European civil actors for Palestinian rights and a Palestinian globalized movement: How norms and pathways have developed

PhD Thesis

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**Abbreviations**

**Badil**: The Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights

**BDS**: Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions

**BZU**: Birzeit University

**CIHRS**: The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

**The European Coordination Committees ECCP**: The European Coordination of Committees and Associations for Palestine

**ESF**: European Social Forum

**EU**: The European Union

**Fateh**: The Palestinian National Liberation Movement

**Hamas**: The Islamic Resistance Movement

**HR**: Human Rights

**ICJ**: The International Court of Justice

**IR**: International Relations

**Ittijah**: Union of Arab Community-Based Associations (Coalition)

**MEWANDO**: Middle East without Wars and Oppression Network (Coalition)

**Miftah**: The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy

**Oslo I Agreement**: The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

**PA**: The Palestinian National Authority

**PACBI**: The Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott to Israel

**The Agricultural Relief PARC**: The Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees

**PCHR**: The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights

**Al-Mubadarah**: The Palestinian National Initiative

**PLO**: The Palestinian Liberation Organization

**PNGO**: The Palestinian NGOs Network (*Al-Shabakah*)

**PSC- South Africa**: South Africa’s Palestine Solidarity Committee

**PSC**: UK’s Palestine Solidarity Campaign

**Sangoco**: The South African National Non-Governmental Organization Coalition

**SOAS**: The School of Oriental & African Studies, the University of London

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1 The Islamic Encyclopaedia’s approach is followed in writing Arabic letters in Latin, unless the name is commonly used in a different way of writing. Arabic words are written in italic.
TSM: Transnational social movements

The Medical Relief UPMRC: The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (known later as the Palestine Medical Relief Society)

UN: The United Nations

The UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP): The United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

UN-GA: The United Nations General Assembly

UNISPAL: The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine

UN-SC: The United Nations Security Council

The UN Durban conference: The United Nations World Conference against Racism

WBGS: The West Bank and Gaza Strip

WSF: World Social Forum
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Chapter I
Introduction

1. Background and introducing the research

This research is generally related to transnational social movements (TSM) trying to affect international politics concerning the Israeli-Palestinian issue. More particularly, the research seeks to understand the pathways and norms developed by a Palestinian transnational movement, which is active in Europe among other regions (South Africa, North & South Americas and India). The research also explores how the national sphere, the European polity, world politics, and transnational dynamics interact with the movement during the emergence of its norms and pathway(s).

In diverse global initiatives for Palestine, non-state actors try to influence international politics. In International Relations (IR) theories, the state-centric conceptualization- such as the realist (and neo-realist)- has been challenged by diverse schools (i.e. by liberal and constructivist schools) in its concentration on states. The early hypothesis of the research suggested that the movement that the research focuses on shows signs of following a line of constructivist framework proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) in relation to transnational advocacy networks, where local non-state actors seek transnational and international pressure on Israel. At the same time, as firstly hypothesized, the movement is a Palestinian movement that has multiple pathways, which have made the model suggested by Keck and Sikkink open-ended for investigation with critical assessment and the search for appropriate theories to help understanding the emergence of a new Palestinian transnational movement.

In fact, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has already been active since 1964 as a non-state actor, though with some bureaucratic institutions, and had its influence on regional and international politics. Similarly, early Palestinian boycott actions since the 1910s- which will be discussed as a background in this research- had affected state actors to endorse a boycott of Israel (i.e. the Arab League) since the 1940s. The Palestinian experience has been largely a non-state experience trying to affect international politics, and had been working towards isolating Israel internationally.
However, through signing the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (known as Oslo I Agreement) between the PLO and the Israeli government of Isaac Rabin in September 1993, the PLO has recognized Israel and the later recognized the PLO and sought peaceful negotiations. Hence, the PLO together with Arab, Islamic and Global South states have largely abandoned the previous isolation and boycott policies against Israel. Internationally, there has been a wide perception that there is a viable peace process that would resolve the historical Arab/Palestinian - Israeli conflict.

After the subsequent failures to implement agreements between the PLO and the consecutive Israeli governments, or reaching a final agreement, tensions have arisen again. Additionally, with the failure of Camp David summit in July 2000 (the US mediated negotiations between the Palestinian National Authority- PA- and the Israeli government); the second Palestinian Intifada (Uprising) erupted, and has especially resulted in the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontations again besides the attempts of the emergence of new Palestinian currents.

With the emergence of second Intifada, international voices and dynamics have intensified whether through the United Nations (both the Security Council and the General Assembly) or through other international bodies. Concerning this research, EU bodies have issued some signs of a potentially relevant actions to this researched movement, though these actions have not sustained during the second Intifada; these include the commissions’ declaration in 1998 regarding goods produced in Israeli settlements, as well as the European parliament recommendation in 2002 in relation to the EU-Israeli Association Agreement, or the ban on weapons which will be explored in relational terms in the following sections of this thesis. However, the thesis mainly explores international dynamics that have produced more transnational interactions in relation to the researched movement, such as interactions at civil society conferences at the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (The UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP), besides the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the built Israeli wall in the West Bank starting from 2002.
The second intifada also came at a time of the re-emergence of wide international and transnational contestations against the US wars (on Iraq and Afghanistan), as well as against the advance of the neo-liberal policies accompanying the rise of right-wing and diverse far right-wing policies and racism almost everywhere around the globe. Major transnational and international contestations were relevant to the Palestinian issue and to this particular research. Internationally, with a shadow of transnational contestations such as in the NGO forums of the UN organizations, one major international and transnational contestation and cooperation has occurred at the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (The UN Durban conference) in Durban/ South Africa in 2001.

Major relevant contestations in relation to this thesis, mainly on the transnational level, include the NGO Forum of the World Conference against Racism in Durban in 2001, besides the alter-globalization movement and associated institutionalized forums such as the World Social Forums since 2001 and their associated European Social Forums. Such forums have given more power to European non-state actors. Additionally, the anti-war-on-Iraq protests and forums in 2003 played an important role in transnational contestation. On national levels, contestations by non-state actors in diverse states in support for the Palestinian Intifada have also intensified during the second Intifada.

Though these international and transnational dynamics have largely failed to deal with struggles such as the issue of racism in Durban in 2001, stop the war on Iraq in 2003, dismantling the Israeli wall, or changing the course of neoliberal world agreements, they had their implications (as this research highlights) on Palestinian interactions with them. During this period, the Palestinian, transnational and international contestations had culminated into forming the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel call in 2005, which is the subject of this research.

The research is interested in relational aspects in general and on Palestinian and European interactions. By tracing- as a departure point- relational aspects from Brussels to Palestine, the research found the need to also tackle other regions that had their major impacts on the pathways and norms of the movement or have played mediating roles. For example, initiatives coming from the Global South (i.e. Brazil, South Africa or the Arab
region) have connected with transnational European initiatives and protests in societies that have started to witness a sort of “awakening” with regards to the Palestinian issue.

2. Introducing the case, puzzle and questions

The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel’s call in 2005 was directed to non-state actors through calling for direct divestment and boycott, beside affecting states through calling for sanctions. It called on “international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel”.\(^2\) The BDS call, which was signed by 171 Palestinian organizations in 2005, is composed of “the Palestinian political parties, unions, associations, coalitions and organizations”, which “represent the three integral parts of the people of Palestine” and “representatives of Palestinian civil society”. The BDS call based its motivation on the previous successful international solidarity with the South African anti-apartheid struggle, and based much of its values on human rights (HR), non-violence, and international law and humanitarian law, as the BDS call explicitly expresses.

In terms of goals, the BDS call asks for “1. [Israel] Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall; 2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and 3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194”.\(^3\)

The BDS call was launched symbolically on the 9\(^{th}\) of July 2005; exactly one year after the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ,) which stated that the Israeli wall built in the West Bank is illegal.\(^4\) The call turned into a Palestinian movement that has strong transnational connections. Hence, the call combined in its text non-state

\(^2\) BDS website, via: http://www.bdsmovement.net/call <accessed on 30 September 2013>
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.
actors, states and international organizations. And the movement seeks to mobilize these actors to pressure Israel until it achieves its goals.

In a version of the constructivist approach to international relations, it is “principled ideas” that “drive change and cooperation” towards HR, and “the primary movers behind this form of principled international action are international networks” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 120).

In relation to ‘norms’, Keck and Sikkink follow the common usage given by Peter Katzenstein: “to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with given identity” (quoted in Keck and Sikkink: 3), while others define norms in relation to institutions (Kelley 2008).

The theoretical line by Keck and Sikkink’s work suggests the Boomerang pattern in relation to HR, which is basically when domestic NGOs or movements (in State A) create links with “transnational advocacy networks”, capturing on common norms related to HR, so that “transnational advocacy networks” advocate State B that has leverage on state A to pressure the later, as represented in Figure 1.
In another book (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 18), the boomerang effect is summarized as (see associated figure 2):

A “boomerang” pattern of influence exists when domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside. National opposition groups, NGOs, and social movements link up with transnational networks and INGOs who then convince international human rights
organizations, donor institutions, and /or great powers to pressure norm-violating states. Networks provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) to struggling domestic groups. International contacts can "amplify" the demands of domestic groups, prise open space for new issues, and then echo these demands back into the domestic arena.

Figure 2: a scan of the "boomerang effect" (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 19)
Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide diverse successful experiences in the 19th and 20th centuries. The initial realization was that the BDS movement follows main aspects of the Boomerang pattern, which is evident in its 2005 call, while sometimes actors in the BDS movement explicitly refer to it (such as Ziadeh and Hannieh 2010, Ziadeh being a member of the BDS national committee).5

At the same time, Keck and Sikkink suggest that the Boomerang pattern has in some cases limited potentials; for instance, when state B has strong security or strategic relation with the targeted state A (like the cases of the US relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel and China, as mentioned by Keck and Sikkink). And here lies the initial puzzle of the research, where a transnational movement as the BDS movement tries to follow the Boomerang pattern, as initially hypothesized, while there are suggested limitations to the Boomerang pathway.

Yet, Klotz’s research (1995) Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid, resonating the pathway followed by the BDS movement in its reference to the South African experience, demonstrates how military, strategic and economic interests between the US and other Northern countries have played a role in the case of South Africa at a time of adopting sanctions (specifically in 1986). This was due to the tense US-Soviet relations at that time, consequently challenging the interest-driven international relations theories. Yet, as Drezner (2001: 179) writes in his review to Klotz’s book, the “problem with the South Africa case is that it occurred in a region that was at best peripheral to the larger Cold War struggles of the day. Material and security interests in South Africa were present but not necessarily that important. Norms mattered in this case because little else did”.

The limitation of strong relations between states A and B are also raised in relation to the European case (Cronin 2011, Aoun 2003, Tocci 2009, Hollis 2010) though European states have less supportive positions towards Israel, and there are more potential changes than in the case of the US (Persson 2013, Khader 2013). However, in the case of the US, the limitation seems more emphasized.

5 Additionally, in an interview with Rafeef Ziadah (London, 18 August 2015), she refers to the boomerang as having an effect though she also speaks of other effects beyond the boomerang.
The research by Camille Mansour (1998 [1996]) on the US-Israeli relations demonstrates how diverse factors converge to make the US-Israeli relations very close, and difficult-though not impossible-to change. The international relations professor Avi Shlaim summarizes major aspects of US supports to Israel in more than half a century:

[…] Since 1949, America’s economic aid to Israel amounts to a staggering $118 billion and America continues to subsidize the Jewish state to the tune of $3 billion annually. America is also Israel’s main arms supplier and the official guarantor of its “quantitative military edge” over all its Arab neighbors.

[…] Since 1978, when the Camp David Accords were brokered by President Jimmy Carter, the United States has used its veto power on the Security Council 42 times on behalf of Israel. The most shocking abuse of this power was to veto, in February 2011, a resolution condemning Israeli settlement expansion that had the support of the 14 other members of the Security Council.6

Similarly, Mearsheimer and Walt’s research (2008: 30-31) demonstrates the intensity of the historical volume of US support to Israel:

Total direct U.S. aid to Israel amounts to well over $140 billion in 2003 dollars. Israel receives about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year, which is roughly one-fifth of America’s foreign aid budget. In per capita terms, the United States gives each Israeli a direct subsidy worth about $500 per year. This largesse is especially striking when one realizes that Israel is now a wealthy industrial state with a per capita income roughly equal to South Korea or Spain.

A research from the movements’ side, by Cassons (2010), suggests a similar conclusion that is related specifically to the transnational solidarity movement with Palestine in the US. Cassons argues that the US political “opportunities are not currently in effect nor will they be available in the foreseeable future for the Palestine solidarity movement” (p. 26). His research compared the solidarity movement with Palestine to previous cases in the US for East Timor and Central America.

This is why a recent article (Sperber 2015), for example, somehow following Noam Chmosky’s position that wonders why boycotting Israel not the US itself that supports Israel-argues that the BDS is strangely ignoring the US and concentrates on “its client Israel”, instead of dealing with the difficult question of what to do amid a situation.

Sperber argues that Israel is a strategic ally of the US and there are strong common interests between them, which is an issue that is larger than the strength of the Israeli lobby in the US.

The previous arguments question dominant pathway by the movement through North America, which has a major leverage on Israel. By pathway, it is meant the geopolitical route, through Northern states or through Northern advocacy groups or both for example. At the same time, it is obvious that the BDS movement is progressing in Europe and North America. The Israeli Apartheid Week that has been consolidating since 2004 in hundreds of North American and European university campuses adopted the BDS call, the European Coordination Committees for Palestine (ECCP) that is composed of 52 European NGOs and groups adopted the BDS call, the Russell Tribunal on Palestine (between 2010-2013) and its emergency session in 2014 also called in its recommendation for BDS, the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation (emerged in 2001 and composed of “[m]ore than 400 groups and organizations” in the US7) adopted the BDS call, in addition to a recent mobilization by hundreds of professors in Europe and North America who adopted a cultural boycott against Israeli institutions, and other numerous groups elsewhere that have also adopted the BDS call. The BDS movement claims to affect major transnational companies to divest from Israel besides many boycott and divestment initiatives by official bodies or companies around the world that contributed to losses in the Israeli economy besides its image.8

It is not the focus of the thesis to assess impact. The aim is not to advocate for the movement or criticize it, but to analyze related aspects to the movement. However, the progress of the movement and its assertion of subsequent successes on the one hand, and the proposed structural limitations on the other hand have in fact formed the initial puzzle of the research. It is a puzzle between the agency of a movement and suggested structural constraints.

8 For a long summary of BDS-related initiatives and claimed successes around the world in 10 years, see: “BDS@10: A decade of effective solidarity with Palestinians”, via http://www.bdsmovement.net/successes/<last accessed on 19 February 2016>
Therefore, it is important to understand why a transnational movement follows a risky pathway with such suggested limitations, though one cannot be sure of their long term impacts that might be equally effective.

Based on the research puzzle, the research questions are:

- What pathways does the BDS movement follow?
- What explains the BDS movement’s developed pathway(s) and norms?

3. **Thesis design**

To answer the research questions, the thesis starts by exploring major theoretical literature on transnational social movements in light of the case in the next chapter. This second chapter entitled ‘theories and methodologies’ explores two major authors, Keck Sikkink and Sidney Tarrow, and try to see how they contribute to understanding the pathways of the transnational movement and explaining its developed norms. The chapter explains how the case suggests limitations on the literature, particularly in relation to agencies and structural factors in different regions.

In the second half of the chapter, further literature is mobilized. The chapter explains why Pierre Bourdieu is incorporated into social movements’ literature to better account for the relation between the structure and the agency. The methodological part of chapter two also explains which actors (in a wide movement) the research focuses on, and what sources of empirical data it depends on. The case is always present while discussing theories. This is related to the methodological choice of the research to go back and forth between theories and the case (abductive methodology), which is also explained at the end of the second chapter.

As a result of this methodological approach, theoretical discussions continue in the following chapters though the focus is on the case itself starting from chapter three. Chapter three discusses aspects related to the ‘split habitus’. Chapter four mobilize other Palestinian literature (i.e. Jamil Hilal) on the field in Palestine to account for the specificity of the Palestinian context. The two chapters related to the world field of power starts with discussing Bourdieu in IR literature and in discussing the concept of the world field of
power. The concluding chapter discusses further literature on social movements in IR in light of the researched movement.

The focus on the case and the empirical side starts in chapter three. Chapter three entitled ‘Habitus of Palestinian actors’ and chapter four entitled ‘Relations in the field of power in Palestine’ discuss the case, mostly, in the Palestinian context. Hence, it explores the development of the Palestinian aspect of a Palestinian-transnational movement. Yet, the two chapters discuss aspects of the transnational relations while focusing on the Palestinian context, which accounts for the close connections between the local/ national and transnational/international.

The habitus chapter explains the previous trajectories of the actors forming the movement, which also accounts for previous waves of protest. It starts with a historical background about the waves of protest and how they relate to the researched movement, and then introduces the example of Gabi Baramki. The chapter investigates how researched actors have diverse trajectories. This chapter explores how the agencies of the discussed Palestinian actors have been inclined to specific norms and pathways until forming the BDS movement.

Then, the fourth chapter discusses the Palestinian actors for the BDS movement in the ‘field of power’ in Palestine since the Oslo period and particularly during the second Intifada until the formation of the BDS call in 2005 and then the institutionalization of the movement in 2008. This chapter discusses major rules of the game and the ‘magnetic’ forces in the field like fragmentation, and how they are incorporated and contested by the discussed actors. In this context, the chapter explores how some norms such as boycott have re-emerged in Palestine in relation to the recent and historical waves of protest.

Though the two chapters three and four focus on Palestinian actors in the field of power in Palestine, they do not ignore transnational and international dimensions that affect the Palestinian field and actors. The fourth chapter discusses how Palestinian actors got engaged, for instance, in early contestations in the UN Durban conference against racism in 2001, in addition to interactions with European actors.

The focus of the following chapters is on these transnational and international dimensions. Chapter five entitled ‘the world field of power: cases from Belgium and the UK’ starts with a theoretical introduction (Bourdieu in IR literature) in light of the case for
the world field, and then introduces the ‘world field of power on Palestine’ in relation to the case. Then, after a discussion of the changing world field of power on Palestine, the chapter discusses interactions between Belgian and British actors with Palestinian actors during the course of the second Intifada.

Though these two examples in Belgium and the UK provide deeper investigation of interactions, with a focus on the transnational dimensions, they could not capture how more established European actors have endorsed the BDs norms. Hence, the next chapter entitled ‘Interaction with European actors in the world field’ adds a layer of interaction in an international organization (The UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP) and transnational forums (World Social Forums and the related European Social Forums). This chapter aims at investigating how norms and pathways have been developing through the mediation of these spaces in general and in relation to the European actors.

The final chapter, seven, concludes on the pathways, norms, and the analysis of how these pathways and norms have developed. It also discusses the diverse literature in addition to Amitav Acharya’s approach on social movement and how they relate to the thesis findings.
Chapter II
Theories and Methodologies

The researched Palestinian movement has been able to transcend national sphere and build a presence transnationally. As such, this dissertation explores and builds on literature of transnational movements. The chapter starts with models discussed by Sikkink and then by Tarrow. As indicated in the last chapter, a puzzle was related to a potential structural limitation to the agency of the researched movement; in particular, this structural limitation is resembled by Northern states’ close relations with Israel. While reviewing the mentioned literature on transnational movements, other puzzles have emerged as well in the relation between structure and agency, and in relation to the local agency of the actors. In this chapter, additional literature to social movements’ theories is incorporated (such as Pierre Bourdieu) to overcome limitations in the literature in light of the researched movement. Moreover, while reviewing the literature, the research case (BDS movement) has been present. This is related to the methodological choice (abductive) that will be explored in the last section of this chapter.

1. The developed models by Sikkink et al.

The thesis discusses different models that try to describe the pathways and norms that transnational movements follow. The model proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) is the Boomerang pattern- as discussed in the first chapter. The BDS movement shows explicit signs of following it with its associated values and norms. However, when the research started looking deeper into the development of the movement, it demonstrated that the pathways leading to the movement do not follow the Boomerang pattern as a model, but deviates from it in major aspects like maneuvering between the Global South and North.

Additionally, the associated norms of the movement are following HR, non-violence and calling for applying international humanitarian law, but also it extends them to other values (i.e. colonialism and apartheid). Pathways and norms of the movement will be explored in depth in the following chapters.
If the initial puzzle of the research was about the relation between the structural factors to the agency of the movement, the following raised puzzle is related to transnational social movements’ theories that can describe and explain the research case (the BDS movement).

In an updated version of the boomerang pattern, Risse and Sikkink extended it in 1999 into the spiral model. Basically, the spiral model follows long term “socialization processes” that center on the spread of HR norms (from “Human rights regimes, international organizations, HR INGOs and Western powers” as categorized by Risse and Sikkink) to states under oppressive governments through bargaining, communication and persuasion then institutionalization to be followed by habitualization where norms become part of the identity (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 11-17; see figure 3). This socialization process does not add much in relation to the previous boomerang pattern except in showing more details about how the proposed process operates, which still does not solve the contradiction with the researched movement extending the values and following diverse pathways.

Figure 3: “The process of norms socialization” (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 12)
Risse and Sikkink’s model (1999) is applicable in any site “irrespective of cultural, political, or economic differences among countries” (6). Moreover, as Jurkovich (2011) argues, these different models deal only with ‘negative HR’ where a government violates a right, and pressure is needed to stop violating it. Jurkovich argues that with “positive human rights”, the government needs to act on solving a social problem (such as the responsibilities of a government towards food), where Risse and Sikkink’s HR models do not function anymore.

In a later work (Sikkink 2005), the boomerang model becomes one element among others dealing with TSM. Moreover, activists do not operate only “beyond borders” but also “within borders”. As figure 4 suggests, Sikkink develops four models; each of which is related to the openness and closeness of domestic and international “opportunity structures”. In the “insider-outside coalitions” model, Sikkink comes closer to the agency of local/national actors. It is a model that privileges domestic opportunities while keeping the external door open depending on national and international opportunities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic opportunity structure</th>
<th>Closed</th>
<th>Open</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>A. Diminished chances of activism</td>
<td>B. Boomerang pattern and “spiral model”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>C. Democratic deficit/defensive transnationalization</td>
<td>D. Insider/outside coalition model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: “Dynamic Multilevel Governance” (Sikkink 2005: 156)

As hypothesized above, the BDS movement, as a whole and with its different components, follows some aspects of the “insider-outside” model. Each component of the movement is primarily concerned with actions organized inside Palestine around one or more issues. Also, the movement as a whole tries to implement activities inside Palestine, such as boycotting an event or calling for boycotting Israeli goods. Hence, the movement follows aspects of the insider-outside process but in a different way than what Sikkink’s model suggested. Moreover, the insider-outside model supposes relatively open structural opportunity in domestic and international spheres. The BDS movement works in a more
complex situation. The domestic domains are Palestinian society/politics and Israeli colonization, and the Israeli domain is almost closed, as perceived by the movement in relation to the Israeli polity where there are laws that criminalize any call for boycotting Israel. Yet, the “political opportunities” in the Palestinian society have been relatively open to boycott initiatives. Internationally, it is difficult to say whether the opportunities are open or closed. For example, there are laws in different countries that criminalize the boycott of Israel. In these countries, the mainstream media and official positions are generally against the boycott, while there are bottom-up initiatives for it. Finally, as El-Mahdi (2009) demonstrates in relation to a researched Egyptian movement in 2004 (Kifaya), political opportunity does not suffice to explain why and how the movement emerges.

2. Models developed by Tarrow et al.

Similar to the latest orientation of paying more attention to the local dynamics in transnational social movements, but also attempting to go beyond HR, Tarrow and McAdam (2005) introduce the “scale shift” concept in relation to the transnational social movements. They have already introduced this concept previously in 2001 with Charles Tilly in their 2001 book Dynamics of Contention. In brief, they argue that transnational social movements do not emerge because of globalization or economic integration, but through agentic-processes that are built. These scale shift processes (between the local and the transnational) involves mechanisms: localized action, attribution of similarity between groups, emulation, and coordinated transnational action. Within scale shift processes, there are three pathways/routes for the “transfer of information”: non-relational diffusion (i.e. through media), relational diffusion through established lines of interaction and brokerage diffusion via a third party connecting previously unconnected actors. In the case of the BDS movement, the diffusion of norms has been following the three ways: relational, non-relational and through brokerage.

In discussing examples of scale shift, Tarrow and McAdam observe that the American civil rights movement had started through relational diffusion then through brokerage diffusion. In discussing the Zapatista case in Chiapas, South Mexico, the authors
observe an international solidarity through relational, non-relational and brokerage diffusion.

Tarrow and McAdam conclude with an important remark in discussing the relation between the national and transnational:

An important characteristic of transnational contention that was often missed in early accounts is that a domestic movement that shifts in scale to the international level does not, as a result automatically become a transnational or a global movement. Transposition of part of the movement’s activities, rather than its transformation, is a far more common pattern. While this may disappoint advocates of a global civil society, it has two important implications: first, a movement may embrace transnational commitments without abandoning its primarily domestic ones; and second, as a result, a movement can spread faster through the relatively weak ties of brokerage chain than through the more intense ties typical of diffusion. Transnational transposition involves not transformation, but partial commitments, verbal compromises, and organizational drift from one issue to another as priorities and agendas change. Although what results is far less than a "global" movement, the major strength of the current campaign against neoliberal globalization is that it retains considerable local, regional, and national roots.

(Tarrow and McAdam 2005: 146)

This is relevant to the research because the BDS movement is a Palestinian movement active transnationally. Moreover, the movement as a whole, and its components, are active inside Palestine (some actors concentrate their activities inside Palestine), and has emerged as a result of major Palestinian dynamics besides transnational and international dynamics. However, Tarrow (2005) examines the Zapatista movement as a black box, without situating the positions that the movement takes (I will refer to them as “position-takings”) to different currents in the movement (i.e. the issue of armed struggle vs. non-violence by Zapatists that Tarrow and McAdam discuss). The Zapatista movement has been formed by at least two major components; an ex-Marxist revolutionary organization and local indigenous movement on the scale of villages. Though Tarrow and McAdam’s “transpositional” concept is important, it seems from this research that the positions are not dividing according only to trans/local dichotomy but also inside the local and transnational. Hence, it is more a multi-positional on the transnational level and the national/local level as well.
When Tarrow discusses a movement such as Zapatista in Chiapas, Mexico, his focus is not on the positioning and emergence of the movement in the Mexican politics (and indigenous dynamics in Mexico), Tarrow concentrates more on the transnational/international dynamics, though he comes through some Mexican politics in trying to see how the diffusion of the solidarity networks emerges in Mexico city and transnationally. Moreover, his concentration is on how the solidarity networks emerge in North America and Europe, not in South America or the Global South in general. Parallel to Tarrow’s theoretical inclination, he depends on information on the Zapatista movement “[m]ore than usual, this section is dependent on the observations of other scholars” (ft. 10: 113) (he cites four scholars from the Global North). Yet, Tarrow and McAdam (2005), though utilizing beneficial mechanisms to describe, they take a step back by clarifying that “[w]e do not claim any causal account” of episodes of contention (144).

In a new book, Tarrow reviews the literature related to transnational HR movements. As Chabot (2010: 100) observes in commenting on Tarrow’s 2005 book *The New Transnational Activism* and its established position, “Tarrow synthesizes nearly all relevant scholarship in our field into his own approach to studying transnational diffusion among social movements”.

