible interesting elements that might otherwise go unseen.

In keeping with the discursive analytical tools outlined above, the empirical analysis will proceed in a first stage to examine the discursive opposition of civil society. In a second stage, to understand the pervasiveness of a certain discourse – or in a Gramscian way whether it constitutes common sense – an analysis of the material side of the struggle is necessary. To that end, the discursive interventions will be investigated first, with a look to understand the ways in which each articulates the concept of nuclear disarmament. Such articulations will be broken down to examine the source of threat and communities at risk but also the policy responses advocated. This allows to gauge the variance of positions and to inquire into the common-sense nature of those discourses. Indeed, the critical constructivist tools will allow to break down the components of those discourses, while a Gramscian approach will
allow to provide insights not only on the strength of those articulations, but also on its hegemonic character and on the configuration of social forces.

Building upon a characterization of contemporary global nuclear civil society, highlighted in Chapter Six, the empirical analysis will the proceed in an effort to understand the construction of the nuclear threat: Chapter Seven will lay out the discourses with the help of critical constructivist tools, whereas Chapter Eight will mobilise Gramsci to examine civil society's material and non-material practices. As to the latter, the discourses of disarmament will be checked for hegemonic ideologies (some of which were described in Chapter Two) in the first instance, and then the strength of social forces behind each discourse will be evaluated. Civil society groups must in fact be able not only to construct a successful narrative, but also a coherent historic bloc in order to build a counter-hegemonic alternative. This analysis will be able to give a view of civil society activism in the nuclear field that allows inferring on the revolutionary potential of different movements.

If civil society is routinely accused of being an unimportant actor because of its lack of coercive power, this thesis hopes to show that, even among those limits, it is a relevant actor. What we expect to see, much like Craig and Ruzicka revealed talking of the non-proliferation context, is hierarchy, even among those that are materially less powerful. This hierarchy will be reflected, if a Gramscian framework is correct, both in the discursive and in the practice of civil society, which can either be hegemonic or counter-hegemonic. Such view promises to help better evaluate the ideological positioning of the many actors that partake in the construction of nuclear

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82 Craig Campbell and Jan Ruzicka, 'The Nonproliferation Complex.'
governance. Also, crucially, by connecting common sense and historic bloc as the two facets necessary to understand civil society’s struggles, this perspective distances itself from those interpretations of the nuclear world, which centre on discourses alone without a clear indication of the power relations underlying them. At best, it could inform the growing discussion in academia and diplomatic circles about what it takes to achieve nuclear disarmament.

5.3 Conclusion

This thesis, in sum, looks at the struggle involving civil society at the transnational level in efforts to shift the discourse around what nuclear weapons mean for security. The NPT and its review process are an optimal place to study just those kinds of relations in that it is a forum that permits that rhetorical exchange in which we are interested, all the while including a role for transnational civil society. Various actors participate in the production of myths, narratives, discourses related to what nuclear weapons are, what they do, and what to do about them. In this struggle, which takes place in various fora at different levels, there are different truths and roughly two juxtaposed sides.

Regimes of deterrence and disarmament, as expressed in Chapter Three, structure nuclear governance as well as much discussion in its institutions. Like deterrence disarmament exists in the mind first of all. This project wants
to trace the attempts at making disarmament common sense, this counter-hegemonic project entertained by non-nuclear armed states but also representatives of civil society. They put forward a new definition of nuclear weapons, a new frame that they hoped would replace deterrence. Nuclear-free world, global zero, nuclear weapons abolition, the model convention – all of these have become general terms to refer to the prospect of eliminating the bomb. But what is actually meant by these terms and do they all represent the same idea? How resonant is this frame? And how counter-hegemonic is this project that civil society advances?

To answer those questions, the following chapters will thus strive to clarify the tensions between the different souls of civil society involved in global nuclear policy by looking at their involvement with the NPT. Chapter Seven contains an analysis of the discourses adopted in the NPT context by the abolitionist and reductionist strands of civil society. These are then examined in Chapter Eight in light of the theoretical discussion to identify the discursive place occupied along the deterrence-disarmament continuum and to pinpoint the structural conditions of their activism. Such analysis is heavily indebted to critical constructivists who started inquiring into ideological domination in international relations and to the thought of Antonio Gramsci, as common sense conceptions will be sought after along with the formation of the historic bloc, a combination which allows assessing counter-hegemonic potential of the various projects. To put current civil society activities in context, Chapter Six will briefly review the history of the anti-nuclear movement, its activities in relation to the NPT, and the ways in which civil
society gains access to the treaty as well as establishing the contours of the communities examined empirically.
Chapter 6

Introducing the Case:

Nuclear Civil Society and the NPT

On the basis of the theoretical scaffolding built in the previous chapters, the analysis should now turn to the selected empirical object: civil society involved with nuclear weapons issues in the NPT framework. We will thus give the contours of the community, highlighting the modalities of their interaction with the treaty, and providing the analytical categorisation that will be further pursued in the following chapters. This chapter seeks to ground the empirical analysis of civil society at the NPT review process, to be conducted in Chapters Seven and Eight, into its historical and institutional position. To that end we will proceed in three phases: (1) presenting the evolution of civil society’s response to nuclear weapons since the beginning of the nuclear age, pinpointing the innovative character of the current fourth wave of disarmament activism. (2) The chapter will argue that the ideological divide within this civil society community is the most relevant, although not the only one, of its divides. (3) Finally, because the forum chosen for this thesis is the NPT and its review process, the mechanisms of civil society’s interaction will be broken down. Through that, the following empirical
analysis will be able to specify the different discursive and material strategies observed at the 2015 Review Conference of the NPT.

6.1 A brief history of nuclear civil society

Since the inception of the atomic age, private individuals have interrogated themselves on the ethical and strategic implications of these armaments and in various cases have taken public stances, resulting also in the organisation of collective action for nuclear arms limitation and elimination. Nuclear civil society in fact is a surprisingly wide category. It is a community that rarely makes the news, at least presently, and that often acts deliberately behind the scenes. It is composed of NGOs, think tanks, academic institutions, associations, and other groups that provide expert analysis and political recommendations to policymakers. The scope of their activity spans from local mobilisation in areas where nuclear weapons have created risks for the population to national campaigns to change domestic laws and global movements that support multilateral negotiations of treaties. Nuclear civil society’s work is not only limited to protests and lobbying, but also includes groups that focus more on analysis and less on advocacy. In sum, attention and involvement in nuclear matters have taken many forms. Of this wide-ranging community the present work will only address a relatively small part, nuclear civil society involved with the NPT. The previous chapter has clarified the reasons for this choice and in the following
section its contours will be explained. However, in order to understand where
the community under examination comes from we should take a step back to
August 6, 1945. The use of nuclear weapons over Japan was the first shock
that prompted the emergence of a worldwide opposition to the existence of
those arms. ‘The nuclear age did not just produce weapons, it also produced
the world’s largest grassroots transnational peace movement, fostered by
nongovernmental organizations.’ 1 Though the size, prominence, and
strategies of the disarmament movement have significantly changed over
time, it never withered away. Lawrence Wittner, an authority on the history
of anti-nuclear campaigns, divides it in three major phases: the mid- to late-
1940s, the late 1950s and early 1960s, and finally the 1980s. 2 To this we could
add a fourth wave, started in the 1990s and re-energised in the second half of
the 2000s. The following sections will examine the older and more recent
developments in turn.

6.1.1 The three waves of anti-nuclear activism

The scientists’ argument for the responsible use of nuclear technology is the
first instance of resistance to have emerged in response to the explosion of
the nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In effect this had started
even before the bomb project was finalised, as attested by the experience of
Joseph Rotblat. 3 A Polish-born physicist associated with Liverpool

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2 Lawrence Wittner, *The Struggle Against the Bomb*, Lawrence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb;*
   Lawrence Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*.
3 A special thanks goes to Sandra Ionno Butcher, Executive Director of Pugwash, for having
   illuminated many details about Jo Rotblat’s life and his history with Pugwash.
University, he was called to work on the Manhattan Project in early 1944. While doubts about the sensibility of making such destructive devices had been in his mind already then, he was committed to help the US succeed before Hitler’s Germany in inventing nuclear weapons. However, as soon as he learned that the German project had been shut down, he resigned from the Manhattan Project and left Los Alamos in December 1944. There his colleagues continued working on making the bomb and finally produced a working one, which was tested at the Trinity site on July 16, 1945.

Scientists at the University of Chicago, led by Leo Szilard, attempted to convince the government that using the nuclear bomb on Japan could not be justified, would jeopardise global support for the US, ignite an arms race, and hamper prospective control agreements. It was the decision to use the bomb against a civilian populated area, despite these warnings, that led many of those scientists to distance themselves from the government. As recounted by Rotblat, ‘the final blow to this [ivory] tower came with the Hiroshima bomb.’

The idea that scientists have a responsibility in their discoveries is what brought this community to leave the ‘ivory tower’ and engage in anti-nuclear activism from early on. As the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory and ‘father of the nuclear bomb,’ Robert Oppenheimer, put it, ‘the physicists have known sin.’ Or in the words of Albert Einstein, ‘[s]cience has brought forth

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5 Lawrence Wittner, *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Vol. 1 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*), 20-36.
this danger, but the real problem is in the minds and hearts of men." He became the most prominent scientific figure to speak against the mass destruction potential of nuclear arms and in favour of their international control.\footnote{Einstein wrote these words in a June 1946’s article in the New York Times Magazine. Along with some of the other texts he wrote on nuclear weapons, it is available in Einstein on Politics: His Private Thoughts and Public Stands on Nationalism, Zionism, War, Peace, and the Bomb, eds. David E. Rowe and Robert J. Schulmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 387.} With many of his colleagues Einstein rejected the notion that security could be achieved through armaments, arguing instead that it requires nuclear disarmament and world government.\footnote{David E. Rowe and Robert J. Schulmann, Einstein on Politics: His Private Thoughts and Public Stands on Nationalism, Zionism, War, Peace, and the Bomb (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).}

In this first surge of activism, some of the scientists previously connected with the Manhattan Project mobilised against the further development of the US nuclear arsenal and put in place several initiatives to try and influence policy. These included the creation in 1945 of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), gathering participants from the main laboratories, and the launch of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Einstein and Szilard were behind the short-lived Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists as well as, a decade later, the release of the Einstein-Russell manifesto, which laid the foundation for the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Scientists pushed successfully for ensuring civilian control of the US nuclear program, but their calls against the development of the more powerful hydrogen bomb were ultimately ineffective, along with demands for international control.

In addition to scientists, the first surge of activism revolved mostly around small peace organisations and world government groups in the US, Europe,
and in Commonwealth countries. Religious leaders also took stances against nuclear bomb use. In Japan, survivors of the atomic bombings – or *hibakushas* – begun holding anti-nuclear gatherings such as the ceremonies to commemorate Hiroshima Day. A further component was the birth of a movement in the Soviet Union, where the need for nuclear control was compounded with a characterization of the US as aggressive. The movement backed initiatives such as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the ensuing Baruch Plan aiming for the international control of nuclear energy. The rise of tensions between Washington and Moscow and the latter's acquisition of the bomb in 1949 put an end to this early phase.\(^1\)

The second surge of anti-nuclear activism started in the US, between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, in opposition to nuclear tests and their radioactive fallout. At a time when nuclear weapons explosions were still a matter of national pride, and beauty contests regularly crowned Miss Atomic Bomb, opposition to the bomb grew stronger, particularly after the *Lucky Dragon* incident, the 1954 H-bomb test that contaminated a fishing boat in Japan. Nuclear tests were also conducted on the Marshall Islands, in Australia, and (once France joined the club) in Algeria, leaving health and environmental damage behind. Based on the risk that radioactive fallout generated genetic modifications in children, it was another scientist, Linus Pauling, who campaigned against nuclear weapons tests.\(^2\) In 1958, Pauling addressed the United Nations with a petition signed by 11,000 scientists.

That is when a women’s movement started forming to put the matter of atmospheric nuclear testing on the public agenda with the creation of the

\(^1\) Lawrence Wittner, *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Vol. 1 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*)
\(^2\) Lawrence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb* (Vol. 2 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*).
Women Strike for Peace. One of their representatives recalled feeling frightened for the future of her own children, but also empowered by being able to do something about it.\textsuperscript{13} Under the leadership of Dagmar Wilson, the movement would mobilise public opinion via kitchen meetings, educating newspaper editors, and also taking the streets: in 1961 over 50,000 people marched in 60 towns across the United States.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) was formed by Lenore Marshall and Norman Cousins. The movement grew in popularity thanks to the endorsement of several celebrities and was able to organise grassroots work, including large demonstrations. After Britain joined the nuclear club in 1952, activism mounted there too, catalysed by the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, or CND, which grew very popular. On Easter 1958, CND activists marched on Aldermaston, the base of the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, in what would become a yearly event.\textsuperscript{15} A similar movement was also established in West Germany under the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions.\textsuperscript{16}

In this phase not only did public protests become more common, but citizens started organising also track II diplomacy initiatives. One of the first unofficial ambassadors was the prominent journalist and peace advocate Norman Cousins, who launched the American-Soviet Dartmouth Conferences.\textsuperscript{17} Similar activities were carried out by Pugwash, which held its

\textsuperscript{13} Interview n. 1, April 25, 2014.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Andrew Futter, \textit{The Politics of Nuclear Weapons} (London: SAGE, 2015), 175.
\textsuperscript{16} Holger Nehring, ‘The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Cultures of the Cold War, 1957–64,’ \textit{Contemporary British History} 19 n° 2 (2005).
first conference of scientists from the two sides of the Iron Curtain in 1957. Both initiatives aimed to stimulate diplomatic progress between the superpowers by hosting unofficial meetings of individuals close to government that could foster compromise through discussion away from formal channels. Advisors of both the US and Soviet leaderships attended Pugwash Conferences, making it possible to pass information on national negotiating requirements.¹⁸

In the 1960s civil society saw the success of some of their demands with the negotiation of a treaty to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, however, was only a mixed victory for the anti-nuclear movement, as nuclear explosions were simply driven underground.¹⁹ In the following years, although concern for the arms race persisted, American pacifists focused their efforts on the Vietnam War while track II diplomacy continued behind the scenes.

The third phase of anti-nuclear activism emerged in the 1980s. At this point the arms race had led Washington and Moscow to produce massive arsenals and, although arms control treaties had been signed during the 1970s, tension was again simmering between the two rivals. With the election of Ronald Reagan, US peace groups gathered behind the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign after the 1979 call for a mutual halt to testing, production, and deployment of nuclear arms by military researcher Randall Forsberg. With a bottom-up approach, a relatively simple proposal, and an appeal to different sectors of society, the freeze proposal was supported by a majority

¹⁹ Interview n. 1, April 25, 2014.
of Americans. In a campaign designed to target the mainstream, the Freeze combined public education with an attempt to influence electoral politics both locally and nationally. A similar appeal was launched by the first of many professional groups that emerged in that period: Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR). Under the charismatic leadership of Helen Caldicott, the group organised talking tours to inform the public of the nuclear danger. It was not until the 1980s, though, that massive international public presence was mobilised in response to another immediate threat, that of deploying a new generation of missiles in Europe, the NATO cruise and Pershing II missiles and the Soviet SS-20s.

The European Nuclear Disarmament (END), launched in Britain in 1980, attracted hundreds of thousands of people in demonstrations across Europe to apply coordinated pressure against the so-called Euromissiles. They argued that, despite East-West divisions, the destiny of the continent was indivisible in the nuclear age and called for a ‘nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal’. As recalled by E.P. Thompson, one of the founders, ‘[w]e were using the pamphlet, letters to the papers, the church-hall, the even the open-air meeting, the—sort of 19th century type methods to break

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20 Benjamin Redekop, ’Physicians to a Dying Planet’: Helen Caldicott, Randall Forsberg, and the Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement of the Early 1980s.’
22 Physicians for Social Responsibility was created in 1961 and had been instrumental in documenting the presence of the radioactive Strontium-90 in children teeth. However, it remained dormant for most of the 1970s until it was revived in 1978. Interview n. 2, April 8, 2014.
23 Benjamin Redekop, ’Physicians to a Dying Planet’: Helen Caldicott, Randall Forsberg, and the Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement of the Early 1980s.’
through into the modernized media.'26 A group of women protested in 1981 at a Royal Air Force (RAF) airbase that was due to host NATO missiles, setting up a camp in Greenham Common that would keep going for two decades.27 END members were travelling widely to meet communities and work with local groups such as the revived CND in Britain and the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) in the Netherlands.28 Large rallies were organised throughout Europe: 300,000 people in Rome in 1981, 400,000 in London in 1983 and almost a million in the Hague the same year.

With the motto ‘Freeze the Arms Race—Fund Human Needs,’ the largest US political rally up to that point took place in June 1982, when one million people marched in New York City.29 Under pressure from all these public campaigns, President Reagan, who had talked of a winnable nuclear war before, reversed his anti-arms control and disarmament stance, telling Secretary of State Shultz. ‘If things get hotter and hotter and arms control remains an issue, maybe I should go see [Soviet leader Yuri] Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons.’30 That proposal was in fact advanced at the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, in which Reagan and Gorbachev exchanged proposals for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Although they never reached an agreement on disarmament, the next year the two

27 The author is grateful to Rebecca Johnson for some brief conversations about that experience.
28 Lawrence Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition (Vol. 3 of The Struggle Against the Bomb).
leaders were able to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty that, as previously mentioned, abolished a whole category of nuclear missiles.\footnote{Lawrence Wittner, \textit{Toward Nuclear Abolition} (Vol. 3 of \textit{The Struggle Against the Bomb}), 369–404.}

In over four decades of bipolar confrontation in the shadow of the bomb, civil society mobilised a range of constituencies and strategies to influence nuclear policy. Due to the Cold War context, their efforts were often criticised in the West as a communist plot to score propaganda points. Nonetheless, some of their demands became policy and, although it is hard to ascribe these successes exclusively to civil society’s efforts, the history of nuclear governance would have been quite different if they had not existed.\footnote{Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘NGOs, Social Movements, and Arms Control.’}

6.1.2 \textbf{Nuclear civil society after the Cold War: a fourth wave?}

After the end of the nuclear-armed bipolar confrontation the involvement of civil society with nuclear politics entered a new phase. Marked by different opportunities and challenges than during previous decades, the movement to limit and eliminate the bomb became more transnational and accepted in the mainstream. International regulation of nuclear weapons and activities had progressively developed throughout the Cold War, giving rise to what became known as the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, detailed in Chapter Two. The nuclear situation seemed to improve in the 1990s: the end of the bipolar confrontation allowed Moscow and Washington to enter in more far-reaching arms control agreements and even take unilateral steps to eliminate certain atomic weapons. This seemed to remove one of the main obstacles to
disarmament. At the same time that decade saw decreased public attention for nuclear weapons issues.

When the Cold War ended, the profile of nuclear weapons in the public eye declined. Progress on nuclear disarmament was slow, and civil society struggled to be seen as a key stakeholder in an area increasingly dominated by security policy discussions.33

Many of the organisations that sprung up during the 1980s are still in action today, and the same is true for a few of the older ones. However, their activities have changed significantly. For some, frustration over the lack of disarmament progress had opened up new routes to action; for others, it meant a continuation of an existing undertaking. Protests as such became only a very minor portion of the activities of nuclear civil society, which tended to become more professionalised, focusing instead on advocacy, lobbying, and the dissemination of information.34 As activities by concerned citizens diminished, a host of organisations kept attention to nuclear issues alive, as well as providing career opportunities for analysts and lobbyists with an interest in the bomb.

At the same time, the community expanded beyond a unique focus on security relations. As noted by Randy Rydell, the ‘constituency of nuclear disarmament has significantly expanded in recent years to include the world’s religions, women's groups, environmentalists, scientists, scholars,

34 For sure direct action has not ceased, as demonstrated by several local actions including the most recent protest at the Faslane naval base on April 13, 2015 by Scrap Trident: Aditya Tejas, ‘Protesters Of Trident Nuclear Weapons System Block Faslane Naval Base In Scotland,’ International Business Times, April 13, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/protesters-trident-nuclear-weapons-system-block-faslane-naval-base-scotland-1879065 (last accessed 26 September 2016).
lawyers, human rights advocates, mayors, and legislators.\textsuperscript{35} Many groups responded to diminished interest in nuclear issues by enlarging their mission. This often depended on decisions by funding agencies, whose priorities changed, making it very difficult for civil society, especially grassroots organisations, to maintain their attention on nuclear matters.\textsuperscript{36}

The effect of ageing, moreover, became a widespread concern, as a ‘greying of the membership’ of nuclear disarmament groups happened across the board.\textsuperscript{37} The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the \textit{hibakusha}, are growing older and less capable of spreading the memory of nuclear effects.\textsuperscript{38}

Generally the advent of younger generations that do not remember nuclear tests or the fear of the arms race is potentially leading to less activism.\textsuperscript{39}

In addition, geography keeps having a great impact on where nuclear civil society emerges. Mobilisation has spurred in those places where the risk of nuclear weapons was alive: at the Livermore National Laboratory, at Greenham Common, but also more generally throughout Europe at the time of the Euromissiles or in the South Pacific in response to atomic tests. However, activities have mostly been limited to the North of the world, with


\textsuperscript{36} The funding of nuclear civil society is a crucial issue that will be addressed in more detail in the following chapters. An initial division can be drawn between public and private sources of funding. The government of Austria, Switzerland, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Norway, the Department of Energy in the US – all are important donors in this field, in the same way as the Macarthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation, etc.

\textsuperscript{37} Lawrence Wittner, \textit{Toward Nuclear Abolition} (Vol. 3 of The Struggle Against the Bomb), 474.

\textsuperscript{38} A group of 500 Hiroshima \textit{hibakushas} that had been in charge of memorial ceremonies and other activities recently disbanded after having tried to pass it on to the second-generation victims. Kyodo, ‘Aging Hiroshima A-Bom Survivors’ Group to Disband,’ \textit{The Japan Times}, February 23, 2015, \url{http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/23/national/aging-hiroshima-a-bomb-survivors-group-to-disband/#.VQsl6ZSSvDQ} (last accessed 20 March 2015).

\textsuperscript{39} Activists interviewed for this project often referred to the nuclear scare to explain their initial mobilisation.
many groups based in Europe and Japan. The United States, where nuclear weapons have been more than anywhere else, a central issue of political debate, the extent of anti-nuclear mobilisation remains the greatest – its major cities being home to the largest number of NGOs, think tanks, and funders. Washington, DC is the base to many nuclear experts and activists, working mostly on domestic decision-making. In New York, on the other hand, most organisations follow closely international deliberations at the UN and its disarmament bodies, from the General Assembly’s First Committee to the meetings of the NPT.