In his book of 2012, Tarrow re-summarizes his earlier works that locate four processes that are followed by such movements in the last two decades. First, actors internalize HR values in their societies to produce specific domestic policies. Second, actors externalize where “the movement of insider activists [go] outside of their national communities into international institutions” (208). This process is similar to the boomerang but seeking the help of specifically outside institutions (such as the European Court of Justice) to affect their local contexts. The third process is the “insider-outside coalition” that has been proposed by Sikkink (aforementioned). The final process is “transnationalization of collective action: by this I mean the sustained cooperation of domestic actors when they work together across national boundaries”, such as the case of the European unemployment marches (207).

One major problematic with such literature, mostly produced by Northern American scholars (i.e. Tarrow and Sikkink) is that they focus mostly on how that local/national
actors, specifically in the Global South, internalizes norms of the “international” (with special weight of Northern values and norms in the “international”). When dealing with the effects of movements from the Global South on Northern movements, the main issues of discussion are how coalition, coordination and networking occur without the discussion, except occasionally, of the other side of the process. Hence, issues related to values and norms from the Global South, being internalized by Northern actors, are marginal issues. Therefore, such literature misses one major side in trying to understand transnational movements in world politics.

The BDS actors, despite internalizing aspects of the global norms, do not frame “their claims domestically in global terms” (Tarrow 2012: 208). They frame them globally in addition to proposing values globally. For example, the movement continues to carry on the norm anti-colonization, and continues to carry on the norm anti-apartheid in societies that have not liberated themselves from the colonial experience yet. The movement also tends to use the norm “anti-normalization” (meaning not making the “abnormal” Israel “normal”) in the Palestinian context. The norm “anti-normalization”, as will be explored, is a Palestinian norm linked mainly to regional Arab norm,9 and tries to become a global norm.10

Additionally, while going into the first period of the literature review, the research engaged with main scholars who theorized transnational movements, with a focus on political science and international relations while recognizing at the same time that the topic is multi-disciplinary in its nature. And as indicated above in reviewing Sikkink and Tarrow, there are important insights but as stated above the empirical data convinced the

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9 PACBI defines “normalization” as adopted by BDS in 2007 in diverse contexts: “in the context of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Arab world”, “Normalization in the context of the Palestinian citizens of Israel” and “Normalization in the International Context”. In the context of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Arab world, it says: “The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) has defined normalization specifically in a Palestinian and Arab context ‘as the participation in any project, initiative or activity, in Palestine or internationally, that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to bring together Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or institutions) without placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation and all forms of discrimination and oppression against the Palestinian people.’ This is the definition endorsed by the BDS National Committee (BNC)”, PACBI website, 31 October 2011, via http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1749 <accessed on 3 November 2014>

10 This norm has been used by European activists in the context of purposeful initiatives to join Palestinians with Israeli outside the context of boycott, as A. from the Nederlands Palestina Komitee explains; informal talk in Brussels on 9 January 2015.
researcher that there is much less focus in this literature on the agency and structural factors in its primary place of emergence of the movement (i.e. Palestine). The literature focuses more on the transnational networks with more focus on Northern contexts. It is not a matter of dichotomy in literature focusing on different contexts, but it is a matter of accounting carefully for the different contexts for better understanding.

The case of the BDS suggests that it follows aspects of different models, but cannot be explained solely by any of the aforementioned transnational social movements’ theories. It seems a peculiar case suggesting its own pattern. In addition, these different models do not deal with colonization cases similar to the one at hand. When they refer to the local or national, they assume that it is a normal state, not a colonized people under a colonizing state with complex layers of Palestinian and Israeli authorities. Additionally, the Palestinians already live in diverse transnational settings across different countries, where the BDS movement tries to connect them.

Therefore, the research has to proceed additionally in literature review to account more to the relations between the different agencies and structural factors in different regions.

3. The question of Agency vs. structure

The proposed limitation (in chapter I) in relation to international structural constraints on the agency of the non-state actors suggests that the researcher should contemplate the relation of structures with the agency. Moreover, the discussion of the case in light of different models by transnational social movements’ scholars also suggests that the local agencies of the movement, and local fields, should be researched more carefully in addition to researching the transnational/international dynamics.

Keck and Sikkink’s approach could be criticized by equating non-state actors working on HR from Ford Foundation (Riles 2004) to grassroots revolutionary movements like Zapatista. Another research, which discussed South African apartheid, pointed out to the ‘Eurocentric approach’ by Keck and Sikkink. Their model does not take account of the South African agency (Thörn 2006). Thörn also demonstrates a difference between HR
actors and “social movements” in a broader sense as in the case of South African anti-apartheid movement.

However, in a later work after activists beyond borders, when Sikkink developed her models of activists “beyond and within borders”; she paid more attention to the agency of domestic actors. Sikkink demonstrated how Argentinian activists developed a new model not existing globally (Sikkink 2005: 170. Moreover, Sikkink (2005) proposes the importance of the structural dimension in her developed four models by realizing open vs. structural opportunities, domestically and internationally. Sikkink also affirms how actors perceive these structures relationally. However, Sikkink still lacks to explain why a certain opportunity structure is open or closed that will affect the actors; i.e. the question of power. What lacks here is the relation between opportunities and international politics that have a role in opening and closing opportunities as non-state actors participate in this process as well. As the BDS case suggests, the opening of international structural opportunities is related to changing power relations internationally, in addition to their own agency. Going further, when focusing on the agency of transnational actors in coming up with HR values in international politics, Keck and Sikkink, downgrade the role of international politics. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 79) trace what they consider the origin of HR becoming part of IR. They write:

After the Second World War the transnational human rights advocacy networks helped to create regional and international human rights regimes, and later contributed to the implementation and enforcement of human rights norms and policy.

However, the research of Madsen (2004: 57) attributes particularly to France and the UK “the ‘Boomerang’ of the Internationalisation of Human Rights” as the title of his research indicates. He finds out that:

It might be considered an irony of history that the demise of French and British imperial power coincided with the internationalization of one of the greatest accomplishments of their political and democratic culture: human rights. Coincidental as well as a by-product of century long exportation of their respective ideas of liberal democracy and republicanism, the double-shift occurred as part of a structural transformation of the international field. In the immediate postwar period, the two wounded imperial powers self-confidently projected themselves as the true authors of the concept of human rights and unquestionably put their fingerprints on the two most central texts of the new international regime, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights
Yet, their activism at the international level was soon overshadowed by the Cold War and the politics of decolonisation.

This does not mean that Madsen did not account for the agency of non-state actors. What he did is putting together the agency and structures to understand the emergence and spread of HR in international institutions. He writes: “the institutions and agents involved are for the most part to be found inside or in the shadow of the field of state power” (59). Yet, Madsen does not focus on other power relations in the development of HR. The research of Waltz (2002) suggests a complex matrix of international and transnational powers that are involved in including Human Rights as part of the UN charter, from South America to post-WWII China (before the communist rule), to Lebanon. Waltz realizes (2002: 440-441):

The USA and China were proponents of including human rights in the charter of the United Nations, although by 1945 the highest ranking officials within the US State Department were not enthusiastic about it. Britain and the USSR opposed the idea, and they twice rejected a proposal that the UN be specifically required to promote the observance of human rights. According to Lauren, British officials were concerned that inclusion of language about human rights would fuel unrest and threaten the Empire […]. Contrary to popular suppositions, at mid-century it was small states and nongovernmental organisations rather than the great powers who were the most ardent and outspoken champions of human rights.

Yet, when Waltz discusses different persons or countries in contributing to the HR declaration, she does not account for their positions inside their societies. Of course, it is not the subject of this research to assess how HR norms have developed. It is just a quick discussion related to HR between different theories and research that demonstrate how agencies and structures could be related, and they include wide areas of the world beyond Euro-centrism.

Similarly, IR scholar Charlotte Epstein (2013) argues, while referring to Sikkink’s approach, that socialization as a communicative act is important in spreading norms; however, this process does not occur between relatively equal agents. Epstein realizes “a certain neglect of structural power of an immaterial kind” (Epstein 2013: 168; emphasis in the original).
Paradoxically, an approach as the one used by Chandler (2002) focuses on “top down” approach to HR, with his focus on Northern HR actors trying to impose their values, which meets Risse and Sikkink’s (2009) spiral model of the diffusion of HR from the Global North to other countries. What needs to be understood in the case at hand is to see both agencies, in a transnational relational perspective, while taking into account the relational dimension between the diverse agencies and structural factors.

In reviewing the literature of social movements theories during the twentieth century up to the New Social Movement literature, Tarrow (2012) argues that a combination of structure and agency in social movements theories have not been satisfactory despite the significant insight and importance of each theory. While reflecting on his own development in studying social movements theories, Tarrow who started in structural approaches has become more inclined into accommodating agency as well, while at the same time he demonstrates that “the study of contentious politics has become one of the most exiting arenas for interdisciplinary work in the social sciences” (17).

Commenting on the most contemporary works of social movements, Tarrow (2012) indicates that “contemporary scholars made great strides in understanding the endogenous processes – recruitment, mobilization, political structuring -- that lead people to engage in contentious collective action. They specified the nature of the organizations engaged in contentious politics. However – the present author included – they did not work nearly as hard to analyze the broader structural relations among movements, parties, and states. In order to do so, the “movement” in social movements would need to be put in motion through the deliberate study of how contention occurs, who engages in it, and the events that mark its beginnings, its development, and its demobilization (21; emphasis added).

Then, Tarrow tries to suggest “mechanism” affecting social movement while he tries to solve the tension between structure and agency: “The systematic study of the mechanisms of contention are one way –certainly not the only one – to break the traditional cleavage between structure and action” (23). Moreover, Tarrow does not concentrate on the cultural question and the type of actors, which seem relevant to this research.
4. **Adding the question of culture**

The insufficiency of cultural analysis in social movements’ literature and transnational social movements is criticized in the newer version of the “political process” approach, as resembled by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) in *Dynamics of Contention*, and as pointed out by Armstrong and Bernstein (2008). Still, in their book, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) explicitly say that though they come mostly from a structural approach, they are re-incorporating cultural aspects.

In spite of the important aspects of diverse social movements theories, including Tarrow’s one, what seems more relevant to this research is the combination of structure and agency while at the same time embracing the question of the type of social groups, with particular attention to cultural dimensions affecting the emergence of movements and their position-takings.

One of his latest developed notions, Tarrow (2012: 186) gives a generalization in his notion of “rooted cosmopolitanism” by noting “[t]ransnational activists, for the most part, are better educated than most of their compatriots, better connected, speak more languages, and travel more often (Appiah 2006: 79)”. Tarrow defines this concept using an example about his father, who lived transnational contexts during the Jewish Holocaust, and was supporting the Zionist advances in historical Palestine.

However, this general description is not enough to explain the case of BDS. The cultural dimension needs more attention. The question arises: why do some highly educated, globally connected persons and who speak more languages, are more inclined to participate in transnational social movements while other persons with similar contexts do not participate in such movements (i.e. some Palestinian persons who have strong transnational connections and know languages do not endorse a boycott of Israel). One example- discussed in the fourth chapter- is the case of Saeb Erakat. Hence, it is important to look further into the agency, in addition to how the social and political cleavages (amid structures) also participate in the emergence of a movement, as discussed in this research below. Then Tarrow (2012: 186) disregards the importance of social groups while quoting Keck and Sikkink: “In fact, it is best to see rooted cosmopolitans not as a distinct class of activists but as a loosely coupled network lodged both in national and in transnational space (Hadden 2011; Keck and Sikkink 1995; Keck 2005)”.


Some transnational social movements’ scholars, as Tarrow (2002), try to resolve the issue of structure and agency with less attention to the cultural dimension and the type of actors, Colas (2002), deploying a Marxist approach, tried to overcome the agency and structure dilemma. However, what seem more relevant to this research are specific types of cultural and social agents, while at the same time taking into consideration a relation between the agency and structures. The work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is relevant in this regard since he discussed this dilemma and proposed a theory of action, while concentrating on the “cultural capital” and “social capital”.

Looking further into literature, Nick Crossley (2002) reviews historical theoretical schools of social movements, and argues that “a major fault line in all the theories we have discussed hitherto is the problem of agency and structure and I suggest that the most fruitful resolution of this problem lies in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977, 1992a, 1998a, 2000a) theory of practice” (168). Crossley argues that Bourdieu can provide a general theory for social movements, where agency and structure dilemma is resolved, though Bourdieu himself discusses social movements briefly.

5. **Benefiting from Pierre Bourdieu**

Three main Bourdieusian themes are relevant to this research. First and most importantly is the question of structure vs. agency. Second, the cultural question – i.e. academic groups- can draw on the usefulness of the cultural capital dimension. Third, though it is more auxiliary, the proposed multi-position-takings pattern by the movement needs a discussion of the position in relation to position-takings.

In his “theory of action”, Bourdieu discusses *fields, habitus*, and forms of *capital*, which constitute the basic pillars in order to understand action by individuals or groups. Therefore, *habitus* of an individual resembles more the agency side (though structures are embedded), which in its turn is inscribed in fields that resemble the structural side. Diverse positions (and related capitals) are situated in competitive relation to each other, and in a hierarchal way where “position-takings” (the term used by Bourdieu) can be understood.
Hence, it gives attention to both structure and agency, and it is a relational ontology, which is important to this research.

Bourdieu (1982) discusses forms of capital; cultural (i.e. education & linguistic), economic (financial, assets, etc.), social (networks, connections, etc.) and symbolic (status, reputation, recognition, prestige, etc.). They are important in relation to the dispositions actors have in their habitus, as well as in fields. These capitals are action generative (as inclinations not determinants) while they constraint actors at the same time. Capitals are in flux and exchanged (i.e. educational to political or economic) and in interaction.

Particularly relevant to this research are dimensions of cultural capital (educational and linguistic; institutional and non-institutional), and social capital (informal and institutionalized connections) inside the habitus of the actors and in developed relations in fields. Actually, it is the initial observation about dimensions of cultural capital that pushed the researcher to think about employing Bourdieu, and hence reviewing literature related to Bourdieu in social movements, political science and IR.

Habitus is “the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations (...) while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus” (Bourdieu 1977: 78), or as Bourdieu adds, habitus “understood as a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appropriations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks” (Bourdieu 1977: 82-3; emphasis in the original).

Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is understood “as a ‘repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct strategies of action” (Merand and Forget 2013: 100). ‘Repertoire’ in social movements’ literature account to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus though habitus concept could connect more dimensions into the previous means of action. Such concepts that overlap, and where the case itself attests to them, assures the researcher of their importance.

Bourdieu stresses that educated middle classes are “brought up in political environment, where they acquire taste, disposition and know-how, not to mention the
inherited ‘ticket’ of cultural capital, such as university degree, required for involvement in the political public sphere” (Crossley: 175). Similarly, Crossley argues that McAdam observed, without theorizing it in relation to structures, that previous activism of an actor constitute a generative habit for further involvement in politics. McAdam (1989) argued that previous biographies of activists are related to their present activism though they witness some alternation and exceptionally radical conversions. This will be explored further in discussing repertoires and waves of protest.

Moreover, Bourdieu’s habitus does not “produce predetermined comportments. Dispositions incline the actor towards one or another practice, which will only be effected in a dialectic with the position that the individual occupies in the field” (Pouliot and Merand 2013: 29; emphasis in the original). These historically embodied dispositions, or trajectories, are adjusted in social spaces that Bourdieu calls them fields. Diverse capitals are inscribed in fields as well.

Bourdieu explains that a field, which resembles more the structural side, “may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.)” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97-98). Moreover, there is a specific logic for each field that can be irrelevant to another field. Bourdieu adds that fields are “spaces of objective relations which have logic and a necessity that is specific and irreducible to those that govern other fields” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 94–95).

Fields exemplify “structured spaces that are organized around specific types of capital or combinations of capital (Swartz 1997: 117)” (quoted in Landy 2011: 24). Or, as Terdimanl explains, fields are compared to “a magnet: ‘a force upon all those who come within its range’, but one where the source of the ‘pull’ remains obscure. The economic, religious, political, artistic, bureaucratic, etc., fields separate and become increasingly monopolized by competing professional groups each deploying its own forms of capital to maximize its material and symbolic interests” (quoted in Scott 2013: 65).
Bourdieu thinks of actors as players; skillful players who have a “sense of the game” with their know-how, trajectories and skills. They innovate and strategize in the game, passionately (with an *illusio*), compete and struggle inside a field to maximize their power (Crossley 2002). At the same time, they are constrained by the “rule of the game” that is imposed by the field structure and hierarchal dispositions inside a specific field. Actors try to make some changes to their benefits. Actors in the field have what Bourdieu calls *illusio*, a passion to play the game rather than an “interest”; otherwise they are not in the range of the “magnetic forces” of the field.

As a relevant field for this research is a field of power. It is not specified in professional terms (i.e. legal, economic, activist, academic, political, HR, etc.), though it combines different aspects: political, economic, and cultural among others. Bourdieu suggests the concept of the “field of power” when it combines diverse capitals and fields (though other fields can still retain some autonomy).

Stephano Guzzini (2013) explains that the field of power is a “wider encompassing field”. This field “overlaps with the fields of economy, the bureaucracy, politics, and (elite) education, constituting and being constituted by the *Noblesse d’états*” (85). In this space, the forces of different types of capital are fought out. And the stake is the “exchange rate” between different capitals (85). Power, adds Guzzini, is not to be sought in objective resources but “in relations of recognition- not just for the analyst but also the agent” (85).

The field of power in Palestine seems even more appropriate for the research since there has been no Palestinian state but a recent Palestinian authority, political movements (many are transnational) with military power in some cases, social movement, economic, cultural and other powers. Additionally, Israel is more hegemonic militarily, economically and diplomatically (through itself and its relation with the US). It is a field of power in Palestine that diverse Israeli actors are related and try to dictate the rule of the game though they are constantly challenged.

Bigo (2011) explains that some IR scholars have simplified Bourdieu’s notion of the centrality of the state in the field of power. Bigo adds that they “explain that for him [Bourdieu] the state as an institution is the meta-field of power allowing the conversion of
different forms of capital. Yet, Bourdieu has insisted that this was only a working hypothesis during the formation of Raison d’êtats and certainly not an “essence” of the state from its creation to now. Secondly, the field is not the institution; it is always what creates institutions” (248).

The Palestinian authority, though relatively powerful in the West Bank, is much weaker than a state to be able to control diverse aspects, and highly challenged, not only by occupation, but also by Palestinian actors such as Hamas in Gaza or other movements. It is also an occupation case where the local field of power contains the occupied as well the occupier.

Moreover, the benefit of Bourdieu’s field of power concept for this research is that it highlights the role of academics and non-state actors as well, in relation to other official actors, while paying attention to relational positions between holders of different types of capital. However, there is no state in the French sense for example. Certainly, the PLO, and later on the PA, tried to impose the “sole legitimate” representative and, hence, the body trying to produce the “vision and division”, which is the “structuring principles of perception and appreciation, of categorization and distinction that form the basis of practice” (Williams 2013: 133). However, they do not reach the level of the state in the established sense. For the international dynamics, the “world field of power” will be discussed in chapter five.

Unlike the discussed transnational social movements theories, which do not look deeply into the local fields of power and agencies (i.e. the Zapatista case), and do not focus on how local actors interact in national, transnational and international contexts, the empirical analysis of the BDS movement suggests that investigating the local context is important in itself, in addition to its relation to a world field, despite important aspects in these theories that the research benefits from. Hence, the research investigates the field of power in Palestine and the local agencies, through their habitus, to understand even a movement that its call in 2005 is directed to transnationals and internationals while avoiding to explicitly discuss Palestinian politics and contradictions.
6. Methodology

6. A. Abductive methodology

The main methodology employed in this research is abductive; that is, going back and forth between the theories and the empirical case (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009). It is in terms of writing structure that the thesis is divided on the basis of a main theoretical part then the empirical part, though they intersect. In reality, the researcher has been going into theories and the case simultaneously since the early stages of the research after choosing the case.

In each phase, the researcher has been employing an abductive approach, and continued doing so where new aspects in the case lead to think of related theoretical readings. The case has been taking the researcher by surprise, repeatedly, while proceeding deeper inside, which re-assured following an abductive methodology. Actually, Abduction is a concept introduced in modern times by Charles Pierce (1839–1914) who considered abduction as logic of surprise (Nubiola 2005).

For example, at the beginning, the researcher thought that the BDS case follows the boomerang pattern, and then while reading more on the case, some deviations started to be discovered. Later on, the case becomes instructive to propose its own pattern though in constant dialogue with theories. In another example, the case suggested that the recent and historical waves of protest matters to the recent development, as also partially suggested by the concepts of the *habitus* and *repertoires*, but then another set of theoretical writings that discusses waves of protest were searched and re-informed and emphasized what the case suggested. At the same time, each theory has been suggestive to look at the case from an angle and hence provide more understanding.

Especially when the researcher realized that the first set of existing theories could not answer many aspects of the case, though they alarmed the researcher into ideas not thought about previously- the case has gained more importance. As Acharya (2011: 624) argues in relation to having the cases suggestive in themselves, this “would require less reliance on deductive theorising, aimed at ‘testing’ theories, and more on ‘induction’ – generalising
from local experiences on their own terms, or ‘abduction’ – ‘using a dialectical combination of theory and empirical findings, moving back and forth between the two to produce an appropriate account’”.

The basic set of theoretical readings has been done between September 2013 and February 2014 while at the same time reading about the case (published books by actors or material from websites), which were followed later on by other sets of theoretical readings until finishing the thesis. Forty four interviews have been conducted during different stages spanning from March 2014 to September 2015. This time interval was beneficial to proceed with interviews while contemplating the theories. The first set of interviews consisted of 19 interviews with actors resident in Belgium, and conducted mostly throughout March 2014: 7 of them are Palestinians-Belgians, five Europeans and two Arab-Belgian/French, 12 females and 8 males, mostly resident in Brussels and from different ages; from the Belgians there are six primarily Dutch speaking and six primarily French speaking. The vast majority endorses the BDS and some are core BDS activists in Belgium.

These interviews in Brussels have directly followed the theoretical readings and initial reading about the movement, and has taught the researcher on the BDS movement in Brussels and how early boycott initiatives have demonstrated an encouragement and limitations for the Palestinian BDS movement. Another cycle of theoretical readings have taken place in the summer of 2014 (especially after realizing the role of events), and then after starting the interviews with actors related to the Palestinian BDS movement or around it or critical to it, which consisted of 15 interviews starting mostly from late 2014). Nine of them are members/ coordinators of the Palestinian BDS movement, PACBI [The Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott to Israel] and/or BNC [The BDS National Committee] (five men and four women) and they are mostly residents in the West Bank but originally from different places, and they are from different ages.

With the Palestinian BDS interviews, the researcher started to have much more knowledge of the movement in the Palestinian context; hence, deviations from some previous literature have started to appear clearer, which encouraged additional theoretical readings (i.e. Acharya and historical waves of protests).
With the last set of interviews in London between June and September 2015 (8 interviews), the discussed components of the case of the UK has been viewed in depth. Few interviews have been conducted with other persons (see the list of interviews at the end of the thesis).

In terms of localities/ nationalities, interviews were conducted with 19 Palestinians, 12 Belgians, 8 British, 7 Arabs (other than the Palestinians), 3 Italians, 3 French, 3 Polish, and individuals from other countries where some have dual nationalities or decadence.

Moreover, writing has been done on stages. The first draft after choosing the case has been written in February 2014. Later on, another set of writing (for the memoir) has been submitted in January 2015, and then the final thesis phase in February 2016. During the latter phase, new components of the case were discovered and contributed to complicating the pathways of the movement. Hence, theories, contemplating about the case and interviews have been informing one another during the different stages of conducting the research.

6. B. The case; its components and extension

The research focuses on one movement: the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel, which is a movement of social and political movements, NGOs and unions. As the theoretical part indicated, the research focuses on the national context besides the transnational and international ones, which means investigating the movement in the Palestinian and global contexts.

The movement that the research focuses on is the core Palestinian movement and its interactions with the extension of the movement in European places among others. Hence, the Palestinian components of the movement (i.e. BDS National Committee and NGOs/ social movements or persons in it) are of core interest. Particularly, actors playing the most part in the formation period of the movement will be the focus, while positioning them in relational terms with other actors in fields.
Main actors who are part of the BDS National Committee are important to the research: PACBI from the academic circles, *Badil*, Stop the Wall, *Ittijah*, and PNGO from the NGOs. In relation to PNGO, which compromises tens of NGOs, the focus will be on the Medical Relief UPMRC and Agricultural Relief PARC (and *Miftah* partially). Among HR organizations, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights and LAW Society are discussed in the early period of the second *Intifada* and before it. Actors are discussed in relational terms with other actors. Other actors are discussed briefly, when relevant, in relational terms such as the National and Islamic Follow-Up Committee (and Marwan Barghouti) during the second *Intifada*.

Moreover, some persons, who are also linked to these organizations, will be the focus as Omar Barghouti (from BDS leadership and PCABI), Gabi Baramki (from PACBI), Jamal Juma (from BDS leadership and Stop the Wall), Mustafa Barghouti (from the Palestinian National Initiative, the Medical Relief UPMRC), and Ameer Makhoul from *Ittijah* (until 2010).

In choosing these organizations and persons as a focus for the case, different considerations are taken into account. Firstly, some of them have leading roles in the formation period (and then might have no prominent role) while others are in less leading positions. Secondly, they represent diverse positions and *habitus* (between political and civil society) that enable to understand and demonstrate the variety. Thirdly, the persons and organizations combine both personal and collective dimensions.

The norms that the research will focus on, in addition to B.D.S., are HR, international humanitarian law, anti-apartheid, anti-colonization, and anti-normalization.

The transnational pathways are methodologically challenging since the movement is extended to all the continents though with concentration of activities in some countries in each continent. The researcher had to manage this dispersed researched movement while not losing essential units of analysis. Since some research has been done on North America, the research has relied on it, particularly to refer to the norm divestment. The research focused on Palestinian-European interactions, and chose two countries as a focus (Belgium and the UK). The UK is a dynamic place for the movement while Belgium is less
dynamic but demonstrates early potentials and limitations on the movement besides being the center for the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) or small organizations that the research investigates their endorsement of the BDS norms in interaction with the BDS movement. In the UK, the focus would be on the academic track through interactions between British and Palestinian academics; mainly between 2002 and 2004, though other actors would be present as the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign and smaller scale British activists. In Belgium, the focus would be on interactions with specific organizations as European Coordinating Committees (ECCP), ABP, Palestina Solidariteit, Oxfam and Intal.

However, focusing on these European places still misses essential aspects not only of the pathways and norms (essential components of the research question), but also the relations between European and Palestinian actors. While proceeding in the research, some other actors were found important (i.e. South African, Brazilian and Arab) who are highly relevant to be able to answer the research questions. They are particularly important to have more understanding of: 1) the developed pathways of the movement, 2) to understand the norms, 3) to explore mediations between European and Palestinian actors and 4) to understand a new wave of boycotts- which will be explored below. Yet, the research does not concentrate on these actors per se, but on the spaces/forums that these actors provide to the BDS actors and; hence, contribute to the global diffusion of the movement.