In the 1990s engagement with multilateral fora, indeed, became a staple of civil society’s activism. This has its roots as far back as 1899, when civil society participated in the First Hague Peace Conference convened to discuss war prevention and arms limitation. With the creation of the UN and of fora to discuss disarmament issues, civil society found occasions to participate. The 1979 Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly is probably a turning point in this regard, because not only did it create the most far-reaching consensual document on multilateral disarmament, but it also established the so-called UN disarmament machinery. It established the Conference on Disarmament, based in Geneva and devoted to the negotiation of disarmament treaties, as well as other bodies like the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), tasked with making recommendations, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), a

40 John Burroughs and Jackie Cabasso, ‘Confronting the Nuclear-armed States in International Negotiating Forums: Lessons for NGOs,’ International Negotiation, 4 n° 3 (1999).
41 Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘NGOs, Social Movements, and Arms Control.’
42 What is now known as the Conference on Disarmament was previously the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962–68), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969–78). Membership and mandate changed through time.
research centre affiliated with the UN. This created a host of diplomatic meetings where civil society could make its voice heard.43

The transnationalism of civil society in nuclear matters has thus been on the rise: NGOs are increasingly participating in global events and knowledge exchange activities with states, but also joining forces to form coalitions. Revolving doors are common in the nuclear realm, where former government representatives often turn to research, consultancy, and/or track II diplomacy. This increases complexity, as it can be hard to know which hat a person is wearing and hybrid entities multiply.44 This process reached a new level at the time of the 1991 Amendment Conference for the LTTB, which saw unprecedented participation of civil society representatives such as Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), which were the idea’s originators. In that context NGOs not only had a chance to compare experiences and establish international networks, but were also granted excellent access. “The Conference likely served as a wake-up call to the nuclear weapon states to limit NGO access at international forums more under their control.”45 In fact, at present civil society is often excluded from many working sessions of disarmament fora, it is physically separated from diplomats, and its events often gather only few governmental participants.

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43 NGOs had been involved in the General Assembly’s Special Sessions on Disarmament, particularly SSOD-II in 1982, when the movement advanced its demands from inside the room, with 53 NGOs and 22 research institutes making statements. Data from The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985 (New York: United Nations, 1985).
44 The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, for instance, was established by the governments of Japan and Australia but it is an independent forum made of former or serving officials. Similarly, the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium gathers independent think tanks and experts at the same time as having a mandate from the European Commission.
45 John Burroughs and Jackie Cabasso, ‘Confronting the Nuclear-armed States in International Negotiating Forums: Lessons for NGOs,’ 461.
In 1995 hundreds of civil society representatives flocked to New York for the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, which was to decide whether to maintain the treaty beyond its initial 25-years duration. Along with many member states, large parts of civil society expected the extension to come in exchange for progress on the nuclear disarmament commitment of the NWS, given that the treaty had proved relatively successful at keeping NNWS to their promise. The Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons was created in 1995 to unify civil society behind the call for disarmament. With the idea to gather 2000 organisations from across the world and to coordinate their activities, civil society representatives sat in the middle of the UN cafeteria and started drafting the Abolition 2000 Statement. Their 11-point plan for nuclear abolition was a critique of the status quo, stating that a ‘world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non-proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states.’ They feared that committing to a permanent NPT the NNWS would have given up their only bargaining chip to obtain disarmament.

Another umbrella group was set up for the 1995 Conference with the goal of supporting the NPT’s indefinite extension, the Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It comprised 18 NGOs, predominantly Washington-based, and was coordinated by the Stimson Center. In contrast to Abolition

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46 As said before, the NPT, entered into force in 1970, had an initial duration of 25 years, after which the parties should decide whether to extend it and under which terms.
49 Interview n. 3, May 22, 2015. As the interviewee pointed out, in some cases this difference of view was also internal, as for the community of organised physicians: PSR wanted indefinite extension because the NPT is the only treaty with a disarmament commitment, whereas the German branch of IPPNW opposed an indefinite extension without guarantees for disarmament.
2000, the Campaign did not put much emphasis on nuclear disarmament, but rather on the benefits of the current nuclear restraint infrastructure and the need to develop it further. This led some to conclude that it resembled ‘the non-governmental face of an approach that had been worked out with arms-control elements within the US government.’ This opposition brought to light a fundamentally under-explored issue with global civil society active on nuclear weapons matters: although all ostensibly support the same goal of nuclear weapons elimination, they do so in very different ways. While this distinction has been present throughout the initial three waves as well, it reached new levels of starkness once disarmament could no longer be dismissed as impossible because of bipolar tensions and started being embraced by former and serving policy makers.

The time around 1995, in fact, is a crucial one for nuclear governance. With new legal documents reinforcing the prohibitions on nuclear-related activities, the normative structure of nuclear weapons has significantly expanded, most importantly with the indefinite extension of the NPT, but also because of the signature of the CTBT and the 1996 ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Until then, the NPT had a limited time period of 25 years since its entry into force in 1970. And, though many wished for an indefinite extension, this outcome was all but taken for granted, and much negotiation was needed to secure it. Further limitations were also introduced with the CTBT ban on all kinds of nuclear tests after a cumbersome process of negotiation, which had started at experts level and

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50 John Burroughs and Jackie Cabasso, ‘Confronting the Nuclear-armed States in International Negotiating Forums: Lessons for NGOs,’ 466.

took two decades to iron out the technical details. The ICJ, on the other hand, did not reach consensus on a comprehensive affirmation of illegality under all circumstances, but it did affirm that nuclear arms use and its threat violate international law in most cases.

Since then, developments have been highly variable, some pointing to a weakening of nuclear governance (e.g. India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, North Korea’s 2003 exit from the NPT and nuclear capability) and others to its strengthening (e.g. the US-Russia arms reduction treaties up to the 2010 New START, the 2015 agreement between the P5+1 and Iran). In the new millennium we are surely not in a phase of renewed public engagement with nuclear weapons politics, but the movement persists, and there is enthusiasm for the issue. In the 1980s people wanted to learn about it, because they thought nuclear war could happen. In the 1990s mobilisation got harder, but then interest spurred again in 2006-08. The frustration over disarmament which exploded after the end of the Cold War was followed by increased global attention on nuclear non-proliferation because of the crises over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, but also by renewed abolition calls. In the midst of all this, civil society has taken positions ranging from the advocacy of abolition grounded on humanitarian imperatives to support for an incremental process of progressive arms limitation.

54 After over a decade of wide international concern about the direction of the nuclear developments in Iran, the five UN Security Council permanent members and Germany (P5+1) signed a deal with Tehran to limit its atomic infrastructure.
55 Interview n. 4, May 7, 2014.
Most importantly, public opinion has shown a problematic disengagement from the issue, ceasing to provide that public movement that in other decades had challenged the nuclear order and its supporters. In the 1980s E.P. Thompson wrote: ‘[a]s anxiety and dissatisfaction mount, there can be glimpsed, as an intolerable threat to exterminist ideology, the possibility of a truly internationalist movement against the armourers of both blocs.’

However, anxiety seems to have waned in the post-Cold War period: marches asking for the elimination or control of the bomb appear to be a thing of the past, and public opinion is widely disengaged from the nuclear topic. Baudrillard wrote that ‘the ‘masses’ silent indifference to nuclear pathos (whether it comes from the nuclear powers or from antinuclear campaigners) is […] a great sign of hope and a political fact of the utmost importance.’ The supposed hopefulness arising from popular nuclear disengagement is debatable, but the matter of that indifference is definitely politically relevant and makes the study of organised civil society in such an historical context all the more cogent.

The NPT had stabilised a nuclear order based upon the almost universal renunciation to the bomb, complemented by IAEA safeguards and Western-led export control agreements. However, fears of a nuclear war between US and Soviet Union were soon replaced by alarm at the potential acquisition of the bomb by what came to be called ‘rogue states’ as well terrorist groups. Despite the remarkable success of the NPT, which in the 1990s was joined by most of the hold-outs (including prominent ones like China and France but

57 Jean Baudrillard, America (London: Verso, 1989), 44.
also problematic countries like South Africa, Ukraine, and Brazil), there were worries that it was not enough. With anti-nuclear activism growing ever more detached from popular perception and participation, decision-making bodies have become a central focus for their work. That is why, in order to study contemporary civil society, attention should be turned to the most important global nuclear forum, the NPT and its review process.

This brief overview has sketched the contours of civil society’s involvement in nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War, although important initiatives have been left out for reasons of space. The community, while growing more transnational and extending to new constituencies, has had to face problems such as diminished public attention, funding, ageing, and geographical underrepresentation. The demand for nuclear disarmament, moreover, has become increasingly accepted by political elites, although its progress at the multilateral level remains limited. How are we to make sense of this complex reality and of the various ways in which civil society has engaged with the central empirical focus of this study, the 2015 NPT RevCon? The following sections will provide some guidance in that by, firstly, inquiring into the analytical differences according to scholars and practitioners as well as specifying the reductionist-abolitionist divide, sketched in the Introduction; and secondly by laying out the groundwork for a study of civil society at the NPT via an overview of the institutional constraints to their participation.
6.2 Distinctions in global nuclear civil society

For understanding the differences among civil society actors it is necessary to establish analytical categories of some kind. Several issues have already been taken with Claudia Kissling’s *Civil Society and Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, but what is interesting for this discussion is that she provides only a shallow view of civil society at the NPT. Regarding the scope of actors involved, in fact, she points to the variety of groups, which ‘ranged from strong activist associations and popular grass-roots movements to specialist scientific and academic policy-analysis institutes’. Kissling rightly recognises the lack of any group explicitly striving for armaments, but explicitly rejects any attempt at classification of the stances taken by those civil society groups that participate in the NPT. While dispensing with that exercise might be justified in light of the fact that boundaries between categories are porous, it significantly detracts from her depth of analysis, leaving the reader unaware of the different agendas and practices of the community.

More effort at classifying is evident in Jeffrey Knopf’s article ‘NGOs, Social Movements, and Arms Control’ that reviews the types of organisations and their activities. While his focus is on all arms control rather than just nuclear, Knopf provides an interesting typology according to primary audience (‘elite’ or ‘general public’) and main activity (‘advocacy’ or ‘information’). As a result, he finds four types of arms control NGOs:

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58 Claudia Kissling, *Civil Society and Nuclear Non-proliferation*.
59 Ibid., 52.
60 Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘NGOs, Social Movements, and Arms Control.’
1. advocacy group: targeting advocacy to elites, as exemplified by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS);

2. social movement: mobilising the public to affect government officials, like the Freeze’s experience;

3. think tank: disseminating information and analysis to policy makers, such as the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS);

4. education group: tailoring information to the public, as in the case of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).

Knopf’s categorisation indeed highlights major distinctions that can be witnessed in the NPT context. The strategies of groups involved with nuclear weapon issues span different types of collective action and have been described by many of this project’s interviewees as falling in either the ‘advocacy’ or ‘information’ category. There seems to be a tension, in fact, between the two main activities that these groups are engaged in, as gathering information for the benefit of decision-makers is often seen as incompatible with the advancement of a specific political agenda. This difference is especially stark in Washington, where, in the words of an NGO representative, ‘think tanks and advocacy each do their things and are not cooperating.’

As noted by Paul Boyer:

Extra-governmental think tanks remain influential in policy formation, just as RAND loomed large in Kubrick’s day. Armchair strategists embedded in a network of foundations and institutes, often with ideological agendas, defense industry ties, and a revolving-door relationship with the Pentagon,

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61 Interview n. 5, April 9, 2014.
continue to play a shadowy but important role in setting the nation’s nuclear policies.\(^{62}\)

A further broad distinction among the different souls of nuclear civil society stems from the expected drivers of political change, which has led some groups to work at the grassroots level while others have focused their attention on directly influencing the decision-makers. As one activist explained in great detail, much non-governmental strategizing depends on the elected theory of political change: whether a top-down approach can alter the political process or bottom-up pressures are going to modify the status quo.\(^{63}\) Yet another strand is what is sometimes referred to as the ‘grasstops’: influential former officials who advocate certain positions and are able to get an audience by virtue of their status and connections.\(^{64}\) However, the elites-grassroots distinction made by Knopf only helps to a certain extent; it is almost a moot point in the current situation because, as he recognises himself, civil society has largely shifted away from trying to influence the public.\(^{65}\)

A better analytical distinction is one that discriminates between the stances, rather than the strategies, of civil society. In examining the US debate around nuclear weapons abolition, Lodgaard\(^{66}\) distinguished among three camps: one for total nuclear disarmament, one for arsenal reduction, and one opposed to all arms control efforts. Indeed, these are the three main positions that can, and have been, taken with regard to nuclear disarmament. Since the

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\(^{63}\) Interview n. 6, May 4, 2014.

\(^{64}\) Interview n. 5, April 9, 2014.

\(^{65}\) Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘NGOs, Social Movements, and Arms Control,’ 182.

position opposed to any kind of arms control is almost by definition absent in
the sort of diplomatic processes analysed in this thesis, the focus should be
on the division between total nuclear disarmament and arsenal reduction.

Disarmament and reduction are indeed very different processes, each with
supporting constituencies. The disarmament camp Lodgaard, however,
identified with the four horsemen proposal, mentioned earlier, something
that should makes us reflect on what is the character of the disarmament they
advocated. As he later notes, their rationale rested on national security and
international order considerations, namely the limitations of nuclear
deterrence against terrorist threats and in a multi-polar situation with risks
of accidental launches.67 This is very different from a morality rationale,
which sees the elimination of nuclear weapons as a way to establish a more
equal and democratic international order.68 A very similar distinction of
approaches can also be identified in the NPT context. Articulating something
that is well recognised within the nuclear civil society community, Rebecca
Johnson identified it in describing the chasm between arms controllers and
abolitionists at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.69 If both
supported in principle the goal of nuclear disarmament, the ways prescribed
to get there varied remarkably, along with the strategy for that conference.

To keep in line with the jargon most employed in an NPT context, this will be
referred to here as the reductionists-abolitionists divide, but the concept is

67 Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 195–197.
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, eds. George Perkovich and James M. Acton (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment of International Peace, 2009).
69 Rebecca Johnson, ‘Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the
the same. At heart lies the realisation that not all civil society groups are alike, since some want to control the risk factors inherent in nuclear armaments, while others propose to make away with them in order to eliminate the risk. Regrettably the analytical attention has seldom focused on the role of this ideological division, which according to this project is necessary to understand the political work this community conducts. Such a distinction is not only crucial for the history of the NPT, but also for the broader issue of global nuclear governance, and the critical question of how to deal with the nuclear risk.

This thesis wants to explicitly look into this cleavage as a way to demonstrate that the same basic tension dividing states is also present in civil society. Chapter Seven will present more practically the two sides of this community, and Chapter Eight will proceed to compare and contrast them. Before doing so, however, we should first examine how civil society participates in the NPT review process. Beyond the strategies and divides among NPT-attending groups, all have to play by an established set of rules.

6.3 Negotiating civil society access to the NPT

The importance of the NPT, as argued earlier, does not only rest on the obligations it establishes for state parties, but also on being the main current locus of contestation for nuclear governance through its review process. Every five years the NPT holds a Review Conference that takes place in New
York, lasts about a month, and aims to produce a consensual Final Document. Each one is preceded by three shorter Preparatory Committees (PrepCom), held alternately in Vienna, Geneva, and New York to set the agenda to be discussed. The RevCons and PrepComs of the NPT are intended to oversee the implementation of the treaty, but almost always follow the same path of long-winded government statements and discussions that appear to be of little use to actually push towards any of the goals of the treaty. For instance, while many states in 2010 favoured strengthening the commitment to the Additional Protocol as the universal safeguards standard, such language did not reach consensus because of the opposition of some member states and was not included in the Final Document. Such is the situation for most other norms that could result from a conference of this kind.

Nonetheless, on occasion the NPT was able to agree on significant measures, even though the implementation phase has always proved difficult. As pointed out earlier, in 1995 the parties met to decide on the future of the treaty. Although it was by no means a foregone conclusion, the conference agreed to indefinitely extend the NPT and to advance on another dossier: endorsing the creation of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East. The 2000 RevCon, moreover, reached an agreement on a set of steps that would further the goal of nuclear disarmament, the so-called 13 practical steps. While there was no consensus on a Final Document in 2005, the 2010 RevCon hammered out a forward-looking Action Plan on all three pillars of the Treaty, along with a decision to take forward the discussion for the Middle East zone.
Sometimes change in agreed language has been more marginal but highly contested, such as the upholding of the humanitarian preoccupations.

Reaching compromise on agreed language is thus a cumbersome process that only occasionally meets success. Regardless, examining the discussions at the NPT is relevant, because it is the best forum where to gauge the preferences of the majority of states and other actors involved. Moreover, it is significant that this debate takes place in the first place and that the voices heard are not limited to dominant conceptions.

The main requirement for civil society groups under examination in this thesis is to participate in the NPT and its periodic reunions. Therefore, it should be explained how participation happens. The NPT is in fact highly hierarchical, both among different types of states and among various actors. If the former depends upon the diverging commitments accepted by different categories of members, the latter has to do with the still faulty access and transparency provided to civil society. While allowed to attend the Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees, civil society is denied participation in some of the discussions and is allowed to take the floor only during a special session. International institutions like the IAEA and the CTBTO, instead, are more actively involved, with a seat and the chance to make opening statements and interventions from the floor. Furthermore, the UN Secretariat is also engaged through its Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), which assists the chair of the RevCon or PrepCom both in the logistical details and in the substantive undertaking of gathering national positions and trying to find areas of potential agreement.
State representatives almost always make reference to the importance they attach to the participation and contribution of civil society. However, they have also proved to be resistant to civil society interventions. While states have been often only verbally supportive of civil society, the United Nations Secretariat has consistently encouraged and facilitated their involvement. As a UN brochure puts it: ‘The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has worked in close partnership with civil society organizations to advance the cause of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.’

Created in 1982, the UNODA – or shortly ODA – is tasked with promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, strengthening disarmament regimes for other weapons of mass destruction, and advancing conventional armaments limitations. With offices both in New York and in Geneva, it provides organizational support for the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies.

Among other things, ODA works to make it possible for NGOs to attend various discussions taking place at the New York headquarters of the UN and in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament. There is a lot of work that goes into the access of civil society in big conferences. For the NPT it is a two-stage process of NGO accreditation and individual registration. Initially the organisations are screened to make sure that their work touches upon disarmament and non-proliferation, but only very few are rejected, and it is not restricted to groups with ECOSOC consultant status. In the registration

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71 Interview n. 7, May 13, 2014.
phase there is not a screening of the individuals, but security might put some in a black list. It is not until the first day of the conference, however, that civil society’s representation ceases to be provisional, when the NGO list gets approved by the parties to the treaty.

Moreover, the ODA collaborates with civil society to organise the half-day session that the NPT RevCons and PrepComs dedicate to NGO presentations. In terms of civil society participation in the conference, the NPT is considered ‘pretty generous’ by comparison with other fora. The UNGA First Committee, for instance, only allocates them three hours, while at each NPT reunion they have a whole half-day NGO cluster. The format of the cluster has changed over time, but generally always included statements by different NGOs. In a relative innovation the 2014 session has been more interactive, although participation by state representatives was abysmal and their engagement with the presentation rather limited. Things went back to normal in 2015 when, a presentation after the next by each organisation, left the session with only five minutes for question and answer. The choice of speakers and format is entirely handled by the NGOs that only give ODA the list on the day. In this favouring of civil society’s autonomy, ODA is quite different from other UN departments that have no NGO coordinator.

The organisation tasked with panel discussions at the UN was for many years the NGO Committee on Disarmament Peace and Security, founded in 1972 by Homer Jack, a Unitarian minister who had been involved with the creation of SANE. The Committee brings together different organisations concerned with disarmament, peace, and security with the aim of facilitating civil

\[Ibid.\]
society’s participation in formal disarmament meetings at the UN. Although the Committee organised a number of panel discussions at the UN over the years, its fate rapidly changed when their main funder went out of business. An organisation which used to employ 20 people, now runs almost exclusively on a voluntary basis. The US$100 per year that each member contributes, along with some private donations, are not enough to cover more than the work of the editor of *Disarmament Times*, the monthly publication of the group.

At present, although the NGO Committee still exists, the coordination has been undertaken by Reaching Critical Will (RCW), one of the largest New York-based organisations in the field. RCW is a largely autonomous section of the historical peace group, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). With its leader, Ray Acheson, RCW is extremely prominent in the organisation of all phases of civil society’s participation, from managing the half a day allocated by the Conference to NGO presentations to coordinating the events taking place in the room assigned for civil society’s uses. Moreover, RCW publishes its own reports and during NPT PrepComs and RevCons produces the daily *NPT News in Review*. That and its website are greatly appreciated by both diplomats and civil society representatives, providing a great repository for conference documents – even those that are initially distributed to states only often make their way quite quickly to RCW website.\(^{75}\)

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\(^{73}\) Interview n. 8, May 22, 2014.

\(^{74}\) Interview n. 9, May 13, 2014.

The day of civil society participants to the NPT PrepComs and RevCons starts early with an 8 o’clock daily Abolition Caucus, followed by a government briefing for NGOs. Whereas the former is for internal coordination, the latter in an event that aims to facilitate dialogue between diplomatic and civil society participants to the Conference. A further avenue for coordination is presented by the Abolition 2000 Annual General Meeting, a one-day consultation where a variety of groups meet to brief each other on their activities and develop joint proposals. While invitations are widely extended, it seems that only the most committed abolitionists take part. Furthermore, civil society groups organise side events to formally interact with the diplomats at the conference. These short meetings tend to take place on the premises of the UN or in nearby Permanent Missions, NGO offices, or rented spaces and involve presentations by both members of civil society and of national delegations or international organisations. With a compact agenda revolving on specific themes and a format including questions and answers, the side events are seen as important avenues of dialogue and political influence. Yet, having participated in dozens of them, the author can attest to the unequal participation in these events, with interns well represented and diplomatic ‘heavy-weights’ often absent.

Even with these formal possibilities of interaction, civil society is kept at a distance from the diplomatic process. It is unable to present working papers to the conference, a right that is reserved to states and groups of states. Moreover, some of the sessions are closed to nongovernmental representatives – the ones where usually more substantive issues are discussed. Also, issues remain with the physical division between diplomats
and civil society. When the Conference meets in the General Assembly room, the lower floor, where state representatives and international organisation officers have their seats, is off-limits. A civil society pass only allows access to the top floor, where space is quite ample, but a sense of division is strongly felt. NGO members often use the stairs to visit the bottom floor in order to have conversations with the representatives, to check the speakers’ list, collect documents, and distribute their publications. Such a practice, although informally accepted, is formally prohibited, and states have complained about it at the 2014 NPT PrepCom. In one instance, publications were removed because found offensive. Also, the possibility to visit the bottom floor was limited to five people at the time by giving RCW five badges and asking them to put every organisation’s publications for display in the new location.

The palpable division between diplomats and civil society means that upon exiting the conference room diplomats spill over into a lounge bar overlooking the garden and the East River where they entertain conversations with colleagues. Being interdicted from the area makes it difficult for civil society to approach members of the delegations that they would like to lobby or present with proposals. The area dedicated to civil society, on the other hand, opens on a part of the Secretariat Building used for educational purposes. Guided tours do not only roam the outside corridor to illustrate the history of multilateral disarmament, but are daily let inside the room in order to catch a glimpse of the UN at work. This treatment has been resented by civil society, as is the cumbersome registration process with

76 The satirical weasels arrest warrants by rebellious organisation Wildfire spurred complaints and the publications table was moved outside of the room. More will be said about them in Chapter Seven.
the massive lines for collecting badges on the first day, preventing many from entering the room on time. Nonetheless, civil society and delegation members spend weeks working side by side and rather often know each other well. A long conference day sometimes even ends with both sharing a drink a few blocks from the UN.

As it has been said, this project is based upon participant observation of the NPT carried out predominantly at the 2014 Preparatory Committee and at the 2015 Review Conference. The groups taken into consideration in this project are thus all that were present there. In terms of demographics, in 2010 1,102 representatives from 110 NGOs participated in the RevCon.\(^77\) At the 2014 Preparatory Committee the organisations were 59, although, as often happens, not all of them actually sent representatives. The 2015 RevCon was attended by a total of 902 individuals from 86 organisations, data further broken down in Appendix A.\(^78\) Civil society at the NPT is heavily North dominated, as most accredited participants come from North America and Europe, with a sizable Asian contingent which is mostly from Japan. African NGOs are increasingly participating. Given that the third PrepCom in each cycle and all RevCons take place in New York, there always is a great participation from US-based organisations, even the ones with the most localised concerns such as groups of downwinders.

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\(^78\) There is a slight discrepancy between the numbers of NGOs and representatives registered for the conference (1,151 and 101 respectively) and those that actually participated (902 and 86 respectively). Broken-down data is available only for registration, in Appendix A. The number of participants, instead, can be found here: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Fact Sheet: Disarmament and Civil Society,’ (January 2016). https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Disarmament-and-Civil-Society-Fact-Sheet-Jan2016.pdf (last accessed 2 November 2016).
In addition to the customary route of civil society access to the NPT, certain nuclear experts have also been embedded in national delegations. This sometimes responds to the need for qualified personnel of small delegations, but in other cases it seems to have more to do with a search for legitimacy by inclusivity. Some examples of this reality are CNS’s William Potter with Kazakhstan, Chatham House’s Patricia Lewis with the UK, and Harald Müller of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) for Germany. Furthermore, the 2014 PrepCom saw another development: a civil society representative was enlisted as assistant to the Chair, a role generally given to a fellow diplomat from the same country. Thereby, Tariq Rauf of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has worked with Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru to bring parties to a consensus. The extent of access that civil society members embedded in national delegations or even in the NPT team is clearly on a whole different level from what regular representatives enjoy. However, it remains to be seen how much of the most sensitive conversations extend beyond diplomats.

In sum, participation of civil society groups at the NPT RevCons and PrepComs is an established practice that allows for several possibilities of interaction. However, limits exist in terms of access and the next chapters will delve deeper into patterns of exclusion that might emerge.
6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided the historical setting of global nuclear civil society to ground the forthcoming empirical analysis of its involvement in nuclear governance at the NPT. As such, it has first focused on the involvement with nuclear policy by nongovernmental organised groups throughout history. Sparked by crises such as the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 1940s, nuclear testing in the 1960s, and the arms race in the 1980s, people have mobilised to call for limits and an end to nuclear weapons. During over four decades of bipolar confrontation in the shadow of the bomb, civil society mobilised a range of constituencies and strategies to influence nuclear policy. Social movements, NGOs, but even private individuals have on occasion achieved such results through a combination of public demonstrations and elite lobbying.

With the end of the Cold War, civil society’s relation to the nuclear question significantly changed, in terms of both strategies and opportunity. The community, while growing more transnational and extending to new constituencies, has had to face problems such as diminished public attention, funding, ageing, and geographical underrepresentation. The demand for nuclear disarmament, moreover, has become increasingly accepted by political elites, although its progress at the multilateral level remains limited. Nowadays the community of nuclear civil society is composed of NGOs, think tanks, social movements, academic institutions, associations, and other groups that provide expert analysis and political recommendations to policymakers and the public. The scope of their activity spans from local mobilisation in areas where nuclear weapons have created risks for the
population to national campaigns to change domestic laws and global movements that support multilateral treaties negotiations. Nuclear civil society’s work is not limited to protests and lobbying, but also includes groups that focus more on analysis and less on advocacy.

Civil society groups are involved in struggles in multiple ways. These struggles deserve further examination, but little attention has been paid so far to the inner workings of civil society in nuclear weapons politics, especially at the transnational level. In order to understand this problématique, the chapter went on to engage with some of the authors who have broadly looked at the same community. This led to recognise the importance of distinctions between research and advocacy and between top-down and bottom-up approaches, as well as the most relevant: between abolitionists and reductionists. While ostensibly all committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament, civil society is in fact divided on what it means by it: disarmament refers to the abolition of nuclear weapons for some, and the reduction in stockpile for others. Exploring this distinction remains the empirical commitment of this thesis.

If this division can be found across the board in most of the sites where civil society is present, the NPT is an especially interesting forum to monitor. The treaty’s periodic meetings, in fact, can be seen as the main forum of contestation, in which nuclear civil society is given voice, albeit unequally. This has led us to briefly review the NPT’s commitments, history, and problems to inscribe civil society’s activities in its wider context. Finally, the chapter has explored what it entails for civil society to participate in the NPT, in terms of access and ability to interact with and influence the process.
Similarly to other studies in the field, this thesis researches the discourses put forward by nuclear communities in order to understand the culture of the groups under examination and its politics. The following chapters will thus strive to clarify the tensions between the different currents of civil society involved in global nuclear policy by looking at their involvement with the NPT.
Chapter 7

Civil Society at the NPT: A Search for Ideologies of Disarmament and Deterrence

In 1959, long before the NPT was signed, Bertrand Russell wrote of the proceedings of disarmament conferences as ‘a morass of technicalities, with arguments this way and that and well-founded objections that are met by equally well-founded retorts.’ While he thought this situation would only hold as long as the East-West confrontation continued, those same words could still describe the now many conferences on issues of disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. What is even more striking is that a few lines later Russell points out that it is the very logic of the nuclear age to prevent agreements, as states doubt others’ self-restraint and worry about how to ensure their national security. In 2016, over half a century after his writings, it is evident that Russell was far-sighted in saying that ‘such questions could be prolonged ad infinitum and that negotiations could

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continue throughout many years to advocate disarmament without incurring the risk of bringing it about.\textsuperscript{2}

This is precisely the situation at the time under examination: being in favour of disarmament is now almost inevitable in the nuclear community, and since the very first resolution of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), nuclear disarmament has been on the global agenda.\textsuperscript{3} Moreover, virtually all states pledge it is a national goal, and the so-called non-proliferation regime stands on this promise, while basically all international organisations and civil society groups but also all states proclaim themselves supporters of nuclear disarmament. ‘We have and we will continue to scale down our arsenal, and to continue to move, step by step, toward nuclear disarmament,’\textsuperscript{4} announced the United States, while China declared itself ‘a staunch champion for nuclear disarmament process.’\textsuperscript{5} At the NPT they come and air their vision for a world without nuclear weapons, regardless of how much their policies align with such aim. It is thus critical to inquire into what is meant by nuclear disarmament and to unveil the process through which disarmament gets preached but has not yet incurred the risk of being brought about.

Between April 27 and May 22, 2015, New York hosted yet another round of the nuclear-age-long wrestling match between supporters and opponents of

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
nuclear reliance. As the doors of the 9th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened, the ammunitions for this battle were all (more or less) ready, in the rather unfrightening form of papers and prepared remarks delineating each delegation’s position. Within those hundreds of pages, thousands of lines of text, millions of words, lay the different interpretations of what the NPT is and how well it is doing its job. More than that, they contained, sometimes hidden behind convoluted expressions and vague definitions, the views of states on nuclear weapons and their ideas about how to achieve disarmament. Studying that ideological clash is important to assess the degree of ideological contestation within global nuclear governance.

Analyses of the discourses and competing claims of states and groups at NPT conferences have been explored, but it was left unanswered what role civil society plays in such narrative struggles. The place of less materially endowed actors, however, deserves further attention, in that it can demonstrate the pervasiveness of a certain system of signification, as highlighted in the US context by Gusterson’s analysis of the nuclear laboratory6 and Cohn’s work on the defence professionals.7 What is most interesting for this research, indeed, is the role that civil society plays in the NPT struggle, because, as seen in Chapter Five, the foundations of governing activity are better understood in light of the attitudes and organisation of civil society. Only within civil society can hegemony be won, according to Gramsci, and similarly this thesis argues that it is there that we should look for the consent and contestation to the continued reliance on nuclear weapons. Civil society is involved in the

6 Hugh Gusterson, *Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War.*
7 Carol Cohn, ‘*Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.*’
NPT process, though it differs greatly from Gramsci’s times – rather constituting the intellectual apparatus behind organised collective action. Such organisations (including NGOs, social movements, think tanks, concerned individuals) participate in great numbers in NPT RevCons, as seen in Chapter Six, and contribute their own assessment of the nuclear condition.

Understanding these voices is not superfluous, because, following Gramsci, the subordinate bear the potential for transformation, if they are able to construct an alternative common sense and a solid historic bloc – in parallel, they can give more or less direct support to the dominant common sense thus reinforcing the operation of deterrence. While the great majority is in favour of disarmament, there appears to be a degree of internal variation. Nuclear-free world, global zero, nuclear weapons abolition, the model convention – all of these have become general terms to refer to the prospect of eliminating the bomb. Scholars have quantitatively analysed the recurrence of such words, but their qualitative examination remains lacking: what is actually meant by these terms and do they all represent the same idea? What ordering ideas underlie them? And what do these ideas do? Asking such questions can enlarge our understanding of nuclear governance because deconstructing the ideologies of civil society gives us a handle in understanding the most stable bases of nuclear thinking.

Ideas are never neutral, and they do not exist away from intersubjective relations. Departing from the assumption that all theory ‘is always for

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someone and for some purpose,” we are led to ask what is the aim of nuclear disarmament according to its supporters. The thesis has a critical core, as it takes issue with this unproblematic lumping together of different processes and political dynamics under the label of disarmament. At a minimum this thesis should show that terminological precision is important for this field and has not been consistently exercised. In addition, if the overarching argument of the thesis were accepted, one would think of nuclear identities as positioned on a continuum between regimes of disarmament and deterrence where the latter is hegemonic. The narratives of civil society at the NPT summits are useful in highlighting the existence of taken-for-granted deterrence theory reasoning even among this community of disarmament advocates. By demonstrating that a deterrence forma mentis is active even among civil society championing nuclear disarmament, we can indeed arrive to prove the common-sensical nature of deterrence, whose tropes are so widely accepted that they get incorporated in some of civil society’s articulations of the nuclear threat.

7.1 Civil society frames at the 2015 NPT Review Conference

This and the following chapter are set on demonstrating that there is a division within NPT-attending global civil society that derives from their

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9 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,’ 128, emphasis in original.
definitions of disarmament, considered a revolutionary project for some, and an incremental one for others. These two strategies, the abolitionist and the reductionist, which have been outlined at the end of Chapter Six, will be examined in turn as a way to understand the variation of approaches to disarmament. As highlighted in the previous chapters, this is a fundamental distinction among NPT state parties as well as within the civil society community that operates in that forum. Clearly every distinction illuminates some aspects while hiding others. However, the abolitionist-reductionist divide is particularly relevant, not just because of its historical operation, but also for its significance in the case of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, as this builds upon a wider cleavage in the governance of nuclear weapons that is hard to reconcile.

The differences in narratives of disarmament will be examined with the aid of critical constructivist methods, developed for a very similar phenomenon. In his analysis of NGOs contesting environmental politics in Brazil, Matt McDonald looked in turn at four key elements that each construction of security defines: the security threat, the referent object of such threat, the agent of security, and the ways in which to realise security.\(^\text{10}\) This is a useful guide to highlight the differences amongst the definitions, which will give us a crucial insight into the process of articulation of nuclear disarmament. Such a schemata, and the historical material analysis that will be necessary to trace the origins of the narratives of threat and of solution, will be crucial to account of the variance of approaches. Moreover, it will allow drawing conclusions on who is the subordinate party within that contest.

\(^{10}\text{This approach is broadly similar to that of Matt McDonald, ‘Discourses of Climate Security,’} 49.\)
The 2015 NPT RevCon discussion, in fact, has been dominated by a tension between two narratives that belong to the abolitionist and reductionist camp respectively: the ‘humanitarian’ and the ‘step-by-step’ proposals. Surely a series of other frames exist, either linked or unconnected to the two mentioned, but they have less relevance to the object of study than the two main ones. Step-by-step and humanitarian narratives, indeed, have been employed not only by various civil society actors, but also by the state parties to the NPT. In fact, they have been employed to such an extent that they had a pervasive effect on the conference itself, drawing a rift between the states and closing all options for consensual outcomes.\textsuperscript{11} The gulf between the two interpretations of the disarmament commitment could not be bridged, contributing to the unsuccessful outcome of the 2015 RevCon, which closed without a Final Document.\textsuperscript{12} This chapter will argue that those narratives are an expression of a wider fracture between abolitionist and reductionist approaches to nuclear disarmament, which can be evidenced among both attending states and civil society.

This chapter focuses particularly on two paradigmatic examples to highlight the distinction between these two main orientations among civil society concerned with nuclear weapons: Global Zero and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The two are not to be seen as ideal-types of this division, rather as particularly indicative examples of a certain tendency which they help illustrate. In fact, they are expression of a wider division within that community, with groups such as the four


\textsuperscript{12} Anthony Burke, ‘Nuclear Politics: Beyond Positivism,’ 2.
horsemen and the European Leadership Network (ELN) falling in the former category and others like the coalition Abolition 2000 and groups like International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in the latter. Additional narratives that have been employed in the NPT context will be addressed and their relation with the step-by-step and the humanitarian discourses will be put in focus.

7.2 The abolitionist camp and its disarmament frame

This part will examine the discourse of the abolitionist camp of nuclear disarmament supporters by focusing on three of its main initiatives. This community shares the view that eliminating nuclear weapons is an urgent necessity and that multilateral international law, in various forms, is the way to go about it. The three major groups in this category that have catalysed attention at the 2015 NPT RevCon are ICAN, Abolition 2000, and the Nuclear Zero lawsuit:

1. The most important is certainly the campaign to abolish nuclear weapons launched by ICAN, which grouped more than 400 organizations behind its call for a humanitarian ban on nuclear weapons.13

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2. Another interesting case is the Abolition 2000 network and its work for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention since the late 1990s.14

3. Finally, the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ lawsuits against nuclear possessor states was supported more or less directly by various parts of civil society.15

All three initiatives have been rather present at the 2015 RevCon through the activities of various organisations. To briefly break them down, we can say that ICAN is a global campaign coalition of many civil society groups pushing for a treaty to outlaw and eliminate nuclear weapons. It was launched from a branch of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in 2007 and has progressively evolved into the main non-governmental supporter of diplomatic process known as the Humanitarian Initiative. With an impressive number of delegates and a youthful communication, ICAN lobbies governments in capitals and at diplomatic meetings to gain their endorsement. ICAN also comprises prominent individuals and actively cooperates with like-minded states, but the basis of its campaign rationale has been the support for the Humanitarian Initiative.16 It stressed that ‘[t]he catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons on our health, societies and the environment must be at the centre of all discussions about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.’17

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Certain civil society organisations had a prominent role in pushing this initiative in the NPT context, especially some of those that sit in ICAN’s International Steering Group. PAX launched *Don’t Bank on the Bomb*, a study on the financial institutions’ investments on nuclear weapons production.\(^{18}\) Article 36 and Reaching Critical Will also had a few publications presented during the conference and the latter, despite being absent for the first week, published its daily summaries of the conference proceedings, the *NPT News in Review*.\(^{19}\) Reaching Critical Will is in charge of organising the room dedicated to civil society to make sure that all the groups that want to hold a side-event can do so, but they are also responsible for the special session dedicated to civil society. Unlike in previous years, in 2015 this was a simple succession of organisation that had clearly not coordinated their speeches.


\(^{19}\) All the issues of the 2015 *NPT News in Review* are available online at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2015/nir (last accessed 7 July 2016).
As mentioned in Chapter Six, Abolition 2000 is a wide network of NGOs for nuclear disarmament from around the world that loosely coordinates around the NPT review process. The main activities conducted by Abolition 2000 have been two big events: the International Peace and Planet Conference and Rally at the eve of the RevCon and the Abolition 2000 Annual General Meeting on the first Saturday. The former was a big event with hundreds of people marching through the streets of New York, with chants and paper cranes that the huge Japanese delegation handed out to bystanders. The latter, instead, always served for the abolitionist elements of civil society that attend the NPT to meet, network, and coordinate. Having attended both the Annual General Meeting in 2014 and the one in 2015, the author can attest there were many less participants in the latter. Moreover, the climate of

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20 Photo by the author, New York, 26 April 2016.
openness and mutual help seemed to recede somehow, as many participants appeared more interested in pushing their own proposal rather than engaging in a meaningful conversation.

The third initiative is the so-called Nuclear Zero lawsuit, leadingly organised by Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) and IALANA. The former has launched the initiative and the latter contributes to it thanks to its experience in the 1996 court case at the International Court of Justice. They organised four side events during the conference and have been only limitedly present. NAPF representatives flew home after attending the Abolition 2000 meeting, while IALANA’s John Burroughs remained longer, though less than in past times.

These three initiatives are associated with three different recipes for nuclear disarmament: a ban, a convention, and a lawsuit. In order to understand what the abolitionist camp means by nuclear disarmament, attention will now be turned to the definition of the threat and of the response proposed by the afore-mentioned groups. As already noted, most of the analysis will focus on ICAN’s role within the humanitarian initiative given its importance in the review cycle under examination.

7.2.1.1 Origins of the humanitarian discourse

A brief look at the humanitarian discourse’s origin is now important to show what are the contours within which ICAN and other groups move. The humanitarian narrative was born in diplomatic circles already at the end of the 2000s, but it was in 2010 that it became a central NPT theme of debate, when it made its way into the Review Conference’s Final Document. In what
came to be regarded as a major turning point, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took a clear stance on nuclear disarmament just ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In the words of then-President of the ICRC, Jakob Kellenberger, the ‘currency of this debate must ultimately be about human beings, about the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law, and about the collective future of humanity.’\(^{21}\) It is the whole of humanity that should be the referent object of security and accordingly, so long as nuclear weapons exist human security cannot be guaranteed. Beyond explicitly introducing the theme of human suffering, the ICRC noted the lack of response capacity at the international level, in case of a nuclear weapons explosion.

The following development was the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where a few states presented those same ideas in their statements.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence remains in the nuclear doctrines, with a considerable number of nuclear weapons ready for launch within minutes while thousands more remain stockpiled. The continued existence of defence policies based on nuclear weapons only serves to prolong this irresponsible gamble with the future of humanity.\(^{22}\)

Switzerland in particular opened its contribution to the conference calling disarmament the poor relative within the NPT and advocating a debate with humanitarian considerations at heart, beyond military and juridical considerations, questioning ‘at which point the right of States must yield to the interests of humanity.’\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\)ICRC, ‘Bringing the era of nuclear weapons to an end,’ statement by Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, Geneva, April 20, 2010.


\(^{23}\)ibid., 7-8.
This preoccupation was reflected by many more delegations throughout the conference and language to that end was introduced in the Final Document.\textsuperscript{24} Adopted by consensus and containing a series of measures to move forward on disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses, the text included an explicit humanitarian reference.

The Conference, while welcoming achievements in bilateral and unilateral reductions by some nuclear-weapon States, notes with concern that the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to several thousands. The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons [...] and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{25}

These few words catalysed a little revolution in NPT language as it was followed by the start of parallel diplomatic discussion process and the humanitarian discourse gaining wider international support between the 2010 and 2015 RevCons. Indeed, three international Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) were held – in Oslo in 2013 and in 2014 first in Nayarit, Mexico and later in Vienna. At these events, convened by the host states, governmental and non-governmental representatives participated in fact-based discussion on the effects of nuclear arms. With the exception of India and Pakistan, the nuclear-armed (both the NWS legitimated by the NPT and not) decided not to attend the first or the second conference, which saw, however, an overwhelming participation of


\textsuperscript{25} Support for the humanitarian initiative went from the 35 states that signed up to a joint statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2012 to the 155 of 2014.
NNWS, the non-nuclear weapon states. The US and the UK have since participated in the one in Austria.  

At the first HINW conference, organized by the Norwegian Government in March 2013, 128 states participated along with UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, experts, and civil society representatives. ICAN was invited by Norway to be its main civil society partner and since all the successive HINW conferences have been preceded by a civil society conference organised by ICAN.

The conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons have provided stark and irrefutable evidence that nuclear weapons cause death and displacement on a catastrophic scale, with profound and potentially irreversible damage to health and the environment, to socioeconomic development, and to the social order. No state or international body could adequately address the immediate consequences by nuclear weapon detonations.

Both in Nayarit and Vienna, discussion has centred on scientific evidence of what nuclear explosions would do in today’s world. In Vienna participation grew to 158 states, but most importantly Austria took the lead in delivering the so-called ‘Austrian pledge’. It committed to bring the humanitarian discussion of the three HINW conferences to the NPT and other UN fora and called on all states parties ‘to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons’. This document was presented at the 2015 RevCon, and it would gain the spotlight.

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29 Ibid.
when it was opened for other states’ endorsement – renamed humanitarian pledge, it would gain 159 supporters.\textsuperscript{30} The initiative has indeed come a long way since the 16 states that gave a joint statement on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at the 2012 PrepCom.

\subsection*{7.2.2 The threat: all nukes}

The risk that the humanitarian initiative seeks to address derives from nuclear weapons existence as such, because of the catastrophic effects that their use would have for people everywhere. ‘Their destructive power is so vast that its effects won’t stop at national borders.’\textsuperscript{31} ‘The effects of nuclear weapons cannot be controlled in space or time. Their existence anywhere is a threat to people everywhere,’\textsuperscript{32} reads an ICAN publication. The specificity of the humanitarian discourse is to maintain that the consequences of a nuclear weapons explosion are ‘significantly graver than it was understood in the past.’\textsuperscript{33} In fact, its supporters have emphasised newly produced research showing that environmental and health consequences have not been thoroughly accounted for. Examples of this include Mary Olson’s work demonstrating that females are more affected than males by radiation exposure as well as the IPPNW data on the famine that would follow a

\textsuperscript{30} By the end of the conference, 159 NPT states parties had subscribed to it, over 80\% of its membership.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{ICAN}, ‘Catastrophic Humanitarian Harm,’ 2.
\textsuperscript{33} Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Austrian Pledge’.
nuclear exchange.\textsuperscript{34} What is more, supporters of the initiative have pointed out the lack of an adequate response capacity: a ‘nuclear attack anywhere in the world would overwhelm the health infrastructure, making an effective humanitarian response impossible.’\textsuperscript{35}

Accordingly, nuclear weapons explosions are the main threat, but the ‘danger of nuclear weapons arises from their very existence,’\textsuperscript{36} because, even when they are not used, bombs produce security, environmental, and economic harms. Deaths from cancer will continue being the ‘legacy of nuclear testing’ for decades to come, while the ‘production of the explosive materials used in all nuclear weapons – highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium – is harmful to human health and the environment.’\textsuperscript{37} A further reason why the threat of nuclear weapons is illegitimate, according to ICAN, is the diversion of public resources it generates, especially as modernisation programmes are carried out across the nuclear-armed states.\textsuperscript{38}

The problem for this frame is not of acquisition by terrorists and rogue states, but possession as such – thus ICAN’s affirmation: ‘When it comes to nuclear weapons, there are no safe hands.’\textsuperscript{39} Such critique refuses the assumption that there are any security benefits deriving from the bomb, as much strategic studies literature has put forward, insisting instead that morality should ground a nuclear-free choice. As such, it has contested a

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\textsuperscript{34} The former was discussed in a side event titled ‘Gender and nuclear weapons’ organised by Ireland, Austria, Costa Rica, Denmark, Sweden, and Trinidad and Tobago on 5 May 2015, the latter at the IPPNW side event, ‘Nuclear famine and the ban treaty: how prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons can prevent a climate disaster,’ April 28, 2015.  \\
\textsuperscript{35} ICAN, ‘Catastrophic Humanitarian Harm,’ 15.  \\
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{ibid.}, 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{ibid.}, 17-8. (last accessed 26 October 2016).  \\
\textsuperscript{39} ICAN, ‘Arguments for nuclear abolition,’ ICAN website, \texttt{http://www.icanw.org/why-a-ban/arguments-for-a-ban/} (last accessed 26 October 2016).  
\end{flushright}
series of myths about nuclear weapons, among others: (1) being essential for security, (2) having kept peace since World War II, and (3) the legitimacy of possession by certain states.\(^{40}\) The humanitarian discourse has placed the spotlight on the illegitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons and perpetuating the concept of nuclear deterrence.\(^{41}\)

In reality the humanitarian frame is not new, as this Bertrand Russell quote shows: ‘The peril involved in nuclear war is one which affects all mankind and one, therefore, in which the interests of all mankind are at one.’\(^{42}\) Caughley traces the origins of the same preoccupation for the safety of humanity in the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in warfare of chemical and biological weapons, but even earlier in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which outlawed the use of weapons and projectiles capable of inflicting unnecessary suffering.\(^{43}\) Even more interesting is the fact that this preoccupation is stated in the preamble paragraph that opens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:\(^{44}\)

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples”\(^{45}\).