The research discovered the importance of other transnational and international mediations that helped endorsing the BDS norms in Europe or encouraged certain pathways. There are numerous mediations. The research chose three of them for their importance in early endorsements of the BDS norms, their mediatory roles and/or their contribution to understanding the global pathways: interactions between Palestinian and European actors in the World Social Forums/ European Social Forums, the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), and the UN Durban conference in Durban in 2001. Hence, the research found it essential to discuss them since they turned out to be core components in the developed pathways and norms, besides playing mediatory roles in the developed pathways in general and in relation to Europe, and the first transnational fora to spark or endorse the BDS norms.
Diverse transnational mediation types have been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, particularly discussed by Tarrow. It is not the focus of the research to assign which type of mediation (i.e. relational, non-relational or brokerage), but to trace the mediations in the process of developed pathways of the movement.

In terms of the period, the focus is on the interval leading to the formation of the movement, particularly since the second *Intifada* in Palestine and the transnational dynamics that accompanied it. The research focuses on the road leading to the formation of the movement in 2005 (the call) and 2007 (the first conference), because it reveals the factors behind the formation of the movement and its choices, while also some attention to cases after the formation is beneficial. Yet, the research could not escape historical aspects essential to understanding the new wave of boycott; either manifested itself in Durban conference in 2001 (and its renewed isolation strategy of Israel), the new Palestinian boycotts during the second *Intifada*, or changes in the field of power in Palestine or globally. Bourdieu’s *habitus* combined with notions of events and historical trajectories and *repertoires* in social movements’ literature are helpful to explain, which will be discussed below.

The research depends on tracing relational aspects and developments through a variety of sources: Websites for specific actors or organizations including PACBI and the BDS movement websites, annual reports, news archives, books and articles by the actors or related to them, besides interviews. In all cases, tracing electronic material is essential, especially that the movement is publicly exposed. Interviews helped in the focus on the locations (Palestine, Belgium and the UK) and less on the forums/ spaces of the UN Durban conference, the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) and the World (and European) Social Forums. In the forums, the interactions could have been traced depending on archives (mostly electronic archives).

Interviews are in-depth and open ended that concentrate on developed relations between actors and their norms and pathways. A set of questions have been prepared for each interview while keeping the interview open-ended and starting with general questions before focusing them, so that the interview leaves a space for interviewees to express unexpected points by the researcher. I have recorded all interviews, except five, after
explicit approval from interviewees if they feel comfortable with recording. Some interviewees preferred not to mention their names (i.e. for security reasons related to traveling to Palestine).

Moreover, thanks to the MA graduate An Peter who informed me about 16 interviews conducted mostly with PACBI persons in 2009 and 2010. Yet, I have not used them in this thesis but provided me with another eye to confirm findings.

A note on limitations, I have not been able to enter into Palestine to interview actors. I have interviewed Palestinian actors either when they come to Brussels or London or via skype. Another limitation is the wide network of the movement in diverse continents, which was discussed previously. A final limitation is related to knowledge of languages in Belgium since the researcher does speak neither French nor Dutch. However, research in Brussels depended on interviews (mostly in English, few in Arabic) where the interviewees were at ease, in addition to some material available in English (publications or websites). In few cases, I had to seek help for translating sections in publications.

The BDS movement related websites, with their archives and other news and organizations websites were of great help in providing details of encounters and/or summaries or minutes of meetings. These includes the websites of: The BDS movement, PACBI, Badil, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, the Electronic Intifada, Wafa news agency (in Arabic), BRICUP website, Mona Baker’s blog, the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), the UN Durban conference, al-Ahram Weekly, Stop the Wall, LAW Society (archives), European Coordinating Committees (ECCP), UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign, and associated websites archiving meetings and declarations related to the World Social Forum and European Social Forum, among other websites.

Annual reports (especially for Badil, Agricultural Relief PARC), and PCHR contain detailed information in each year for prominent organizations for the research, in addition to press releases, which are also primary resources. Many of the relations with diverse Palestinian, regional and transnational/ international actors appear clearly in annual reports.

The information analysis, in addition to interviews, is focused on the relational areas and different stages of developing norms and pathway of the movement.
Each of these organizations and persons helps in understanding aspects related to the empirical side of the research though some are helpful in the different sections of the research. No single actor is sufficient for any section of the research. Always there will be set of actors to have in-depth understanding.

Many theoretical readings have mainly been related to transnational social movements (TSM) literature, particularly in political science and in political sociology through the lenses of international relations. For theoretical aspects, the writings of Hilal are important to further understand related specificities of the field of power in Palestine to this research and positions of actors (i.e. the fragmentation aspect), besides the literature on Palestinian civil society (mentioned below). In addition, conducted research on the Palestinian movements, civil society and politics, historical boycott experiences, have been useful to this research. Some research and MA thesis on the Palestinian civil society, specific NGOs and boycott activities are beneficial as well (i.e. Hammami 2000, Jad 2007, Hanafi and Tabar 2005, Tabar and Azza 2013, Botmeh 2007, Payes 2006, Joudeh 2006, Al-Adarbeh 2011). It is important to see the relational aspects between academics (represented in some of this literature) and civil society organizations. Moreover, the research benefited from a number of writers or actors for this research have been theorizing for the BDS movement (i.e. Baramki 2010, Barghouti 2011, Juma’s diverse writings, Mustafa Barghouti diverse writings, Lim 2012, Wiles 2013, Bakan and Abu-Laban 2009, Erakat 2012, Hanieh et al. 2006, Jamjoum 2011, among others).

Another set of research related to the Palestinian, European and world fields in relation to Palestine are important for understanding major dimensions of fields and changes in them (i.e. Khalidi 2013, Khader 2013, Persson 2013, Cronin 2011, Aoun 2003, Tocci 2009, Hollis 2010).

Attending conferences, meetings and lectures related to the research was also helpful to see interactions between Palestinian BDS actors, European transnational actors and officials. I have also conducted some interviews on the margin of these conferences. For example, the researcher attended two lectures by Omar Barghouti at ULB and University of Ghent. I have attended the following conferences in Brussels:
- “The European Parliament/EU obligations towards occupied East Jerusalem”, organized by European Coordinating Committees (ECCP), Mundubat and ABP (hosted by MEP Maria Arena); 17 November 2014.

In limited cases, I have been in a “participant observation” position; for instance, attending a meeting at the World Social Forum in Tunisia (March 2013) between BDS and European actors for the Palestinian rights. In another instance, I co-organized a march in Brussels, on 6 March 2013, for Palestinian prisoners with Amnesty International and Palestina Solidariteit. It was also a chance to see interactions between transnational actors (i.e. the debate on the boycott norm).

6. C. Mobilizing Bourdieu, TSM theories and limitations

Bourdieu suggests “open concepts”, as he describes the field concept, in a protest to positivism. He adds that these concepts have to be “put to work” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 95-96). This correlates to the methodological inclination of the research to be abductive. This is true in national context and of course truer in international and transnational ones where Bourdieu had much less focus.

What the research is mostly interested in Bourdieu’s analysis lies in its relational approach and the analytical tools it provides. Bigo (2011: 232) argues in relation to employing Bourdieu’s concepts that “[t]his sociology of politics is certainly not designed as a way to reduce everything to a general theory of power with some general atemporal concepts named as field, habitus, justification, and doxa. This would be a return to a grand narrative”, where Bourdieu himself was critical to be seen providing a grand theory. Instead, what is suggested is, as Bigo explains, is that “[t]he field and habitus of Bourdieu are thinking tools as long as they try to render the diversity of practices” (237).
Moreover, I have been using Bourdieu in political science and international relations literature (see more discussion on Bourdieu in IR in chapter five).

Since the beginning, the researcher chose a qualitative methodology based on interviews and information analysis to see interactions amid power relations. The research has not focused on measuring social or cultural capital *per se* or to draw the fields in themselves with different position of actors or constructing the fields *per se* but rather on tracing developing links (in social capitals) and knowing about cultural capital of actors and how they relate in different fields.

The focus is on the relational aspects, as discussed in the theoretical framework. The research is to explore how diverse actors recognize/ contest and cooperate, and how they are positioned in relation to each other.

For example, the research does not concentrate on constructing the different fields, but on how the movement is positioned and related to major dimensions in fields. Moreover, the research does not concentrate on how much resourced some NGOs – though it still matters, but on how other actors recognize a specific organization to be resourced and legitimate/ not legitimate. In relation to fields, the research builds mainly on existing literature to locate major aspects related to the rule of the game, *doxa* and dimensions of fields through time, while the research also investigates helpful data. In short, the research is interested in the BDS movement in these fields and not in fields themselves.

What the research keeps focus on is not to be dragged by theoretical and methodological debates not related to the case in the empirical part. For example, there are numerous debates and techniques on how to measure social capital; either through Bourdieu’s application or other scholars as Coleman and Putnam. However, this research does not “measure” social capital *per se*. Social capital is help in this research to understand coalition building in the previous trajectories of actors, national/ transnational connections (i.e. connections between Global North and South), attaining more power in the national or transnational connections and how it is a source of legitimacy or lack of (i.e. connections to funders could decrease the perceived legitimacy of actors).
Additionally, the research finds investigating related cultural capital is helpful to explain the positions of the actors in the field in Palestine and transnationally. The focus is on how PACBI, for example, is positioned in relation to other actors, and how transnational links are culturally enhanced; either through academic links or the language used.

The institutionalization of links, including institutionalized social and cultural capitals, are also helpful to explain the process of institutionalized coalition building in the trajectories of the actors, and how institutionalized links re-emerge from the *habitus* of actors into a new institutionalization.

The researcher realized that there are certain dimensions that Bourdieu does not concentrate on them, such as the role of episodes and events. Mérand and Forger (2013) realized through their research the importance of time. They argued that “with the field-capital- habitus trinity, there is, to put it bluntly, a lack of attention to detail” (p. 110). Mérand and Forger also point out to a problem in Bourdieu’s view about the source of change. Bourdieu emphasized that external shocks (i.e. military defeat) from external fields could cause change, while there are little chances of change coming from within a field. Though this seems true in dimensions related to the case, it does not hold true for other dimensions, especially in the Palestinian context that witness subsequent *Intifadas* and grand protests (though still Israel is occupying and strong). Yet, in the transnational context in Europe, the external *Intifada*, through the agency of the Palestinian actors and through the mediated events of contention, affect the transnational actors and push for raising the level of some norms such as boycott to Israel, as also being argued by David Landy’s research (2011) on the effect of a “distant field” from Palestine on diasporic Jewish activism for Palestinian rights.

The events and episodes of the second *Intifada*, and before it, suggest that they have been important for the development of the BDS movement, and such episodes generate related events that have their effects, or a cycle of events as Tarrow indicates, that pass through multiple transnational mediations. For example, the decision taken by the Palestinian Council for Higher Education in the 1990s not to cooperate with Israeli universities came in the context of the episode of the first Palestinian *Intifada* when Birzeit University and other Palestinian universities have been closed by the Israeli occupation.
This episode of the Intifada has generated subsequent events, though smaller in scale but related to the development of the movement. The EU parliamentary decision to freeze scientific cooperation with Israel in 1989, which Baramki comments positively on it (Baramki 2010: 125), came in the context of the episode of the first Palestinian Intifada.

Similarly, the confrontational events of 1996 and 1998 between Palestinian and Israeli sides contributed to an increased crack in the rule of the game (i.e. a negotiation track) and the re-emergence of the boycott norm. The episode of the second Palestinian Intifada generated in its turn subsequent national and transnational events in relation to the development of the norms of boycott, and the associated sanctions and divestment norms. Transnationally, the Durban event, the events of global anti-war protests and alter-globalization protests and forums have been relevant as well to the research. These events are important, in relational terms, in the developing of the BDS movement’s pathways and norms.

Social Movement theories have been interested in events beside other factors (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 3). Tarrow (2012: 17) realizes in his social movements’ study that “[e]pisodes of contention are broader – and last longer – than social movement campaigns”. In another work, Tarrow (1996) evaluated Charles Tilly’s “event history” approach, which looks at small and big events in history, related to contentious politics. Tarrow realizes that the “strong point of the event history approach is in its power to relate forms of contentious politics systematically to the kind of non-eventual processes that escape Sewell's Great Event approach, such as industrialization, immigration, the business cycle, variations in harvests or population growth and decline. Its weakness is the difficulty of relating sequences of events to non-eventful variables like institutions, political processes and the importance of contingency that Sewell underscores” (Tarrow 1996: 588-589).

Actors of the BDS relate to the events. For example Ameer Makhoul who had a role in the earlier period related the “international solidarity movement” to the episodes of

The researcher employs the layer of events while benefiting from Bourdieu’s concepts in non-eventual dimensions (the fields and changes in them, *habitus* of actors, etc.).

The trajectories of actors, as theorized by McAdam (1989) relate in this research to Bourdieu’s *habitus*, but situated in relation to fields. In particular, the research focuses on seeing aspects of the *habitus* of actors in previous inclinations to the Boomerang pattern in addition to other pathways (‘split habitus’ discussed in the next chapter); like previous Palestinian, regional and South African experiences. In addition, previous political experiences and skills in coalition building are beneficial to see how they move in the Palestinian sphere and transnational ones.

Related to events and *habitus* are waves of contention. While proceeding in research, historical waves of protests have confirmed their importance, and suggested themselves strongly when seeing how the current BDS movement relates to previous waves of isolating Israel. While Bourdieu concentrates on the *habitus* of actors, and McAdam discussed the previous trajectories of activists in their present activism, it could be extended to what Anwar Abdel- Malik (1984) considers the “depth of the historical field” while discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict. That is, there are collective historical trajectories as those related to the 1920s Palestinian boycotts or the first and second *Intifada* boycotts, and as will be discussed in the research as a historical background. It would provide much more understanding to discuss the BDS movement as a new wave of protest (isolating Israel) that relates itself implicitly and explicitly to previous waves of isolating Israel; either the Palestinian early boycotts in the 1920s, the official Arab boycott policies from the 1940s, or the “anti-normalization” waves starting from the late 1970s,

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11 Ameer Makhoul, “the solidarity movements: Ripping experiences and retreat in the scale” (in Arabic), *Badil* (Haq al-Awda publication, no. 29-30), December 2008, via https://www.badil.org/ar/publications-ar/periodicals-ar/haqelawda-ar/item/140-article04.html <last accessed on 19 February 2016>

12 “Wave” and “cycle” of protest have a similar meaning. As Paul Almeida clarifies, “a cycle of protest is a rapid expansion of social movement action in geographical scale, diversity of social groups participating, and amount of disruptive activity. Scholars also interchange the concept of a cycle of protest with “protest cycles” and “protest waves.””See: Paul Almeida, “cycles of protest”, Oxford Bibliographies, via http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0086.xml <last accessed on 19 February 2016>
while at the same time actors ‘distinguish’ themselves from previous waves. This dimension has been suggested not only because the BDS movement explicitly relates to previous waves of isolating Israel, as will be discussed, but also because the research found out how residuals of previous waves affect the new one though the new one has its new dimension.

This part is related to the historical context, where some discussion of this context seems insightful to understand the present. Otherwise, the present movement seems stripped from historical layers that affect it. Yet, this is not the focus of the research, and will be discussed mainly in certain areas of the historical context, especially what relates to the *habitus* of actors and the changing Palestinian-Arab field inside the world field of power on Palestine.

Hence, the historical waves are also discussed in terms of fields (employing Bourdieu), but again benefiting from social movements’ literature on waves of protest. Tarrow (2012) indicates that “hot episodes” should be understood in historical context. For example, the civil rights movement in the US in the 1960s could be traced back to earlier events such as Roosevelt’s opening up employment to African Americans and Truman’s Cold War related policies of civil rights. Tarrow indicates that “[i]nstead of focusing on particular events, scholars are turning to longer and more complicated episodes and trajectories of collective action, reaction, and regime change” (15). Tilly’s “historically tuned” focus on “contentious events” seem relevant to this research in seeing links between the current BDS movement and earlier isolating Israel waves. In this dimension, the research concentrates on the relation of the current BDS actors to earlier events related specifically to the norms boycott, anti-normalization and the strategy aiming at isolating Israel internationally, in order to understand further the developed pathways and norms.

Hence, the events- including episodes- are triggers to old “*repertoires*” of action in the historical trajectory of actors. The next chapter discusses the boycott norm as part of the *habitus* of the actors, not only during the first and second *Intifadas*, but also in historical terms since the early twentieth century in historical Palestine. Though it is related to seeking legitimacy from previous historical norms, it’s also a recurrent norm part of the *repertoire* of social movements. As the edited book by Mark Traugott (1995) *Repertoires*
and Cycles of Collective Action indicates, through major scholars of social movements in cases from Europe, US, Japan and South America, historical repertoires, sometimes through centuries, reproduce themselves and can be transformed. For example, Traugott’s research indicates how barricades were used by French movements at the end of the sixteenth century, continued for centuries but has gone through fundamental changes depending on other factors.

Similarly, Tarrow (1995: 90-91) argues in Traugoutt’s book, again based on Tilly’s research of historical contention in France and the UK, that “the repertoire developed slowly and haltingly and no faster than the development of states and capitalism” (which were the main structural focus for Tilly). Tilly speaks – Tarrow adds - about “a general repertoire that is available to the population as a whole. At any point in time, he writes, the repertoire available to a given population is limited, despite the possibility of using virtually any form of contention against any opponent. The repertoire is therefore not only what people do when they make a claim; it is what they know how to do and what society has come to expect them to choose to do from within a culturally sanctioned and empirically limited set of options” (emphasis in the original).

In the Arab context, Trabulsi (2012) suggested that the recent Arab revolts constitute a new wave after the recent two previous Arab protest waves in the early 1990s/late 1980s and early 1980s/late 1970s. He argued that they were basically revolts against neoliberalism. However, he does not proceed to suggest how they are actually related other than the structural incentive of neoliberal policies since the 1970s.

Rabab El-Mahdi (2009) argued in her research article in an edited book with Marfleet Egypt: The Moment of Change, just preceding the recent Egyptian revolution in 2011. She argues that a democratization movement, which emerged in 2004-2005 (Kefayah meaning ‘Enough’), can be understood in the context of “cycles of protests”. Particularly she traces the personnel, leadership, shared communities of protests of the movement in previous two cycles: the pro-Palestinian Intifada protests in Egypt in 2000-2001 and the Egyptian anti-war protests against the war in Iraq in 2003. She anticipated actually that upcoming contentions are expected though Kifaya did not succeed but constituted a new cycle that gave additional momentum for a new cycle to come. In practice, the reply to
political frustration in believed values and norms against Mubarak’s regime policies towards Israel and the US came into protests for the value of democracy in Egypt, which was a believed issue in the historical PLO normative inclinations before the later leadership moved into a conservative position on change in the Arab region (to be discussed later). Yet, El-Mahdi discussed recent cycles of protest to a new movement (few years’ cycles).

In this research case, it traces recent waves/ cycles of protest, both nationally and transnationally, as also part of the habitus of the actors in relation to the BDS movement with also a historical background to previous affecting historical waves. Moreover, these cycles of protest are discussed in terms of power relations as well. Both social movements’ literature and suggested concepts by Bourdieu are helpful together.

It is not only the boycott norm, but the new pressure strategy, or the new wave of isolating Israel, which re-appeared in the NGO Forum at the UN Durban conference in 2001, relates to previous waves. In Durban conference, Palestinian actors among others who pushed for Zionism is racism, resembling a previous wave expressed itself in the 1975 UN-GA resolution, was re-used in 2001 to set up a new wave. Hence, combining the habitus concept of recent actors active for a new movement, and tracing how they relate (and seek legitimacy as well) from previous repertoires, while being triggered by episodes and changes in fields, all together help to explain the emergence of a new wave with its distinctive characters. Being aware of these analytical tools, while proceeding in the research, the research sees how the actors for the new movement relate to previous norms and waves of boycott/ isolating Israel internationally, how they distinguish themselves at the same time from previous norms, and how aspects of the previous waves find their ways into the new wave.

Events also frame the time period of the focus in the research. Consecutive events also connect the different periods together and provide a historical background and consistency as well.

The focus is on a set of Palestinian episodes and events that generate other related events:

- The Oslo I Agreement in 1993 and the disappearance of the boycott norm in Palestine,
- The 1996 and 1998 confrontations leading to the re-emergence of the norm “boycott” in Palestine:

- The second Palestinian Intifada (and the failure of negotiations in 2000) leading to the spread of the boycott norm between wide Palestinian actors and a series of transnational and international events (i.e. Durban conference in 2001) that opened the road to the BDS movement,

- A historical background in different sections of this research (either in habitus or world field) deals with related previous boycott and anti-normalization events that usually accompanied revolts, wars or episodes.

Gaza wars, especially the 2008-9 war, is important for the further development of the movement, but the researcher decided to limit more the recent time interval (particularly during the second Intifada and the direct aftermath) since it deals with the emerging period of the movement and to better manage the research and finally deleted the next periods, as a focus, but still deals with them here and there.

Related international and transnational forums/ spaces include where the pathways and norms have been developing and “pulling” to the world field, and include:

- UN related events: The Durban conference in 2001 (and particularly the NGO Forum), the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 2004 on the legality of the Israeli wall, and the interactions at the civil society conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP).

- Transnational events during the second intifada: alter-globalization forums at the World (and European) Social Forum including the anti-war protests and assemblies in these forums (with a focus on interaction with European actors).

- European non-state actors related events: Oxfam-Belgium and Belgian “civil missions” and boycott activities in Belgium during the second Palestinian Intifada, the road to SOAS conference in 2004 in London, and the road to Bilbao’s meeting between BDS activists and European solidarity groups (mainly the European Coordinating Committees ECCP) in 2008.
These spaces intersect. For example, the Palestinian interaction with European actors (particularly the ECCP), in relation to the BDS norms, are mediated by the other spaces (the World (and European) Social Forums, and the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP), and by campaigns by specific European organizations.

Moreover, there are other spaces that affect the BDS movement. On why these spaces are discussed not others is because they are more relevant, and in reality they have been suggesting themselves while proceeding in the research, which resembles in a way what Bruno Latour (2005) suggests on the researcher to follow the network in his Actor Network Theory. This network suggested on the researcher to look at Durban meeting in 2001, to check SOAS conference in London in 2004, then the road to Bilbao meeting in 2008, which opened other research spaces such as the World (and European) Social Forum and the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), and finally to trace some related historical background. Yet, while following the network, some decisions have been taken to include some spaces and areas while excluding others (like the role of the UN Special Rapporteurs) that seemed less relevant compared to other spaces to the research in addition of being beyond capabilities (i.e. investigating North America for example).

Some EU related events will be included through other events as the EU’s freeze of the EU-Israel scientific agreement in 1989, the European Commission’s declaration on Israeli settlements’ products in 1998, the EU parliament’s recommendation to freeze the EU-Israel Association Agreement in 2002, while others that have followed exceed the period that the research focuses on: the declared freeze on developing the EU-Israel Association Agreement in 2009, the European Commission’s guidelines on investment in Israeli settlements in 2013, and two conferences by EU parliament members on the Palestinian issue in Brussels in 2014 (that the researcher has attended), and labeling Israeli products from the settlements in November 2015.

Bourdieu is pessimistic in relation to change since he stresses on the re-production of structures, unless there are what he calls “hysteria” in the field during a crisis, or due to the effect of external fields. The crisis dimension is important, where the Palestinian experience is difficult to read without continuous crisis resembled by wars, occupation, transfers and resistance cycles. It is difficult to understand the development of the BDS
movement without understanding the new crisis of the second Palestinian *Intifada* and the cracks in the Palestinian political movement or cracks between transnational and international actors. Bourdieu views change coming, mostly, from above though under contestations in fields. However, the *habitus* of actors in the BDS movement also tends to be a “radical habitus” inclined to change, with “durable dispositions towards contention” as Crossley realizes in social movements, which differentiates from the main hypothesis in Bourdieu’s approach (Landy 2011: 33). But also Bourdieu’s stress on “hysteric” moments that could bring change is related to the research interest as well with the layer of episodes as the *Intifada*, which goes with Tilly’s suggestion on the need of events.

Though one of the choices to benefit from Bourdieu, as explained in the theoretical part, is the relation between structure and agency, the research will be careful when approaching the agency of actors. Bourdieu is subject to critique in different aspects including the notion that the agency of the actor is constrained by the fields and their positions. Judith Butler, for example, brings the example of Rosa Park, in her critique to Bourdieu, to demonstrate how the free will, coming not from dominant position, had started a wide change (in the case of American civil rights movement). However, such a personal act by Rosa Park cannot be separated from the general social and legal mobilization that has been going on (Aradau 2008: 47). Tarrow’s approach is in line with this argument as well.

Yet, the over-emphasis on constraining the agency with positions and dispositions has been a general line of critique to Bourdieu. Bruno Latour has questioned Bourdieu’s approach in demonstrating the contradiction between the subjective and objective. Latour argued that when people think that things have objective properties, the subjective argument is raised against them – by Bourdieu - in the sense that the “objective” in socially constructed. However, when people think they are subjectively free, the objective argument is raised against them – by Bourdieu - in the sense that they are constrained by objective forces (Latour 1993: 51-3).

In relation to the research, the researcher needs to be careful when investigating the agency of the actors, while keeping in mind that movements are producers of knowledge as well. Actually, Keck and Sikkink (1998) demonstrate that their theory of the Boomerang
pattern is following the practice of movements themselves. This goes in line with Escobar’s (2000) argument about social movements’ production of knowledge. Hence, the research will be careful when relating to the agency of the actors to learn from their practices and expressions. Yet, this does not undermine the strength of the fields, as will be discussed for example in the world field of power on Palestine and how it has been pushing for decades to abide by the dominant rules of the game.

Another aspect of Bourdieu is his “conceptualization of the social universe as an arena defined by ‘endless and pitiless competition’ (Wacquant 2007: 266)” (Jackson 2009: 105), which is an ontology based on conflict and competition. Yet, at least in societies under colonization, if not in general, the idea could be questioned in normative basis or even on factual basis. Already Fanon did so with the Marxist notion of class stratification and struggle, which Bourdieu employed in his conceptualization with a cultural extension (i.e. cultural capital), in relation to the Algerian society at time of the anti-colonial struggle (Fanon 1965).

Through analyzing the development of the BDS movement, the competition factor is obvious and needs to be explored in depth. However, the ‘unity’ factor has also been strongly present, at least in the normative side if not on the practical side, as evident for example in the BDS call in 2005. This suggests a possible deviation from Bourdieu’s ontological assumption about a social universe identified by conflict. Hence, the research pays attention to coalition buildings and cooperation between actors as well.

As a line in social movements’ literature (El-Mahdi 2009) argues, the concept of “cooperative differentiation” suggests that global movements demonstrate unity before targeted actors while differentiate at the same time in their constituencies.

Finally, on writing the thesis, there was an interesting proposition of writing the thesis as a narrative of developing events amid contradictions of actors. However, the researcher followed at the end a more usual way of writing a PhD thesis for a clearer reading at this stage. Yet, that point is taken into consideration where the developments are mostly revealed gradually in the subsequent chapters. The thesis also contains many quotations, mostly by actors, and sometimes long ones, which is an aware choice that
reflects in the writing way the agency of actors besides detailing the provided empirical side. The thesis is full of detailed description of developed events and relations, as details further assure the most accuracy of exploring and further away from quickly opinionated statements.

Non-English phrases in this thesis are written in *italic* font. The way of writing the Arabic words followed the approach of the Islamic Encyclopedia.
Chapter III

Habitus of Palestinian actors

As discussed previously in the second chapter, the *habitus* of actors helps to indicate an inclination for certain ways/ mode of action, and accounts to the agency side of the actors though different capitals are inscribed in the *habitus* as well. Moreover, the theoretical part explained how the *habitus* concept by Bourdieu is accommodated with social movements’ literature that discusses previous *repertoires* and waves of protest. As a quick review, *habitus* resembles the ‘tool kit’ in the previous trajectory of the actors. Actors also incorporate cultural and social capitals in their trajectories, which incline them towards a specific action.

The initial phase of the research focused on trajectories of Palestinian actors in relation to Northern actors (hence tracing the possibility of the boomerang pattern towards the Global North). However, while proceeding in the research it turned out that the *habitus* is more complicated and diversified, which introduces the concept of ‘split habitus’.

As Bigo (2011) argues, drawing on literature related to European diplomats that live “split habitus” between the national and European universes, “the analysis of the position and trajectory of the individual agents working in these domains are very often simultaneously (or consequently but with frequent multipositioned forms of authority) agents playing domestically and internationally. […] The connection of the domestic and the international is personalized into the two habitus cohabiting in the very same individual” (251).

Previous trajectories of actors in the BDS movement suggest that dimensions of the trajectories of actors inside the Palestinian, transnational and international spheres encourage their current developed norms and political pathways. This chapter discusses diverse past trajectories.

Moreover, this chapter explains how actors have their diverse Palestinian activism experiences, which incline them into wide political coalition, boycott and isolating Israel. The chapter starts with discussing historical waves of boycott, which relate to the habitus of some actors. Then the chapter discusses the example of Gabi Baramki before discussing diverse actors in the following sections.
This chapter carries on by focusing on pervious trajectories until recent one before forming the BDS movement, for both persons and groups. Two sections in the chapter also discuss social and cultural capitals inside the trajectories of actors, which reveal important inclinations to the BDS movement and its different pathways and norms.

1. **Historical waves of boycott**

It is discussed in the literature aforementioned how waves of protests relate to a recent wave, and how trajectories of activists transcend from a period to another though they also change. These waves of historical boycott initiatives, aiming at isolating Zionism or Israel, constitute major collective trajectories of Palestinian BDS activists, even if they did not participate in but they relate to. Yet, many have participated in the latest waves during the first and second *Intifadas*. In addition, actors try to assert a Palestinian historical legitimacy in their current boycott calls.

*The historical legacy*

BDS activists are explicit about the roots of “boycott” in the long history of Palestinian struggle against Zionism. They legitimize their call by additionally referencing Palestinian popular experiences of boycott (i.e. Baramki 2010, Barghouti 2011). Similarly, Rafeef Ziadah from the BNC refers to the boycotts during the early Palestinian struggle period, and expresses her surprise that boycotts are widely perceived that had occurred only during the Palestinian *intifadas*. During the wide boycott activities in the second *Intifada*, a PLO boycott office that was one of the active bodies in boycotting Israel, and part of the Palestinian Observatory, referred to the 1936 General Strike as the “longest and most successful strike (boycott) in history”.

As a general background, the research of Fouad Bsaiso (1987: 1025) demonstrates how the boycott norm has emerged in historical Palestine between the period of 1914 and

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13 interview with Rafeef Ziadah; *op. cit.*

14 “The file of boycotting the Zionist and settlements’ products” (in Arabic), the National Office to Defend Land and Resist Settlements (PLO’s office), [no date; most probably in 2001], via http://www.nbprs.ps/page.php?do=show&action=mo7 <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
1945, waving up and down “accompanying the struggle of the Arab Palestinian people against Zionism since the early infiltration of Zionism into Palestine during the Ottoman rule” (Bsaiso 1987:1027). Boycott resembled Palestinian, and then Arab, “popular roots” (as Bsaiso indicates) before it has been adopted by collective official Arab policies and beyond.

Popular Palestinian boycott initiatives have started in the early twentieth century. The “boycott” norm has diffused from neighboring Egypt and diverse Global South initiatives in the twentieth century. In neighboring Egypt, a boycott against British products occurred in 1914 when the UK declared that Egypt is a British protectorate. The first documented Palestinian boycotts in 1914 and 1915 came simultaneously.

Some refer the norm “boycott” to Irish roots in the late nineteenth century. Irish farmers ostracized the British landlord in Ireland, Captain Charles Boycott, and transferred his name into a verb, because Charles Boycott refused to reduce rents.\textsuperscript{15} Chinese boycotts have been famous for their continuity for half a century, through via different waves. They started from Shanghai’s boycott against American commerce, which has occurred after the US restrictions on Chinese immigration to the US. The Chinese boycotts have been directed against Japan in 1908 and 1915, in 1919-1922, and in 1923. Similarly, Indian boycotts against British colonization have been famous, and continued to resemble some waving character transnationally. The National Committee of the Indian Socialist Party decided to engage in solidarity boycott against British and French products until the UK and France withdrew from Egypt in 1956. Globally famous boycotts that had an influence on the Palestinian boycotts, as will be detailed, are the boycotts and sanctions against the South African apartheid.

The first Palestinian boycotts were “based initially on boycotting the Jewish industry and products [in Palestine], and the boycott procedures have been interrelated with the armed Palestinian resistance against the efforts of the Zionist institutions to possess the land and plunder Palestine’s resources” (Bsaiso 1987: 1027).

\textsuperscript{15} “boycott”, Merriam-Webster dictionary, via www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/boycott <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
The Palestinian boycotts also came as a reaction to a Zionist boycott of Palestinians. The new Zionist immigration waves to Palestine followed policies based centrally on economic boycott against the Arab population in Palestine. For example, the Jewish National Fund, which was the major funding Zionist institution, stated that lands bought from Palestinians remain under the Fund’s property “forever so that it stays under the property of the Jewish nation without being transferred” (quoted in Bsaiso: 1028). Moreover, if a Jewish settler in Palestine rents a land from the Jewish National Fund, all works related to the land should be done by Jewish workers; otherwise, there are penalties that could lead to reclaiming the land by the Fund. The Zionist movement raised the slogan “occupying labor” in Palestine, which means that work is only for Jews in Palestine (Bsaiso 1987: 1028-1029). Hence, the Zionist policies in historical Palestine centered on three main principles. Firstly, the occupation of land to become a Jewish property, secondly, the occupation of labor that means replacing the Palestinian labor; thirdly, the buying of the Jewish production and boycotting the Palestinian and Arab production.

Compared to European and Russian Jewish thinkers that called for equality for Jews based on citizenship in these societies or based on equality between humans, Zionism proposed an exit outside Europe to build a Jewish national home outside Europe. Jewish Different waves of Northern Jewish settlers came to historical Palestine starting from 1882. The diverse Zionist thinkers and activists saw only the Jewish realities facing them in Russia and Europe, where racism against Jews was strong. Later on, these thinkers had to deal with the reality of Arab Palestinians in their land resisting the Zionist claims to historical Palestine. The philosophers of the Zionist movement believed, in various ways, that Arab Palestinians are “strangers” to what they believed to be their Jewish grandfathers’ land, and that the land of Palestine needs them. For example, one of the early leaders wrote:

In my dream I come to the land. And it is barren and desolate and given over to strangers; destruction darkens its face and foreigners rule in corruption. And the land of my forefathers is distant and foreign to me and I too am distant and foreign to it. And the only link that ties my soul to her the only reminder that I am her son and she is my mother is that my soul is as
desolate as hers. So I shake myself and with all my strength... I throw the old life off. And I start everything from the beginning.16

In its issue on 11 April 1914, the Arab Jaffa-based Palestine newspaper demonstrated that the Palestinian boycott against Jewish settlers was not a new mean but it has started back then to take a more decisive shape especially after realizing that European and Russian Jewish settlers in Palestine do not buy from Arabs (Christians and Muslims). It also reported that it was rare to find a trace of Arab workers in the Jewish projects in Palestine (quoted in Bsaiso 1987: 1029).

Similarly, a statement by the Islamic-Christian Association in Palestine commented in 1929 that “hubris and love of revenge has reached an un-imaginable level [by Jewish settlers], where they have started to explicitly call for boycotting us as if they became the owners of the country and its vast majority. Hence, they have started to do what we should have done, or at least to deal with them in reciprocity so that we are not the only ones harmed without our rivals” (Hamouda 2011: 73-74).

The first boycotts have started during the first wave of Jewish settlers in Palestine (1882-1903), but it was spontaneous and scattered. It was the second wave (1904-1914) that started to witness in 1909 and 1910 “creating local organizations seeking to prevent selling the land to Jews and calling to boycott Jewish products” (Bsaiso 1987: 1029). However, the first Palestinian national call came probably in a conference organized by the Islamic Christian Association in Nablus city on 26 January 1920, which invited persons from different areas in Palestine and called for boycotting Jewish production in Palestine and selling land.

Major waves of Palestinian boycotts coincided with the Palestinian general strike and/or uprisings starting from the early 1920s, which passed through the uprising of 1929 and then the 1936 general strike and revolt. Hence, boycotts have not been separate from wider confrontational events. During the early 1920s, Palestinian resistance has started to consolidate where the first popular uprising occurred in May 1921, which started in Jaffa

city. The fifth Palestinian National Conference on 22 August 1922 called for boycotting the Jewish commerce, avoiding selling land and boycotting the Jewish electricity company Rotenberg, among its diverse demands. Consecutive calls and conference have occurred since then. In 1936, the “popular militant revolution reached its peak […] and its banner was ‘boycott, strike and reject paying taxes [to the British mandate]” (Bsaiso 1987: 1031).

This quick historical background also traces the transnational spread of the boycott norm against the Zionist project beyond Palestine since 1929, directly after the Palestinian Al-Buraq uprising (*Habbat al-Buraq*). A conference was held in Jerusalem in 1929 with representatives from diverse Palestinian regions, Syria, Lebanon and East Jordan. The conference members “swore to prohibit selling land to Jews, and to boycott the Jewish industries and shops and to encourage Arab industries and shops” (Bsaiso: 1031).

The next major event had occurred during the Palestinian general strike and uprising between 1936 and 1939. Back then, another major Palestinian-Arab conference was held in Blodan, Syria, on 8 and 9 September 1937 with the participation of 327 representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, East Jordan and Palestine. This conference “provided a new dimension for boycott to include the Arab markets outside Palestine” (Bsaiso: 1031). Moreover, it tackled the issue of boycotting selling lands to Jewish settlers by neighboring Arab land owners.17

Blodan conference of 1937 combined the official Arab representation and the political persons, as a first Arab conference dedicated to the Palestinian issue. It was called by the “Committee to defend Palestine in Damascus”, which was headed by Nabih al-Azmah. The conference was attended by Arab ministries from Syria, Lebanon, East Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (who were mostly under diverse British and French mandate governance). The conference was headed by the ex-Iraqi Prime Minister Naji al-Sowaydi and the deputies of Shakeeb Arslan from Lebanon and Agnatyos Hraike; the bishop of Hama city for the Christian Eastern Orthodox. The secretary of conference was the Palestinian Mohammad Izzat Darwazeh (to be one of the major historians for *Nakba*).

The Arab official adoption of boycott came in the second Arab League Council meeting in Blodan, Syria, on 2 December 1945, which adopted boycotting the Jewish

settlers’ products from Palestine. It instituted a permanent committee as well. The committee started its activity on 5 January 1946, Later on; a Permanent office for boycott was instituted to be the reference point for boycott guidelines. It was followed by instituting boycott offices in Palestine and different Arab countries, echoing a decision by the Arab League Council in June 1946 (Bsaiaso: 1032).

Hence, the popular boycott initiatives (particularly from Palestine but also from neighboring countries) became institutionalized in the Arab official policies for decades to come. The Arab-Israeli conflict peaked in isolating Israel strategy in 1975 by equating Zionism with Racism in the UN-GA Resolution 3379, with the help of the Non-Alignment Movement and states from the Global South. It came two years after the UN-GA adopted the convention on apartheid. It coincided with strict Arab League boycott policies and oil embargoes on countries that support Israel, amid wide confrontational policies in the region.

As Stop the Wall’s report on the Arab League boycott realizes, “the isolation of Israel through a comprehensive boycott campaign is not a new concept. It dates back to Israel’s creation from the destruction of over 450 towns and villages together with the forced exodus of more than 750,000 Palestinians from their lands. Boycotts and sanctions characterized the relations of states across the Middle East with Israel from 1948 until the Oslo Process, continuing today, albeit as weakened and largely ineffective mechanisms […]. The 1975 UN General Assembly Resolution, equating Zionism as a form of racism, seems distant to the current political climate where Israel is treated as a legitimate member of the global community”. Yet, the report distinguishes itself from Arab official policies as will be demonstrated in another chapter.

In this atmosphere, the two UN-GA resolutions in 1975 of equating Zionism with a form of racism, aiming at isolating Israel and creating civil society conferences, were issued. As will be discussed below, the civil conferences at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) were part of the spaces that pushed ahead for the BDS norms. Moreover, many Palestinian actors have been engaging in this space, which included Baramki that represented the Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, Allam Jarrar from

PNGO (both had been members of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP’s established International Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine). Other actors included Al-Haq, Agricultural Relief PARC, and friendship associations with Birzeit University, among others. Additionally, the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP’s civil society meeting since 1984 have encouraged European civil society actors and encouraged the forming of the current European Coordinating Committees ECCP (as will be discussed later). This annual space has become part of the Palestinian actors’ *habitus* to interact with transnational actors from Europe, the US and the Global South. The case of interactions at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP will be explored in chapter six.

*The wave of the first Intifada*

Since the 1980s, more European and American organizations have joined the Global South organization in solidarity with the Palestinian issue, and the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) was one of the encouraging spaces for such organizations. Hazim Jamjoum (2011: 134), a young Palestinian who has been active in the Israeli Apartheid Week and Badil, relates to the transnational historical trajectory by saying:

In the decades that followed *Nakba*, member states of the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference imposed sanctions on the new state of Israel, refusing to recognize the Zionist state and combating any normalization with its institutions. As the Palestinian liberation movement began to grow in the 1960s and 1970s, volunteers from different parts of the world, particularly the Global South, joined the armed struggle as both trainers and trainees who took part in the military and political apparatuses of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its member factions. […] However, despite these demonstrations of support from countries in the Global South, Zionism remained largely unchallenged in the countries of the Global North, even by Northern leftist movements, and space for criticism of Israel only began to open with Israel’s invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 […].

The civil society calls at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) for sanctions have started to circulate during the first *Intifada* compared to previous period where such calls were not evident at this committee. For example, in November 1987, just
before the *intifada*, the South African representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) talked about sanctions and referred to apartheid: “We demand the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the two racist regimes in Tel Aviv and Pretoria for their intransigence and the threat they pose to peace in the Middle East and southern Africa and to international security”. At that time, “Apartheid” analogy has not been largely mobilized between Pretoria and Israel, with some exceptions. However, the content of PAC’s representative suggested a similarity. He said, “In many respects, the Azanian and Palestinian people have had to share a common colonial fate. The peoples of Azania and Palestine have seen their countries handed over by British colonialism to settler minorities […]. Apartheid is not mere racial discrimination, but denial of the fundamental right of self-determination, to the oppressed and dispossessed majority in that country. Given that apartheid South Africa and Zionist Israel are both the product of British colonialist history, given that settlers were imposed on the majority of both indigenous populations, given that they both subscribe to the myth of racial superiority, it is not very difficult to understand the close collaboration that presently exists between Pretoria and Tel Aviv, despite the fact that the present rulers in apartheid South Africa were known collaborators with Nazi Germany.”

However, two years after, the first *intifada* witnessed broad boycott campaigns by Palestinians against Israeli products, indicating another wave of boycotts after the loosing of the Arab League’s boycott. As the research of Tamari (1990: 168) demonstrates, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) sought a sustained campaign for civil disobedience (*Isyan madani*), which was “generally seen by all political factions as the main instrument of mobilization as well as the strategic means of achieving total disengagement from Israel’s political control over the West Bank and Gaza. Commercial strikes, tax boycotts, the mass resignation of police and tax collectors were all seen as steps toward a cataclysmic moment of separation when the system of colonial control would disintegrate” (*emphasis in the original*).

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20 “International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People” (New York, 30 November 1987); UNISPAL website, via https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/8A76052B47053F608525752700790B1B <last accessed on 19 February 2016>
Tamari adds: “The boycott campaign had already been addressed in some detail in the early communiques of the uprising. The Fateh clandestine directive (February 20, 1988) […] laid down the conditions for boycott as follows: (a) Palestinian manufacturers should improve the quality of their products, to be on par with equivalent Israeli items; (b) Arab products should not be priced higher than similar Israeli products; (c) local products should be diversified so as to provide the maximum possible replacement for Israeli goods. Strike forces were directed in a number of UNLU communiques to enforce the demands for boycott. This was usually understood to mean spoilage of Israeli commodities after initial warning to the storeowners, but only if there was a local substitute for the item. The spoilage campaign was accelerated in the spring of 1989 and reached its zenith in March, when masked squads of the strike force raided hundreds of shops in several towns and held public bonfires of the offending items […]” (p. 169). According to Jabbour’s study (1990: 12), the partial boycott campaigns during the first months for products that have alternatives, which was called by the Unified Leadership of the first Intifada, was around 25%.

Enhancing popular committees would be the ultimate goal of creating an alternative structure to the colonial regime. Moreover, in August 1988, there were varying degrees of success. While street confrontations had carried on by stone throwers, and commercial strikes had continued successfully, some popular committees had not been able to sustain as the example of the alternative educational network and the agriculture committees and domestic production committees to create an alternative house production, Tamari demonstrates.

An additional “boycott” dimension was practiced by Palestinian workers through partial boycott campaigns for working in settlements that reached 90 percent of settlements’ workers boycotting working their (Jabbour 1990: 8).

The Palestinian boycotts and refusal to pay taxes during the first Intifada, though with varying degrees of success, had parallel similar calls transnationally. The NGOs declaration at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP’s sixth international civil society conference on Palestine, less than two years after the intifada in August 1989, was attended by 351 NGOs (138 of them as observers). It stated in its declaration that “[w]e call for effective international political and economic pressure on Israel to make it comply
with its obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and to accept
United Nations Security Council resolutions […]. We call upon Governments, educational
and cultural institutions, professional associations, trade unions and individuals world-
wide, to utilize all cultural relations to pressure Israel (including sanctions), to cease these
practices”.21 In the workshops of the conference, these calls had circulated the idea of
pressure from Northern countries: “The mobilization of external influence on Israel from
the United States and Europe is important”; “Other economic pressures, including boycotts
of Israeli products and the divestment of support to the Jewish National Fund and removal
of its tax-free status, should be pursued, particularly in Europe”, “To support the
Palestinian people's struggle for economic independence and self-sufficiency by
purchasing Palestinian goods and services and boycotting Israeli products and services
when a Palestinian or other non-Israeli alternative exists”; and “Mobilization of
international support for Palestinian education and cultural institutions”.22

At that conference of 1989, the following organizations were present among others:
Birzeit University, Naim Khader Foundation (Belgium), Palestine Solidarity Campaign
(UK), the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP), Palestine Solidarity Committee
(South Africa), Agricultural Relief PARC, Union of Palestinian Medical Relief
Committees (of Mustapha Barghouti who was present); all of which would have been
engaged in interaction during the later wave of boycott represented by the BDS movement,
though with different degrees of quick endorsements.

The call for educational and cultural institutions to utilize cultural links with Israel in
order to cease them also hints to coinciding with the European Parliament’s
recommendation in January 1988, which called for not signing a protocol and to freeze
scientific and academic cooperation with Israel in 1989. The European commission applied
the recommendation in February 1989 (Skolnik and Berenbaum 2007).

The first Intifada and its wide popular initiatives constituted a legacy for its
generation and the following generations. For example, the research of Tabar and Azza
(2014) demonstrates how the atmospheres of “popular resistance” that have formed during

21 “Sixth United Nations International NGO Meeting on the Question of Palestine” (Vienna, 30 August
1989), UNISPAL website, via
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A6661B058F313C3985256DC2006C1BEB <last accessed on
19 February 2016>
22 Ibid.
the second *Intifada* saw the first *Intifada* as their model. Jamal Juma (from Stop the Wall) refers frequently to the first *Intifada*. He said for example: “In the first Intifada we had strong trade unions, strong women’s institutions, youth movements [...]. But now these structures are weak. We need to invest in them, to build them up.”23 He said in another interview: “Our work is based on popular committees... behind the Stop the Wall campaign is a group of people my age (46). We were the youth leading the first *Intifada* [...]. We were wanted, we were jailed, we were active in the streets, and we had this history strongly in our minds. When [Israel] started building the wall [2002] we began this campaign”.24

That Palestinian boycott wave geared momentum again during the second *Intifada*, though differently from the first *Intifada*. It was a call issued by National and Islamic Higher Committee for the Follow-up of the *Intifada*, which was led by Marwan Barghouti in the West Bank, and was part of confrontational means such as the armed struggle that Marwan supported. He was imprisoned by the Israeli army during invading Ramallah in April 2002 and sentenced by a court, which he did not consider legitimate, for four life sentences in allegedly being part of armed operations.

Since his adolescence, Marwan was part of *Fateh* youth, and became the president of the student council at Birzeit University, and the head of the youth wing of *Fateh* (known as *Tanzim*). He supported Oslo Agreement but nominated himself as an independent for the 1996 legislative elections. This is because the late Arafat feared Marwan’s popularity as the PLO-Tunis had feared the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza since the Madrid talks (Parsons 2005: 32, 48, 52 and 56). Marwan became more critical to the PA (Mattar 2005: 96). He wanted to nominate himself for the PA’s presidential elections against Mahmoud Abbas in 2005 but withdrew at the last moment after pressures by leaders in *Fateh*. He continued to issue statement from his prison calling for wide Palestinian boycotts against Israel among other confrontational means. The second *Intifada*, especially during the first period, witnessed wide Palestinian boycott campaigns against Israeli goods with the

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participation of political factions, unions and NGOs, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Nakba, anti normalization and the moral legacy

Another norm through the new wave of isolating Israel, preceding the BDS call, was ‘anti-normalization’. Since the Egyptian regime signed Camp David treaty, a pillar in the official Arab League boycott collapsed. The popular (non-statist) “anti-normalization” norm has emerged first in Egypt, in Palestine (after Oslo), in Jordan (after the 1994 peace treaty) and in other Arab countries where there have been newly established links between an Arab state and the Israeli state. The anti-normalization calls firstly emerged through Egyptian civil actors. The Egyptian anti-normalization initiative emerged in reaction to the third article in Camp David treaty that called for “establishing normal relations” between Israel and Egypt. After signing the Egyptian-Israeli agreement on 2 April 1979, the Committee to Defend the National Culture was established and has been pioneered by Egyptian intellectuals and writers. It was chaired by the mathematics professor and literature critic Abdel Azeem Anis (was arrested during Sadat period). There was an active enrollment by the leftist novelist and feminist Latifah al-Zayyat who has been active in the committee (was arrested for this reason in 1981), and the novelist and professor the late Radwa Ashour (the wife of the Palestinian poet Moreed Barghouti), among many Egyptian intellectuals. The first statement by the anti-normalization committee specified “normalization particularly in the domains of culture, media, education and art cooperation”.26

The Egyptian novelist Jamal Ghitani wrote the first short story Nawbat Hirasa (night watch) that dealt with the issue of normalization with Israel.27 Other Egyptian anti-normalization committees have emerged including the Popular Movement for Resisting Zionism and Boycotting Israel in 1995. The Egyptian political parties established an anti-normalization committee (Shaban and Jammal 2001). Additionally, faith-based figures

25 Khalid Sarjani, “Latiffah al-Zayyat: The pioneer in literature and criticism” (in Arabic), Al-Ahram newspaper (Cairo, 10 March 2013), via http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/135764.aspx <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
27 Ibid.
such as the Egyptian Coptic papal (the late Pope Shenouda III) issued a decree that considered Egyptian Christians who visit the holy places in Palestine practicing ‘normalization’ because of passing through the Israeli embassy in Cairo.

In Jordan, after two years of signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, some societal responses that have been encouraged to normalize relations have retreated quickly under pressure from anti-normalization campaigns though the official policies continued to push ahead, in general, for normalization.28

The Palestinian anti-normalization efforts have been initiated after the PLO-Israel agreement in 1993.29 Some Palestinian writers, with pan-Arab orientation, such as Adel Samara, Ghazi Sourani, and included Azmi Bshara, have established the Resisting Normalization Committee (lajnat monahadat al-tatbee’) in 1993.30 The Palestinian anti-normalization norm is more linked to the Arab field. Similar to other Arab initiatives, the Anti-Normalization Committee was established in Jordan in 1994 by the Professional Unions to protest signing the Jordanian-Israeli peace accord.

On the moral level, and this is important to discuss in order to understand tensions around the emerging new boycotts in the UK for example, the Palestinian and Arab narratives took it for granted that there was a “transfer” of Palestinians amid planned massacres in 1947-1948 war. The creation of Israel is widely considered part of the British colonization of Palestine. Moreover, the Jewish immigration waves to Palestine have been encouraged and sustained by a British colonial policy. It was not only the Palestinian public and private land and homes that have been confiscated by Zionist settlers after the Nakba of 1948, but also whole cities and towns. Hence, boycott policies (incorporated in laws in different Arab states) had not only boycotted Israel but also dealt with individual Israelis who were also subject to this reasoning, which will extend to the forthcoming Arab oppositional (to the regimes) anti-normalization reasoning.

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28 Jihad Mnassa, “Twenty years of resisting normalization with Israel in Jordan” (in Arabic), Al-Arabi Al-Jadid newspaper (London, 1 November 2014), via http://tinyurl.com/j84d56u <last accessed on 20 February 2016>


This line of reasoning of Nakba, which for example was generally promoted by the “Palestinian historians of Nakba”,\textsuperscript{31} has been part of the Palestinians’ and Arabs’ deep beliefs. This is why the UN-GA resolution 181 of 1947, which recommended dividing historical Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, was rejected then by the Palestinian representatives (back then) and the Arab states.

However, as the Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi points out to what dominant values have been circulating in the world field on Palestine, he wrote that the Zionist version of events related to the UN-GA 181 of 1947 became the paradigm to look at the whole history of the Palestinian issue, though Palestinians have refused to divide their land with settlers, which was a position similar to those by most peoples in the world who refused to divide their land with invading settlers. Khalidi wrote that the “partition resolution [UN-GA 181] meant, in effects, the establishment of a Zionist state on Palestinian soil irrespective of the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants and was taken by the Zionist leadership as a green light to launch their long-contemplated and delayed conquest of such a state. To most Westerners, thoroughly imbued with the Zionist version of events, this last statement would seem shockingly wrongheaded” (Khalidi 1997: 5).

As an example of this line of thinking in relation to the waves of boycott and anti-normalization, the research of Bsaiso on the Arab boycott policies argues for the legitimacy of the Arab boycott in line with the “international legitimacy”. International law becomes a site of contestation and interpretation that depend on the positions of actors. Bsaiso bases his arguments on quoting Arab legal writings on legitimizing Arab boycott policies.