\(^{42}\) Bertrand Russell, \textit{Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare}, 1.


\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, emphasis added.
Surprisingly, this was lost on more than one delegation at the 2015 RevCon, given that some protested the inclusion of a similar sentence in the draft report from Main Committee 1 that was discussed on 10 May 2015.

Rather than being a totally new idea, the humanitarian frame results from inserting new ideas within a more traditional pro-disarmament argument. The 1996 Canberra Report is a good example of the shift from a national security to a human security perspective. Also, the research institute on disarmament under the UN umbrella, UNIDIR, has worked since 2000 on the relationship between human security and disarmament. They have concluded that ‘[t]hinking at the human scale—in terms of human security and humanitarian approaches—and not just at the scale of states was seen to be a promising new dynamic for multilateral approaches’. Humanitarian concerns have in fact been prominent, to a greater or lesser extent, in the negotiation of all the most recent multilateral agreements prohibiting weapons or activities connected to them, from the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines Ban Convention to the 2008 Cluster Munitions Conventions, and even in the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty. The same process of grafting identified by Price is being employed now by ICAN and other supporters of abolition to criticise the hypocrisy of having banned less dangerous weapons and disregarded atomic ones. Yet, the governance of nuclear weapons, for all its variety, has generally rested on national rather than human security so far, making such process of grafting a challenging one.

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49 Price, ‘Reversing the Gun Sight.’
As we have seen, the representation of the nuclear danger according to the abolitionists rests upon the possibility, intentionally or accidentally, to launch an atomic bomb. It follows that the agents of this threat are the states armed with nuclear weapons, the only ones with the capacity to unleash their destructive consequences. Furthermore, another category of states has been identified as central in the production of nuclear danger, as vividly illustrated by Wildfire>_, the satirical blog run by former diplomat Richard Lennane. As his title of Chief Inflammatory Officer lets on, the organisation is a very critical voice newly added to the abolitionist camp, which does not shy away

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50 This is the ‘pinned tweet,’ or the post given most visibility by @nuclearban, the official ICAN Twitter account, https://twitter.com/nuclearban (last accessed 26 October 2016).
from very radical proposals, as attested by his side event titled ‘Burn the NPT’ at the 2014 PrepCom. Supporting the ban and opposing any procrastination, Wildfire>_'s jokes and caricatures have spared almost nobody in the nuclear community, but have been particularly virulent against a category of states: the ‘weasels.’

Figure 5: The Weasel, Wildfire>_ flyer\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{quote}
A Nuclear Weasel State is a country that is a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, but which is in a nuclear alliance with a nuclear-weapon state, and thus depends on nuclear weapons for its defence and security. Some weasels even have nuclear weapons on their territory.

Weasels include NATO members, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Weasels typically claim to support nuclear disarmament, but will also be observed undermining disarmament initiatives that look too promising. They will generally defend the interests of their nuclear-armed patron.

Weasels are cute, but pose a serious obstacle to nuclear disarmament.
\end{quote}

With its mock arrest warrants for weasels, Wildfire contributed to raising attention around those states that benefit from extended deterrence even without having the weapons themselves. The weasel is further defined as a ‘party to the NPT which is technically a non-nuclear weapon state but is in an alliance with one or more nuclear-weapon states and relies on nuclear weapons in its national security doctrine; a purveyor of double standards, a hypocrite.’ While most in the civil society community would never use similar words, the term weasel has spread between 2014 and 2015, as has the blame received by nuclear umbrella states.

The referent object of the threat, in turn, is ‘each and every citizen of our interconnected world,’ according to the Humanitarian Pledge. It is the whole of humanity that would be hit by nuclear weapons destruction and is affected everyday by the dangerous practices relating to their existence. A case in point here is the Nuclear Zero lawsuit, which made of an entire nation a nuclear victim. ‘The Republic of the Marshall Islands acts for the seven billion of us who live on this planet to end the nuclear weapons threat hanging over all humanity.’ The country suffered a total of 67 atmospheric nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958.

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52 Wildfire, ‘Glossary of the Terms and Locutions Appurtenant to the diplomatic Itercourse on Nuclear Weapons in which The Words are deduced from their Originals, and Illustrated in their Different Significations by Examples from the best Diplomats and Officials,’ http://www.wildfire-v.org/NPT2015/Glossary.pdf (last accessed 29 June 2016).
Recounting personal experiences of nuclear suffering is symbolic in NPT circles, where the nuclear survivors stop being an imagined essence and acquire physical reality. We can see this in the massive applause at Foreign Minister Tony de Brum’s opening address, in which he told his own story of assisting to the Castle Bravo test from a fishing trip with his grandfather. Further attestation of this is represented by the massive numbers of *hibakushas* who flock to the UN on the occasion of the RevCons (and more limitedly for PrepComs and other meetings) in order to voice their call for nuclear disarmament. Though they are not all survivors, Japanese have been the largest nationality for civil society delegates in 2015. In addition, Mayors for Peace organised a photo exhibition in the UN lobby, with pictures of the effects of the bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All these have been attempts at catalysing the emotional reaction to human suffering.

All in all, the humanitarian frame proposed by ICAN identifies all nuclear weapons explosions as the gravest threat motivating nuclear disarmament and all of humanity as the community at risk. Substantially equal is the position of other abolitionist groups like Abolition 2000. Nuclear weapons are thus represented as an inherent risk with no positive sides or potential exceptions, because the extent of their consequences for humanity makes them illegitimate. After having examined the abolitionist representation of the nuclear threat, we will now turn to its construction of the response.

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57 See Annex A for exact figures.
7.2.3 The response: To ban or not to ban?

To describe the humanitarian response, we should take the words of Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, both because of Vienna’s leading role and for his own stature. The Austrian diplomat in charge of the disarmament dossier is what could be defined a rock star of the disarmament movement, having been even chosen by an online poll to be awarded the title of “Arms Control Person of the Year”. His speeches, often off-the-cuff ones, have been loudly applauded from the civil society seats at the NPT RevCon. If the risk inherent with the bomb is one of use, Kmentt affirmed that ‘elimination is the only responsible way to eliminate the risk.’ ICAN’s position, however, is slightly different: ‘[e]liminating nuclear weapons – via a comprehensive treaty – is the only guarantee against their use.’ If both agree that elimination is crucial, ICAN adds that this should be achieved via a treaty; using the brackets, however, makes the ban appear as simply a specification of the general policy recommendation, while betraying an attempt to make a specific suggestion pass as general.

ICAN believes that the ‘most effective, expeditious and practical way to achieve and sustain the abolition of nuclear weapons’ would be a universal ban. ICAN’s Asia-Pacific Director, Tim Wright, wrote that ‘[o]ver the past year, 122 nations have formally pledged to work together to prohibit nuclear

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59 Alexander Kmentt, presentation Switzerland, Austria, Chatham House, Too Close for Comfort, April 28, 2014.
60 ICAN, ‘Arguments for Nuclear Abolition.’
61 ICAN, ‘Humanitarian Harm,’ 24.
weapons through a new treaty.\textsuperscript{62} However, 'a new treaty' is not the favoured route for all supporters of the humanitarian approach and this tends to fuel confusion within the abolitionist community. While ICAN has been trying to persuade others of the utility of a ban, it encountered resistance, as civil society itself appears divided on this issue. ICAN’s idea of the ban differs from the Nuclear Weapons Convention promoted by Abolition 2000, which previewed negotiations among NWS setting timelines and procedures for elimination.

ICAN, to the contrary, proposes to negotiate a treaty to ban and eliminate atomic weapons ‘even if the nuclear-armed states refuse to participate.’\textsuperscript{63} This is seen by members of the coalition as an affirmation of power in the face of the NWS’ opposition, as stated by an ICAN representative, who made the point that the ban cannot be ‘dependent upon their participation or we give them power and nothing will happen.’\textsuperscript{64} Contrary to Abolition 2000 experience with drafting the Nuclear Weapons Convention, ICAN did not get involved with drafting the text of their proposed legal instrument. As explained at an ICAN campaigners’ meeting by Ray Acheson, who sits on the organisations’ International Steering Group, this has both internal and external motivations: on the one side, the organisations supporting the ban


\textsuperscript{64} Intervention at ICAN campaigners’ meeting, London, July 6, 2015.
do not want to be constrained by a set text, on the other they fear that states would not appreciate a treaty handed over by civil society.\textsuperscript{65}

Interestingly, for the main organisation behind the ban movement, ICAN initially maintained its foremost ‘goal has been to strengthen political support for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention without further delay.’\textsuperscript{66} As a long-time activist candidly admits, she used to believe that NWS needed to be involved for a proposal to be meaningful, but she has since changed her mind.\textsuperscript{67} These converts, so to speak, even include some of the ‘founding mothers’ of the Abolition 2000 statement, who turned into eager supporters of ICAN because of the potential seen in its distinctive approach and in the empowerment of the NNWS.\textsuperscript{68}

Side-lining the NWS is an expression of that frustration with the lack of disarmament progress that exploded particularly after the end of the Cold War. According to ICAN, non-nuclear weapon states can contribute to disarmament, because it aims to replicate the example of the convention to ban anti-personnel landmines. That was negotiated among and initially entered into force for the states for whom it was acceptable, but created pressure on the holdouts to agree to the new norm. The idea is that the nuclear predicament is similar to a situation in which a ban on smoking can be established: ‘if you leave it up to the smokers there is never going to be a smoking ban.’\textsuperscript{69}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[65] Intervention at ICAN campaigners’ meeting, London, July 6, 2015.
\item[66] Tim Wright, ‘The Momentum Builds for Nuclear Abolition.’
\item[67] Civil society leader, ICAN campaigners’ meeting, London, July 6, 2015.
\item[68] Interview n. 3, May 22, 2015.
\item[69] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
For all the Abolition 2000 insistence on the model nuclear weapons convention, on the one hand, and of ICAN on the ban treaty, on the other, it is crucial to note that the association of elimination and a single multilateral legal instrument is not a necessary one. In the 2015 RevCon this point was aired by the New Agenda Coalition, moreover, in a working paper seeking ‘to elucidate the legal approaches capable of advancing “effective measures” with a view to facilitating a meaningful exchange as well as decision-making’.

The group identified four main options:

1. A comprehensive nuclear-weapon convention
2. A nuclear-weapon-ban treaty
3. A framework agreement comprising mutually supporting instruments
4. A hybrid arrangement.

Even other organisations that have been active in the humanitarian initiative do not share the programmatic focus on the ban. ILPI, the Norwegian international law think tank, for instance, is ‘agnostic on the ban.’ They do co-organise events with ICAN and are on the same page ideologically if not practically. Other initiatives, moreover, have sought to mobilise multilateral UN fora on these matters, particularly under the leadership of Alyn Ware, thus undertaking a completely different route.

Yet another legal avenue was the already-mentioned series of court cases opened by the Republic of the Marshall Islands at the ICJ against all states.

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71 Interview n. 10, May 8, 2015.
holding nuclear arms, and in San Francisco against the United States. At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, taking most by surprise, the delegate of the Republic of the Marshall Islands announced that his country had sued the nuclear powers for their failure to disarm. Building upon the disarmament commitment enshrined in the 1996 Advisory Opinion, NPT Article VI, and customary law, the tiny archipelagic state, which was used to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests, wants the nuclear-armed to fulfil their obligation. It is asking for a declaratory judgment on the breach of obligation to negotiation of disarmament, cessation of the arms race, and performance of duty under the NPT in good faith.

This is surely related to the initiative to ban the bomb, but the action and forum chosen to stimulate that change differ. As for other recent initiatives by this community, it is NNWS that are expected to hold the agency needed. In this case, more specifically, it is those who have been victims of nuclear weapons. Recalling his country and his own personal experience of witnessing the devastation of nuclear testing, Foreign Minister Tony de Brum spoke at the 2014 PrepCom of the legal claims that were publicly announced

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72 These are nine lawsuits to the International Court of Justice, one for each nuclear-armed state, both those recognised by the NPT and not. Also, another court-case was opened in San Francisco against the United States only. If the accounts for the former regard their lack of fulfillment of the disarmament committee, the latter concerns misconduct in the testing activities. Interview n. 11, 25 April 2014.

73 Interestingly civil society attending the PrepCom appeared taken by surprise too by the announcement, showing the lack of coordination among the different currents of the abolitionist community.


shortly before.\textsuperscript{76} He also observed: ‘because we have experienced directly the effects of nuclear weapons we felt that we had the mandate to do what we have done.’\textsuperscript{77} According to this view, non-nuclear weapon states that have been victims of the armaments’ destructive effects have a special place in this conundrum, as the ones with a legitimate claim to make against their use and possession. The responsibility to take the measures to disarm is certainly of the NWS, but the NNWS can hold them accountable to what they committed as well as stigmatize their behaviour.

\subsection*{7.2.4 Summary}

Here a few differences and similarities among the abolitionist community of global nuclear civil society will be outlined.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & ICAN & Abolition 2000 & Nuclear Zero \\
\hline
\textbf{Risk} & Nuclear weapons use & Nuclear weapons use & Nuclear weapons use \\
\hline
\textbf{Referent object} & Humanity & Humanity & Victims \\
\hline
\textbf{Agent of threat} & Nuclear possessors & Nuclear possessors & Nuclear possessors \\
\hline
\textbf{Collective action requested} & Ban treaty & Nuclear weapons convention & ICJ ruling \\
\hline
\textbf{Agent of response} & NNWS & NWS & NNWS \\
\hline
\textbf{Characterisation of disarmament} & Necessary & Necessary & Lawful \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Disarmament discourses by abolitionists}
\end{table}

The table above shows how nuclear disarmament is conceptualised by the main campaigns or organisations in the abolitionist camp: ICAN, Abolition

\textsuperscript{76} Republic of the Marshall Islands, ‘Statement at the General Debate.’
2000, and Nuclear Zero. All three of them share the same assessment of the type of risk deriving from nuclear weapons, namely the eventuality of nuclear war, or any other use; this makes states in possession of nuclear arms the greatest agent of the nuclear threat according to abolitionist organisations. Crucially the referent object of security according to all three and more markedly for ICAN is humanity, in a radical cosmopolitan departure from the national security paradigm. All of them want to get to a disarmed end-state, where no country possessed nuclear weapons, however, they differ on the kind of collective action advocated. For ICAN it consists in a ban treaty and for Abolition 2000 in a nuclear weapons convention, with the crucial difference here lying in the agent of such response: NNWS for the former and NWS according to the latter. The third option, provided by Nuclear Zero, is to make disarmament possible through a ruling of the ICJ.

All three approaches can be firmly established within the disarmament regime of nuclear weapons governance, as has been laid out in Chapter Three. In the case of ICAN and others, nuclear abolition is ‘an urgent humanitarian necessity.’ It is a total elimination of deterrence relationships that this camp advocates and does not foresee any security role for nuclear arms. According to this camp, all those who benefit from the bomb are to be opposed, though ICAN is not interested in engaging with them, contrary to Abolition 2000. This discussion, in fact, has shown how even closely related nuclear narratives bear important differences which have made it impossible for the abolitionist camp to speak with one single voice. The discursive material used for the humanitarian narrative is drawn from the classical

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78 ICAN, ‘Arguments for Nuclear Abolition.’
disarmament activism dictionary that, with many ups and downs, has been rearticulated since the late 1940s, but merges it with ideas about human security that had their golden age in the 1990s.

In sum, there is a degree of internal variety among abolitionist proponents, though all share the view that the threat of nuclear weapons regards all possible explosions and the potential risk for all of humanity. Thus, the response advocated is a comprehensive legal prohibition of varying nature. In the next section we will look instead at the reductionist strategies.

7.3 The reductionist camp and its disarmament frame

The reductionists stand in contrast to the abolitionists, often considered idealists, heirs of the peace movement and hippy culture. Instead, these groups announce: ‘[w]e’re not tilting at windmills. We’ve got a plan.’ If the abolitionist is a rather unsurprising community of nuclear disarmer, this section will make the case that the reductionist camp is much more puzzling, because of its merging of anti-nuclear and state-centric tropes. This is a community of civil society representatives wanting to appear more ‘pragmatic’ than the abolitionists, and thus using images of realism like above. They tend to propose agreements that can be implemented in the short term. For more far-reaching undertakings, they believe, the time is not yet ripe, but could become if enough of those intermediate measures were in

place. A prominent think tank representative in Washington clarified to the author that he was not an idealist, one who wanted zero nuclear weapons, but rather a pragmatist, someone who just sees it as a goal and wants to work with what can be achieved at the moment.80

The reductionist camp is somehow more undefined than the abolitionist one. Moreover, many such groups have an international outlook but are heavily US-based and centre their activities in Washington, DC, where they perceive political change is easier to instigate. Typically their priorities are reducing nuclear weapons, increasing non-proliferation efforts, optimizing national security spending, and halting the spread of biological and chemical weapons.81 Global Zero is one of the few organisations based in the US capital that are able or willing to operate transnationally, one major delimitation of this research. Yet, as for most of those American groups, the NPT is not the main focus of its activities.82 In effect, Global Zero is rather disengaged from the broader arms control community, as several of them reported that its members do not tend to participate in nuclear events held either in Washington or in New York.

Given that there are significantly less groups and individuals from the reductionist camp that attend the NPT review process, most of the attention in the ensuing section will be devoted to Global Zero. In addition, a few more institutions will be mentioned here, like the Arms Control Association,
Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and the European Leadership Network, all of which can be generally traced to the reductionist approach.

Global Zero was founded in 2008 by Bruce Blair and Matt Brown. There was a feeling, according to some organisers, that ‘it was time to generate a new movement to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons’.\textsuperscript{83} In its 2009 Action Plan proposal for nuclear disarmament,\textsuperscript{84} the movement made clear that Global Zero is an ‘effort formed in response to the growing threats of proliferation and nuclear terrorism and dedicated to achieving the phased, verified elimination of all nuclear weapons’.\textsuperscript{85} Two things emerge from this quote: firstly, that the reason behind Global Zero’s formation is the threat of nuclear acquisition by other countries or terrorist organisations; and secondly, that the way to get to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons is through a series of phases, or steps, as will be discussed in the following sections. This concern with reductions and a general gradualist strategy are indeed what distinguishes Global Zero and many reductionists.

The policy focus of Global Zero at the NPT in 2015 was on de-alerting, or measures to reduce the ability to launch nuclear weapons quickly. It did so with initiatives both élite-oriented and grassroots-focused to raise attention on the issue, reflecting the duality of its approach. Regarding the former, Global Zero has a strong focus on high-level support by so-called ‘movement leaders’ comprising Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev as well as former

\textsuperscript{83} Interview n. 12, June 1, 2015, emphasis added.
foreign ministers, ambassadors, military officers, etc. Global Zero leaders met with Russian and American Presidents and one of them – Chuck Hagel – even became US Secretary of Defence. The presence of high-level figures has made the organisation famous and their side-events very well attended, as was the case for the launch of their latest report, which was chaired by retired General James Cartwright. As we will see, the participation of important establishment figures is crucial for reductionists.

Concerning the grassroots, in 2015 Global Zero brought one of the largest NGO delegations to the RevCon. They participated in only few days of the conference, but were an impressive amount of young people, sporting Global Zero t-shirts and very organised. Over one day they came to speak in smaller groups with members of key delegations to brief them about the Global Zero recommendations. They also organised an act of ‘guerrilla visual action’: at night-time on May 3, they projected a huge rubber duck in crosshairs over the side of the UN Secretariat’s building, with the caption ‘We’re all sitting ducks #NPT2015’.

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87 Global Zero also has a grassroots dimension in its student chapters at 150 among universities and high schools.

With quite different means, Global Zero has thus brought yet a different perspective to the 2015 NPT RevCon. The organisation’s discourse on nuclear weapons’ threat and response will be put forward while analysing its rhetorical origins. To do that, the nuclear security narrative will firstly be fleshed out, as it shows that the diagnosis of the risk of Global Zero and others substantially coincides with second-nuclear-age preoccupation overviewed in Chapter Two. Moreover, the NPT step-by-step narrative will be evoked to highlight the nature of the response advocated.

7.3.1.1 Origins of the nuclear security discourse

The post-Cold War strategic situation brought former officials to join the crowd of anti-nuclear activists in arguing for disarmament. Previously a supporter of rational models of deterrence, Robert McNamara stated, with

\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
the 1996 Canberra Commission, that ‘immediate and determined efforts need to be made to rid the world of nuclear arms and the threat they pose to it.’

Instances of former élites voicing opposition to the retention of nuclear weapons were not unprecedented, as the case of General Lee Butler demonstrates, but they were never heard as clearly as in 2007 with the previously mentioned four horsemen initiative. The emergence of a bipartisan group of men who had held very prominent decision-making positions was a significant development as were the names of those involved: George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. This widely cited op-ed argued for the elimination of all nuclear weapons on the grounds that their deterrent potential is no longer useful for dealing with terrorist organisations and new nuclear states that have not been socialised in nuclear relationships like the Soviet Union and the US were.

It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American ‘mutually assured destruction’ with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used.

All the attention that has been given by civil society to the nuclear security project shows the pervasiveness of the new discourse, introduced mostly by US officials as early as the Clinton administration and consistently restated under the presidency of both George W. Bush and Barak Obama. Deterring proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorists was the whole rationale of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass

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91 Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Bill Perry, and Sam Nunn, ‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,’ Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. Since then, similar letters have been written by their homologues in France, UK, Russia and other states.
This was the time of the ‘axis of evil’ speech, which singled out certain states as an international security threat in light of their involvement in WMD programs while being associated with terrorism at one level or another. Such was the justification for the Bush strategy of preventive military intervention put in practice in Iraq in 2003, which saw the addition of the new tool of counter-proliferation to the most traditional non-proliferation approach. If counter-proliferation opened the way to the use of force, what mostly characterised it was the interdiction on transfers of weapons, equipment, or delivery vehicles and export control mechanisms have indeed come to the centre of the regulatory system. Examples of export controls include the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

While the Bush years are generally considered to have been quite radical in their legitimation of military means for the maintenance of the nuclear order, the arrival of Barak Obama at the White House represented a return to multilateralism and international diplomacy. Like the four horsemen, Obama was also committed to a world free of nuclear weapons on the premise of a decreased utility for national security. Indeed, though in his 2009 Prague speech, he stated ‘clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,’ though he added the caveat that it might not happen during his lifetime. Surely this more liberal approach has worked in the case of Iran, reaching a deal to curb

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93 Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade, 85–133.
95 The White House, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama,’ Prague, April 5, 2009.
its nuclear capabilities in 2015, but it is still unclear how substantial was the change between the two Presidents. Beyond a more respectful attitude towards the NPT than George W. Bush had and further arms control progress with Russia, Obama’s policy remained based upon the reliance on the nuclear arsenal.