Bsaiso argues that there have been continuous gross breaches by the Zionist movement, and then by Israel, to the general principles of international law. First, the successive Jewish immigration to Palestine has been occurring despite the rejection of Palestinians, which was expressed starting from 1919 by the Islamic-Christian conference in Jerusalem that refused Balfour Declaration, British mandate and Jewish immigration, and the subsequent continuous contestations in national conferences, revolts and official

\textsuperscript{31} For example, Mohammad Izzat Darwazeh, Arif al-Arif, Mustafa Morad al-Dabbagh and the academic Walid Khaildi.
letters. Second, the Balfour Declaration is considered illegitimate from the point of view of general law since it is not an international treaty and was conducted between a foreign minister of a state and Zionist individuals and bodies who lacked lawful existence in Palestine to determine the fate of a third country that the UK has nothing to do with, and has not even controlled Palestine at the time of Balfour declaration. Bsaiso adds that the declaration was issued before five years of the League of Nations’ mandate on Palestine. Hence, the mandate itself is illegitimate for this reason, \(^{32}\) and for the reason that the mandate system was justified by the Allied Powers on the basis of preparing countries “until such time as they are able to stand alone”, and not for the purpose of providing this land to other foreign communities (article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations). \(^{33}\) Third, Bsaiso continues, the UN-GA resolution 181 (on 29 November 1947), which “recommended” the partition of Palestine, is considered illegitimate since it is not the responsibility of the UN to create or divide states against the will of its peoples. \(^{34}\)

\(^{32}\) The Mandate on Palestine states that “the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. See: League of Nations, “Mandate for Palestine” (Geneva, 12 August 1922, Communiqué au Conseil et aux Membres de la Société, C. 529. M. 314. 1922. VI). UNISPAL website, via https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/2FCA2C68106F11AB05256BCF007BF3CB <accessed on 3 June 2015>

\(^{33}\) In article 22, the region previously under the Ottoman Empire was particularly regarded more “developed” as the convent divided the world according to its classification of world peoples to become part of the “modern world”. The article stated: “Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.” See: The Covenant of the League of Nations, Yale University website, via http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art21<last accessed on 19 February 2015>. With regard to the principle of self-determination, although international recognition was extended to this principle at the end of the First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab territories, at the time of the creation of the ‘A’ Mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there. Actually, it may well be said that the Jewish National Home and the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle. See: Hammond, Jeremy R., “The Myth of the U.N. Creation of Israel”, Foreign Policy Journal, 26 October 2010, via http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/10/26/the-myth-of-the-u-n-creation-of-israel/ <last accessed on 19 February 2016>. Additionally, the Levant countries including Palestine (previously under the Ottoman Empire) were considered by the mandate system under category A meaning that they are “more prepared” compared to other regions

\(^{34}\) In line with this logic, a sub-committee was established in the UN-GA to study the legal implications in 1947 and concluded that the UN could not “deprive the majority of the people of Palestine of their territory and transfer it to the exclusive use of a minority in the country…. The United Nations Organization has no power to create a new State. Such a decision can only be taken by the free will of the people of the territories
Another example of this line of reasoning is the academic article that Nabil ElAraby wrote back in 1968, when he was a first secretary representative of Egypt to the UN - four decades before being the Secretary General of the Arab League in 2011. He wrote in relation to the UN-GA resolution 181 (ElAraby 1968: 97):

The fate of the Palestinians was decided for them by the United Nations, to their detriment, without reference to the rule of law. No impartial observer could, in all fairness, deny that the United Nations was rushed into far-reaching actions affecting the lives of nearly two million Palestinians without having given careful and thorough examination to the legal implications involved. The legitimate aspirations and the high hopes of the whole Arab nation were consequently shattered when they saw with deep sorrow that the United Nations, the supposed conscience of mankind, had reached biased conclusions that brought grievous damage to the cause of justice and international morality.

This moral belief of rights caused much tension inside the different components of the PLO and among Arab states in trying to accommodate rights to politics. The PLO opted initially to match the right with political goals when the Palestinian National Covenant of 1968 adopted the goal of a liberated secular democratic state. That goal meant that all inhabitants have equal rights, and it avoided any references to the UN resolutions that recognize Israel. Abdel-Raheem al-Shaikh, a philosophy professor at Birzeit University and from the boycott atmospheres, wrote that the PACBI campaign in 2004 “though has not adopted a political project by this campaign (meaning that related solutions: The one state, two states, …), since it is the responsibilities of the head of the Palestinian National Movement (the PLO), the campaign [PACBI] called back the eloquent language [balaghat] of the first Palestinian National Covenant (that was amended in 1996) in taking the responsibility of defending the Palestinian rights, and communicating the

in question. That condition is not fulfilled in the case of the majority proposal, as it involves the establishment of a Jewish State in complete disregard of the wishes and interests of the Arabs of Palestine”. Yet, the UN-GA passed the partition plan of November 1947. Actually, this was the position, for example, of Faris El-Khoury of the Syrian representative to the U.N., who said that “the General Assembly is not a world government which can dictate orders, partition countries or impose constitutions, rules, regulations and treaties on people without their consent.” At that time, Jews constituted no majority in any city in Palestine despite the accelerated immigration waves during the British mandate; either in numbers or in land property. The partition plan was rejected on this basis by the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine- that was a representative to the Palestinians then- in a letter to the Secretary General of the UN). And the Arab states at the UN asked that the issue of the legality of a UN sponsored partition plan to be referred to the International Court of Justice, but the issue was not put on vote before the UN-GA. See: Hammond; op. cit.
Palestinian injustices in the different geographies of the occupied homeland and in diaspora [shatat] as well’.35

During the first appearance of the late Yasser Arafat before the UN-GA in November 1974, he did not mention any UN resolution related to Palestine. Instead, he said that the “question of Palestine is being re-examined by the United Nations, and we consider that step to be a victory for the world Organization as much as a victory for the cause of our people. It indicates anew that the United Nations of today is not the United Nations of the past, just as today's world is not yesterday's world. Today's United Nations represents 138 nations [….] the League of Nations abandoned our Arab people, and Wilson's pledges and promises came to nought. In the guise of a Mandate, British imperialism was cruelly and directly imposed upon us. The Mandate issued by the League of Nations was to enable the Zionist invaders to consolidate their gains in our homeland”.36 Hence, the PLO opted for isolating Israel and Zionism internationally and not recognizing the UN resolutions as they legitimize colonization. However, this position would change, as will be discussed in chapter five that is related to a changing world field on Palestine.

However, the Nakba narrative is still believed in by all actors discussed to form the BDS movement, and extended to the “continuous Nakba” narrative. Stop the Wall is a member organization of the National Committee for the Commemoration of the Nakba, and participates in the annual marches and activities on the annual commemoration of Nakba.37 In one of its early publications, it considered the wall as the “second Nakba”,38 and part of the “ongoing Nakba”.39

Ameer Makhoul, the ex-coordinator of Ittijah, argued - while commenting on the way to Durban conference in 2001 - for “consolidating the approach of solidarity movements with the Palestinian people as a people in the West Bank, Gaza, diaspora

37 “About Us”, Stop the Wall, via https://www.stopthewall.org/about-us <accessed on 25 August 2015>
(shatat) and inside [the Green Line]⁴⁰, as one Palestinian cause, all descending from the Nakba”⁴¹.

Baramki who himself being displaced from the Western part of Jerusalem in 1948 with his family and lost their house that he kept thinking about how to return it (Baramki 2010, al-Shaikh 2015) wrote also on the discrimination against Palestinian academics inside the Green Line, and considered Nakba a Palestinian memory commemorated each year (Baramki 2010 : 76). Some BDS actors from PACBI’s atmosphere still call for one democratic secular Palestinian state (for instance, Omar Barghouti and Haidar Eid among others). George Giacaman (2011), the founder of Muwatin and then part of PACBI, wrote in 2001 that the Nakba is the common unifying issue of the Palestinian identity.

Badil has been formed in 1998 particularly for this issue, out of fear that political negotiations during the Oslo process could sacrifice the right of return of refugees. Badil instituted “Badil Ongoing Nakba Education Centre”.⁴² As in a 2002 statement published on Badil’s website commemorating Nakba, it stated that in Palestinians inside the Green Line “owned more than 90 percent of the land in historic Mandate Palestine. Today, the indigenous Palestinian Arab population owns and controls just over 10 percent of the land within the borders of their historic homeland (i.e. inside Israel and the 1967 occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip”).⁴³ Badil issued a statement in 2010 entitled “The Nakba is Not Just an Event to Remember...The Nakba is Ongoing, and the Time has Come for it to End”.⁴⁴

Badil based its reasoning on “rights-based approach” to the rights of refugees to return, and not to be ignored by potential political solutions and negotiations that have been taking place in the 1990s. Badil, among others, was able to widen the scope of the right of

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⁴⁰ This means Palestinians who are currently Israeli citizens.
⁴¹ Ameer Makhoul, “Four Years on Durban Conference: Zionism is racism, Israel is apartheid” (in Arabic), the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, 3 September 2005, via http://www.anhri.net/palestine/ittijah/2005/pr0903.shtml <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
⁴⁴ “BADIL Statement: The Nakba is Not Just an Event to Remember...The Nakba is Ongoing, and the Time has Come for it to End”, Human Rights Voices website (originally at Badil’s website), 15 May 2010, http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/site/documents/?d=9994 <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
return among PNGO circles since the end of the 1990s. The rights-based approach is a way to muddle through diverse Palestinian political views, amid building a wide coalition, so that the movement as a whole does not take an explicit political stand (i.e. one state or two states). It is an approach that would be re-produced by the BDS movement that based itself on rights-based approach, as a different dimension from the previous waves of boycott.

Hence, in the subsequent waves that have been trying to isolate Israel through boycotts, the Nakba analogy has not been surrendered though political developments varied across time. However, each wave has its distinctive character and part of political developments related to it. This research is beyond focusing on the previous waves, and finds it is sufficient to demonstrate dimensions in which the BDS wave is related to them but with its own new characters. The research focuses on this new wave to understand it.

2. The example of Gabi Baramki

In the academic dimension, where PACBI is a major instituting body of the BDS movement, the example of the late Gabi Baramki (1929-2012) can give us a clearer picture of the habitus. Inside this habitus, cultural and social capitals are also embodied.

Baramki served for a long time as the vice-president of Birzeit University, in Palestine, and practically the acting executive president, chairman of the executive committee of the Palestinian Council for Higher Education (CHE), and a steering committee member of PACBI (formed in 2004). Also, he combined the academic experience with civil society organizations. Besides being a founder and president of the Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, he also participated at the civil society conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in the 1990s and 2000s. The BDS norms had been discussed there during the period of the second Intifada. He was also the inaugural speaker for the first BDS national conference in 2007.

The bibliography of Baramki (Baramki 2010, al-Shaikh 2015) shows historical practices and perceptions he had gone through at Birzeit University. Moreover, his cultural

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46 For example, Omar Barghouti writes (quoted in Erakat 2012: 88): “the fundamental pillar of the BDS call was its rights-based approach that does not endorse any particular political solution to the Arab-Israeli colonial conflict, but insists that for any solution to be just and sustainable it must address all three basic rights stated in the call.”
and social capitals have developed since studying at Birzeit School then acting as a vice president for Birzeit University under occupation. They together generate a tendency to the BDS movement.

He witnessed the loss of the family home in West Jerusalem in 1948 and displacement, then lived the occupation through frequent closures of Palestinian universities and the killing and arrest of students as well shooting his 14 years-old daughter during a peaceful school march in 1980 (Baramki 2010: 19). He also witnessed discrimination against Palestinian professors holding Israeli nationality, and he experienced the lack of solidarity by Israeli universities and rectors with the Palestinian universities under occupation, he wrote. These experiences facilitate a tendency in line with the three main goals of the BDS movement: end of occupation, end of Israeli discrimination and the right of return of refugees.

Baramki was a partner in Nasir’s family educational project who instituted Birzeit University from a school. The family and cultural capital, which Bourdieu (1982) gives high priority in tracing habitus trajectories, are so evident in Baramki’s relation with Nasir family (Baramki 2010: vii). For them, the university has not only been an academic project but also a national political project, where the exchange between the cultural capital and political one has been evident.

Other than his internal way- the main way- of resisting Israeli occupation at Birzeit University (BZU), as part of his habitus, he joined a transnational organization called the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (founded in 1957 by Joseph Rotblat and Bertrand Russell in Pugwash, Canada). The organization believes in non-violence. He mobilized the World Council of Churches, and PEACE (Palestinian European Academic Cooperation in Education) to pressure Israel during the closures of BZU. Baramki and BZU have learned gradually to mobilize Palestinian, Arab and Western influence in trying to sustain BZU, pressure the Israeli occupation not to close BZU and/or stop oppression.

For a long time until the early 1990s, BZU had depended on Arab funding through the PLO. Additionally, BZU has taken funds from Ford Foundation in 1952 to transfer the school into Birzeit College, and a fund from USAID in 1960 to have associate degree in public administration (though Baramki will be more cautious from US aid later on). After Oslo agreements, BZU had more European funding.
BZU’s international staff reached almost third of the university staff at a time enabling them to benefit academically and having witnesses to oppression (Baramki 2010: 39). Since 1978, they have opened associated friends offices in London and Michigan and other places to support them. In the 1980s, they signed sister-ship agreements with European universities (Baramki: 116-118), and during the first Intifada they mobilized European universities and official bodies in trying to pressure Israel to re-open BZU and other universities.

In addition to Baramki’s and BZU’s focus of their actions inside Palestine, further trajectories of Baramki in Palestinian and transnational politics are discussed in other sections of the thesis.

On the Arab habitus, Baramki wrote that he replied to the “mainstream Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot [that] published an article that went back into the history of Birzeit in the 1930s and 1940s, telling its readers that the institution was even then known to encourage Arab nationalism. That part of it was true and were not ashamed of it. What to us was ‘nationalistic’ was ‘criminal’ to them” (Baramki : 49). Baramki uses apostrophes between the word nationalistic, indicating maybe to the different meanings the word can have; either liberating against an external oppressor or oppressive against another internal or external group or in spectrum in between depending on what associated with it.

The founder of BZU had a pan-Arab tendency, and the early school started to teach in Arabic. Baramki himself had developed friendship with Palestinian pan-Arabs (as George Habash) during his study at the American University of Beirut. These persons had a leading role in the Palestinian resistance against Israel (Baramki 2010, al-Shaikh 2015). Baramki describes the development of BZU where they “gradually established an informal liaison office in Amman […]. We were a Middle East university and needed to know what people were reading in the Arab world” (68), and BZU initiated a one year program for foreigners entitled “Palestine and Arab Studies”.

On the institutional level, the first accreditation of BZU passed through the Arab academic circles first. In the meeting of the Association of Arab Universities in Iraq in 1976, they voted smoothly on accepting BZU. Baramki demonstrates as well how they were linking with the Arab world secretly so they are not punished by the Israeli occupation. He writes: “I got used to moving back and forth between the realm of the
Israeli military and the forbidden world of Arab education sponsors and the PLO” (67). Most of the funding of BZU, other than the tuition fees, had been from Arab sources and passed through the PLO then.

However, the Arab *habitus* is diverse inside each of its cultural, academic, linguistic, social, financial and political dimensions. In the negative side, Baramki also witnessed oppressive elements that were practiced by various Arab regimes. For example, official Jordanian circles feared BZU as a competition to the Jordanian universities (Baramki 2010, al-Shaikh 2015); instead of encouraging independent emergent Palestinian experiences against the occupation. This caution has manifested itself as well in denying official approval to the university, back then, since it was a Palestinian national expression not part of official Jordanian aspirations in Palestine, Baramki describes. In another place, Baramki mentions their “great disappointment” by the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David accords, which “failed even to mention Palestinian national aspirations” (78). Moreover, for most Palestinian actors, Arab borders through Jordan and Egypt that follow the Israeli border controls are obligatory to travel outside Palestine. Such borders are not an easy experience either in relation to time, check in (out) and security investigation if not the denial of entry especially for political reasons, as some interviewees from the research indicate.

Similarly, Omar Barghouti says that he learned while being a student at Columbia University in 1983 that without the Arabs, the Israeli ethnic cleansing of Palestinians would have been complete if Palestinians were not part of the Arabs and their strategic region. At the same time, while Barghouti also points to the Arab struggle for freedom from authoritarianism and from dependency in politics is correlated to the Palestinian issue.47

Baramki, before the formation of the BDS movement, has been engaged in a decision of academic boycott during the first *intifada*. The Palestinian Council for Higher Education (CHE) took a decision of non-cooperation with Israeli academic institutions amid the closure of Palestinian universities.

47 “‘Omar’: Leading a different kind of resistance”, An interview at Al-Qabas newspaper (Kuwait; 16 October 2011, in Arabic); via http://www.alqabas.com.kw/Articles.aspx?ArticleID=742276&CatID=304 <last accessed on 19 February 2016>
He became part of PACBI in 2004, which was the first institutionalized Palestinian initiative to issue a boycott call based on the South African anti-apartheid experience. PACBI became a major body in establishing the BDS movement. In the first Palestinian BDS conference in 2007, Baramki made a clear reference to earlier Palestinian boycotts. It highlights the importance of previous waves of boycott to the current movement, as part of personal and/or collective trajectories or as a mean or legitimizing the movement as being part of the continuous Palestinian struggle. The first BDS conference’s steering committee reported in 2007:

The conference was opened by Dr. Gabi Baramki (PACBI) who reminded participants of the fact that boycott has been a tool of the Palestinian struggle since the 1920s. He stated that the power of popular boycott derived from international law and universal ethical principles, and emphasized the timeliness of a Palestinian popular boycott movement, especially now, when isolation and fragmentation are imposed more than ever on the Palestinian people, in order to bring about loss of hope, dignity and surrender. Boycott and popular struggle contributed to the liberation of India and South Africa, he stated, adding that, while it is true that the challenge for Palestinians is bigger, because South Africa never enjoyed the level of support Israel has from the United States and Europe, the Palestinian boycott campaign can be effective because of Israel’s ultimate dependence, politically, diplomatically and economically, on the West.48

3. Politicized social movements and coalition building

Politicized civil society actors

After the eruption of the first Palestinian Intifada in December 1987, Palestinian organizations got more active in protesting occupation, boycotts campaigns or helping the uprising through services and popular committees (agriculture, health, education, etc.). It is important to understand that under occupation and resisting it, diverse Palestinian organizations and institutions were not largely typical universities, NGOs or health providers for example; but they were part of the resistance atmosphere with a highly politicized dimension, which has been a strong part of their trajectory. Therefore, it is not surprising that they engage frequently in political programs that resemble social and political movements rather than NGOs focusing on specific issue of expertise.

It is not only leaders of NGOs have been related to political experiences or parties in their *habitus*, but many of the employees of NGOs are still affiliated. According to the survey conducted by Gerster and Baumgarten (2011: 9) in relation to the employees of NGOs, though being “a member of a political party is not as common as it was during the 1970s and 1980s, 37% of NGO employees have been members of a political party. Currently 24% are members of a political party and 16% are active members. 37% of NGO employee’s still feel loyalty to a party they have left”.

As the research of Hammami (2000: 16) on Palestinian NGOs observes, “[p]rior to the emergence of the PA, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were among the few areas in the Middle East where a political space was available for the emergence of a strong and pluralistic infrastructure of NGOs. This was achieved both despite and because of the Israeli occupation.”

The different actors to engage in forming the BDS movement have been part of the politicized Palestinian experience from their own positions. If talking about Baramki (from PACBI), Birzeit University as well as other Palestinian universities have been spaces of political aspirations besides their academic missions. As Baramki explains, Birzeit University was subject to closures, the university engaged in informal education that became widespread during the first *intifada*.

Baramki has been active in the Palestinian politics then. For example, during the first *Intifada*, he was one of the persons declaring in a press conference in Jerusalem what to be regarded as the political demands of the Palestinian *Intifada*.49

Similar atmospheres have emerged in other “civil society” organizations. For example, the Agricultural Relief PARC was founded in 1983 by young agronomists who graduated then from the USSR. The organization has been associated with the Palestinian Communist party (Abu-Sada 2007). As Parsons (2005: 50) articulates it, “the PCP [communist party] established the Union of Medical Relief Committees [chaired now by Mustafa Barghouti] in 1982 and the agricultural equivalent PARC in 1983, building on ‘the extant voluntary work committees’. Initiatives such as these did not go unnoticed by other

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factions keen to maximize popular grass roots support. The PFLP, the DFLP, and lastly Fateh each established parallel institutions for health, agriculture, labor, and women, until by the mid-1980s, ‘there were five women’s committees, four health committees, at least two agricultural committees and two competing labour union federations’”.

The Palestinian Communist Party was considered in Europe’s most leftist circles the most moderate among Palestinian factions (joined the PLO in 1987). It was the only faction to early recognize the UN resolution to divide Palestine (affected by the Soviet position as well), and distanced itself from armed struggle (that caused split in the party in that bases with the then newly formed the Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party). As Hanafi and Tabar’s research (2005: 64) demonstrates, the communist party particularly “was oriented to Western sources of funding much earlier than other factions” [in the 1970s]. The party had received most of the funding resources through their NGOs (Particularly Agricultural Relief PARC and the Medical Relief UPMRC), mainly from French and German donors.

Mustafa Barghouti (born in 1954) was part as well of the Medical Relief UPMRC that started its establishment in 1979. He had been related to the communist party. Barghouti became a leading person in the party, and co-headed the party in 1998 (Mattar 2005: 96). He left the party in 2003. He was a founding member of the Palestinian National Initiative (al-Moubadara) in 2002 with Haidar Abdel Shafi, Ibrahim Dakkak (also part of PACBI) and Edward Said among others. At least until the year of issuing the BDS call in 2005, he believed in the two states’ solution, but in opposition to Oslo accords. He was also part of the steering committee of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid talks before the delegation resigned after discovering the Oslo secretive track.50

The Medical Relief UPMRC is the biggest health NGO, and since 1979 it has been involved in mobile clinics to Palestinian places under occupation. During the second intifada, mobile clinks increased. In “2003-2004, PMRS [previously UPMRC] ran sixteen mobile clinics”. This is significant when the percentage of Palestinian persons without any health insurance is 39.6% in the year 2000, and with poverty rate of 32 percent- living

50 Ibid.
under USD 2 per day- as reported by the UN in 2001.\textsuperscript{51} In 2001, the Medical Relief UPMRC reported that 254,262 patients have been seen in the Medical Relief UPMRC health centers, and 38,850 beneficiaries in mobile clinics. It also reported that there were 1,200 health professionals (volunteering), 250 employees, and 23,000 community volunteers.\textsuperscript{52} In general, between 1967 - the year of the occupation- and 1992, the public sector has declined sharply, while “the NGO sector’s share of total health care provision increased from 8 percent to 68 percent” (Habasch 1999: 19).

After the occupation in 1967, sixty percent of the newly established clinics were run by “health committees while the remaining 40 percent of the clinics were established by charitable organizations and the private sector” (Habasch 1999: 19). The strength of the emergent Palestinian civil society after occupation, mostly resembled by diverse popular committees, has been moving to the form of institutionalizing as NGOs. Paradoxically, as Hanafi and Tabar points out, after the PA’s emergence, a sort of sharp contradiction developed among leftist NGOs that found themselves also in somehow neo-liberal line. They have been pushing ahead for strengthening a non-governmental sector (not only against the authoritarian policies by the PA), and depending less and less on voluntarism and more and more on the funding of neo-liberal sources. From its side, the PA followed neo-liberal policies\textsuperscript{53} and has been suspicious of the non-governmental NGOs because it feared competition from them.

Particularly, the Medical Relief UPMRC has been the most critical NGO to the PA’s attempt to take the responsibility of the health sector. Other health committees criticized the PA’s health policy in terms of its favor of political appointees close to the PA, or in aspects of its health policy, while one of them dissolved itself and integrated in the ministry of health as it saw that the responsibility of health sector should be the PA’s one. However, the “UPMRC went a step further than the above mentioned health committees. It

\textsuperscript{51} Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (2001 prochure), via http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/upmcr_01.pdf <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
\textsuperscript{52} Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (2001), op. cit.
\textsuperscript{53} For example, the PA’s health policy focused on secondary and tertiary health provision compared to primary health provision, which affects the more marginalized segments of the society. Habasch (1999: 16) demonstrates that while “primary health care represents approximately 90 percent of health care usage, only 16 percent of the overall budget of the MOH is allocated to primary health care. In contrast, secondary and tertiary health care, which constitute 10 percent of the usage in the health sector, consume 80 percent of the MOH’s expenditure on health.”
criticized not only the structure of the PHC [Palestinian Health Council of the PA], but also the health plans for their approach to health care delivery. Moreover, unlike the UHWC and the UHCC [other health NGOs], the UPMRC presented its own alternative vision. This vision emphasized the important role of NGOs in providing the necessary expertise for health policy formulation at the national level. Furthermore, health care reform, according to the UPMRC, should be a joint effort by all health care providers, with the primary function of the MOH [Ministry of Health] being the design of health policy” (Habasch 1999: 14-15).

From the point of view of the Medical Relief UPMRC, it advocated that the health care to reach the marginalized and justified itself in terms of “grassroots activism”. A self-description says: “PMRS' mobile clinics are an example of how the grassroots sector of the Palestinian medical/health care system has adapted and grow”.  

Frequently, professionals and volunteers work in war areas and get injuries. Mustafa Barghouti was injured, beaten or shortly detained in different occasions. In October 2015, he was subject to an alleged assassination attempt with a sharp metal or knife and he accused the Israeli side.

Mustapha Barghouti was raised in a politicized family, with progressive atmosphere, and his grandfather and father were subject to prisons. Transnationally, as a biography article in 2004 describes him, he was the “international spokesman for the Palestinian NGO sector, and organizer of international solidarity presence in the OPT”. He was involved in the second Intifada in the establishment of the Grassroots International Protection for the Palestinian People in 2001 and a major figure in hosting a World Social Forum session in Palestine in 2002. These steps were just few years before the BDS call in 2005.

He has also been active in the Palestinian civil society field in trying to have an impact on Palestinian politics (i.e. the Palestinian National Initiative Al-Mubadarah).

54 “Mobile Clinics - Programs”, PMRS website (no date), via http://www.pmrs.ps/details.php?id=q1duk2a2074ybe2zvb0pe <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
55 Ibid.
Attached to *Al-Mubadarah* is a boycott campaign called *Badir* (means “take an initiative”) in the late 2000s that calls on Palestinians to boycott Israeli products inside Palestine, and especially active inside universities.\(^{58}\) As the research of Habasch (1999) indicates, the Medical Relief UPMRC had extended wide and diverse links with health providers, the PA and other NGOs while preserving its leading position. Yet, this position will be contested - though with cooperation - at the same time by other coalitions during the second *Intifada* until forming the BDS call.

Similar to linking NGOs to politics and in the same health field, the late Ahmad Maslamani (born in 1958) studied medicine in Romania and joined the PFLP (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). He was arrested by Israel on numerous occasions for prolonged periods. He was a founding member of the Union of Health Work Committees in 1985. A young member of this committee (and BDS National Committee member) relates to that experience by saying that it was founded on volunteerism and different from the current NGO atmospheres.\(^{59}\) Maslamani, as many other persons in these atmospheres, stayed a member of the central committee of the PFLP, and became a steering committee member of Stop the Wall, as the latter publishes an article in condolence.\(^{60}\) In describing Maslamani, the article wrote that he “stood firm against normalization and his voice was influential among Palestinian civil society organizations”\(^{61}\).