Indeed, the same preoccupation with terrorists and potential proliferators remained the top national security priority in the Obama administration’s strategic documents. The National Security Strategy of 2010 affirms that ‘there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.’

As said, Obama’s approach significantly differed from that of Bush in rejecting the latter’s reliance on unilateralism and the unforthcoming nature of his diplomacy. To revamp Washington’s image as a supporter of international cooperation Obama worked to take a leading role in the discussion of nuclear issues. It is in this context that we can read the launch of the Nuclear Security Summits. While his Prague speech is remembered for his aforementioned disarmament commitment, he then also announced an ‘international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years.’ If on the former aim his record is certainly lagging if not lacking, the latter objective has seen practical movement, demonstrated by the fact that since then four Nuclear Security Summits, or NSS, have been held: in Washington in 2010, Seoul in 2012, The Hague in 2014, and again Washington in 2016.

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Bush had succeeded in 2004 to get the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1540 for the imposition of measures against the transfer of WMD and their materials to non-state actors, which identifies the state as the only legitimate holder of WMDs. In the same year the Global Threat Reduction Initiative was established, with a mission ‘to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide’—despite being a national structure. This only confirmed the Bush administration’s reliance on non-inclusive agreements backed on the international arena by the most powerful states. Instead, Obama’s framework wanted to represent a larger constituency in an effort to cover most of the nuclear-fuel possessing states. However, even this was an exclusionary effort, as demonstrated by the fact that Iran, despite its significant nuclear program, has not been invited to any of the four rounds of NSS meetings. ‘Well, I think we make the invitations,’ the author was told by a Washington think tank representative when trying to understand why that was the case.

Nuclear security, however, is not just a strategy of the United States; rather it has come to constitute a more general discourse spread and accepted by other countries. What the four rounds of NSS have accomplished is to make more states cognisant of the need to ensure protection of their nuclear materials, and in some cases also the conclusion of voluntary agreements for securing them. In addition, it has become increasingly common to refer to the nuclear security regime as a component or even an addition to the non-proliferation regime. It is telling how it was included in some scholarly

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99 Washington, DC think tank representative, comments on the margins of an event on nuclear security, Washington, DC (April 2014), emphasis added.
definitions of the nuclear governance components. These, according to Thakur, are disarmament, non-proliferation, and security for peaceful uses.\textsuperscript{100} While in line with the three pillars of the NPT, the conflation of peaceful uses and security gives the term less a connotation of right and more of duty. For Trevor Findlay, instead, nuclear security is in a triad with nuclear safety and non-proliferation,\textsuperscript{101} which seems to remove from the analysis all reference to disarmament or the right to nuclear technology.

In fact, nuclear security appears to be the frame of mind that some would like to attach to nuclear weapons governance.\textsuperscript{102} However, what can be criticised in this effort is the attempt to shift the preoccupation of an international treaty to domestic dynamics. The kind of governance that is involved with improving nuclear security is internal, not international, and is thus exposed to different complexities, as well as much of the same exclusionary character of the counter-proliferation case.

7.3.2 \textbf{The threat: nuclear proliferation to unreliable actors}

This long prologue was necessary to illuminate how in the last decade a mainstream advocacy of nuclear disarmament has indeed developed in the US. The attention to nuclear security has shifted the debate to the ‘demand’ side, directing attention to potential holders of nuclear weapons. The ‘offer’ side, instead, is only conceived of in terms of control, as existing nuclear arsenals are described as if they were a problem only in so far as vulnerable to

\textsuperscript{100} Ramesh Thakur, ‘Nuclear Weapons.’
\textsuperscript{101} Trevor Findlay, \textit{Nuclear Energy and Global Governance}.
\textsuperscript{102} The European Union submitted two working papers on the matter at the 2015 NPT RevCon, demonstrating the importance of this frame even beyond the United States.
theft of nuclear material. In effect this discursive move that constructs only
certain arsenals as a security threat de-politicises the nine holders of nuclear
weapons. As others have noted, this is essentially an ethnocentric argument
with deep roots in colonialism and wide repercussions on states’ security
policies.\textsuperscript{103}

When talking about disarmament, reductionist groups tend to actually refer
to the dual goals of stopping proliferation and reducing existing arsenals. The
threat deriving from nuclear weapons accordingly resides in their potential
acquisition by new actors, particularly non-state. If on the one hand nuclear
weapons dispersion carries the risk of terrorists acquiring and (inevitably)
using them, on the other the bombs of the nuclear armed are at risk of being
launched by accident or miscalculation.\textsuperscript{104} Global Zero’s website states that
the danger of nuclear weapons lies in the possession and modernisation of
atomic arsenals, but also in the fact that ‘Terrorists are trying to buy, steal or
build the bomb... North Korea, led by an erratic and aggressive regime, is
poised to deploy nuclear forces for the first time' and regional proliferation
would follow a nuclear-armed Iran.\textsuperscript{105}

The commitment to disarmament and to undertaking steps in that direction
is seen as necessary to 'enhance prospects for preventing the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by new states and by terrorist groups.'\textsuperscript{106} The risk posed by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Booth, ‘Nuclearism, Human Rights and Constructions of Security (Part 1).’
\item \textsuperscript{104} Bruce Blair, ‘Lowering the Nuclear threshold: The dangerous evolution of world nuclear arsenals
\item \textsuperscript{106} Joseph Cirincione, ‘The impact of nuclear posture on non-proliferation,’ in In the Eyes of the
Experts: Analysis and Comments on America’s Strategic Posture, ed. Taylor Bloz (Washington: US
Institute of Peace, 2009).
\end{itemize}
nuclear weapons is thus recognised only in the case of other actors’ reliance upon them, telling a story of US submission to nuclear blackmail, instead of being involved in it. According to reductionists, nuclear-armed terrorism is the reason why achieving zero is so urgent. 107 This is made explicit in the Global Zero documentary *Countdown to Zero*, which draws on images of atomic terror to explain how easy it would be for a committed terrorist group to create nuclear havoc. 108 As the movie director explains, the three main areas of concern raised by the movie are rogues states and terrorist making the bomb and human error setting off the bomb. 109 The threat thus derives primarily from those unreliable actors and, only in third place, by vulnerability of the existing nuclear arsenals.

If in private talks Global Zero leaders see nuclear risk even beyond that, they have deliberately decided to focus on those issues because ‘it helps people understand the urgency’ 110 given that longer-terms issues are harder to get people’s engagement. This choice is understandable, considering that it builds upon a frame which is by now well-established within the nuclear community, that we could call the nuclear security frame. Within civil society the main proponent of the nuclear security narrative is perhaps Graham Allison from Harvard’s Belfer Center, who in 2004 affirmed that nuclear terrorism was ‘more likely than not in the decade ahead.’ 111 He became a

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108 *Countdown to Zero*, Director Lucy Walker, 91 min (2010).


110 Interview n. 12, June 1, 2015.

111 ‘Q&A with Graham Allison: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,’ *Belfer Center Newsletter* (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Spring 2004),
champion of nuclear terrorism preoccupations, with his “doctrine of the Three No’s: No loose nukes, No new nascent nukes, and No new nuclear states.”\textsuperscript{112} His Belfer Center colleague, Matt Bunn, has been credited for having pushed the idea all the way to the ears of President Obama.\textsuperscript{113}

In sum, the reductionist discourse is heavily influenced by the narrative of nuclear security that prioritises fighting proliferation through attacks on its perpetrators. As such, in a world that has seen less and less countries trying to obtain the bomb, the spotlight has been turned on a few states of concern as well as non-state groups upon the assumption that they would almost inevitably use nuclear weapons if they had them. Seeing the threats of proliferation as growing is not just factually incorrect, as we have seen in Chapter Two, but it contributes to constructing a particular subject for the nuclear threat. It appears clear, in fact, that it is not the whole of the global population to be endangered by this threat – rather it is an unidentified ‘us’, which should more properly be capitalised in ‘US’.

\subsection*{7.3.3 The response: a step-by-step recipe}

The main idea behind the reductionist camp’s prescription for collective action is that you cannot get from the current situation to a world without nuclear weapons without going through some stages.

Others, including the American president, believe that only global zero, the verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons called for by Article 6 of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Interview n. 13, May 28, 2015.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
NPT and by so many world statesmen, will keep the world safe from the risk of a nuclear weapon someday destroying a major city.\(^{114}\)

The measures that should be taken in order to implement that commitment to disarm vary somewhat in the constructions of the reductionists. According to some in the community, the most important measure, the key step, is securing nuclear materials from terrorist theft. Such is the position of all those organisations that have made of nuclear security their paramount pitch. The unavailability of a verification mechanism has been used for years to justify the lacking commitment to a treaty to prohibit all types of nuclear weapons testing. The issue of verification is still an objection aired by those who are unconvinced about nuclear disarmament, and indeed reductionists have often tried to prove its feasibility and confidence-building merits.\(^{115}\)

Certain groups have focused their attention on the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), like the Arms Control Association, while still others have pushed for reduced spending on nuclear weapons, like the Ploughshares Fund. More generally, reducing arsenals and some of their dangerous associated practices has been the paramount concern of this community.

Reducing the arms has indeed been central among the policies Global Zero advocated, particularly in its Action Plan, which outlined the group’s ‘practical, end-to-end strategy, including near-, medium- and long-term


steps, for the phased, verified, multilateral and proportionate reduction of all nuclear weapons to zero.\textsuperscript{116}

**Figure 7: Phases of Global Zero Action Plan\textsuperscript{117}**

As with the abolitionist community, the end point is supposed to be a multilateral legal instrument, but much more emphasis is placed upon the steps required to get there. Therefore, to reach zero Global Zero recommends starting with the nuclear weapon states first and particularly encourage reductions and posture shifts by the United States and Russia. Indeed, two of the four Global Zero major reports discuss precisely these issues.\textsuperscript{118}

While this seemed a useful route when relations between Moscow and Washington were thawing, their worsening state risked jeopardising the *mise en œuvre* of the plan, so Global Zero shifted to the de-alerting agenda. Another important report was released under the guidance of Gen. Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States.\textsuperscript{119}

The proposal, backed by more than 75 former senior political officials, national security experts and top military commanders, makes the case that a multinational de-alerting agreement could greatly mitigate the many risks of nuclear weapons use, including from computer error, cyber launch,


\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.


De-alerting is important, according to Global Zero, as it involves a change in nuclear strategy in a way that reduces the weapons’ role because it makes nuclear retaliation possible in a time frame of only a couple of days, instead of immediately as is the case now. De-alerting in fact promises to eliminate the risk of unauthorised and accidental use.

Many civil society groups working under the same assumptions explicitly evoke the step-by-step parlance. As Daryl Kimball said, citing the 2010 Final Document, ‘all of the nuclear-weapon states committed “to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament,” including “all types of nuclear weapons.’\footnote{Daryl Kimball, ‘Greater U.S. & Russian Cooperation and Leadership Is Necessary to Fulfill NPT Article VI Obligations to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Dangers,’ Statement to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, May 1, 2015.} Overall, the list compiled by Kimball and a few other mostly US-based experts recommended five actions, four of which included the language of ‘steps’ in their description.

As a result, whether for bilateral reductions or through posture changes, the actors expected to make change happen are the nuclear weapon states. Global Zero’s ‘focus is getting countries with arms to get interested in disarmament.’\footnote{Interview n. 12, June 1, 2015.} This is partially different from the nuclear security narrative, which has also been ascribed to the reductionist camp, because in that case the agents of the response are all those states that possess enough civilian nuclear capabilities to be a palatable target for theft or illegal procurement on the part of eventual proliferators. In both cases a class of

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{122} Interview n. 12, June 1, 2015.

preferred nuclear citizens can be conceived of, the most technologically developed few that would solve the global risk posed by the same technology they hold.

7.3.3.1 The step-by-step discourse at the NPT

This need to go through stages is primarily a psychological matter according to some,\(^{123}\) though this section will show that it is also highly embedded in the institutional framework of the NPT. The step-by-step approach is based upon the assumption that certain moves would reduce mistrust among states, which in turn would create a better climate for nuclear disarmament. Such is the view held by the nuclear weapon states and by several other NPT parties, united by the claim that nuclear disarmament can only proceed incrementally. According to this vision there are a series of measures on which international consensus should be built before nuclear elimination can happen. Implementing Article VI would pass through intermediate legal arrangements that, to an extent, have been formalised in texts agreed upon at successive NPT Review Conferences.

An early appearance of the step-by-step narrative is to be found in the McCloy-Zorin Accords of 1961, the important US-Soviet text that laid the principles for nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament. Accordingly, ‘[t]he disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage

\(^{123}\) *Ibid*.
carried out within specified time-limits." By now in the NPT context the introduction of time frames is highly contested, with the 2012 conference for the Middle East WMD Free Zone being just the most recent example. However, the idea that a set of stages must be subsequently completed so that disarmament can take place is a recurrent and very powerful frame, especially among the NAM.

The origins of the language of steps in NPT parlance can be traced to the list of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, though it would be made explicit only in 2000. With regard to disarmament the conference demanded the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in a year and start of negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; more generally, it called for the 'determined pursuit... of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating' them. Reiterating and specifying the Article VI commitment was indeed crucial for the NPT’s indefinite extension.

The 13 practical steps, included in the Final Document of the 2000 RevCon were a further elaboration of that effort to summarise what should occur before the effective implementation of Article VI. The 13 practical step included those 1995 elements as well as a whole spectrum of other activities:

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126 Ibid.
from the reduction in the role of nuclear arms in security postures to transparency and confidence-building measures. A list of the thirteen steps as summarised by Sharon Squassoni follows.  

1. CTBT.  
2. Testing moratorium.  
3. Fissile-material cut-off treaty (FMCT).  
4. CD role on disarmament.  
5. Irreversibility in disarmament and arms control.  
6. Unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate NWS nuclear arsenals.  
7. START II, III, ABM.  
8. Trilateral Initiative.  
9. Steps by all nuclear weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament:
   1. Further unilateral reductions.  
   2. Increased transparency.  
   3. Further reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons.  
   4. Concrete agreed measures to reduce operational status of nuclear weapons.  
   5. Diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.  
   6. Engagement by all NWS in process, as soon as appropriate.  
10. Excess fissile material under verification  
11. General and complete disarmament.  

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129 Early entry force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, without delay and without conditions.  
130 A moratorium on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a CTBT.  
131 Necessity of negotiations in the CD of a non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.  
132 Necessity of creating an appropriate subsidiary body in the CD with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.  
133 The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear, and other related arms control and reduction measures.  
134 An unequivocal undertaking by NWS to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.  
135 The early EIF and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.  
136 The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russia, and the IAEA.
12. Reporting. Reporting

13. Verification for disarmament.

As often is the case in diplomatic settings, texts tend to be reiterated at following conferences, thus the steps would become a central NPT RevCon debating theme. Civil society in turn has kept track of developments in those fields.

If in 2005 there was no political will to find a consensual outcome. Given the US reticence to reaffirm the commitment to the 2000 document, the steps emerged again at the following RevCon. A further specification is in fact to be found in the document approved by the 2010 RevCon, which included an Action Plan with a total of 64 measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

The steps have thus become a great number and of widely different orders of magnitude, from the negotiation of treaties that have been stuck for decades to minimum measures of transparency. The NWS see the 2010 Action Plan as a “long process” that in the short term is not expected to produce any outcome. One result, however, was reaped in 2015, as the NWS took pride in their increased transparency at the RevCon. This refers to the launch of the P5 Process, which held a series of reunions including all the five NWS recognised by the treaty. “These conferences are building the foundation on

137 Reaffirmation that ultimate objective in nuclear disarmament is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
138 Regular reports, within the framework of strengthened review of the NPT and recalling the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ.
139 Verification development for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon–free world.
140 Squassoni, ‘Grading Progress on 13 Steps Towards Disarmament.’
which future P5 multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament could stand’, argued the United States.142

The most tangible outcome of these meetings is the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which was released at the 2015 RevCon.143 Beyond the inability of the group to settle on a common definition of nuclear deterrence, for this study it is interesting to note the way in which the NWS have defined nuclear disarmament. ‘The process leading to the realization of the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons and any measure contributing hereto. Nuclear disarmament may also refer to the end state after nuclear weapons are eliminated.’144 One problem with this view is that nuclear disarmament comes to mean two things: both the process and the end-state. Also, and more importantly, it encompasses any measure contributing to the disarmament process, thus, even eliminating a single warhead would constitute disarmament – or progress on any of the 13 or 64 measures mentioned before.

The same contradiction appears embedded in the discourse put forward by the reductionist strand of civil society. According to a Global Zero organiser, ‘nuclear disarmament is the process of elimination of all nuclear weapons with intrusive global inspection system to ensure that nobody is cheating and the legal framework prohibiting possession.’145 The process outlined in this movement’s position, and of the reductionist community more broadly, is

144 Ibid., 2.
145 Interview n. 12, June 1, 2015, emphasis added.
certainly more defined than that agreed by the NWS, but it maintains the same confusion between outcome and process. Such distinction is important to understand whether the NWS are effectively complying with their Article VI commitment, while at the same time constituting a central cleavage in the civil society community. As stated by a senior Russian figure at the 61st Pugwash Conference, moderate analysts recognise that disarmament is under way, even though not fast enough, while radical ones say there is no progress at all. 146 Clearly it is hard to assess the pace whether what constitutes disarmament remains unspecified.

At a closed-door event attended by the author, a prominent Global Zero leader said of a nuclear-free world that ‘we’re all sceptical about it,’ but the concern should not be so much on eliminating all of the bombs, but on reducing all those unnecessary ones. To make sense of the seeming disconnect between advocating for an organisation called Global Zero and refusing the need to get to zero is that both reduction and elimination ‘involve exactly the same steps’.

7.3.4 Summary

The reductionist approach thus constructs a markedly different threat than the abolitionists, one in which both the risk and the response have a less global character.

The table above shows two varieties of how nuclear disarmament is conceptualised by the reductionist camp. Given that most of the analysis has concerned the discursive position of Global Zero, the organisation is at the forefront, but accompanied here by a summary of the mainstream nuclear security narrative, which has been described in depth. This shows that nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of the bomb to untrustworthy actors is the major definition of the threat coming from nuclear weapons. If the agent of such threat resides in terrorists and rogue states, their target can only be the West, though it remains largely implicit.

The response to the nuclear threat appears much less linked to the concept of disarmament than in the abolitionist frame. Here too there is a certain variety, from a prescription for the securing on nuclear materials and stopping proliferation to other measures that should reduce the nuclear threat. These are always to be undertaken by the most powerful actors in nuclear governance, the 'haves', either in the sense of possessing nuclear technology or the weapons themselves. Given these states' reliance on the same danger that the reductionists insist on wanting to eliminate, nuclear
disarmament can only be seen as a process, or even a utopian aspiration, whereas the nuclear security narrative does not express itself on the matter. Global Zero’s narrative on nuclear disarmament thus appears to be in line with the dominant prioritisation of non-proliferation, nuclear security, and the step-by-step process for nuclear disarmament, much in line with mainstream thinking, as will be seen.

7.4 Conclusion

The first analytical move has aimed at showing how disarmament can be (and indeed is) constructed differently, a task aided by unpacking discursive construction of the threat and the solution. The study of the frames of disarmament employed by civil society from abolitionist and reductionist approaches has examined their respective articulations, placing these into the wider context of nuclear discourses. Chapter Eight will proceed to compare the frames so as to highlight their ideological positioning and function in the hegemonic apparatus. The focus on language and its strategic use draws from the assumption that language ‘constitutes the principal means through which meaning is given to security’\textsuperscript{147} in various contexts. What should be retained for now is the high variance of disarmament calls put forward at the NPT. The very way in which nuclear weapons constitute a threat differs for abolitionists and reductionists, as do policy prescriptions.

\textsuperscript{147} Matt McDonald, \textit{Security, the Environment and Emancipation}, 25.
Following this, we should turn to research how these articulations have been received in the NPT context, that is, it will deal with the crucial issue of interpellation. Not only the construction of security is important, but also the resonance enjoyed by particular frames, especially when the community analysed is composed of NGOs and think tanks with no formal coercive or institutional power. This will allow building upon the critical constructivist analysis so far carried out and a more direct engagement with the Gramscian theory of civil society and its related concepts of common sense and historic bloc to illuminate the overall strategies of civil society at the NPT. As such, Chapter Eight will provide an examination of the common sense nature of the two frames by looking at the process of interpellation, and an exploration, preliminary as it may be, of the historic blocs supporting the competing ideologies.

148 The difference here is amongst the four types of power identified by Barnett and Duvall: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. For more see Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds. *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Chapter 8

Civil Society Common Sense and Historic Bloc at the NPT

Analysing nuclear politics with a Gramscian outlook leads us to look at the complexities of the nuclear state and its rule. It requires paying attention not just to the nuclear state strictly defined, as most positivist accounts would have it, but in a broader framework that recognises the mutual constitution of the state by political and civil society. The importance of civil society rests on the fact that it is where the struggle for hegemony takes place, or the contest among competing ideologies to obtain consent. Indeed, the consent the state needs to maintain its rule is not only built through governmental functions and bureaucratic directives, rather it is also based upon popular understandings that are so widely shared to be taken as a given. Such social concepts are part and parcel of that common sense which has been outlined in Chapter Two. In order to understand the rule of the state we need, therefore, to take into account the meaning-making practices, the ideological inclinations, present in institutions and artefacts such as trade unions, parties, churches, schools, political texts, popular novels, and paintings. Traits and trends of the hegemonic ideas will be present both in high and in low political representations, as will alternative ideologies.
The analysis of the common sense nature of civil society’s understandings of nuclear disarmament introduced the question of the circulation of frames. If the articulation of a narrative is indubitably central for those interested in the cultural milieu of a certain policy area, even more significant is the way in which the narrative is received and spread. Therefore, the analytical gaze of this section drifts towards the theme, hereto only anticipated, of the organisation of social forces behind a common conception. For Gramsci such a conglomerate is the historic bloc, a union of intent among disparate actors that can alternatively support or challenge the hegemonic order. Both for the maintenance of a hegemonic project and for the establishment of a counter-hegemonic alternatives, it is indeed necessary that various forces, with different social, economic, political and ethical concerns combine their efforts. A project becomes dominant only if it is able to present its particular corporative interests as general and natural. There is never a single dominant ideology and a subordinate one; hegemony, in fact, is never fully acquired, it is constantly in a state of tension among competing propositions.