Though both Mustafa Barghouti and Ahmad Maslamani have been active in politicized health committees, there are still small differences as well, which reflected itself in the bodies forming the BDS movement. With smaller health committee, in a trajectory related to PFLP with more emphasis on the liberation of Palestine and the refugee issue, Union of Health Work Committees was aligned with Stop the Wall and OPGAI coalitions though it was also part of PNGO as well.

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\(^{59}\) Interview with D. G. (Brussels, 18 November 2014).

\(^{60}\) Stop the Wall, “In Memoriam: Dr. Ahmad Maslamani”, *the Electronic Intifada*, 7 January 2008, via http://electronicintifada.net/content/memoriam-dr-ahmad-maslamani/796 <last accessed on 20 February 2016>

Actually, most of social movements to emerge during the 1980s were associated with political factions around the PLO, in an attempt to assert its alternative leadership to any Israeli encouraged leadership (i.e. “village leagues” in the 1970s), and also as a sort of diversity and competition reflected in political factions.

Other examples for those who are attached to the BDS movement but not necessarily part of the National Committee is Hanan Ashrawi (from Miftah NGO), who participated in the Durban conference in 2001. She had a historical political experience in the PLO (executive committee member), and became a minister in the PA until 1996 when she resigned. Similar to other discussed actors, she combined the political experience (part of the PLO) with experiences related to the BDS one (i.e. rights-based approach, human rights and global connections). She founded an NGO called “the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy”, abbreviated as Miftah (means key). As some aspects from her public profile highlights:

He [her father Daoud Mikhail] made his daughter aware of her surrounding and challenged her to use her own perceptions of the world and to have a unique voice. Daoud Mikhail impressed on his daughter the main issues. First, he used to always say "women deserve equality by right and not as a gift condescendingly bestowed by men." Second, a famous statement of his was, "liberate yourself, you liberate the land." Both statements are evident in the work of MIFTAH, the non-governmental organization she created and heads since 1998, and show the enduring influence they had on her life. […] Her political career began as early as her days at AUB [American University of Beirut], where she was actively involved in student politics and even helped dig shelters in Palestinian refugee camps, driven by her passionate commitment to the Palestinian cause. While studying in America she also became actively involved in the Women's Movement, a cause she continues to proudly advocate. […] As the university [Birzeit where she taught] suffered intermittent closures by the Israeli military, Ashrawi was busy founding the Birzeit University Legal Aid Committee/Human Rights Action project and teaching in her home or at a local hostel. However, this was only the beginning, her political work was about to take a great leap. […] She joined the Intifada Political Committee, serving as well on its Diplomatic Committee until 1993. From 1991 - 1993 Yasser Arafat appointed her as Official Spokesperson of the Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Peace Process and a member of the Leadership/Guidance Committee and Executive Committee of the Delegation. […] In 1993, with the Oslo Peace Accords signed by Arafat and Rabin, and Palestinian self rule established, Ashrawi headed the Preparatory Committee of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights in Jerusalem, and was Founder and Commissioner of that committee until 1995. […] In 1998, however, Ashrawi resigned from the government in protest against political corruption, specifically Arafat's handling of peace talks. At the same time, she founded MIFTAH -- the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, whose ultimate goal is a respect for human rights, democracy and peace. MIFTAH reflects Dr. Ashrawi's drive to end the Israeli occupation on humanitarian, rather than historical or ideological, grounds.
Dr. Ashrawi is a member of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo and of numerous international advisory boards including the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA), and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).

Another person who played a role in the Durban conference and BDS formation is Ameer Makhoul, who was the coordinator of Ittijah (the NGOs umbrella inside the Green Line). He commented on the process leading to Durban conference in 2001, where he was an active person, that funding from Ford Foundation and USAID have tried to pressure Palestinian NGOs inside the Green Line to form a united body with Israeli NGOs. He wrote that “the choice was decided by the organized civil action sector through Ittijah to take the general Palestinian, the regional Arab and international dimensions as strategic routes while being aware what the price to pay for this [choice]”.

The example of Ameer Makhoul (born in 1958 in Makhool village near Haifa city) solved this contradiction as being coming from this atmosphere of NGOs but also from a political atmosphere, and continued to be so. He co-founded the Arab Student Union in Israeli universities in the 1980s (he is a graduate of sociology from Haifa University), and headed it. He was a member of political movements Haraqit Mithaq (Constitution Movement) and Hizb al-Tajamoe al-Democratie (Democratic Gathering Party) where both were led by Azmi Bshara. Makhoul became the coordinator of Liberties Committee at the mass-based body the Follow-Up Higher Committee of Arab Masses (inside the Green Line) in the 2000s. He was a co-founder of Ittijah in 1995 as an umbrella of Palestinian NGOs inside the Green Line. His line was different from the historical line represented by the Israeli Communist Party, which was almost the only early legal entity for the Palestinians inside the Green Line after Nakba. The Israeli Communist Party defended rights of Palestinians and sought at the same time the “integration” of Palestinians in the Israeli state and society. Makhoul connected activism and call for equity not with integration in the Israeli society but in linking with the Palestinian cause elsewhere and viewed Israel as a Zionist colonial state.

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63 Ameer Makhoul, “Four Years on Durban Conference: Zionism is racism, Israel is apartheid” ; op. cit.
On the split *habitus*, Makhoul has concentrated his activism inside the Green Line with Palestinians elsewhere. He combined both political and NGO activism, and had split *habitus* between Arab, Global South and North routes before forming the BDS movement. He headed to Durban conference in 2001 part of the Arab group, where he also wrote on the importance of the links with Arabs and the Global South. He was a member of the international Council of the World Social Forum, and was also active in the framework of the EURO-MED NGOs Platform, and he represented *Ittijah* at the UN Economic and Social Council.

*Social capital and Coalition building*

In these experiences, one can see the social capital inside Palestine, transnationally and internationally. These persons have been active during the second *Intifada*, where the Agricultural Relief PARC for example hosted *al-Marsad* (the Observatory) for boycotting Israeli goods, which was a coalition of Palestinian bodies. It does not only show the politicized experiences but also consolidated social capital with wide social and political actors. Their experiences demonstrate the development of wide networks and social connections that combine political factions, NGOs, universities and research centers, media. These networks also extend beyond Palestine into transnational and international links as demonstrated by the examples of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) and World (and European) Social Forums (chapter six).

The 2001 annual report of the Agricultural Relief PARC, during the second *Intifada*, demonstrates its wide links with diverse NGOs, PA ministries, Arab and international networks. For example, on coalitions and connections, the report states what to be recognized as the Agricultural Relief PARC’s high resources: “PARC is hosting the Palestinian Network of NGOS (PNGO) as well as the Palestinian Committee for Boycotting Israeli Settlements’ Products, the Committee for Agricultural Coordination, the Arab Network for Sustainable Agriculture as well as the Organic Agriculture Network

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64 *Ibid.*

65 “The Prisoner Ameer Hanna Faris Makhoul” (in Arabic), Assra 48 website [n.d.], via http://assra48.com/Asser_Profile.aspx?XID=48 <last accessed on 20 February 2016>. Makhoul was arrested by the Israeli authorities in 2010 and sentenced for 11 years in prison for a “security case”, where he allegedly helped to give coordinates of Israeli security places to *Hizbollah*. 91
among the local and regional networks […]. The good relationship PARC has with 350 institutions opens wider scopes and improves efficiency in monitoring the projects‘ implementation”.66 The Agricultural Relief PARC provides a detailed decomposition of its relations: 150 [Palestinian] NGOs, 35 international governmental and non-governmental organizations, 20 [Palestinian] ministries and governmental organizations, 15 international organizations locally, 10 universities and research centers, 17 [Palestinian] networks and coordinating committees, and 120 village and local councils.67

Also, Jamal Juma (around 53 years-old) has been associated with the Agricultural Relief PARC, and was a founding member of the Palestinian Environmental NGO Network (PENGON) in 1996 to become a body forming Stop the Wall in October 2002. Stop the Wall and the Agricultural Relief PARC also worked together during the second Intifada in Land Defense Committees (Norman 2009).

In Badil’s case, it reports in its annual report of 2006 that it engaged in the following institutional affiliations; either in Palestinian circles or transnational and international settings:

BADIL is a member of the global Palestine Right-of-Return Coalition (since 2000; […]), al-Awda Right-to-Return Coalition registered in the U.S.A (since 2001), OPGAI-Occupied Palestinian and Syrian Golan Heights Advocacy Initiative (since 2004), HIC-Habitat International Coalition (since 2002), and an affiliate of CRIN-Child Rights Information Network (since 2002). In 2005, BADIL became a member of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and signed a partnership agreement with UNHCR..68

In its annual report of 2001, Badil demonstrated that it engaged in “a dozen key organizations and advocacy initiatives from Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, North America and Europe, participants in two annual strategy workshop (Cyprus, October 2000; Brussels, November 2001). This, and the formation of numerous new right-of-return initiatives by Palestinian communities in exile, have led to a situation where global

networking and coordination around the right of return have become self-sustainable”.\(^{69}\)

Moreover, *Badil* has an “oversight committee” that includes members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (of the PA) and members or advisors to the PLO’s National Council,\(^{70}\) which again demonstrates the connections between these NGOs and political actors.

All of these mentioned organizations (*Badil, Ittijah, PACBI, Stop the Wall and PNGO*) are major components in the road to forming the BDS call in 2005. Most have also acquired skills in wide coalition building in Palestine, regionally and transnationally, with split *habitus*. *Ittijah* and PNGO were formed as wide coalitions in 1995 and 1993, consecutively, inside the Green Line and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, after Oslo Agreement. Stop the Wall is a coalition that started forming in 2002-2003. *Badil* engaged in forming another coalition in 2004 and 2005 (OPGAI-Occupied Palestinian and Syrian Golan Heights Advocacy Initiative), amid preparation to participate in the World Social Forum.

OPGAI was formed by 10 organizations then, with a different direction from PNGO. This initiative indicated one of its main aims as: “the building of a [*sic*] new Democratic social movements in the Israeli occupied territories”, and normatively seeks to rely “on the voluntary efforts of its member organizations as well as support from international partners who share common values and objectives”. It pointed out that its first objective is “to promote cooperation and collaboration among sectors of the secular civil society including unions, associations, NGOs and the grassroots. From the work towards the first objective, OPGAI seeks to form a core group made up of diverse representatives of Palestinian civil society to establish a common definition of a unified democratic social movement”.\(^{71}\)

This coalition building between different movements and NGOs has been a main characteristic for these NGOs and social movements, which inclined them to institute another wide coalition resembled by the BDS call in 2005.

Each of these NGOs or other bodies had its own activism inside the Palestinian field, with diverse experiences and positions, which developed diverse position-takings. For example, most of them have participated in boycott campaigns against Israeli products or

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\(^{70}\) See for example the annual report of 2006; *op. cit.*

taxes during the first and second Palestinian Intifadas, before forming the BDS movement. As an article by the head of Research at Bisan Center (part of OPGAI) indicates, the 1980s “witnessed the birth of the developmental civil organizations that were based on a resistance discourse of development […], and was grounded on the two slogans of boycott and local production”.

Most Palestinian NGOs, in addition to their activism inside Palestine or the roles they played in the South Africa’s Durban conference, at the World Social Forum or at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), also developed close links with Northern NGOs and social movements with common values (other than funding). They have also been inclined to the values of HR, international humanitarian law and the ‘Boomerang’ pathway into Northern, and through Southern routes. As a participant in forming the BDS movement says (Ingrid Jaradat, who is European Palestinian), links of transnational social movements with their organization (Badil) had been long before the BDS movement and continued after it. As will be explored in the world field of power on Palestine, especially in the period of the second Intifada, these movements/NGOs have developed wide and close links with Global Northern and Southern actors before forming the BDS movement.

Moreover, the connections between academics and NGOs have been strong. On the base level of NGOs, according to the survey conducted by Gerster and Baumgarten (2011: 3), an “academic background is shared by 90% of NGO employees (59% BA, 19% diploma, 12% MA and 1% PhD […])”. Also, 40 percent engage in improving their education and training courses.

Some Palestinian research institutions are active in networking and part of the NGOs or other initiatives. For example, OPGAI initiative that was active in calling for transnational boycotts at the World Social Forum had in its membership Bisan Center for Research and Development, and Land Research Center and Environmental Education Center, besides Badil and other NGOs that produce research. Since the period of the first Palestinian Intifada, as the research of Hammami (2000: 16) finds out, “dozens of donor-
supported research centers emerged during this period, many founded by academics during the long years of Israeli-imposed university closures”.

For example, Hanan Ashrawi instituted Miftah in 1998 after resigning from the Palestinian Authority in 1996. Similarly, Ibrahim Dakkak, from PACBI, was also a co-founder of the political Palestinian National Initiative in 2002 with Mustapha Barghouti and Haidar Abdel Shafi. Different persons related to PACBI have instituted NGOs or have been part of NGOs such as George Giacaman from Muwatin (means Citizen) NGO, or the late Jacqueline Sfeir and Mdad (means Support), Jamil Hilal from Muwatin, Riham Barghouti and Adalah’s branch in New York.

Type of actors

Hanafi and Tabar (2005) distinguish between different types of NGOs. They argue that NGOs like the Agricultural Relief PARC and the Medical Relief UPMRC “not only accumulated experiences in fundraising but also formed long-term relationships with INGOs. INGOs, mainly the solidarity groups with leftist orientations, provided generous support to leftist local organizations. At the same time, Islamist NGOs, which also emerged in the 1980s, raised most of their funds locally but also drew on their own external networks, with aid being provided from the Palestinian diaspora but also from foreign, primarily Arab, states” (64). However, Mega-NGOs say that they still have moderate funding compared to the major political factions. They also have moderate popular recognition.

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74 She has been active in the “apartheid” analogy since Durban WCAR in 2001, where she gave a speech at the NGO Forum in Durban addressing the analogy of “apartheid” to the case of Israel, until her recent article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz titled “The boycott is our Palestinian non-violent resistance” on 11 February 2014, and her lobbying with the Kuwaiti authorities in 2014 to boycott a company (Veolia) that is on the main list of the BDS movement, has also main aspects of previous trajectories that make her supportive to the BDS. She and her NGO were one of the Palestinian bodies that signed the BDS call in 2005 and is part of PNGO as well.


76 For example, the list he headed in the 2006 PA’s legislative elections that is mainly composed from civil society circles, the list got 2.7 percent of the general vote. In his nomination to the PA’s presidential election in 2005 (competing Mahmoud Abbas) he got around 20 percent of the vote.
There are diverse “positions” among actors. The combination of trajectory of each actor or set of actors, and other sorts of capitals provide more understanding. In this part of the research, three broad groups are identified in relation to their *habitus*, though these groups intersect and there are blurry boundaries between them.

Firstly, there are the actors of sustained trajectories of engaging in mass political mobilizations. They have lower cultural capitals in their Palestinian society, stronger social capital inside the Palestinian political society and recognized as such. Therefore, they have higher political and symbolic capitals as recognized largely in the Palestinian society(ies), while they have lower transnational social and cultural capitals with Northern actors (though still they have good connections). These actors have been important in the mobilization of the boycott norm in the Palestinian society during the second *intifada*. Some of them developed transnational links to South Africa or the regional Arab region, and they tend to be practically more inclined to mass politics compared to the BDS’s core establishing bodies. They have contributed partially to the process leading to the BDS formation without necessarily being core part of it, or they have not sustained their *active* presence in the movement. The example of Marwan Barghouti and Ameer Makhoul (though different from one another) fit in this group. They are also on the edge of NGO politics, either outside NGOs but with links to them (i.e. Marwan Barghouti), or inside NGOs (i.e. Ameer Makhoul the ex-head of *Ittijah*) while engaging at the same time in political action.

The second group indicates previous trajectories in mass political mobilization but not necessarily sustained though these actors have a potential of engaging in mass political actions. They have been coming from the “civil society” (i.e. NGO/ social movement or a university with national political project). They had a tendency to consider the entire Palestine been colonized and should be liberated as a whole (though some were on the edge of Oslo politics). Hence, they are more “radical” than large NGOs (or what Hanafi and Tabar (2005) call “Mega NGOs”). They have a more radical discourse than the two states solution, where the refugees issue has been a core issue. They have a more critical discourse to NGO funding and agendas (i.e. the diverse critical articles on NGOs quoted in this research by circles of PACBI. Yet, some groups active in this “category” (not
necessarily individuals) rely to a large degree on Northern funding or have been involved in institutions relying in it (yet some do not depend on it). In terms of practice, not discourse, they have been founding themselves in more distance to mass politics though they still normatively call for such sort of mobilization. In this sense, in their trajectories, they have been more “radical” than “Mega NGOs” but more “moderate” in practice in relation to political actors discussed in the previous group. They have high cultural capital, if not the highest, in academia and/or languages and/or media (specifically English or other Northern languages), which is linked directly to Northern actors. Hence, they have strong transnational social capitals with Northern actors. The cases of PACBI, Badil and Stop the Wall broadly fit in this group though actors are diverse between one another and inside each organization. Hence, sometimes they intersect with the first group.

The third group has been as well politicized and in leftist circles as most actors of the previously discussed groups (not all). The research focuses on the cases of the Agricultural Relief PARC and the Medical Relief UPMRC, which had a leading role in PNGO. In their trajectories, they have been related to the Palestinian Communist Party for a long time, which recognized a sort of two states solution though it did not abandon the right of refugees, and the party was not part of the armed struggle that has been followed by the PLO factions. They formed health and agricultural committees in the 1980s, with a high level of volunteerism, and got highly active during the first intifada in solidarity-type service providing coupled with a politicized dimension part of the first intifada. Gradually, they became large NGOs, more professional, with high sources of funding from Northern sources, while still keep political aspects and not a small degree of volunteerism. They are as well more “moderate” than the first group, though sometimes intersect and could be considered more “radical” than the second group in relation to participation in the political life. They have been engaged in political process as Mustapha Barghouti formed Al-Mubadarah in 2002 or nominating themselves to the elections (both heads of the Agricultural Relief PARC and the Medical Relief UPMRC nominated themselves united in the January 2006 elections but then separated) or they have high cultural capital especially in linguistic or media spheres. They have as well strong transnational links to Northern actors.
Again, these are broad characteristics that intersect with the other groups and actors and they are diverse inside each group. In particular, the second and third groups are difficult to draw lines between them clearly. For example, Jamal Juma was active part of the Agricultural Relief PARC until the second Intifada; hence had a leg on the third group, while in coalition with politicized persons that are part of factions (i.e. PFLP) in Stop the Wall and in some popular committees; hence, he had a leg in the first group. Similarly, Ameer Makhoul has been active in political movements inside the Green Line and the head of the NGOs’ umbrella for Palestinians inside the Green Line. From the third group, Mustapha Barghouti heads a large NGO while at the same time he co-established a political initiative in 2002 and participated in some popular protests against the wall for example. Similarly, Ibrahim Dakkak from PACBI had been active in political initiatives and was a co-founder of the Palestinian National Initiative. Some have played double roles such as the general director for LAW Society (which was a large NGO in terms of funding), who had a role in Durban conference in 2001, and then became the lawyer of Marwan Barghouti after his arrest by the Israeli army.

These three broad groups, which the research concentrates on them while there are many other actors involved that the research does not focus on, had considerable roles in the formation of the BDS call (directly or indirectly). What has been common in the core group that formed the BDS call was being part of “civil society” organization (an NGO, social movement or academic group). The second group has been more in the core of the formation of the BDS call in 2005 and sustained its relation with the movement throughout its development from a call to a movement.

Stop the Wall, PACBI, Badil and the umbrella Ittijah have been prominent bodies in forming the BDS call in 2005 (Erakat 2012). Discussions between themselves took place also at PNGO office in Ramallah for months, before issuing the call.

Marwan Barghouti was a leader in the boycotts in Palestine during the second Intifada, and endorsed the BDS norms, but he was not active public figure in the

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77 It is also confirmed in the interview with Ingrid Jaradat (Brussels, 19 November 2014). And is re-asserted in the discussion below.
78 Interview with Ingrid Jaradat; op. cit.
movement. Ameer Makhoul had an active role in the Durban conference of 2001, and was part of instituting the BDS call in 2005, but had more distance from concentrating on the apartheid analogy, and has not continued as active public member of the movement after he was jailed.

Other important characteristic of these organizations is that they are part of the Palestinian resistance atmospheres, which differentiates them from some literature that draws a strict line between “civil society” organizations and political organizations; hence, this literature does not contribute to understanding how such wide coalition of actors from unions, political actors to NGOs can gather in a call and then in a movement.

Moreover, most of these discussed actors are different from the more “rooted” resistance bodies resembled by members of factions or popular committees in towns, camps and neighborhoods in cities, which have been active during the first intifada and re-activated somehow during the second intifada. Such rooted circles were composed, in the example of popular committees in villages, of village elders, activists, farmers, students and local political leaders (Norman 2009: 128). Yet, these rooted bodies are connected to the discussed actors in this research in various ways as suggested by the example of Stop the Wall and the Agricultural Relief PARC in their attempts to protest against the wall since 2003. Moreover, these committees joined the BDS movement.

“Grassroots activism” has diverse meanings. By some, they describe themselves “grassroots” when for example middle class, or higher middle class, urban-centered organizations or persons provide services to villages, camps and poorer places, or participate from time to time in demonstrations that take place in these places. A different understanding is closer to what the name suggests; that is, people themselves in places organize and administer the process of communal service provision or the struggle. The discussed civil society bodies in this research mostly resemble the first definition. Yet, they vary in degrees and participation, in a spectrum; rather than being strictly divided according to participatory or non-participatory classification. Additionally, the most active organizations in forming the BDS call have resembled the character of social movements rather than typical NGOs, or located in between.

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79 Also, this is indicated by the interview with the coordinator of Bilin’s popular committee Iyad Burnat (London, 17 June 2015).
Rafeef Ziadah (a third generation refugee born in Beirut) is an example from refugee circles, who did not also come from a typical NGO. She was active in Canada during the second intifada, and participated in founding the Israeli Apartheid Week. She stressed that the Israeli Apartheid Week, which connect students in tens of universities in different continents, has spread without external funding, but from the students’ own resources at universities.\(^{80}\) Similar to other atmospheres in BDS bodies, she had allies in Northern societies. For example, she was active in leftist and anti-war on Iraq, and had her critical stand on tendencies in Northern societies such as saying that “racism is worsening in Europe and you feel it everywhere you go”. She mentioned an incident where “we were doing an action at my university [in Canada back then] and one young man came and kicked me in the stomach and told me you should be raped before you have terrorist children. That moment and that racism made me so angry so that I wanted to come on stage and express all that anger that I was feeling, and that when I performed for the first time”.\(^{81}\)

Rafeef points out to her grandfather as a worker in a refugee camp in Lebanon, whom has been displaced from historical Palestine, connects with her current activism in the BDS movement (in trade unions as well), and her assertion of the rights analogy (she says “I’m with equal rights”). She says in an interview:

> I come from a refugee family in Lebanon. We lost most of our family members in the camps invasion, and the subsequent wars happened in the camps. My grandfather refused to leave the refugee camp because he thought that when the buses come to take us to Palestine he doesn’t want to be forgotten. And after two weeks we lost most of our family. What I got from my family about the right of return to Palestine, this sense of justice, we lost in Oslo. It does not need big academic papers to know justice for Palestine. My grandfather was a simple construction worker that he simply knows the sense of justice.\(^{82}\)

As a refugee, Rafeef stressed on the issue of return, which corresponds to similar atmospheres in the major bodies that pushed ahead for the BDS call. Obviously, she has diverse trajectories, including close links with transnational Northern activists (and

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\(^{80}\) “Rafeef Ziadah BNC at World Social Forum 1st part”, Youtube (uploaded on 20 December 2012), via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MO4-YdY0A_w

\(^{81}\) “Rafeef Ziadah on Palestine, Israel and justice”, Youtube (uploaded on 26 May 2012), via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddwkhffV cbo

indigenous circles in North America). She is part of an Arab identity as well, as for example she says in one of her poems “allow me to speak my Arab tongue before they occupy my language as well [...]. I’m an Arab woman of color and we come in all shades of anger”.83

*Badil* has been trying to connect with refugees in camps in Palestine (i.e. through Friends of *Badil* in some camps) besides refugees communities in various regions around the world, and for that reason it was described as resembling a social movement (Hanafi and Tabar 2005). The examples of *Badil* and Ziadah point out to refugees’ component that has been active in forming the movement in Palestine and transnationally.

Stop the Wall is not an NGO in the typical sense, or at least this is what it normatively seeks. For example, one of the members of Stop the Wall says “Stop the Wall is a campaign, we didn’t want it to be an NGO, focusing on proposals and collecting money. We didn’t want it to be like any organization just looking for profits. It had to be a grassroots struggle” (quoted in Norman 2009: 141). Similarly, PACBI is not an NGO in the typical sense, but critical volunteer academics connected to an academic union.

Moreover, such bodies have been critical to NGOs’ funding, and consider that much of the NGOs atmosphere have lost much of its nationally inspired agendas for more donors’ driven agendas. They are also part of the Palestinian field. For example, 40 percent of surveyed Palestinian, before three years of the second *intifada*, viewed foreign funding as negative or very negative (Modar Kassis quoted in Challand 2010: 4). Such persons and organizations would face the contradictions between being critical to typical NGOs and constituting a sort of social movements different from the mass-based organizations that many believe in normatively.

An example of such contradiction is Khader Shqairat, who headed a large human rights NGO (LAW Society), with large Northern funding, while he had a political inclination critical to political positions from Northern governments. He played a role in the political process leading to Durban conference in 2001. Since 2002, he focused more on being the lawyer of Marwan Barghouti, with some political initiatives related to

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83 “Rafeef Ziadah - Shades of Anger”, Youtube (uploaded on 27 February 2015), via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HceI0sUyhJQ
Barghouti. The NGO was marginalized. As the late Palestinian scholar Hisham Sharabi introduced him in a lecture at the Center for Policy Analysis in Washington:

Khadir shqairat holds a BA in law from Bicol University [in Philippines] and MA in international law from Rostov University [in Russia], the founder and general director of LAW Society, specializing in land confiscation, and environmental cases. Member of the Palestinian lawyers Bar in the West Bank. He’s also a founder of the Arab Human Rights Network in 1997 in Cairo. Shqairat’s publications include Human Rights Movement: Where to? (1997), Policy Analysis of Palestinian Human Rights Organizations in 1998, the Status of Human Rights in the PA areas: Situation, Constraints, Policy Options (1998).84

The Split habitus of Shqairat between Asia, Arab and Northern regions is explicit. Through his connections to Cairo, it facilitated the route to the Durban conference in 2001 as will be explained below (the next chapter). He has been highly critical to the EU policies and funding,85 and to the PA’s oppression and policies, which would raise storms of critiques from these Palestinian and European official bodies and would raise financial allegations against LAW Society. Similar to other actors, he has accumulated considerable cultural capital and social links.

The discussed core social movements leading to the BDS were in a place between NGOs and social movements. They sought wide outreach with a politicized dimension and a tendency towards coalitions (also amid competing coalitions). At the same time, they sought a wide coalition with unions, political factions and different segments of the Palestinian civil society in its broad sense. And as explained in the next chapter of maneuvering in the field of power in Palestine, without the consent of the political factions, the coalition would be relatively narrow even among NGOs.

4. Aspects of the cultural capital in trajectories

In relation to the cultural capital, the example of Baramki demonstrates how he had worked with Nassir family to build up the highest level academic institution in Palestine, which places them in a high cultural capital margin among the Palestinian universities. Much of PACBI’s atmosphere came from Birzeit University, though not exclusively. It


85 Ibid.
was also first formed in 2004, before the BDS call, and it gave a great incentive for forming the BDS call in 2005.

Birzeit University (BZU) has been an academic institution for the Palestinian struggle, and was an important space for politicized student activities from diverse regions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

During the last two decades, BZU also witnessed some shifts not only in terms of funding but also in terms of less regional diversity from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as Baramki indicated sadly, which was also intensified by Israeli policies of segregating areas one from another. Moreover, BZU started to raise tuition gradually to seek more elitist education, as perceived for example by the student bodies of Fateh, the Islamic block and the left. The ex-president of BZU Khalil Hindi pointed out to the dilemma of choosing either an “elitist education” or “mass education”. He argued for connecting both in higher education in Palestine while focusing on one or two universities to have an elitist education, which implicitly points out to BZU (Hindi 2013).

Concerning the student atmospheres at BZU, it has been more connected to mass Palestinian politics as represented by political factions for example. If taking the case of Marwan Barghouti, who finished his BA and MA at BZU, and headed the student council, he has been inclined more into mass politics. Baramki wrote about his appreciation of Marwan but also his sadness of Marwan’s adherence to armed struggle.

As Abaher El-Sakka points out, the notion of the “organic intellectual” (from Antonio Gramsci) is strong among Palestinian academics and intellectuals. Intellectuals perceive their role in resisting the oppressive status quo through their writing and through their engagement as well. Edward Said published a book about intellectuals (1994) where he argued for an “organic intellectual” following the Gramscian notion.

Generally speaking in the Palestinian case, many intellectuals and artists have been involved in political movements and/or theorizing about it, and many have been subject to prison (i.e. Mahmoud Darwish), exile (i.e. Darwish and Hanna Nassir from Birzeit University), or assassination (i.e. Ghassan Kanafani, Naji al-Ali, Kamal Nassir, Majid Abu

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86 Bisan Center for Research and Development, “the crisis of BZU” (in Arabic), September 2013, via http://www.bisan.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Birzeit-crises.pdf
87 During discussing my presentation on Gabi Baramki, at SMAC, ULB, October 2014.
Sharar, Kamal el-Udwan, …) mainly by Israel but also by other states or factions in some cases.

Palestinian academics and cultural persons have been drawn from diverse trajectories, and had their footprints in the Palestinian resisting politics. The Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish has been involved frequently in phrasing major Palestinian declarations such as the “independence declaration” of 1988 that was adopted by the Palestinian National Congress (PLO’s parliament), and as will be demonstrated below, he wrote an article on apartheid in May 2001 amid the preparations for the Durban conference.

Edward Said has been as well a member of the Palestinian National Congress, and have always rejected the US plans of Palestinian interim self-governance under Israeli occupation, which were proposed since the 1970s. He objected vocally with high tone to Oslo agreements, differently from some academics who had their critiques but kept links to the PA (as Baramki and some persons related to PACBI).

Academics from Birzeit University related to this research, as Baramki and Lisa Taraki have been part of the Palestinian liberation atmosphere and pushing ahead for it, even before the first Intifada. In relational terms to other actors of this research, some academics who are frequently quoted in this research and related in one way or another to PACBI atmospheres wrote critically in the 1990s and early 2000s on the transformed roles of civil society organizations particularly since Oslo accords. Their major reference was the experience of the 1980s and particularly the first Intifada. Back then, civil society organizations have been mobilizing widely to resist the occupation on the ground. At the same time, academics have played roles in civil society organizations.

In relational terms to other academics, PACBI circles (though having diverse positions as well), have been ranging from being close to Edward Said’s position-taking to a position that engages critically against Oslo process (before the second Intifada). Baramki and other academics from Birzeit University have served in the PA institutions after Oslo agreement, while at the same time they sustained their own critiques to Oslo agreement and the PA’s policies after Oslo agreement. Their positions developed during the second intifada in a belief that Israeli policies do not seek peace. At the same time, these academics are distinct from academics who served directly in the power.
Taking the example of Baramki, in developed bridges with Western culture and education, since school years, Baramki has been raised in an atmosphere with close bridges. He was playing piano (classical music), performing theatre (i.e. for Shakespeare), and had excellent command of English. Moreover, Baramki stressed on the “quality of education” that Birzeit University has provided (Baramki 2010: 41), which is also associated with other political values and routes. For example, as it is clear from Baramki’s understanding, the norm “violence” comes with being non-educated (Baramki 2010: 33).

Moreover, in the Western connections, they have been connected to contesting atmospheres as well. As Baramki demonstrates, Birzeit University has been hosting Western academics that were critical to the Israeli policies as well as to their states’ official policies. Additionally, some who studied or being resident/nationals in Northern societies had such critical connections. For example, Samia Botmeh has being active in the UK in issues related to trade unions. 88 Rafeef Ziadeh has been connected to contesting Canadian and UK atmospheres.

The number of PhD holders has increased after Oslo agreement in the legislative and executive bodies of the PA. They have risen from 12.6 percent in the PLO’s Central Council members in 1991 (and 72.3 percent of BA holders mostly from Arab countries) to 14.8 percent in the PA’s legislative Council of 1996, and then to 24.2 percent in the PA’s legislative Council of 2006. They also constituted 24.7 percent in the PA’s ministry councils between the years of 1994 and 2006. 89 Half of the PA’s prime ministers since Oslo agreement held PhDs. In the Palestinian unity government of 2014, eight ministers out of eighteen held PhDs, and at least five were related to civil or charitable NGOs. 90 Hence, the number of PhD holders rose to around quarter of the PA’s legislative and executive bodies. It demonstrates the increasing power of academic circles after Oslo agreement. Moreover, many of the key figures are related to financial or business circles.

Yet, PACBI circles are related in a critical way to other groups of academics who are in power. The example of Mahmoud Abbas (the current head of the PA at the time of writing) and Saeb Erekat (the head of the PA’s negotiation team) resemble a case in point.

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88 Interview with Samia Botmeh (in Palestine via skype; 4 December 2014)
89 Samar Barghouti’s PhD study on the characteristics of the Palestinian elite; quoted in Hilal 2013: ft. 3: p.7.
Both have gained PhDs. In their academic and/or political trajectories, they have been inclined to the primacy of the negotiation route. Abbas was a major engineer of the Oslo agreement and continued to believe in negotiations as almost the only route (started to make changes lately). After the Israeli assassination of top Palestinian leaders from *Fateh* such as Abu Jihad of Abu Iyad, Abbas rose in ranks and has been one of the most moderate Palestinian leaders. He also engaged in secret meetings with Israelis since the 1970s.\(^91\)

Erakat has headed the negotiation department at the PLO for long time. As Bradford University (he received a PhD in conflict resolutions and peace studies) presents him, he said that “it was at Bradford that he became convinced that there was no military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it would end only through negotiation”.\(^92\) As Bradford articulates it, studying there represented a “unique opportunity of studying peace [that] helped him realize the central place of conflict in human nature, and therefore the necessity of negotiation. Dr. Erekat’s skills were put to immediate test as he joined the Palestinian negotiating team in 1991”.\(^93\) He taught political science at al-Najah University (Nablus, Palestine) in 1979 and was the director of external relations at the university (1982-1986). He started to advocate peace through negotiations since 1982 in published articles at *al-Quds* newspaper (he became part of the editorial board). In one “of his 1982 articles, calling for a dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli academics, [it] provoked an explosion of anger at Al-Najah campus, and a boycott of his classes”.\(^94\)

Abbas was a main engineer for the Oslo secretive track, while Erekat was part of the official public Palestinian negotiation team that was headed by Haidar Abdel-Shafi (Erakat started as a vice-president). The public Palestinian negotiators resigned after they surprisingly discovered the Oslo secretive track, while Erekat remained as one of the few who would play a negotiating role. The other negotiators, many of them came from Birzeit University circles or from politicized civil society (i.e. Haidar Abdel-Shafi and Mustapha Barghouti) or from the PLO inside Palestine as Hanan Ashrawi, have been more critical to


\(^{94}\) “Saeb Erakat”, *Palestinian Biographies; op. cit.*
the Oslo accords, as it did not condition, for example, freezing the Israeli settlement building in addition to other issues as the way the decisions were taken unilaterally and secretively in Oslo.

BZU, in general, distinguishes itself from student politics inclined to mass/factional politics and believing in armed struggle and from the PA’s policies and its academics. However, this position is not a reflection of PACBI’s position of course, but it hints to the positions in which PACBI emerges from.

A hint of differentiation can be seen between Omar, Mustafà and Marwan Barghouthi. Omar Barghouthi, from PACBI, has finished his BA and MA from Columbia University in electrical engineering (and started his graduate study in philosophy at Tel Aviv University). His articles (and published book in 2011) are mostly in English and translated to other languages.

Omar, Mustapha and Marwan Barghouthi are descendants of the Barghouthi extended family, and as the Encyclopedia of Palestinians (Mattar 2005: 96) says “the Barghouthi family has produced several figures active in various public spheres”. The Encyclopedia starts with Omar Salih (1894-1965) as one of the early known public figures in Barghouthi family. Barghouthi family is an extended family spread around 20 towns around Ramallah, and used to be an aristocratic family during the last times of aristocracy in Palestine in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which served the Ottoman authorities in collecting taxes from peasants, and payed much attention to educating its children as a way to ascending. Omar Salih, for example, gained high education in Jerusalem and Beirut and sent to study law in Istanbul then (Tamari 2003). Omar Salih, similar to his father, played political roles between being close to the Ottoman authorities and opposing them.

With time and generations, much has changed especially under occupation. Both Mustafà and Bashir Barghouti have being leading figures in the Palestinian Communist Party (changed its name to People’s Party after the collapse of the Soviet Union). Mustafà had already wide transnational links from the communist party period and its affiliated medical relief organization. He has studied first in the USSR, and then had academic programs in the UK. In terms of the cultural dimension, Mustafà Barghouti is a physician

95 “‘Omar’: Leading a different kind of resistance”; op. cit.
who graduated from Moscow in the 1970s with a higher certificate in Philosophy, “continued his studies and received a degree in Philosophy and an MSc in Business Administration and Management from Stanford University, US; and returned and became Director of the Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) in Ramallah since 1990 […] wrote numerous articles focusing on civil society and health development in Palestine”. 96 He presented in “more than 50 Arab, European, and American universities, and contributed as well to publishing four books on the Palestinian cause”. 97 He is “an Associate of the Oxford Research Group, a programme dedicated to developing effective methods for positive change on security issues through non-violent means”. 98 During the second Intifada, he wrote on issues related to transnational solidarity in English at Al-Ahram Weekly, the Electronic Intifada and transnational solidarity websites.

Marwan (born in 1958), as a leading figure in Fateh, finished his BA from Birzeit University while he was in exile during the first Intifada. He got his MA on the subject of French-Palestinian relations from Birzeit University, and continued his PhD in political science from the Institute of Arab Research and Studies (in Cairo) that is part of the Arab League’s Cultural Organization (Alecso), while being in his second period in Israeli prisons (he submitted his thesis secretly during a year through his lawyer, and it was about evaluating the role of the PA’s legislative council). He published several political books in Arabic, and learned Hebrew while being in prison in his first time during the first Intifada.

Before forming the BDS campaign, Mustafa had very close connections with transnational civil society actors, while Omar (with Lisa Taraki and others from PACBI) had close relations with transnational academic atmospheres, as the example of British-Palestinian interactions suggest (chapter five). Marwan had been more linked to the Palestinian constituency though he had relations (as part of Fateh) with French and European deputies.

PACBI’s atmosphere is the most one connected closely to transnational academic circles, specifically those in the North though not exclusively as Baramki example

98 “Mustafa Barghouti”, Palestinian Biographies; op. cit.
demonstrated links with the Arab academic circles to gain transnational academic recognition or as some are connected to South Africa as Haidar Eid. As will be explained in the world field of power on Palestine (chapter five), specifically in the case of the UK, the links with British academics and PACBI have crystalized in institutionalizing the first academic body in the Global North to endorse the BDS norms. And only academics in the UK and Palestine chose to form their own distinct boycott bodies related to academics (PACBI and BRICUP that will be discussed later) though they sought coalitions with other spheres. The politicized cultural capital, with strong dimension of social capital, has been powerful in being exchanged into political capital inside Palestine and transnationally (in using Bourdieu’s terminologies). PACBI was the first institutionalized Palestinian boycott initiative (in 2004) directed to outsiders, and in close interaction with transnational academics, and it had its major influence on forming the BDS call a year after.

Yet, the discussed actors to contribute to the process of forming the BDS call also have considerable cultural capital, either linguistic, media or education. Hanan Ashrawi’s example (from Miftah) had a high cultural capital in the Palestinian society where:

Before joining the political arena, Ashrawi was a professor of English at Birzeit University […]. Ashrawi holds Bachelor and Master's degrees in literature from the Department of English at the American University of Beirut. She earned her Ph.D. in Medieval and Comparative Literature from the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. She returned to Palestine in 1973 to establish the Department of English at Birzeit University in the West Bank, which she chaired from 1973-78 and 1981-84. From 1986-90 she served as Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Birzeit. Ashrawi is editor of an anthology of Palestinian literature and author of The Modern Palestinian Short Story: An Introduction to Practical Criticism; Contemporary Palestinian Literature under Occupation; Contemporary Palestinian Poetry and Fiction; and Literary Translation: Theory & Practice. Ashrawi's writings also include From Intifada to Independence and her 1995 autobiography, This Side of Peace: A Personal Account.99

Rafeef Ziadah from refugee circles studied in Canada after leaving Lebanon, and finished her PhD (York University at Toronto), besides being a performative poet. Her activism was mostly inside university campuses (i.e. the Israeli Apartheid Week), and continues her post-doc at SOAS, London, at the time of writing the thesis.

This politicized cultural capital had strong links with other Palestinian circles. As described elsewhere, Baramki was part of the Council for Justice and Peace and the Higher Education Council. He also had a political role as was evident in the first Palestinian Intifada and also became part of the PA’s educational efforts. Similarly, Ashrawi has been a member of the executive committee of the PLO.

Jamal Juma is a co-founder as well of the Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange in 1996 with academics, writers and other professionals. As the Guardian introduces him - in an article he wrote, “[h]is articles and interviews are widely disseminated and translated into several languages”. Juma wrote in several websites in English such as the International Solidarity Movement’s website, the Electronic Intifada among others. Moreover, Juma participates in conferences in universities as those at SOAS. Stop the Wall website is in Arabic, English, Spanish and Portuguese (for connections in South America). In 2005, Stop the Wall engaged in teaching courses on the history of Palestine and struggle (Norman 2009).

Juma was a major actor in Agricultural Relief PARC until establishing Stop the Wall in 2002. In its turn, PARC had wide academic relations though it is an NGO. Its annual report of 2001 states that “PARC works with Al-Quds University on a master’s program in developmental studies, trains students at al-Najah University, Hebron University, Al-Quds Open University, conducts research with al-Najah University and the Islamic University in Gaza and other research and training centers”.

For Badil, dimensions of its cultural capital, other than languages where its website is in English and Arabic with a translating team, is resembled through partners in media: Ma'an News Agency and Al-Ayyam Publishers (Badil’s annual report of 2006), which are widely viewed Palestinian media outlets. It issues al-Majdal magazine in Arabic and English with wide contributions from Palestinian and transnational writers, including its transnational editorial staff, in addition to its dynamic website. Its engagement in diverse research activities include working closely, for example, with Prof. Susan Akram from Boston University’s School of Law, participating in Civitas Project at Nuffield College (Oxford University), and in the editorial board of Forced Migration Review (Oxford

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101 PARC’s 2001 annual report; op. cit.; p. 25.
University Refugee Studies’ Center). It has been engaged in contracts and on volunteer basis with researchers from diverse universities in conducting its own research (i.e. comparative study on refugees return and real property restitution, mapping Palestinian return and a survey on Palestinian refugees). Beyond being a practical research producer, it participates in academic circles as presenting at al-Najah University in 2001. As will be discussed afterwards, an affiliated academic with Badil’s visited South Africa in March 2001, and argued for an Israeli analogy with apartheid. Badil published articles since 2001 describing Israel as apartheid.

Similarly, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (headed by Raji Sourani) has mostly academics on the board of trustees, which included (in 2001) the late Ibrahim Abu Lughod (associated with Birzeit University), Hanan Ashrawi (also associated with Birzeit University), Anis Qasim and Khalil Sheqaqi (who was dean of scientific research at al-Najah University). Moreover, an example of the links in cultural and economic spheres, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights “has received in 2001 USD 123,664 [out of USD 1,643,648 total donations in 2001] is from the European Union through Birzeit University Institute of Law”. 102

Ameer Makhoul (from Ittijah) has diverse published journalist articles, including in Badil’s website, but usually his articles are translated from Arabic. 103 His less established cultural capital in English for example or in academic circles coincided with his mass-based political activity and his early focus on linking with the regional Arab actors, as will be explored in the next chapter through the route to the UN Durban conference in 2001. However, his wide transnational links in different regions including Europe as a director of Ittijah, inclined him to the BDS norms though with critical dimensions to the over-emphasis on the ‘apartheid’ analogy, according to Makhoul.

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103 See for example his articles on Badil’s website under the tag “Ameer Makhoul” [diverse dates], via https://www.badil.org/component/k2/itemlist/user/92-ameer-makhoul.html <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
5. The Habitus in relation to South Africa

It has been discussed in the previous example of Baramki how he had split habitus in Palestine, in regional Arab connections, in links with European actors and the Global North generally, and in the UN. As chapter six explores, Baramki has been active as well at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP’s civil society conferences during the 1990s and 2000s. The interactions had been frequent with South African actors (particularly the Palestine Solidarity Campaign) that have been mediating to lift up the Palestinian demands transnationally.

In this section, the example of South Africa as one of the important trajectories from the Global South is discussed as a collective Palestinian trajectory with some focus on actors related to the BDS movement.

Nilsson Mandela and the South African struggle has been among the collective Palestinian memory of shared struggles. Close links had existed between the PLO and ANC (African National Congress), while strong relations had existed between Israel and the Apartheid South African regime.

On the day of the funeral of Nilsson Mandela in 2013, a national day of mourning was announced in Palestine and flags were half-mast. Even on the top official level, the PA president Mahmoud Abbas visits South Africa frequently. He said after Mandela’s funeral: “We shared historic relations of struggle with Mandela, which will remain forever enshrined between the Palestinian and South African peoples.”

And Khalid Mashal from Hamas said that Mandela “was a symbol of resistance and human struggle,” and that Palestinians can learn the lesson from Mandela’s for the need “to resist the Zionist occupation and [all] forms of injustice and oppression suffered by the people of the world.”

Hanan Ashrawi of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and from the NGO Miftah that has had a role in the process leading to the BDS call, and who knew Nilsson Mandela well, did a special day service at the Holy Family Church in Ramallah for Mandela’s funeral and said “Palestine was not a question of solidarity or advocacy, but was

104 “For Palestinians, Mandela was ‘one of us’”, Times of Israel, December 8, 2013, via http://www.timesofisrael.com/for-palestinians-mandela-was-one-of-us/ <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
105 Ibid.
[a cause] that he internalized and participated in as one of us. The linkage between South Africa and Palestine that Mandela spelled out was one of shared principles and struggles, primarily for self-determination, freedom, and human dignity.”

A point that Leila Shaheed, the ex-ambassador of Palestine in Brussels, raises is that the Palestinians at that time “inherited” the Algerian struggle in Europe from the Europeans who struggled for the liberation of Algeria. The “Algerian model” that brought independence from the French settler-colonial regime was a great inspiration for Palestinians, as well as a material support. Algeria had been open in diverse ways for the Palestinian struggle from the political (many of the Palestinian National Council meetings have occurred in Algeria) to even military training back then.

The PLO’s relations with the South African ANC go back to the 1960s, and Algeria was the connection at that time. In Algeria, after independence, the PLO (and mainly Fateh headed by Arafat) and the late Algerian president Houari Boumediene had close relations. There, the PLO got in touch with the ANC, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, the African liberation movements including the Namibian liberation movement. The leadership of the PLO was supportive in financial terms as well to the ANC, and Mandela would not forget the Palestinian support. The BDS actors would inherit such historical connections with South Africa, as Shaheed argues.

Shaheed points out to even an attempt by the late Edward Said who gathered them once in 1985 to propose following the ANC model, though she argues that the point is that Israel is nor the White South African apartheid regime in terms that Israel is “the spoiled daughter of the West” while the boycotts were popular among people in the US against the South African apartheid. However, Said was searching for alternatives amid the difficult Palestinian condition. He was critical to Oslo where he considered that the PLO’s leadership did a grieve mistake in not understanding the Israeli project in Palestine. While many in the PLO believed that Israel would withdraw at the end from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as it did in Sinai in Egypt and as it showed readiness to do so in South Lebanon and Syria, Edward Said saw that there was a consensus between Israeli parties that Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem constitute a “red line”, and this is particular to

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106 Ibid.
107 Interview with Leila Shaheed (Brussels, 31 March 2014)
108 Ibid.
Palestine differently from other Arab regions because the core of the Israeli project lies in Palestine (Parsons 2005: 64-66).

Though the analogy between Israel and Apartheid has appeared frequently in Palestinian writers and politicians from major factions at least since 1971,\(^{109}\) the mentioned attempt by Edward Said in 1985 could be the first collective attempt to suggest an analogy in practical terms. As aforementioned in the example of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), South African actors have been pushing as well for this analogy before the first *Intifada*.

An example that demonstrate the easiness to relate to this analogy from the Palestinian side, a Palestinian center called Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners has been formed in 1989 amid the efforts to release Palestinian prisoners during the first *Intifada*. As its current director says, choosing the name was to have a consensus and not to choose a name of a Palestinian political prisoner so that no particular faction can be associated with the name of the prisoner.\(^{110}\)

Currently, South Africa, for BDS current activists, plays in somehow what Algeria used to play in the previous Palestinian analogies. South Africa is reconnecting Palestinians with other movements that have been active in the anti-apartheid struggle, as has been evident in the Durban conference in 2001. Some of the activists interviewed in Brussels, that are supportive to the BDS movement, were active in the South African anti-apartheid struggle.

Omar Barghouti expressed in different times that he was active in the South African anti-apartheid experience while being at Columbia University.\(^{111}\) Haidar Eid, one of the main persons in PACBI, studied his PhD in South Africa at Johannesburg University.\(^{112}\)

\(^{109}\) For example, in 1971, two publications by the PLO and PFLP mentioned frequently and explicitly the analogy between apartheid and Israel (Clarno 2009, fl.11 & 12: p. 67).

\(^{110}\) “Al-Doqmaq: Mandela Institute for Prisoners misses Mandela”, (in Arabic), *Bokra* news website, 6 December 2013, via http://bokra.net/Article-1231174 <last accessed on 20 February 2016>


\(^{112}\) “Dr. Haidar Eid- Interview with Haidar Eid on the Palestinian International TV” (in Arabic), uploaded on Vimeo on 22 Sep 2014, via https://vimeo.com/106812186 <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
He did a PhD in English Literature and Philosophy in Rands Afrikaans University; Johannesburg. Later on, he worked as a senior lecturer at Vista University, Soweto.113

Eid expresses frequently the relevance of the South African struggle for the Palestinian struggle. For example, he says “Palestine and the Palestinian people truly deserve to experience their South African moment of liberation. i.e. equality, freedom and justice […]. I strongly believe that we are living our South African moment. We will not wait for the Israelis to change their minds – we will make them change the same way White South Africans changed their mind about Apartheid!”114

Stop the Wall, a major body in the BDS movement, re-appropriates the historic relation between the PLO and the South African ANC, and said in a report: “The close solidarity between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the South African liberation struggle, as well as on the other hand the continuous ties between Israel and the South African apartheid regime, underscore the links between experiences of oppression”.115

As will be discussed in the next chapter, diverse Palestinian actors have been connecting with South African actors during the second Palestinian intifada, and the Durban conference has been covered in their websites or referred to in the first Palestinian call for boycott that has been directed to transnational actors in 2002. Also, the next chapter discusses responses by Badil, LAW Society, Ittijah among others, which have also pushed for this analogy at the UN Durban conference in 2001.

BDS activists do not lack multiplicity of continuous references to the analogy between the Palestinian and South African experiences. For example, a South African BDS publication quotes different sayings by Mandela on the historic relation with the

113 “Haidar Eid”, Nebula website, September 2013, via http://nobleworld.biz/images/Noteoncontributors5.3.pdf  <last accessed on 20 February 2016>
Palestinians.\textsuperscript{116} Hence, the inclination to the South African experience has been part of collective experience including actors who had roles in forming the BDS movement.

At the same time, the exact analogy with South Africa has generated debate among Palestinian actors as well as many transnational actors. From the Palestinian side, the efficacy of the route was debated. For example, Ameer Makhoul (the ex-coordinator of \textit{Ittijah}) has questioned following the South African model as a model. He referred to multiple models (including the Algerian model and Frantz Fanon’s suggested way) and Palestinian own ways.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly, from academic side, a similar debate has occurred.\textsuperscript{118} From the side of the ex-Palestinian ambassador in Brussels Leila Shaheed, she does not see the South African model enough though they have learned from.\textsuperscript{119}

From transnational activists, some were cautious from the apartheid analogy not to equate Israel with apartheid and hence legitimize total boycott though they are still inclined to it, as will be explained in the following chapters.

Finally, trajectories can enhance our understanding to see how actors incline to a certain act. Though this chapter focused on trajectories, the following chapters will further discuss trajectories while inscribing them in national and global fields.


\textsuperscript{117} Ameer Makhoul, “In the memory of Frantz Fanon and the international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people” (in Arabic), Frantz Fanon Foundation, 12 December 2012, via http://frantzfanonfoundation-fondationfrantzfanon.com/article1883.html <last accessed on 21 February 2016>


\textsuperscript{119} Interview with Leila Shaheed; \textit{op. cit.}
Chapter IV
Relations in the field of power in Palestine

The development of relations in the field of power in Palestine is helpful to explain the emergence of norms and pathway(s) of the BDS movement inside Palestine; particularly the re-emergence of the boycott norm among Palestinians and its early link with South Africa among diverse routes.

Accordingly, tracking the relations between the wide civil society organizations and to other Palestinian political and Israeli actors, while considering aspects of transnational and international actors (in this chapter), are important to explain the development of the norms, and the emergence of the BDS movement. The fact that the movement was formed amid contested power relations in the field sheds light on the Palestinian pathway and the ability of some NGOs/social movements and academics to form a coalition of wide actors, including political factions, in which they played a leading role that contributed to privileging their norms.

The thesis selects some of the most active actors in drawing the road to the BDS movement to focus on. While some of these actors played a role in setting the path to BDS formation, they did not necessarily contribute directly to the formation phase of the movement in 2004 and 2005 and onwards. As such, this chapter focuses on the period that follows the signing of Oslo I Agreement in 1993- through looking at the Palestinian-Israeli contestations in 1996 and 1998, and especially during the second Intifada from the year 2000 until 2005. The chapter is divided according to these periods.