For the purpose of this research, the array of actors to be analysed is not the entirety of civil society groups that Gramsci referred to – trade unions, the Church, schools, media, etc. That would certainly be a valuable exercise in a national context where a certain cultural approach to nuclear disarmament could be assessed within those various communities, or with a cross-country comparison. In keeping with the analogy drawn in the research design, the focus here will be on the interaction between transnational civil society and other social forces of nuclear governance, particularly states, coalitions, UN, funders, and the general public. By looking into the politics of nuclear
disarmament and the competing approaches of reduction and abolition, the chapter aims at highlighting the difficulties of both frames to become common sense and of producing a historic bloc in the contemporary nuclear order.

8.1 Civil society NPT frames and common sense meanings of nuclear disarmament

As the two previous chapters have highlighted, both the problem and the solution to the current nuclear conundrum have received a varying treatment by civil society. Nuclear disarmament has indeed been constructed in widely differing terms by those groups that, in and beyond the NPT review process, belong to the abolitionist or the reductionist camp. Looking within the programmatic statements of different civil society groups, and zooming in on certain issues with interview material, allows us to see the nuances in their interpretation of the nuclear risk. As reported in the table below, this is differently characterised – proliferation or use – and so is the origin of the threat – terrorists and rogue states or all those involved in nuclear possession. Again, like in Chapter Seven, the cases of Global Zero and ICAN are taken as exemplary of this division. What crucially drives them apart is the referent object of the threat, which according to the abolitionist comprises the whole of humanity, whereas in the reductionist characterisation seems to imagine a specifically Western subject. As such both the collective action and the agent identified to respond differ, but most
importantly disarmament itself is for some a necessity, and a utopian aspiration for others. This underscores the fundamental ideological distinction between the two.

**Table 4: Visions of Disarmament for Global Zero and ICAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Reductionists</th>
<th>Abolitionists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Zero</td>
<td>ICAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent object</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent of threat</td>
<td>Rogue states, terrorists</td>
<td>Nuclear possessors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action</td>
<td>Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control</td>
<td>Ban treaty, disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent of response</td>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>NNWS, NWS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterisation of</td>
<td>Utopian, a process</td>
<td>Necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disarmament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The views of the two different communities are not to be seen as opposing processes of securitization and de-securitization, to borrow the Copenhagen school terms. In fact, it would be too limiting and even misguided to see the reductionist approach as an instance of framing nuclear weapons as a security threat, while the abolitionist one as an attempt to devoid them of that characteristic. Instead, both discourses in effect move toward portraying the bomb as a menace to global security. The issue is that they do so by employing two very different conceptions of the nuclear order: following Gramsci, the abolitionists and the reductionists can be seen as bearers of different versions of nuclear common sense. Varieties of common sense can in fact coexist and do keep transforming in time by building upon sedimented discourses. For the purposes of analysis the definition of categories and the simplification of arguments have been undertaken, even though clearly this

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1 While the first four categories are taken from McDonald, the fifth is added by the author.

has limits. After all, a ‘lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure.’

8.1.1 Discourse contestation and the common sense of nuclear disarmament

The struggle for common sense is indeed happening at various levels in the NPT context. The reductionist camp, and Global Zero particularly, is in effect supporting the dominant narrative of nuclear history, which sees it as a succession of natural pursuit of atomic capabilities and territorial spread as well as quantitative surge. According to this story, the threatening actors are acting against the norms set by the so-called international community, thus convincing them to give up their aggressive plans is one of Global Zero’s challenges. The move to reframe the nuclear threat in the post-Cold War age appears to confirm the need, even for hegemonic conceptions, to be constantly restated and rearticulated in order to maintain their prominence as a security conception. As highlighted by critical scholars, the new threat of nuclear terrorism had to emerge in order to give meaning to the existing arsenals previously justified by the Soviet threat.

Instead, the nuclear arsenals of the established nuclear-armed states receive little scrutiny, while no question is raised as to why they would need these devices to boost their security. These states are called to play a role, namely

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4 Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, ‘Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control,’ 36.
‘pursuing Global Zero by negotiating further reductions in their arsenals’,\(^5\) but it is not made clear how reductions link to elimination. The paradigm of nuclear need is thus left unchallenged, at least for the most powerful states, with the implication that not all nuclear weapons are equally problematic. For ICAN, and crucially differently from Global Zero, the problem is not of acquisition by terrorists and rogue states, but possession as such. ‘When it comes to nuclear weapons, there are no safe hands,’\(^6\) is a central ICAN argument. According to one of its leaders, this frame ‘puts human needs first, not the ideology of deterrence.’\(^7\) ‘Whether deterrence works doesn’t matter, it is what nuclear weapons do that matters.’\(^8\)

The simplicity of the message has surely been one of the strengths of the humanitarian discourse.\(^9\) Nuclear weapons have horrific consequences on human beings, which are forbidden by international law, therefore they should be banned. It was because the idea of the nuclear weapons convention appeared too complicated and only few people understood it, that IPPNW introduced the idea of the ban.\(^10\) The greater inclusion of more partners and the international turn, which led to the creation of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, led to this rebranding.\(^11\) If the humanitarian initiative is an effort at reframing the debate on nuclear disarmament globally, it has seen civil society take an increasing role. The process of reframing goes through the establishment of accepted text and its

\(^5\) Global Zero, ‘Frequently Asked Questions.’
\(^6\) ICAN, ‘Arguments for Nuclear Abolition.’
\(^7\) Civil society leader, ICAN campaigners’ meeting, London, July 6, 2015.
\(^8\) Interview n. 14, June 19, 2014.
\(^9\) Tim Caughley, ‘Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons,’ 27.
\(^10\) Interview n. 3, May 22, 2015.
\(^11\) Ibid.
strength is proportional to the diffusion it enjoys. Therefore in the NPT context – but also in diplomatic practice more broadly – activism has focused on introducing a certain language in the statements of states, with the aim of seeing it reflected in the outcome documents. For the Abolition 2000 movement, for instance, it was crucial to see as many states as possible use the expression ‘nuclear weapon convention’ in their statements. In some cases they were even able to have their own people write statements for certain states, together with the establishment of personal relations and even friendships between civil society representatives and members of delegations.

Similarly, for ICAN a prime aim has been to change the language used by NPT parties in their statements and working papers. They have mobilised huge human resources to make that happen. This was particularly evident at the 2014 PrepCom, when tens of ICAN members and affiliates were seen making contacts with each individual delegation to fill in a form. In 2015 the focus was on making sure that as many states as possible would endorse the Austrian pledge, later known as humanitarian pledge. This was often guaranteed by the repeated ICAN calls to the permanent missions and long chats with the delegation members. Special attention was also given to those from low-income countries.

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 In these forms ICAN members would note relevant data for country positions.
At the same time, the very debate at the 2015 RevCon has highlighted the political importance of shifting the global discourse. In one of its publications, ICAN points out that the term ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’ is now commonly used.\textsuperscript{16} Expressing one’s deep concern over the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons has become a sign of one’s affiliation with a certain narrative of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, there were abundant efforts, particularly on the part of the NWS, to refrain from using those terms. All of the P5 together countered the ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’ frame, limiting themselves to a reference to the ‘severe consequences of nuclear weapons use’ in the Joint Statement of the P5 Conference on 2015.\textsuperscript{17} For instance, the US and the UK delegates reacted to the first draft of the Main Committee 1 report by asking that the references to the humanitarian consequences be moved to the chapeau section of the Final Document.

Yet, the French statement has been much more vehement, proclaiming ‘Unacceptable, unacceptable’ that a conference to which it did not partake was praised in the document. The overall French statements at the 2015 RevCon are indeed the best example of the NWS’ attempt to distance themselves from the HINW. In the speech at the General Debate, Ambassador Jean-Hughes Simon-Michel pointed out that France is fully conscious of the ‘severe effects of nuclear weapons’ but that, because of their purely defensive role, nuclear arms and the deterrence they provide are wholly compliant with international law. He went further, in the Main

\textsuperscript{16} ICAN, ‘Catastrophic Humanitarian Harm.’

\textsuperscript{17} Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Joint statement from the nuclear-weapon states at the London P5 conference,’ Gov.uk, February 6, 2015.
Committee I speech on May 1st, arguing that ‘nuclear disarmament cannot be declared - it must be built’ and that it ‘can only be reached through a series of concrete measures, step by step.’\footnote{France, ‘Statement by Amb. Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament,’ 2015 NPT Review Conference, Main Committee I, May 1, 2015, http://www.francetnp.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/discours_1er_pilier_final_revcon2015.pdf (last accessed 22 October 2016).}

These statements reflect the fear of becoming entangled in a web of words contrary to France’s (and the NWS) position. It is clear that Paris is intent in countering the opposed disarmament argument, especially the humanitarian one while supporting the step-by-step approach. The effects of nuclear weapons are in fact defined here as ‘severe’ in clear opposition to attempts to introduce a debate on ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’. It is in the same vein that one can read the remark on the infeasibility of disarmament by declaration. According to the French position, the calls for negotiating a ban on nuclear weapons are misguided because they do not consider the ‘strategic context’, which demands a series of step-by-step measures rather than a single comprehensive process.

The materials used for the construction of the narrative of the step-by-step process are well established: sovereignty, stability, defence, and technical approach, among others. That is what makes this narrative so successful and, in Gramscian terms, common sense. Statements reinforcing the efficacy of nuclear weapons for keeping national security have been pervasive ever since the invention of these weapons. It is less important that rarely the question has been raised as to what is the actual evidence to support that claim, because what really matters is that most people are convinced that nuclear deterrence keeps peace. The reductionist discourse can thus build upon what
is already believed to be true by many; thereby challenging it becomes all the more difficult. Conversely, this is the same reason why the humanitarian discourse is weak, despite the adherence of over a hundred national delegations. It is built upon cosmopolitan ideas about the indivisible nature of security and the equality of all world citizens that simply do not carry much weight in the current state-based nuclear governance. The conception is certainly counter-hegemonic, but it is not as clear how much of a chance to succeed it has in the contemporary security situation.

In 2015 the climate was certainly more conducive to abolitionism than it has been at most points in nuclear history. Indeed, many opportunities have opened for this narrative with the proliferation of organisations and individuals, even with political responsibilities, that speak in favour of disarmament. Several analysts have asserted that nuclear weapons ‘are in the process of being recoded as unacceptable instruments of terror that are of no use in war.’ Some have even gone further to argue that ‘it is now the anti-nuclear advocates who are at the cutting edge of the debate for the first time, and the pro-nuclear advocates who are the ones pushed into the corner.’ However, it will not be enough to preach to the converted, since the deterrence ideology does exist and remains at the basis of security strategies of several states and alliances. That is because of the disciplinary effect of nuclear discourse, which has colonised the entire polis, according to Kinsella. In fact, despite its apparent inconsistencies, the deterrence

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19 Hugh Gusterson, ‘The New Nuclear Abolitionists.’
ideology and the notion of disarmament as a step-by-step process benefit from greater resonance than their abolitionist alternative.

Reductionists therefore operate through recourse to common sense ideas about deterrence and proliferation, while what abolitionists do poses a counter-hegemonic challenge to the dominant order.

8.1.2 Maintaining common sense: the deterrence-disarmament continuum

This discussion can benefit from bringing in the perspective of the UN, for its particular position on disarmament. It ‘has become part of the identity of the United Nations as an organization; some have called it now part of the organization’s “DNA”’. On the conceptual level the UN has consistently recognised a distinction between the goal of armaments regulation and disarmament. In a talk at the margins of the NPT PrepCom of 2014, Virginia Gamba expressly stated that the step-by-step process more clearly resembles regulation of armaments than their elimination, as demonstrated by the fact that not a single weapon has been destroyed to comply with an existing treaty. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane went even further saying that ‘some might question whether the step-by-step approach will result in zero nuclear weapons . . . or zero disarmament.’ The

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2008 UN Secretary General’s five-point plan for disarmament, for example, envisages either the agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments or the conclusion of a comprehensive convention.\textsuperscript{25}

The policy prescriptions advanced by reductionist groups, whether for the reduction of numbers and practices of the nuclear weapons states or for securing sensitive material, are not a radical challenge to the current nuclear governance. The focus of these movements, as exemplified by Global Zero, is thus on risk reduction, not elimination, because the way in which they propose solving the threat of nuclear weapons does not immediately – and many would say necessarily – require the dismantlement of deterrence relations. What distinguishes practices and proposals built on a regime of disarmament, as opposed to one of deterrence, is the reduction in the value of nuclear weapons, similarly to what put forward by Nick Ritchie.\textsuperscript{26} As it has been put forward in Chapter Three, in fact, it is less important to dismantle a warhead than to disarm a relationship. If on the one hand a state stops employing the threat of nuclear use towards even just one other country, then disarmament is under way; if, on the other, it keeps relying on nuclear deterrence, this thesis’ position is that it matters little whether it has enough to inflict intolerable damage to the opponent once or more than once.

To be fair, among the two actions that Global Zero has advocated most recently, the de-alerting campaign belongs somewhere in between the deterrence and the disarmament regime. It is true that a US-Russian


\textsuperscript{26} Ritchie, ‘Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.’
confrontation with high alert levels contains the same amount of blackmailing of one within a de-alerted situation; still, renouncing the possibility of attacking the opponent with almost automaticity is a move towards de-valuing nuclear weapon and thus in the direction of disarmament.

Figure 8: The continuum between deterrence and disarmament regimes

The graph above summarises some of the policy proposals that have been seen until now, both from reductionist and abolitionist groups, to highlight the fact that all of them are on an ark that can tend more towards a regime of deterrence or to one of disarmament depending on the value that nuclear weapons play in the security of the states/global society. At one extreme we find arrangements that envisage no role for nuclear arms (so much so that they would be banned or comprehensively prohibited), whereas at the other extreme these weapons keep playing a security role, at least for some. Countering proliferation, reducing arsenals numbers, and limiting nuclear spending surely make accidental nuclear war less likely but do little to change existing deterrence relations. This should be seen as a way of identifying the place of an advocated policy option to the wider nuclear order.

The abolitionist strategy could be seen in Gramscian terms as an attempt at war of movement given the importance attached to one single immediate objective that is set to revolutionise the status quo. However, the movement
to ban the bomb does not convincingly explain what would happen after the perspective entry into force of a similar treaty and how that would contribute to nuclear disarmament. The reductionist approach invoked by the NWS and others, instead, can be seen as an example of what Gramsci would call war of position. Their message is not opposed to the status quo, rather it falls perfectly within its confines by supporting in theory the goal of disarmament but subordinating it to a series of conditions. While this discourse does give support to nuclear disarmament, it does so in a way that makes it appear distant and even impractical. The whole security framework would need to be different, very different from today’s, in order for disarmament to become possible – in essence, the discourse discredits the same idea it purports to be espousing.

Those groups that support a reductionist strategy depart from the assumption that the risks nuclear weapons create come mostly from their use by terrorists or rogue states that could acquire them and, the argument goes, almost inevitably use them. This logic assigns a higher rationality to those states that already possess nuclear weapons, making it seem that use by them is a foreclosed option, whereas new proliferators, both state and non-state, would not exhibit the same caution. In practice this discourse does not contest the security benefits that states currently derive from holding nuclear arsenals, nor does it address the morality of relying on the threat of using the weapon even if only virtually. This view, in sum, does not respond to the question: ‘is deterrence good?’

Parallel to this, the other side of the discourse is also partial and politically charged in that it does not acknowledge another query: ‘is disarmament
better than deterrence?’ Surely many abolitionist activists would say that they do because they give ample reasons why deterrence is bad, including the huge sums of money spent, the health and environmental effects of the nuclear-weapons-building apparatus as well as the potential destruction of nuclear attacks brought on by a failure of deterrence. However, saying that deterrence is bad does not necessarily imply that it is worse than the alternative, disarmament. It is unfortunate that the abolitionist community of civil society involved with nuclear weapons questions does not engage with the security argument because as long as that is not done there can not be a conversation between the two sides of this struggle.

As seen so far, this struggle within civil society replicates the global division between regimes of deterrence and disarmament. The discourse of the reductionists operates within the hegemonic tropes of deterrence and non-proliferation in their disarmament advocacy. The abolitionists, instead, premise theirs on a counter-hegemonic project that does not only contest the reliance on deterrence but also, implicitly, notions of sovereignty and the supremacy of national security. After having established the discursive strategies of civil society, we will now turn to their organisational and material strategies as a way to unravel the war of position of the reductionists and the war of movement of the abolitionists.
8.2 Nuclear civil society and the creation of the historic bloc

Following from the previous analysis, it appears clear that the struggle over the meaning of disarmament is not a resolved quest with one side firmly dominating. Instead, both the reductionist and the abolitionist interpretations exist and manage to make a powerful case. It is evident, however, that one of these visions, deterrence, is more strongly embedded within the global psyche. Global Zero’s narrative thus appears as an expression of the common sense of nuclear order, deterrence, the hegemonic ideology at the basis of practices of non-proliferation and arms control. The position of ICAN, disarmament, instead is taken to be a counter-hegemonic narrative, which challenges deterrence both as an ideology and a strategy.

After having established that there are different interpretations of the nuclear threat and of the necessary response, the analysis now turns from the ideational to the material by analysing how the Gramscian concept of historic bloc could help in assessing nuclear civil society’s struggles at the NPT. In the same way as Gramsci distinguishes between civil society and political society in his analysis of the Italian fascist state, this thesis discusses global civil society and global political society to examine the global nuclear politics in the case of the NPT. The focus is not on the creation of domestic consent, but of consensus in international negotiations and, just like at the level of the nation-state, this thesis argues that global civil society is crucial in crystallising a certain ruling order. In order to reflect upon this notion of historic bloc, it is thus useful to reflect upon which union of forces lie behind the configuration of narratives that we have examined so far.
The unity of the historic bloc proposing each version of the nuclear common sense will be examined, in the NPT context and more broadly. As has been repeated throughout, the NPT is but an arena of a broader struggle. Its periodic conferences allow to have a glimpse into the diplomatic and activist communities involved with nuclear policies, but the range of these groups’ activities is much wider. The conclusions that will be drawn concerning the historic bloc are very preliminary, but hope to illuminate some of the ways in which the global nuclear civil society addressed in this thesis has been interacting with the structural constraints of the nuclear order, here broken down as: states, populations, funders, and their geographical limitations.

8.2.1.1 States

It would be easy to imagine government-NGO relations in events like the NPT RevCon as distant and uncommunicative; instead the opposite is true. For sure many restrictions come with the UN badge marked with the ‘T’ of temporary or ‘N’ on NGO as opposed to the ‘D’ of delegate. The former are prohibited from taking the floor and attending certain sessions, and even barred from some areas of the building. At the 2015 RevCon, however, a lot took place where all classes of participants are allowed, demonstrating that states are willing to engage with civil society. Even more, a significant few states have included in their national delegations non-governmental representatives to receive assistance, but also a preferential point of access with other civil society constituencies.27

27 Some examples of this phenomenon are Bill Potter for Kazakhstan, Harald Müller for Germany, Patricia Lewis for the UK, but also Carlos Umaña for Costa Rica and Christian Ciobanu for the RMI.
Not only did most countries praise the role of civil society in their statements, but they also supported them in practice. The thirteen governmental briefings for NGOs organised throughout the four weeks of the conference are further proof of that. These are early sessions in which a national delegation or coalition sums up the status of negotiation allowing for questions from the floor, usually very crowded with civil society representatives. The countries or groups of countries involved in these briefings are all, in their own way, important reference points for NPT politics.  

One indicator of state support for civil society’s activities at the NPT is their organisation of side events. These are open events, usually taking place during breaks of the RevCons and PrepComs in which panel presentations are followed by questions from the floor and tend to be well attended by the non-governmental community. Despite some exceptions, these also are some of the main actors in the NPT forum. These events represent a chance for states to showcase their endorsement for certain proposals and to demonstrate their backing of a particular civil society organisation. Although convincing opposing sides to endorse their proposals remains the ultimate aim of most groups under examination, their events are often limited to like-minded states or actors, with the result that most of the work is done

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The degree of involvement and consequently satisfaction for this kind of arrangements has greatly varied, from what can be assessed by the author’s interviews with these individuals, such as Interview n. 15, May 13, 2015 and Interview n. 16, April 30, 2015.

28 These were Austria, France, Egypt, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, UK, US, NAC, NPDI, and a group composed of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Governmental briefings for NGOs occupied a slot from 9 to 9:50 and were held almost each morning before the RevCon starts in a little room, Conference Room C, which becomes NGO-central during the review process.

29 At the 2015 RevCon the states that organised or co-organised side events were the following: Argentina, Austria, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States.
preaching to the converted. It often happened that events related to the ban campaign had only diplomats from friendly states present; similarly, NWS delegates were in many occasions in the audience of reductionist-inclined groups.

As should be clear from the discussion of common sense, the states that support the reductionist approach, and its underlying deterrence regime, are the five nuclear-armed states recognised by the NPT, as the French statements illustrate. These, however, are also joined by a variety of states – mostly US allies – that still benefit from nuclear deterrence and speak in favour of step-by-step recipes. For instance, Australia, in response to the 159-countries strong Austrian pledge, launched a competing working paper that obtained less than 30 endorsements. This created quite some confusion because of the similarity in the two countries’ names – so much so that the Dutch Foreign Minister himself fell victim of a major Freudian slip in his opening remarks, claiming support for the ‘Austrian pledge… hmmm, wait, the Australian one!’

Examples of coalitions that belong to the reductionist historic bloc include the de-alerting group, which focused on producing agreed language on reducing the operational ease of a nuclear strike, and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a group of states close to the US that

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30 Unfortunately, the text only contains the correct language in support of the Australian statement, but the slip of tongue was personally witnessed by the author and confirmed by the bemusement it received among civil society at the conference. Netherlands, ‘Speech by Bert Koenders, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,’ 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, May 27, 2015, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/27April_Netherlands.pdf (last accessed 30 June 2016).
attempted to build bridges between abolitionists and reductionists.\textsuperscript{31} The position of NPDI is particularly interesting here, because its statements include elements of both abolitionism and reductionism without explicitly recognising this tension. ‘We hope to contribute to a growing consensus that any perceived security or political advantages of nuclear weapons are outweighed by the grave threat they pose to humanity.’\textsuperscript{32} This unevenness and contradiction should not be seen as evidence of the limited explanatory power of the present framework. To the opposite, common sense is always in flux and never permanently acquired, with hybrid mutations produced by the tension among competing ideologies. Still, it is significant that NPDI supports nuclear sharing agreements, a clear indication that this group values positively the security benefits of nuclear deterrence.\textsuperscript{33}

Beyond the relatively high consistency of the reductionist camp, it is more interesting to inquire into the abolitionist historic bloc and the states and coalitions that support it. If most of the criticism in the previous section has regarded the complicit role of reductionist civil society in supporting the ideology of deterrence, the rest of this chapter will highlight the failure of the abolitionist camp to produce a coherent union of social forces. The creation of an abolitionist historic bloc has been in the making for several years. If during the Cold War many states felt that advancing nuclear disarmament could not proceed in the climate produced by the bipolar opposition, things changed in the 1990s. NAM states, to be fair, had promoted the goal since

\textsuperscript{31} The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative is a coalition, launched in 2010, which includes Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.


\textsuperscript{33} NPDI briefing, May 11, 2015.
their very creation.\textsuperscript{34} However, many more states embraced their call, and more moderate ones at that. The creation of the New Agenda Coalition in 1998 was a powerful signal: a group of medium powers from different regions of the world called for progress in nuclear disarmament in order to maintain alive the promise of the NPT grand bargain.\textsuperscript{35}

Ireland is a long-time champion of the cause, ever since in the 1960s it proposed at the General Assembly a text that would result in the negotiation of the NPT itself. Furthermore, in more recent times, several states have provided leadership and support for the humanitarian initiative, starting with Norway and Switzerland, and coming to include New Zealand, Mexico, Austria, South Africa and others. Both at the NPT and at the UN General Assembly, these states took the lead in sponsoring joint statements: from the statement strong of 16 states led by Switzerland at the 2012 PrepCom, to the one of 80 states coordinated by South Africa at the 2013 PrepCom, and the resolution introduced by New Zealand at the same year’s UNGA, which gained 155 endorsements. At the 2015 NPT RevCon, the joint statement presented by Austria reached 159 signatories. The states allied to the abolitionist community are a series of non-nuclear-weapon states that have made of nuclear disarmament a priority. Clearly not being part of a nuclear alliance is a crucial factor for being part of this bloc.

\textsuperscript{34} The Non-Aligned Movement was created in 1961 to include states that were neutral in the East-West confrontation. It now comprises 120 members mostly from the South. For an investigation of their involvement on nuclear issues see William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, \textit{Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement}.

\textsuperscript{35} The New Agenda Coalition was formed in 1998 by a group of medium-range powers with a firm commitment to world security without nuclear arms. It played its most active role at the 2000 Review Conference when its proposal, the 13 practical steps were adopted consensually. Its members are Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa.
Norway has played a tremendously important role in the humanitarian initiative, providing funding and endorsement for its activities since early on. After Nayarit, however, Oslo has distanced itself from the abolitionist community and failed to give the humanitarian initiative continuing public support.\textsuperscript{36} South African delegates spoke vehemently at the 2015 RevCon about the need to fill the legal gap, including a powerful condemnation of the ‘minority rule’ of nuclear politics, which won a long applause at the RevCon closing on May 23. However, Pretoria made clear it would not host in the near future any conference of the humanitarian initiative.\textsuperscript{37} The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) is a big abolitionist supporter, for instance, but it has refrained from wholeheartedly supporting the idea of a ban treaty. Most importantly, the ban proposal was not formally endorsed by Austria either. Vienna’s position is particularly relevant, because in the past few years it has grown to become the main champion of the humanitarian approach.

These illustrious defections show that the abolitionist camp is struggling to create a historic bloc. In part this can be attributed to the power of the deterrence common sense, which has stymied proposals in the direction of disarmament. Nonetheless, another factor resides in the difficulty at obtaining internal coherence among the civil society proponents of the abolitionist approach. Even among fierce supporters of disarmament there is a dominant view, whose background ideas are becoming more widespread and less contested, and it can be observed that among abolitionists it is ICAN

\textsuperscript{36} Interview n. 17, April 30, 2014.

\textsuperscript{37} Hopes were high that South Africa would host another HINW conference, as demonstrated in ICAN Norway, ‘Next Stop: South Africa,’ ICAN Norway website, http://www.icannorway.no/campaign-news/next-stop-south-africa/#.WA6RKpN96Rs (last accessed 24 October 2016). However, South Africa ultimately decided not to, as recounted by Richard Lennane, ‘Full spectrum lunacy,’ Wildfire>\textsuperscript{3} website, October 19, 2015, http://www.wildfire-v.org/news2015.html (last accessed 24 October 2016).
that is acquiring a hegemonic role. Proponents say it is the one proposal that can win; in parallel, they have grown in numbers and professionalism. The way in which they represent the ban as the logical consequence of the faulty governance demonstrates an attempt at naturalizing ICAN’s specific policy prescription in the eyes of all the abolitionist community.

Despite the variety of initiatives and policy proposals for the legal abolition of nuclear weapons, it is fair to say that the ban campaign has gained a hegemonic role, which remains highly contested. To explain its decision to distance itself from the humanitarian initiative, Norway cited the general association of the initiative with the proposal for a ban treaty.\(^\text{38}\) It should also be noted that the main global disarmament champion, the United Nations, has not given its full support to the ban idea. For disarmament the UN recognises five agreed upon standards: verifiability, transparency, irreversibility, universality, and the legally binding nature of commitments. Advocacy of a legal abolition on nuclear weapons conducted recently under the banner of ‘ban the bomb’ or similar, risks hampering the universality principle, UN sources have warned.\(^\text{39}\)

### 8.2.1.2 Popular mobilisation

As has been seen so far, most of what civil society does in the NPT context is engage with states and other nongovernmental actors to publicise their message. If we compare this with the mass mobilisation of the 1980s described in Chapter Six, we can see that there has been a clear and

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\(^\text{38}\) Richard Lennane, ‘Expediency wins as Norway abandons its humanitarian principles,’ *Wildfire* _special issue_, November 30, 2015.

significant shift in strategies. Maintaining political engagement on issues related to the bomb in the current situation is an issue reported by most people in the civil society community. People's worries tend to centre around more tangible issues, whether global or local, for example the occupation of Palestine, as identified by Israeli disarmament advocates, or climate change and humanitarian emergencies, as many others pointed out.

This is a problem both in terms of catalysing political involvement, but also for what concerns political opportunity. Regarding the latter, one should question whether items that in specific discussions are paramount maintain that status in more general engagements. To remain on the same example, this is evidenced for instance by the fact that almost no Middle Eastern state has raised the proposal for a zone free of WMD in the region when high-level delegations have met with President Obama.\textsuperscript{40} The priority attached to nuclear issues, in fact, is simply overstated in nuclear-related diplomatic discussions, which necessarily focus on just one aspect of a more complex set of challenges. As for the former, both organisations dedicated to lobbying Washington's decision-makers and organisers of grassroots activism lamented with the author that getting people mobilised for the cause of nuclear disarmament (whatever its definition) got harder since the end of the Cold War, with the associated reduction of the nuclear risk in popular perceptions.

However, it should also be noticed that the appeal to populations is remarkably absent in the strategy of most organisations. Although many affirm their commitment to education, few activities in practice are like Peace

\textsuperscript{40} As reported in a Chatham House rule discussion on the sideline of the RevCon.
Boat and the New York-based Hibakusha Stories. From the very start also Global Zero combined top-down and bottom-up initiatives, though the former has prevailed over the latter. Global Zero has a grassroots dimension in its student chapters at 150 universities and high schools. Its leadership recognised that ‘experts and former leaders so far are the ones who have had the influence’ in virtue of their ability to talk to decision-makers. It was also argued that ultimately you need a strong grassroots movement – while acknowledging, however, that such a movement ‘is not there yet’.\(^\text{41}\) Indeed, people at Global Zero conceded that before being able to run a grassroots movement to influence political change, it is first necessary to build it, and they ‘are not running it, but building it now.’\(^\text{42}\)

As far as top-down, Global Zero gives paramount importance to reports by “distinguished commissions”, and its 2015 New York side event served to launch the most recent one. Among their strategies we can identify a strong focus on high-level support by so-called “movement leaders” comprising the likes of Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev as well as former foreign ministers, ambassadors, military officers, etc.\(^\text{43}\) Relying on high-level support and direct lines of access with decision-makers is constructed as particularly relevant by this community, even beyond Global Zero.

For instance, there is an expectation that, because of its clout, expertise, institutional knowledge, and personal contacts, ‘the Belfer Center is able to influence the executive.’\(^\text{44}\) The European Leadership Network, moreover, was purposefully created to gather authoritative voices in a network of political,

\(^{41}\) Interview n. 12 June 1, 2015.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Gordon Corera, ‘Group Seeks Nuclear Weapons Ban.’

\(^{44}\) Interview n. 13, May 28, 2015.
military, and diplomatic leaders. As one of its key figures mentioned, ‘the
most progressive things said in this field are said by people like myself who
used to be something.’ In a closed-door confidential meeting organised by
an NPT member, the rationale for involving civil society representatives was
laid out: these experts’ involvement is important because they have an impact
on public opinion as well as on decision-making, both in Washington and in
the world.

Moreover, there has been a redirection in the priorities of many organisations
that were or are working on nuclear disarmament. They have made an
attempt at ‘finding opportunities to go out to other constituencies where they
are’. Part of this was a progressive widening of the mission to include
nuclear energy matters and even environmental issues. One of the oldest
standing organisations, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), is a good
example of this: it was concerned with nuclear war at its funding in 1962,
grew to include nuclear power in 1978 and by 1990 had also incorporated
environmental protection. Moreover, it is significant that the lead
publication on nuclear weapons politics, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
added the risk of climate change to that of nuclear explosion in its assessment
of how close the world is to its traditional priority of averting a nuclear war.
Among other things, this agenda enlargement has made it easier to accrue
funding, as will be explained in the next section.

45 Des Browne, intervention at NPT 2014 PrepCom ‘Change in Action- Overcoming Barriers to Non-
Proliferation in the Middle East,’ May 8, 2014.
46 Confidential meeting, May 8, 2014.
content/uploads/2016/05/2015_agm_minutes.pdf (last accessed 29 June 2016).
48 Interview n. 2, April 8, 2014.
8.2.1.3 Funding

Beyond getting people involved, fund-raising has also become harder since the end of the Cold War, as stressed by members of global nuclear civil society from all sides of the spectrum. Foundations are the main source of support for civil society organisations working across the board, followed by states (generally through the MFA or some specialised agency), and, more marginally, by voluntary contributions. The generosity of foundations dramatically decreased since the 1990s, when the perceived risk of nuclear confrontation receded. While some funders went out of business completely, others continue to exist but are providing support for other issue areas like population control or poverty in developing countries. In Washington they worry that ‘Connect US closed, Ford and Hewlett pulled out, Colombe Foundation, that was especially for grassroots, pulled out, and even Ploughshares, which is the main funder shrunk.’ 49 The MacArthur Foundation, which used to fund a variety of organisations, turned its attention away from the issue for a while, though it is now back in and has a heavy focus on nuclear security. 50 Smaller organisations like the Canadian Simons Foundation and the British Joseph Rowntree Foundation are some of the very few examples of non-US funders for this community.

Ploughshares Fund is one of the main powerhouses of this galaxy, being one of the main funders of the business and probably the only one entirely devoted to nuclear matters. Moreover, it is highly embedded in the institutional power of the Washington political system. What makes it special...

49 Interview n. 18, April 4, 2014.
is that it combines the role of funder and think tank, while also having an important media component. Ploughshares in fact took the lead in coordinating various campaigns working for a nuclear deal with Iran, which led its president, Joe Cirincione, to take credit for the 2015 success.

Arms control experts, regional experts, ethnic groups, peace advocates, military leaders and countless others also supported this historic agreement. These groups and individuals were decisive in the battle for public opinion and as independent validators of the negotiated solutions. They all endorsed the deal, but they lacked a common platform – a network to exchange information and coordinate efforts. Ploughshares Fund provided that network.\footnote{Joe Cirincione, ‘How we won: The story behind the Iran agreement victory,’ Ploughshares website, September 22, 2015, \url{http://ploughshares.org/iran-deal-victory} (last accessed 26 June 2016).}

An in-depth study of the role of Ploughshares in that case would be interesting ground for further research.

Beyond high-impact campaigns such as the one around the Iran deal, getting funds for less mediatised issues has become a problem. Not only has the size of the funds available dwindled in the past decades, but also the whole structure has undergone some changes. If the funding for the Freeze campaign in the 1980s was organic, now most of it is project-based.\footnote{Interview n. 13, May 28, 2015.} Foundations have also been increasingly asking for quantifiable means to assess the viability of projects. One of the criteria is to identify traces of language in official documents. This illuminates further the struggle that we have identified earlier in this and in the previous chapter on the negotiating input of civil society. A further criterion is to include individuals who tend to pass through the revolving doors of nuclear politics, which an interviewee exemplified with the figure of Robert Einhorn, who worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies before being appointed Special Adviser
for Nonproliferation and Arms Control in the State Department. There are countless other examples of such revolving-door behaviour at all levels of responsibility.

The impression is that funders prioritise “validators” in their choices, attaching a premium to the credentials of those making the policy argument, thus preferring individuals who have worked in government or in the private sector. According to an expert, NGOs simply do not bear much weight in the nuclear debate, because they are considered biased, as opposed to institutions like the Belfer Center, which instead is thought of as impartial. Curiously, representatives of the reductionist camp are very quick in attributing partisanship to others, but very slow in seeing it in their own advocacy. A perfect example of a validator is the character of Valerie Plame, one of the godmothers of Global Zero and an often-employed nuclear celebrity in Washington. Before being fired in retaliation for her husband’s opposition to the Iraq war, Valerie Plame used to be a CIA operations officer working on nuclear weapons. She is described as being involved in ‘covert counter-nuclear proliferation to make sure the bad guys – whether terrorists or rogue nation states – did not get a nuclear capability.’ It is upon this experience that her credibility for the Global Zero project is established.

States have also taken a lead in funding civil society organisations or projects. Switzerland and Norway have been recognised by most interviewees as the

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53 Interview n. 19, May 12, 2015.
54 Interview n. 13, May 28, 2015.
55 Ibid.
57 Ploughshares, ‘Video: Why Do We Care About Nuclear Weapons?,’ Newsletter email, December 1, 2015.
two major funders for nuclear policy. The Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), for instance, are entirely funded by France and Germany respectively.\footnote{Interview n. 20, April 4, 2014.} Similarly, the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs is supported only with Egyptian money, both public and private, because accepting foreign funds is seen as potentially limiting independence.\footnote{Interview n. 21, May 4, 2015.} Several organisations reported that they try not to restrict to just one governmental source because there is the potential for being pushed around.\footnote{Interview n. 22, April 10, 2014.} The possibility of strings attached to funding was also suggested by an interviewee who raised the issue that the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) would get 70% of its funding from one single, little country in the Gulf.\footnote{Interview n. 23, April 3, 2014.} It would be rather interesting to look deeper into the patterns of funding and check the extent of criticism that the funding governments get from different organisations.

The same exercise would be interesting in the case of foundations as well, considering there is a feeling among many civil society representatives that they want to concentrate nuclear-related activity on certain issues and tactics. Funders, in fact, hold a big say in what direction a certain advocacy or research should go to be economically viable: ‘with any large funder organisation likely to be affected by osmosis if not by directive.’\footnote{Interview n. 24, May 7, 2014.} The risk is that foundations prioritise organisations by associating their funding priorities with certain proposals, or even buzzwords like humanitarian or nuclear security. IPPNW representatives, for instance, have lamented that
‘some foundations decided not to fund us for our support of the humanitarian campaign.’\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, given the paramount role of US foundations, foreign proposals have a lower rate of success, sometimes simply because they would choose a US organisation for it is easier to execute the grant.\textsuperscript{64}

While a more thorough analysis would certainly deliver more nuanced results, it is quite evident that reductionist approaches that privilege the ideology of deterrence, or that do not openly challenge it, are much better able to secure the funding needed for their projects.

\textbf{8.2.1.4 Local vs. global}

Connected to the matter of funding, another issue raised by many civil society representatives was their uneasiness when a movement was seen as the emanation of a particular state. This was an issue early on for the nuclear weapons convention community, for instance, which found it ‘very difficult to get diplomats to read, engage and criticise’ the model convention they had written because it was perceived as a NAM text.\textsuperscript{65} On the other side of the spectrum, Global Zero had to struggle to shrug off the image of being a US-only campaign: with its two American co-founders and a plan of action heavily focused on US-Russian engagement, it was indeed a difficult task.

Although many have shown willingness to advance international proposals, there is a general belief that domestic lobbying is more relevant. For US groups, for example, the main focus of activities has been Washington, DC because of the idea that the US Congress is where things happen and where

\textsuperscript{63} Interview n. 2, April 8, 2014.  
\textsuperscript{64} Interview n. 19, May 12, 2015.  
\textsuperscript{65} Interview n. 3, May 22, 2015.
political change can be influenced more easily. ICAN also relies on domestic lobbying to a great extent, favouring the engagement of governments and parliaments directly by its local partners. This extends now to 95 states, and in some cases it is aided by an ICAN point of contact, though the absence of representatives in Russia and China is recognised as a significant gap.

The reason for the prominence of local over global fora is to be found also in the ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions dedicated to disarmament, what is commonly referred to as the “UN disarmament machinery.” The Conference on Disarmament, which is the body designated by the UN to negotiate disarmament agreements, has been deadlocked since 1998. Despite the reduced membership, it proved impossible to agree upon even a shared agenda because of the operation under consensus rule. In the lead-up to 2015 two additional new fora were instrumental for the discussion of nuclear disarmament: the high-level meeting of the General Assembly and the first session of the open-ended working group (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament. Both operated under General Assembly rules of procedure, that is voting was allowed, thus overcoming the usual stumbling block of the consensus rule. In a similar vein, ICAN has pointed out the need for a forum ‘open to all and blockable by none’.

Whether or not a new forum for disarmament will bring more results than the existing ones remains to be seen. What is evident from the previous discussion is that there is a tension between the global and the national

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67 Interview n. 25, May 11, 2015.
moments of nuclear civil society. Since the United States is so paramount in nuclear politics globally, many global initiatives are still markedly national. This shows how resistant cultural differences remain in defining the boundaries of identificability. Further research could help mapping the geographic distribution of a sentiment opposed to nuclear weapons as well as the specific local characteristics.

8.2.2 Struggling to create a historic bloc

To conclude, there are a couple of considerations that can be made on the historic bloc’s concept application to civil society in the NPT context in terms of unity and of target. Clearly there is not a concerted effort at building a single historic bloc of disarmament advocates and the construction of the historic bloc is not undergoing that deep and wide engagement with society at large that ultimately is needed to change the status quo.

Regarding the issue of unity, it has been reported that ‘[t]here is a complicated history of rivalry and distrust among various groups working on these issues.’69 Indeed, civil society groups are not building an integrated historic bloc; they are divided among themselves even within the same governance mode, but even more across the deterrence-disarmament divide. ICAN’s approach has created some tension within civil society as many are unconvinced of the utility of a treaty that does not include the possessors and beneficiaries of nuclear weapons. If on the one hand ICAN’s intense push for the ban produced a coalition by being able to promote a singular and easily

69 Rebecca Johnson, ‘Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty.’
understandable aim, it has also created great divisions within the same abolitionist camp. According to ICAN’s leadership, civil society needs to work on the grassroots, expert, political, and scientific levels – ‘they don’t need to work together but all are needed.’  

This is not the first time that civil society at the NPT splits. In 1995 there was a significant difference of views regarding the extension – as Johnson noted, civil society ‘divided as sharply as did governments over this issue.’  

For example, PSR favoured saving the treaty, being the only one with a disarmament obligation, while the German branch of IPPNW feared that an indefinite extension would mean giving up a leaver for disarmament.  

That same division between radical and accommodating approaches, or between abolitionists and reductionists, is still alive today. In sum, as stated by one long-time activist, in the anti-nuclear movement ‘the differences are significant and material.’ Instead, all these groups should be encouraged to address their differences rather than hiding behind them, or they risk to undermine the commonality of their aims.

In terms of the problem of target, civil society appears to be building the historic bloc in all the wrong places. In most approaches seen so far the focus of attention has been on decision-makers either local or global, by both abolitionists and reductionists. Sure it is more practical to convince diplomats and much nicer to work at the UN rather than among the masses, but a true change in the ‘common people’ perceptions of nuclear weapons

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71 Rebecca Johnson, ‘Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty.’  
72 Interview n. 3, May 22, 2015.  
73 Interview n. 4, May 7, 2014.
would need to emerge in order to make any international legal milestone meaningful and sustainable. So long as deterrence keeps holding power in the minds of people everywhere it will be unimaginable to overturn its legal infrastructure. More should be done to understand what the public knows and believes about nuclear weapons, as well as to spread information and focus campaigns among the wider population instead of aiming mostly at the top-down approach.

This requires also a reassessment of the terminology used in this thesis. As explained in the research design, civil society working on NPT issues is a very limited proxy to gauge into the politics of cultural support for nuclear order. The discussions within the NPT tend to be extremely self-referential and with little practical relevance for the people at large, resulting in a very limited representativeness (both nationally and globally) for the NGOs and other organisations that were examined here. In reality this actor is indeed very different from the multifaceted image of the civil society from the Gramscian analysis. The national-popular, or in our case, the ‘global-popular’ is to be looked for in history schoolbooks, pop music, and everyday conceptions. Clearly the texts analysed in this thesis are much more removed from this sphere of consciousness and can thus only illuminate the higher philosophical superstructures rather than the common cultural ones. If we are to think of Global Zero and ICAN as the organic intellectuals of Gramsci, being directly involved in propagating their groups’ ideology to the masses, we should advise them to keep in mind the importance of being part of the society one is trying to alter.
8.3 Conclusion

Because of its nature, nuclear governance is said to be not very open to the emergence of a mass-based resistance in which organic intellectuals challenge statist conceptions with the support of civil society. However, more care should be taken in emphasising the distinctions therein. Civil society is relevant not only for the extent and quality of its activities, but also because of the complex relationship that links it to other actors, namely states, institutions, business, and media. Moreover, it is the ideological component of civil society activism that is particularly well positioned to produce new insights. Ideational factors are the underlying drivers of the evolution of global nuclear weapons rule.

In the world of civil society active within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty there are several positions of power, seen as the ability of a civil society group to get states to do what they want. It is important to note that, because the NPT is a diplomatic context in which states are the ultimate decision-makers, civil society exercises power to the extent to which it is able to influence states’ rhetoric and practice. This is multifaceted and covers several of the classical definitions of power. First of all it is a matter of resources: organisations that are present at the Review Conference and are there in large numbers have more of a chance to affect the discussions at the Conference, for instance by lobbying states to accept new more progressive wordings. In addition, how well endowed the groups are has a direct effect on their ability to pursue political change, as funding allows effective mobilisation – organising events, paying travel costs to speakers, producing better information material, etc.
Secondly, some of this power depends on the resonance enjoyed by civil society’s arguments. In order to influence states, a group must be perceived as legitimate, and this can only happen if there is a degree of alignment with the views of the state to be influenced. Given the normative variance of nuclear governance, such a discriminant can lead in an opposite direction: clearly a more marked abolitionist standpoint would resonate well with states that have made of nuclear restraint their overarching policy; on the contrary, a group that supports deterrence and its mitigation through risk-reduction policies is likely to score points among states that base their security upon deterrence.

Finally, one further dimension to the power of NGOs and similar organisms derives from their ability to control the agenda. While in the diplomatic negotiation context of the NPT review process civil society does not have a say on what the states will discuss, it is nonetheless an important contributor to the discussion on its margins. As seen before, between civil society session and side events, non-state groups have several moments of interaction with the broader conference, but who gets represented in these instances is a crucial marker of power. This last dimension shows us markedly how the struggle in which civil society finds itself involved is not only vis-à-vis the states or international organizations to be influenced – it is also and importantly a competition within a community that, at least to a certain extent, seeks the same money and visibility.

This chapter has demonstrated the pervasive character of contestation within the nuclear civil society realm. With the help of an analysis indebted to Gramscian thought, it has demonstrated that, while seemingly united for the
elimination of nuclear weapons, groups draw on different ideological positions, which in certain cases can be interpreted as instances of common sense. Building upon the insights on civil society’s nuclear disarmament frames of Chapter Seven, we have inquired into the common sense nature of reductionist and abolitionist narratives and the historic bloc to which they belong. This chapter has shown that the narratives of disarmament constructed by different NPT-active civil society groups are widely different, in a way that is similar to the fundamental divide between a regime of disarmament and one of deterrence. The hegemony of nuclear deterrence is evidenced by the fact that among civil society there are groups that, perhaps unwittingly, support its ideological regime. In turn, with the centrality these same groups have to policy circles, they contribute to reinforcing the operation of deterrence. As the example of Global Zero shows, part of civil society actually advocates policies rather similar to the dominant deterrence-centred paradigm supported by the nuclear weapon states. ICAN’s campaign instead indicates that if the referent object of security is taken to be humanity the nuclear order status quo itself becomes the problem, showing that alternative conceptualisations are possible.

Moreover, in the second part of this chapter we have shifted from the initial hermeneutical attention, with a section on the historic bloc that combined language with materiality in an attempt to bring forward that dialogue between critical constructivism and Gramscian theory put forward in Chapter Five. Both linguistic and non-linguistic practices are recognised by both trends as relevant, though more analytic attention has gone to the former rather than the latter. Such a turn positions this thesis in a middle ground
between post-structuralist and structuralist accounts. The outlook of Gramsci himself, from what can be understood of his thought in his fragmentary Prison Notebooks, is precisely halfway between the hard determinism of historical course and the productive hermeneutics of ideas. In his own words, ‘the material forces would be inconceivable historically without the form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material world.’

‘To lay bare the nature of a particular historic bloc is to demystify the state and open the possibility of constructing an alternative historic bloc and thus an alternative state.’ Such an exercise is more necessary than ever, as described in the Introduction: the crisis of deterrence and proliferation are being in fact accompanied by a crisis of disarmament, in which it is coming to mean everything and nothing. This thesis is merely a sketch of what could be done when thinking of nuclear civil society in terms of its involvement in the production of common sense, but more is needed in order to better focus the current cases, differentiate the various strands as well as show the discursive and practical connections with state institutions.

This analysis has shown that the claim for nuclear disarmament is based on morality, for the abolitionists, and for security, according to the reductionists. On the one hand, the abolitionists’ focus on morality incurs the problem of not taking into consideration the perceived benefits of nuclear weapons for a part of the international community. On the other, reductionists’ focus on security leads to an underrepresentation of the concerns of those states and actors that have renounced nuclear weapons. In sum, both perspectives have something to offer in terms of ideas for the management of the nuclear order,

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but both are aiming only to one sub-set of nuclear governance. A fundamental problem with the community of civil society preoccupied with nuclear weapons is that it is not involved in one integrated conversation. Instead, it carries forward different interpretations of what is the problem with nuclear weapons and provides policy solutions that only address one side of it.

I have argued that the way in which nuclear weapons are conceptualised and narrated by civil society can help us understand this fundamental distinction. As described in previous chapters, the normative diversity of the nuclear order results in a fragmented system whereby a regime of deterrence lives side by side with a regime of disarmament. These are the foundations of those common sense ideologies that the reductionist and abolitionist camp of civil society respectively propagate. In practice these communities act as if only one part of the deterrence-disarmament spectrum described above existed, effectively talking past each other. The first group does not question the morality of a nuclear order based on deterrence, while the second does not question the security repercussions of one based upon disarmament.

The tension identified by this thesis is underplayed by civil society representatives. ICAN and Global Zero, two movements that are confronted and contrasted by the present work, have indeed collaborated at times. For instance, Bruce Blair addressed two of the conferences of the HINW. Moreover, on more than one occasion, members from the two communities were seen speaking favourably of the mutually supporting nature of their initiatives.76 The purpose here is not to contradict that, but to highlight that,

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76 One example was the nuclear disarmament working group of the 2015 Pugwash Conference.
beyond the political preference for step-by-step or comprehensive approaches, there is a deeper divide. This thesis claims that it is necessary to engage on that issue if one is to see a more unified movement for nuclear disarmament, or even just a more clear debate on it.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

On October 27, 2016, just as this thesis was about to be finished, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution mandating actions to bring to reality one of the plans for nuclear disarmament examined in these pages.\(^1\) With that, the UN decided ‘to convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination’.\(^2\) Adopted with 123 votes in favour, 38 opposed, and 16 abstentions,\(^3\) this milestone resolution demonstrated the relevance and political urgency of the themes developed by this thesis. Most importantly, it proved once again how deep the divide is in the attitudes towards the bomb. A negotiating mandate with a grounding in the language on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons would have been unthinkable a few years ago, yet now it is a reality supported by a strong majority. How the process will go forward is yet to be seen, as is the counter-strategy of those opposed to nuclear disarmament, but what is certain is that

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\(^1\) To be precise, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly approved the draft resolution L41, co-sponsored by a group of countries close to the humanitarian initiative. The General Assembly is set to approve the resolution later in 2016.


the second nuclear age is seeing a new degree of contestation. Indeed, this last development made it all the more apparent that disarmament advocates have the most convincing message, whereas the supporters of deterrence are on the defensive, as Booth had noted. 4

The culture of nuclearism, with its reliance on the bomb for national security, has been examined here with reference to civil society, but a broader theoretical conclusion that can be drawn is that such culture is in a state of crisis. It appears increasingly contested because of the growing wedge between those who believe in nuclear deterrence as a way to eliminate war, and those who see such a choice as immoral. Indeed, the nuclear common sense is certainly shifting if so many states could come to affirm they want to start negotiating nuclear disarmament, even in the absence of the nuclear-armed. This is a very important development for the governance of nuclear weapons, showing that the reliance on the bomb is getting unstable from a cultural perspective. Whereas it is way too early to affirm that a post-nuclearist forma mentis is developed, this has at least taken hold among the scores of states that decided to reject the possession of the bomb as well as in the minds of those who advocate against it. The UN vote of October 2016 has reaffirmed this identity distinction by revealing who stands in which camp.

Such a crucial dimension, however, has not been appropriately tackled in nuclear studies, mostly interested in explaining how deterrence works to prevent nuclear threats and how nuclear threats can emerge in the form of proliferation. Not convinced by realist accounts of the nuclear reality, 5

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5 While the literature on nuclear issues from a realist perspective may be too wide to be treated together, the rationalism and state-centric nature of this inquiry remains a common point. For
presented as the result of a series of rational choices, this project sided with those affirming the importance of norms, ideas, and patterns of thinking in the exercise of nuclear politics. As Schell famously put it, the bomb exists in the mind first of all,\(^6\) thus it is in a cultural analysis that we can find an answer to the important questions regarding the existence of nuclear weapons and how to change that. The approach to the nuclear problem offered by this thesis stands opposed to most mainstream takes, which typically are rationalist, US-focused, and often imbued with a problem-solving intent. Instead, *Strategies of Disarmament* turned all those tenets on their head, adopting an interpretive approach that prioritises the global level of interaction rather than a particular country, and that maintains a critical edge. As such, this work contributed to the theoretical literature on nuclear weapons in two ways: 1) by further defining what is meant by nuclear governance, and 2) by being the first to apply to that reality concepts drawn from Antonio Gramsci.

The benefit of that approach has been a sensitivity to the contribution of all those non-state forms of collective organisations active on the nuclear politics front, which allowed to make an empirical contribution as well. Examining the 2015 NPT RevCon process, in fact, the analysis showed that there is growing momentum for nuclear disarmament and that this is so also thanks to the role played by civil society. Now the process that culminated (for the time being) in the aforementioned UN resolution, demonstrates once again that civil society is an important part of the picture. Non-governmental groups have catalysed discussion, spread information, and to a degree

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\(^6\) Jonathan Schell, *The Seventh Decade*, 34.
mobilised public opinion. They have also worked side by side with governmental representatives of friendly states to devise coordinated approaches and divide tasks. As Figure 9 shows, representatives of abolitionist civil society have owned that development, attesting to the effort they have put into this long process.\(^7\)

\(^7\) It has not been discussed in depth in this thesis because the focus was the 2015 NPT Review Conference, but the UN vote on resolution L41 is the end of a longer process, only briefly referred to. The UN General Assembly had mandated already in 2012 the formation of an open-ended working group to advance the discussion of disarmament, which met throughout 2013. In 2015 it launched a second OEWG, which held three sets of talks in 2016 and concluded with a report that recommended the start of disarmament negotiation the following year.
What this points to is that the politics of nuclear weapons at present cannot be understood in their entirety if we do not also look at the input that actors other than the state have, as even civil society can contribute to a change in the governance of nuclear weapons. This is not to take an idealist position that expects the reliance on the bomb to be simply dropped because Austria and others have said so. Surely powerful forces (from the military to business

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8 Author’s own Twitter feed, a few hours after the vote on October 27, 2016.
interests germane to the nuclear infrastructure) will be working against these developments, and entrenched positions will be hard to challenge. Yet, this thesis demonstrated that the role of these non-governmental forces should be recognised and their input assessed. This point is certainly not lost on many of the scholars reviewed here, particularly those who wrote on civil society and security governance. However, it is an important addition to the field of nuclear studies, in which the supremacy of the state is assumed. More should be done to map the activities and inclinations of civil society in other global fora as well as in their domestic realities if we are to understand the stimuli under which nuclear governance operates.

The strength of a Gramscian analysis rests on its vision of a struggle of social forces competing for dominance through the linguistic and cultural exercise of providing alternative versions of common sense in which others can recognise themselves. In this day and age we find ourselves in a nuclear interregnum, in which the old deterrence-based common sense still holds, but is increasingly challenged by the supporters of a regime of disarmament, who see a world free of nuclear weapons as an urgent, not just distant, priority. Since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear risk appears to have receded, seemingly relegated to the ‘dustbin of history’ because of the end of the bipolar – and nuclear-armed – confrontation. The removal of the nuclear danger from the sphere of cognition of most individuals generated a degree of passivity that changed the face of contemporary global nuclear civil society. Indeed, this community is now vastly different from the waves of activism during the Cold War, with the massive marches and local meetings that
characterised it. Still, organised collective action remains important though more so in global diplomatic reunions than in the everyday practice.

This thesis has inquired into that by questioning the drivers of the current nuclear disarmament activism. Such has not been an attempt at providing a normative pointer as to what direction the governance of nuclear weapons should take, but rather at highlighting the political role of such activism through rigorous empirical research. What it aimed to achieve was producing insights on the changing nature of the nuclear common sense through a direct analysis of civil society and its transformational potential. The theoretical framework employed, combining critical nuclear scholarship, critical constructivist approaches to security, and Gramsci’s insights on civil society, allowed us to ground the analysis on an understanding of the nuclear reality centred around ideas and narratives. Whilst that combination has been productive of insights and largely coherent, it also created problems in some respects. In particular, an entirely Gramscian analysis would have required a more through examination of the economic bases of the civil society groups analysed here. Such is a limitation of the present study, but also an avenue for further research.⁹

This analysis of nuclear civil society has been an exercise at criticism conducted in the interest of understanding how much the seemingly progressive ideas of disarmament advocates have interiorised dominant conceptions about the utility of nuclear arms and their political functioning. As such, global nuclear civil society has been unpacked here according to the ideological aim of their contestation, or the meaning they have ascribed to

⁹ Other avenues of further research have been detailed in Chapter Eight when discussing the various dimensions of the struggle to create a historic bloc.
nuclear disarmament. Through the analysis of the different frames that global nuclear civil society employed in its advocacy, this thesis has been in a position to show the tension underlying this community. Considering that this is already fraught with infights, the purpose was not fomenting further tension, but rather opening the space for a dialogue among diverging positions for the benefit of the community at large. It is not unprecedented that non-governmental organisations struggle with one another, but what is specific about this situation is that such division is underplayed and often unacknowledged.

The strategies of those groups that seek reductions should be separated from those that aim for abolition, according to this research, because theirs is not just a difference in approach, but also in ideological positioning regarding the nuclear risk. *Strategies of Disarmament* has demonstrated that the construction of the nuclear threat operated by reductionist and abolitionist groups do not coincide and each builds on rhetorical material that can hardly be harmonized. That is because they relate to the common sense conceptions on the nuclear order in totally different ways. The reductionists quietly support it with their statements defining the nuclear threat as an issue of rogue states and terrorism as well as supporting disarmament through a step-by-step process centred on the reduction of great power arsenals. This orientation, it has been argued, is the same common-sensical notion that has been advanced since the end of the Cold War, largely as an effort to find a new meaning to nuclear weapons. This shows that civil society has at times aided that process of redefining, by throwing its weight behind the new nuclear security conception of the risk stemming from the bomb.
The construction operated by the abolitionists, instead, markedly differs. They claim that the bomb poses a threat to all of humanity and that, in order to tackle it, even the least powerful have a role to play in supporting the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons. Not only is the referent object an unusual one for a field so marked by national security as nuclear politics, but the response also runs counter much of the taken-for-granted assumptions about international order. Aided by critical constructivist methodological guidance, the thesis affirmed that this frame contestation produced silences and hierarchies among more or less resonant discourses. Far from more mainstream constructivist interpretations of nuclear politics, it is not so much the spread of norms that preoccupied this project; instead it is the revelation that power is in action even among those that are seemingly most detached from it.

Such a cleavage at the level of civil society goes to contribute to the situation in which nuclear disarmament acquires a shifty meaning, numeric reductions for some and abolition treaties for others. For this project, this is a crucial point, for it is what has prevented the creation of a unified historic bloc among the NPT-attending nuclear civil society. Such fragmentation is a problem, if one follows a Gramscian logic, because it subtracts significantly from the contribution these social forces could provide if they were united. In the NPT Review Conference context, the reductionists can count on the endorsement of those states associated with the step-by-step recipe to nuclear disarmament, while some abolitionists are actively involved in the humanitarian project to ‘fill the legal gap’ of disarmament. The illustrious defections from this camp come to demonstrate the difficulty of building a
historic bloc upon a counter-hegemonic narrative of humanitarianism that is quite far apart from prevailing security conceptions. The UN vote for negotiating disarmament in 2017 demonstrates that the consistency of the abolitionist historic bloc is all but assured, as important proponents of nuclear disarmament like Norway and Switzerland have abstained from the resolution. The social forces in support of abolition might have lost some pieces, or maybe the shifting of common sense has only just started and these states will reverse their stance. Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining internal consistency within civil society organisations from the abolitionist camp remains an issue, though one that might be progressively solved in light of the UN mandate.

The theoretical and methodological choices adopted by this work have allowed productive results, though some issues deserve to be fleshed out. While the examination of common sense could build upon critical constructivist methodologies, the analysis of the historic blocs of nuclear governance was based upon a less mediated application of Gramscian thought to the nuclear reality. NPT-active civil society representatives have been taken to bear a part in the construction of those abolitionist and reductionist historic blocs. Clearly here the metaphor whereby an organised group of non-governmental actors engaged with a diplomatic process is taken to represent civil society exposes its problems. Gramsci posited the necessity to analyse cultural domination in the many spontaneous collective actors that operate within a state by examining organised religions, trade unions, media, and schools, among others. The creation and, crucially, the spread of common sense related to nuclear weapons does happen in those institutions
at large, and a more encompassing study of those locales at a transnational level would be a welcome contribution. What this thesis has shown is indeed only one face of that larger picture. Still, the analysis of the interaction of collective non-profit groups with the 2015 NPT Review Conference is a telling example of that broader global nuclear civil society.

Another area that would deserve further work is at the theoretical level for what concerns the process of interpellation: if it is quite clear that articulating messages can take different forms and many instruments, both quantitative and qualitative, are available to the interested scholar, the same depth cannot be found in the case of interpellation. As such, the resonance of a certain message can certainly be established through many examples and anecdotes, but more effort should be made at specifying what should be in place in order to argue that a certain community has been hailed in by a message. In this move from the ideal world of discourses to the material one of people and organisations lays a central issue for interpretative analyses.

In sum, this thesis does have limitations, but it also provided an original contribution on the ideological nature of nuclear governance and the role of civil society in the struggle to define nuclear weapons risks. Whether the bomb will keep its relevance in the years to come remains to be seen what we can say is that most likely there will be civil society working on both sides of that ideological struggle.
Appendix A

Civil Society at the 2015 Review Conference of the NPT

I. Statistics on civil society participation in the 2015 Review Conference of the NPT

The data presented here was sent to the author by Soo-Hyun Kim, Political Affairs Officer, Information and Outreach Branch, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). A specification is to be made: this data does not give a completely accurate picture because there are NGOs that have annual passes through ECOSOC, for instance, who went straight to the conference without having to inform UNODA since they already have access to UN grounds. Email exchange: June 4–9, 2016. The data is reported as it was transmitted by the UNODA; the graphs and the lists of top countries are the author’s own elaboration.
Registered organisations

Regional distribution of registered organisations

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![Regional distribution chart]

Country distribution of registered organisations

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The top countries by number of registered organisations
Registered representatives

Regional distribution of registered representatives

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Country distribution of registered representatives

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The top countries by number of registered representatives

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Gender distribution of registered representatives

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II. List of the organisations of civil society participating in the 2015 Review Conference of the NPT

# List of non-governmental organizations

1. Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy  
2. Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire  
3. Arms Control Association (ACA)  
4. Article 36 Limited  
5. Asociacion de Lucha para el Desarme Civil  
6. Asociacion para Políticas Públicas (APP)  
7. Ban All Nukes generation (BANg)  
8. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs  
9. Bike for Peace  
10. British American Security Information Council (BASIC)  
11. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)  
12. Canadian Voice of Women for Peace  
13. Center for Policy Studies (PIR Center)  
14. Chatham House  
15. Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament  
16. Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND)  
17. Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center  
18. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches  
19. Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA)  
20. Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e.V.  
21. Friends Committee on National Legislation  
22. Geneva Nuclear Disarmament Initiative  
23. Georgetown University Department of Government  
24. Global Security Institute (GSI)
25. Global Zero
26. Hidankyo/Hibakusha Organization of Japan
27. Harmony For Peace Foundation
28. Heinrich Boell Foundation
29. Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung
30. Hiroshima Hypocenter Reconstruction Project
31. Hiroshima Prefectural Government
32. Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham
33. Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
34. Institute for Security and Safety at Brandenburg University for Applied Sciences
35. International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA)
36. International Association of Peace Messenger Cities (IAPMC)
37. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)
38. ICAN Germany
39. International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR)
40. International Law and Policy Institute
41. International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP)
42. International Nuclear Law Association
43. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM)
44. International Peace Bureau (IPB)
45. International Peace Research Association (IPRA)
46. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
47. International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)
48. Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union (JCCU)
49. Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA)
50. Japanese Trade Union Confederation (JTUC-RENGO)
51. Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network for Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation
52. Los Alamos Study Group
53. Mayors for Peace
54. Mouvement de la Paix
55. Non-proliferation for Global Security Foundation (NPSGlobal)
56. National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons
57. Nei til atomvaapen (No to nuclear weapons)
58. New York State Bar Association
59. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
60. Nuclear Information and Resource Service
61. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
62. Nuclear Watch New Mexico
63. Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance
64. PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition
65. Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (PNND)
67. Peace Action
68. Peace Boat
69. Peace Depot
70. People for Nuclear Disarmament (PND)
71. People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
72. PragueVision Institute for Sustainable Security
73. Project Ploughshares
74. Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
75. Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University
76. RECNA Supporters
77. Rideau Institute
78. Rissho Kosei-kai
79. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
80. School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland
81. Seoul National University
82. Soka Gakkai International
83. Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK)
84. Stichting Samenwerkingsverband IKV - Pax Christi
85. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
86. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
87. The International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists (INENS)
88. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
89. The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo)
90. The Peace Foundation Aotearoa-New Zealand
91. The Simons Foundation of Canada
92. Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research
93. Tri-Valley CAREs - Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
94. United Nations Association of Serbia
95. Union of Concerned Scientists
96. United Methodist Church - General Board of Church and Society
97. United Religions Initiative
98. University of Vienna, Department of Contemporary History
99. Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
100. Visions Solidaires
101. Western States Legal Foundation
102. Women for Peace, Sweden
103. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
104. World Future Council Foundation
105. World Peace Council
106. Yale University - International Security Studies
107. Youth Arts New York
Appendix B

List of interviewees

I. List of interviews

In the following is a list of the interviews quoted in this thesis. The interviewees’ names have been anonymized to ensure the maximum level of protection. They are listed, together with each interview’s date, in the order in which they appear in the thesis.

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II. List of consulted individuals

In the following is a list of the civil society representatives, diplomats, and UN officials consulted by the author for the research project in the period 2014–2015, mostly at the margins of the reunions of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee and 2015 NPT Review Conference. For each, name, institutional affiliation, and place of the interview are provided.

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<td>Henry Sokolski</td>
<td>Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Krepon</td>
<td>Co-Founder and Senior Associate, Stimson Center</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenifer Mackby</td>
<td>Then Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Ashish Sinha</td>
<td>Program Director, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Togzhan Kassenova</td>
<td>Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Ira Helfand</td>
<td>Chair, Security Committee, Physicians of Social Responsibility (PSR); Co-President of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)</td>
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<td>John Isaacs</td>
<td>Then Executive Director, Council for a Liveable World</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Becca Cousins</td>
<td>Then Program Director, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Chris Lindborg</td>
<td>Analyst and Program Manager, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)</td>
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<td>Thomas Graham</td>
<td>Retired Ambassador; Executive Chairman of the Board, Lightbridge</td>
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<td>Jim Baird</td>
<td>Managing Communications Director, Peace and Security Collaborative, ReThink Media</td>
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<td>Peter Weiss</td>
<td>President Emeritus Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Paul Meyer</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Space Security, The Simons Foundation; Adjunct Professor, Simon Fraser University</td>
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<td>Mark Versteden</td>
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<td>Director, Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, SIPRI; Senior Advisor to the President of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Carl Robichaud</td>
<td>Program Officer, International Peace and Security, Carnegie Corporation NY</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Soo-Hyun Kim</td>
<td>Political Affairs Officer, Information and Outreach Branch, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Randy Rydell</td>
<td>Then Senior Political Affairs Officer in the Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Ann Lakhadir</td>
<td>Formerly NGO Committee on Disarmament</td>
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<td>Katherine Prizeman</td>
<td>Associate Political Affairs Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Michael Spies</td>
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<td>Hiro Sakurai</td>
<td>Representative to the United Nations in New York, Soka Gakkai International (SGI); Executive Committee, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Ray Acheson</td>
<td>Director, Reaching Critical Will, Women International League for Peace and</td>
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<td>Lyndon Burford</td>
<td>Advisor, Delegation of New Zealand to the 2015 NPT Review Conference</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Wilbert van der Zeijden</td>
<td>Then Senior Researcher, PAX</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Mohamed Shaker</td>
<td>Chairman of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA); President of the 1985 NPT Review Conference</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Magnus Løvold</td>
<td>Advisor, International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI)</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Daniela Varano</td>
<td>Campaign Communications and Social Media Coordinator, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Sergio Duarte</td>
<td>Formerly UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>Senior Advisor for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament issues, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Director, INCIE</td>
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<td>Disarmament Campaigner, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Germany</td>
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<td>Matt Brown</td>
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Benford, Robert D. ‘Frame Disputes Within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement.’ *Social Forces* 71 n° 3 (1993): 677–701.


Fitzpatrick, Mark. ‘The World After: Proliferation, Deterrence and Disarmament if the Nuclear Taboo is Broken.’ *IFRI Proliferation Papers* (2009).


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