As previously discussed in chapters two and three, the research finds out that events, and consecutive waves of protests and boycotts, are important components to the understanding of the movement's development. Three main events are identified in this research; the first event being the first Intifada (discussed above in terms of the boycotts). The second is the Oslo Agreements' period, characterized by increased polarization/fragmentation between political groups and exemplifying a retreat from the
previous boycott model that have been applied in the first Intifada. The third looks at the 1996 and 1998 confrontations that lead to the re-emergence of the norm “boycott” and an initial break with the rule of the game resembled mainly by following a US mediated negotiations track.

The chapter investigates how during the second Intifada boycotts became widely spread by diverse Palestinian actors. Also, during these periods, the chapter discusses contestations and cooperation entailing fragmentation and unity trends between diverse actors are important to understand the attempts to form a ‘third current’ leading to the BDS formation, amid a changing field of power in Palestine. Moreover, a section in the chapter discusses the Durban conference in 2001, back and forth between Palestinian actors and others, as well as some aspects with European actors before focusing on them in the following two chapters.

1. The Oslo Agreements Period

In the world field of power on Palestine, as explained in details later on, there was a gradual transformation by the PLO from “revolutionary legitimacy” and “liberation strategy” to authority legitimacy and state-building goal during the Oslo period. This transformation would eventually contribute to fragmenting the field in Palestine (Hilal 2013). In turn, the political fragmentation entailed a lack of a common goal by major Palestinian political actors.

A fragmented field

Already, at least since 1988, the two states solution was more explicitly addressed. Yet, it was a moment of divergence by some as well. For instance, the first statement declaring the establishment of Hamas movement came after the eruption of the first Intifada and amid peace projects mainly based on the UN resolutions 242. Hamas rejected
the line of negotiations then. As of then, this defection from the PLO’s line, and then the PA’s policy, that Hamas represents, would become a major faction gaining the highest legitimacy in the PA’s legislative elections of 2006 - after more than a decade of Oslo agreement in 1993. This sharp divergence on leading policies constituted a major polarization inside the field.

Other political positions were somehow in the middle between Fateh and Hamas, ranging on a wide spectrum of positions. Baramki, for instance, thought that the occupation of 1967 would not last two years and withdraw under international pressure. However, later on, the continued occupation made him realize that “though [Israelis] have taken our land”, Palestinians need to recognize them and reach an agreement of two coexisted parts in historical Palestine (Baramki 2010: 32-33), while insisting on the right of return of refugees.

A major line in the first Intifada had concentrated its goal on an independent Palestinian state, without undermining other rights, while resorting to a wide array of “popular resistance”. This included non-cooperation, boycotts, creating alternative organization (i.e. in food and education), demonstrations and stone confrontations, besides limited armed confrontations especially in its last period.

However, during the Oslo agreement of 1993 and its aftermath “many intifada activists turned to involvement in the Palestinian authority and holding the diverse employment” (Sawaftah 2015: 55). Yet, the Oslo agreement has generated a growing controversy in Palestinian politics and society leading to a state of great polarization inside the national movement. This included rejection of the agreement by major Palestinian factions (i.e. PFLP, DFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad). It also included the resignation of the public Palestinian negotiating team in Madrid talks between 1991 and 1993. With

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120 The statement of Hamas, carrying religious dichotomies then, declared that (translated from Arabic) “the intifada of our steadfasting [morabit] people in the occupied land rejects the entire occupation and its pressures.. rejects the policy of confiscating the lands and implanting settlements.. came to awake the consciousness of those running towards insignificant peace.. towards empty international conferences.. behind sidway treasonous reconciliation on the road of Camp David [Egyptian-Israeli treaty of 1979]”. See: “In pictures- 28 years on the first statement by Hamas” (in Arabic), Palestine now, 17 December 2015, via http://tinyurl.com/jsm5s3c <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
exceptions, such as Saeb Erakat, the team placed critical remarks to the Oslo track. There were hopes to some and great disappointment to others.

As Jamil Hilal (2010) argues, the “Palestinian political field” has been subject to polarization especially since the Oslo agreement. As such, the extreme fragmentation of two geographies administered by two Palestinian competing authorities in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, either under Israeli occupation or siege, has not started in 2007, but was an accumulation since the Oslo agreement. The Israeli policies, of course, have been pushing ahead for this fragmentation through their policies, widely referred to as “buntasanization” policies, and separating the West Bank from Gaza Strip. This geographical fragmentation resulted in dealing with the West Bank and Gaza Strip as separate entities, as well as dividing the West Bank into three distinctive areas of A, B and C. It also resulted in increasing army checkpoints and settlements, building separate bypass roads for settlements in the West Bank, and later on the wall - creating what is referred to as “Bantustans”. The PA had control over 93 percent of the population versus 17 percent of largely disconnected land between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additionally, the PA had been engaged in close economic and security arrangements with Israel, including Israel’s responsibility to collect tariffs and taxes to be transferred later on to the PA. This has created a major Palestinian dependency on Israel, based on approvals and control. Israel sustained the upper hand in issues related to economy, land, water, military, and free movement.

Moreover, international and regional powers have played a major role in sustaining fragmentation, and creating a competitive set-up that played Palestinian actors against each another. As one article argues, this “division reaches the academic realm, too” (Turner and Shweiki 2014: 1-2). Turner and Shweiki add: “The dominant, conventional approach has often accepted and internalized the colonizer’s discourse that divides and fragments the Palestinian body politic into separate and distinct groups - some thereafter renamed as ‘Arab–Israeli, ‘Bedouin’ and so on - and reduces ‘the Palestinian people’ to only those who reside within the occupied territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This structural feature of the Oslo period, with the support of the international donor community, has entrenched geographic divisions politically”.

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In its turn, the Palestinian agency as well correlated largely to the fragmentation. Yet, though many actors, whether *Fateh, Hamas* or “civil society”, have been heading in atmospheres of competitive fragmentation, partially, they have also been normatively and practically trying to unify in a contradictory process and to varying degrees. The Oslo agreement was one of the peaking periods of polarization between the different Palestinian actors. As discussed in the habitus section, some civil society organizations witnessed this contradiction when, for instance, the PA and NGOs competed on health provision.

In commenting on the Oslo accords, Baramki notes (2010: 140), “I cannot say if it was better or worse [Oslo accords], but it was certainly different”. Haidar Abdel-Shafi and Mustapha Barghouti, accompanying the resignation of the Public Palestinian delegation, were not satisfied by the secrecy of the negotiations and the fact that it did not lead to a freeze on settlement building. For others, Oslo process and its aftermath represented a period of great fear to give up major Palestinian issues like the right of return. *Badil*, for instance, was established out of that fear.

Regardless of their critical evaluation, as explained before, the PLO leadership in exile asserted its authority amid fear from alternative leadership from inside. One of the mutual fears that characterized Oslo period between the PA and diverse Palestinian actors encouraged the formation of PNGO, *Badil, Ittijah* and others in the 1990s.

Trade unions were also affected. They witnessed fragmentation during the 1970s and 1980s for political and other reasons. The multiplication of trade unions, reaching 150 in 1986 compared to 22 unions in 1981, is revealing. An attempt of unifying occurred in 1990, before a united body was formed under *Fateh* leadership. The body was set to hold elections after a year, but that has not taken place till now. In 2007, five union federations were formed, including the Federation of Independent & Democratic Trade Unions & Workers' Committees in Palestine established by the Democracy and Workers' Rights Center, and an NGO established in 1993. They generally hold high level of non-cooperation between each other (Botmeh 2007: 41-42). Hence, the domination of trade unions is split between *Fateh*, Islamists, and leftist NGO activists. Defections are also related to the “the level of loyalty [to the head of the union], control of the financial
dimensions, the external relations with international trade unions, and external travels” (Botmeh 2007: 42).

Nonetheless, in the sphere of “civil society”, professional unions (teachers, engineers, doctors, journalists, lawyers, etc.) are more active than trade unions. Though they are not united in one federation, they do cooperate (Botmeh 2007: 39).

Hanafi and Tabar (2003: 206), hold the “aid industry” responsible for polarizing the “social field” in Palestine, by claiming that “it is the banality of aid systems and their ‘conceptual maps’, which envision the social field as neatly divided up into political and civil societies”. Their conceptual framework mobilizes Foucault’s notion of “regimes of truth”.

NGOs’ formation itself has been following the logic of fragmentation, according to the report of the Palestinian Societal Association (Dalia). Dalia’s report explains that a transformation has occurred since Oslo accords where political factions stopped funding civil society that has been active in the grass-roots level. Back then, the diversity and competition between political factions was largely subject to responding to societal needs and participation. While the establishment of the PA “made it the gate of funding for the Palestinian people, which led to drying the sources of funds that has been channeling through the PLO to social movements and civil society. The civil society in its turn became dependent on the same international funding sources of the PA; hence, moving through its [the funding] political agenda […..]. Where the international donors do not fund except registered organizations, many of those working in these organizations re-built themselves as Non-Governmental Organizations in order to receive the developmental funding. The civil society lost the wideness, depth and plurality that it used to have; instead, competition and fragmentation replaced it, and the non-official initiatives emerging from the bottom failed to receive any funding” (p. 15).

Similarly, Hanafi and Tabar (2003: 210) realize more polarization through “the market-like competition” in relation to NGOs after Oslo period, which affected other social

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121 Dalia Association, “the necessity of decreasing the dependency of the Palestinian civil society on international aid” (in Arabic), May 2007, via http://www.dalia.ps/files/ConceptPaperArabic.pdf <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
and political groups. They argue that “the availability of new forms of bilateral and multilateral assistance to NGOs induced a state of competition between Palestinian organizations. This resulted in a struggle for organizational survival, between the urban middle class activists in the NGOs and the traditional elite in the charitable societies and grassroots leadership within the committees. Western donor funding introduced new criteria of funding and new conditions for dispersing aid, this established a hierarchy among organizations in terms of access to funding, and invariably it was the charitable societies and popular committees which lost out and were subsequently marginalized”.

In a discussion entitled “The Fragmentation and Decline of the Mass Movement, and the Shift from a Social to a Gender Agenda” (p.7), Islah Jad (2008) reaches a similar conclusion on the increased fragmentation tendency around the Oslo period. Particularly, she discusses the case of feminist organizations that split due to many factors including a new wedge between feminist and national liberation agendas.

Civil Society Power

Some research that is quoted in this chapter, where part of it corresponds to circles related to PACBI (i.e. Hilal, Jad, Botmeh, Baramki, Omar Barghouti, and Hammami). In particular, their contestation with some civil society actors enhance understanding relational aspects in the field, fragmentation and resisting it, during that period.

The Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have already become important actors. Hilal (2013) draws on a number of Palestinian sociological researchers to demonstrate that three groups pertaining to “the political elite” (he refers to the ruling elite) inside Palestine faced changes since Oslo agreement. He concludes on the emerging power of civil society organizations among the political elites: the Bourgeoisie that has been consolidating, the technocratic (i.e. the ex-PM of the PA Salam Fayyad), and the struggle that the “supervisors of the civil society organizations” engaged in. Some of the civil society actors, Hilal adds, “were able to attain important gains in participating in decision making”. It demonstrates that leaders in the civil society, though relationally in a weaker position than the PA and technocratic actors, still hold a relatively powerful position. These
hierarchical positions, which are in relations of contestation and cooperation, put the civil society organizations as a third player in the Palestinian ruling elite.

For example, three relevant actors for this research have occupied ministerial positions in the PA, besides being part of NGOs: Mustapha Barghouti (the Medical Relief UPMRC), Shawqi Issa (was in LAW Society then headed Insan) and Hanan Ashrawi (Miftah). Yet, it is worth noting that these ministerial positions - with the exception of Ashrawi who was part of the PLO - were in unity governments (Barghouti in 2007 and Issa in 2013), which suggest less fragmented orientation than the Hamas-Fateh competition. Moreover, though part of the fragmentation, Palestinian NGOs have been able to contest it by instituting a unified body in 1993 (PNGO).

PNGO portrays its importance by stating that “[d]uring the past fifteen years PNGO has become an important component of the Palestinian society. PNGO has become an important reference and mechanism for coordinating the Non-Governmental sector. It has succeeded in establishing relations with different civil society organizations, such as the ‘Palestinian Union of Charitable Societies’, the ‘National Institute for NGOs’, the various Palestinian Political Parties and the Professional Unions”. 122 It was discussed previously how NGOs/social movements have played an important role in the Palestinian society under occupation, as Jad (2007) summarizes it, “[b]etween the end of the 1987 intifada and the signing of the Oslo Agreement, the NGO sector was the main channel of foreign aid aimed at providing services at the grassroots level. This included clinics, schools, kindergartens, and income-generating projects. The result was that these NGO actors became important and acquired even more power than their parent parties [the leftist ones]” (Jad 2007: 623).

Around three quarters of the existing Palestinian NGOs today have been established after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. Most of them have transformed from charitable work to a more politicized work resisting the occupation, while providing services. The period of the first Intifada witnessed more politicization and the addition of around 30 percent of existing NGOs (Payes 2005: 104). Moreover, many

popular committees (mixed between local activists and representatives, NGOs and political factions), with mobilization skills, have been established and led the confrontations with the Israeli army.

However, after two years of the first Intifada, these popular committees became more professionalized. Funding was shifting to the development sectors (Hammami: 16-17). In the post-Oslo period, ‘development’ was a main norm for many NGOs. For example, Agricultural Relief PARC’s annual report of 2001, published after the second Intifada, stated an intended shift in its policy to urgent aid.  

In a survey conducted in 1996, the World Bank estimated, numerically, the general impact of the Palestinian NGOs, composed of a total of 1200 NGOs. The survey shows that NGO’s contribute to around 60 percent of the health care services “and ran all the disability and pre-school programmes, most agricultural services, low cost housing and micro-enterprise credit schemes” (Pages 2005: 103).

NGO funding is widely critiqued within the Palestinian society, and by relevant academic literature discussed in this research. Such critique withdraws considerable part of the recognition of the NGOs. As an article by Islah Jad (2007: 623-24), quoting Lisa Taraki - both are from PACBI - argues:

The role played by Palestinian NGOs [in the West Bank and Gaza Strip] before the 1993 Oslo Agreement differs significantly from their role in the post-Oslo phase. Before the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Palestinian society was organised in and around political parties and mass grassroots organisations. NGOs were linked to these parties under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which encouraged and financially supported the parties and their satellite organisations. While the PLO and its political parties were banned by Israel, their satellite organisations were to some extent allowed to work, since they were seen as service-providing organisations. [...]. The new NGOs that mushroomed in the post-Oslo period distinguish themselves from the older forms that are categorised as either charitable societies or popular mass organisations (uttor jamaheryya), which had an entirely different structure, discourse, leaders, projects, and networks (Taraki 1989; Shalabi 2001). The older mass organisations were open-access structures with public agendas, aiming to mobilise the largest number of students, workers, women, and youth into organisations serving each of these sectors. The newer ones, in contrast, are active in cities, run by an urban middle-class elite, and are smaller entities, dependent upon foreign funding  

123 PARC’s annual report of 2001; op. cit.
Also, another article summarizes the changes in PNGO and argues that, “Palestinian civil society has evolved since the 1980s, from being an integral part of the Palestinian resistance movement to a network of independent, professional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)” (The Advocacy Project 2001).

Unlike some PLO leaders or factions, in addition to Hamas and Jihad, whom resigned from the PLO executive committee as a protest against the Oslo Accords, or as the case of the opposition to Oslo agreements by Edward Said, the public negotiation delegation, being either from civil society or from academic atmospheres, has been less vocal in its opposition. Much of the opposition was articulated, as well, through the language of a democratic ruling when the PLO entered into the Palestinian territories, or through criticizing specific negotiation policies such as neglecting the issue of the Israeli settlements.

One of the reactions to Oslo is the consolidation of NGOs. PNGO- the Palestinian NGO Network- was established in September 1993 (the same month of signing Oslo agreement), by 70 NGOs (Payes 2005: 107). Currently it consists of around 135 NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since then, the NGOs sought more independence in politics as well in funding.

A somehow similar process has occurred among the Palestinian NGOs inside the Green Line where they have formed their umbrella, Ittijah, as also a reaction to Oslo accords. They found themselves isolated and left over by the peace talks on the one hand, and found in “international advocacy” a scape from being involved in Israeli institutions, while at the same time pressuring Israel (Payes 2005). Yet, the ex-coordinator of Ittijah, Ameer Makhoul, was closely linked to political parties of mass mobilization inside the Green Line, as discussed in chapter three.

The PLO leadership, in relation to international actors, set the main tone for post-Oslo period: Monopolizing the political track through the US mediation and dialogue with

\[124\] “About Pngo”, op. cit.
Israeli governments and peace groups, dependency on Western aid and some regional aid, the monopoly of violence by the new Palestinian police force, the hegemonizing of the economic sphere, and distancing itself from popular initiatives to push for resisting Israeli policies on the ground (except in times of crises, changes occur). Amid highly contested agreement with Israel and fear from an internal leadership from inside Palestine, the PA leadership has followed unilateral and generally repressive character, which would increase the polarization of the Palestinian political groups.

Soon after 1995, NGOs, especially human rights NGOs criticized the PA’s violations (i.e. torture and death under torture in prisons). They have witnessed firsthand these violations and their members have at times been imprisoned; including prominent figures such as Iyad Sarraj and Raji Sourani - one of the early political prisoners, who was imprisoned for a short period of time under the PA. Though they headed important human rights organizations part of PNGO, these prisoners have been beaten.\(^\text{125}\) When PA started its work in 1995, its newly established General Intelligence (al-mokhabarat al-Aamma) exemplified its fear from “others”, including the NGOs. It monitored the NGOs through a questionnaire to the officers of the NGOs. The questionnaire also included detailed questions on any political affiliations or jail experiences in their case or pertaining to other members of the family (Sullivan 1996: 97).

Other NGOs, like Badil that concentrates on the right of return of refugees, have feared compromise, during negotiations in the 1990s, from the part of PA on the refugees’ issue.\(^\text{126}\)

Even inside Fateh, the PA was facing criticism. Marwan Barghouti, a leading figure in Fateh particularly for the youth generation, has enrolled in certain contestations, mainly on corruption and democratic issues, with the PA leadership after Oslo. He consequently, ran independently for the 1996 legislative elections.

\(^{125}\) Ulrike Schleicher, “Alternative Nobel Prize for the Palestinian Raji Sourani”, Qantara, 30 September 2013, via http://en.qantara.de/content/alternative-nobel-prize-for-the-palestinian-raji-sourani-we-just-dont-have-the-right-to-give <accessed on 28 Nov. 2014>

\(^{126}\) Interview with Ingrid Jaradat; op. cit.
Coinciding with increased intra-Palestinian fragmentation, a wide range of actors, were developing links with Israeli counterparts in the first period after Oslo agreement. The PA’s new security apparatuses had been engaged in close security cooperation with the Israeli army, as the PA signed Paris Agreement in 1994 for close economic relations.

This has entailed other opposing actors as well. Marwan Barghouti has consolidated dialogues with Israeli sides during that period until the second Palestinian Intifada. In relation to NGOs, Rigby (2010) drew on existing research to demonstrate that “[d]uring the 1990s there were significant international funds directed to the promotion of warmer relationships between Palestinians and Israelis through ‘people-to-people’ dialogue projects. Such programmers often included a conflict resolution training and capacity-building component, but they did not include training for nonviolent resistance. It has been estimated that between September 1993 and October 2000 there were about 500 people-to-people projects involving over 100 organizations and a total budget of $20-30 million”. The contestation of Palestinian NGOs and the PA and other actors has been on other issues than on how to resist the Israeli policies during the immediate post-Oslo period.

A survey on the Palestinian NGOs, including PNGO, in relation to the question of “normalization” with Israel indicated that the question of dialogue with Israeli counterparts has received a middle ground (with increasing criticism during the second Intifada). The survey demonstrates as well that the PA has encouraged this tendency of dialogue, while-as indicated above- the funded projects “people to people” has encouraged such a tendency as well.

Moreover, the euphoria atmosphere of the immediate Oslo agreement represented in the belief that Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories marginalized other issues. As Badil indicated in 1996, PNGO – which was a central organizer of a conference

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for Palestinian refugees in Amman, “decided after the conference not to adopt refugee work as a priority”.129

In the immediate post-Oslo period, there is no available indication that the norm “boycott” has been widely mobilized as was the case during the first intifada. However, in small Palestinian circles, closely connected to Arab ones, the norm “anti-normalization” with Israel (meaning not making relations with Israel normal) has emerged in 1993 during the period of Oslo accords. In 1993 also, some Palestinian writers, with pro-Arab orientations, established the Resisting Normalization Committee (lajnat monahadat al-tatbee’).130 As such, the Palestinian anti-normalization norm is more linked to the Arab field, as explained in the previous chapter. Another anti-normalization committee, called the Palestinian Popular Committee to Resist Normalization was formed and operated mainly in Jerusalem. One of its founders was Saeed Daoud (who will be active later in the anti-Wall activity). They issued a statement back in 1995 against “cultural and artistic normalization” after a meeting by three Jordanian artists with Shimon Perez. This resulted in a membership cancellation at the League of Jordanian Writers.131

Concerning PNGOs’ relation with the PA and other actors, an escalated contestation has been going on between 1995 and 2000. The year 1995 witnessed the World Bank NGO Trust fund accompanied with the passing of a PA law on NGOs. It was considered to resemble the restrictive Egyptian law on NGOs. That year also witnessed some coercion against persons from human rights NGOs. As Hammami summarizes the relation at that period (2000: 17):

The relationship between the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] and the local NGO community is characterized by ever-growing PA authoritarianism toward the various NGO sectors, and NGOs' constantly evolving attempts to thwart governmental control. By 1995,
the "professionalized" NGOs, dominated by figures with political histories in left factions, had become a vocal lobby whose first showdown with the PA followed the issuance of a repressive draft law on charities and associations by the ministries of social welfare and justice in February 1995. The conflict was aggravated by the emergence in 1995 of a World Bank initiative to create a $15 million Palestinian NGO trust fund. This project brought about the fundamental change in the PA's assessment of the NGOs-from being a mere political irritation to becoming an actual (though limited) political threat. Responding to the role that PNGO was given as part of a consultative committee to the NGO fund in December 1996, Arafat created a government-controlled Higher Council of NGOs based in Gaza and largely comprised of Fateh organizations and others left out of PNGO. Soon after, he created a similar body in the West Bank.

The PA has tried to represent itself as the only legitimate authority, and to impose the "vision and division" on Palestinians; defining what/who is “good” and “bad”. In addition, it tried to impose its military monopoly on Palestinians (especially on Hamas and other factions) in cooperation with the Israeli army. It tried, as well, to hegemonize the political track and the economic resources, which led to increased polarization instead of consolidating complementary tendencies that has been present in the first Intifada.

Moreover, the PA has been following the international rule of the game that bets on linkages with international states, mediated roles mainly by the US, cooperation and trust building with the Israeli governments, to achieve the Palestinian demands of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There have been some changes incurred by the PA lately. Israeli governments insist until now, backed by the US administrations, that only negotiations, with sole US mediation, can achieve something; otherwise all steps by the PA or other actors (including the EU) are considered unilateral and hostile steps (Khalidi 2013).132

Each actor tries to contest dominant actors, by changing the rules of the game to their interest, while at the same time accepting major dimensions of rules of the game pertaining to acknowledging the legitimacy of the players. Those Palestinian factions that refused the rule of the game have been largely excluded from the field by being subject to arrests

132 Also, see recent news: “Washington : Establishing a Palestinian state would not be achieved except through direct negotiations”, Yediot Ahronot, 3 December 2014; “Israel and the US seek to ban the conveying of the meeting by the sides signing Geneva’s fourth convention to discuss the situation in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem “, Haaretz, 27 November 2014; “Prominent political Israeli sources warn the PA from taking cases to the International Criminal Court”, Israel Hayom, 10 December 2014. These news are translated into Arabic from Israeli newspapers by the Institute for Palestine Studies- Mukhtarat; each according to the provided date, via: http://www.palestine-studies.org/ar/daily/mukhtarat-view
either by the Israeli army or PA’s enlarged security apparatuses. The leftist factions (PFLP and DFLP) have opposed aspects of the rule of the game, though partially depended on aid from the PA (Hilal 2013). The People’s Party (ex-Communist Party) participated in the PA’s governments even as it raised some critiques. PNGO has been contesting aspects of the PA’s role; mainly on issues related to funding, laws, democratization and human rights. Similarly, Baramki served in the new Palestinian ministry of education. Many academics from diverse universities have been enrolled in positions in the PA or in writing studies to International organizations like the World Bank. While many others raised opposing views, the most vocal opposition came from Palestinian academics abroad, as Edward Said.\footnote{133 Series of interviews by A. P. with academics related to PACBI (conducted in Ramallah in 2009 and 2010); interview with A. P. (interview in Brussels).} Hence, wide circles raised their opposition voices from within the Oslo framework.

The funding issue has also been part of the new rule of the game. The PA, as well as major NGOs became dependent on Northern and regional funding (i.e. EU, US and Saudi). Hilal (2013) considered the funding issue part of the increased polarization. Political factions also depended on regional funding (particularly Hamas). Whereas leftist factions either took much of their funding from the PA (that controlled the PLO), or depended as well on regional sources of funding (i.e. Iran). Funding sources, with diverse political inclinations, has been another source of fragmentation in the field.

This has coincided with regional and international political polarization between what is known as “the moderate axis” (Saudi, Egyptian and Northern states) and “reluctance axis” \textit{(mihwar al-momanah)}; including Syrian and Iranian states and other fluctuating states, such as Iraq and Qatar). Major Palestinian factions (particularly \textit{Fateh} and \textit{Hamas}) have been then divided into these blocs. The whole field has been polarized and was exposed to further political and financial polarization, both regionally and internationally. This departs from the previous PLO experience that had maintained a higher degree of unity and immunity from these internal and regional/international polarizations (Hilal 2013).

Additionally, major NGOs have been more detached from the regional forces and sought the Northern routes. For instance, Mustapha Barghouti (2012) says that Arabs have
neither will nor ability to fight Israel. However, such voices are more inclined normatively to a Palestinian unity and hold opposing views to both Fateh and Hamas. As will be discussed later, other civil society components, including Mustafa Barghouti, have also sought regional support, though unidentified except in popular terms. The fact remains that regional powers are too polarized to play any effective role, which constitutes the regional crisis affecting the Palestinians as well. To exemplify, Hilal writes that popular resistance would be strengthened if supported by “a wide Arab and regional current” (2013: 31).

Some research has focused on the economic hegemony as a space of contestation between PNGO and the PA, but also the political (and even diplomatic) links that PNGO (and other) actors have been developing has been a space of contestation. The World Bank NGO Trust Fund (USD 15 million) in 1995, which alarmed the PA about the potential strength of PNGO, was not only a point of contestation on monopolizing economic resources as Hammami indicated, but also on the ability of PNGO to develop international links with powerful international institutions like the World Bank, the EU and others. PNGO gained a consultative status with the World Bank NGO Trust Fund.

As Hammami indicates, “[g]iven that the NGOs did not represent a real political force, the PA probably could have ignored them were it not for the collective impact of the World Bank NGO fund, the role of human rights organizations and NGOs' use of legal strategies” (17). The next sections in this chapter also discuss the attempts of some NGOs to create a third current in the Palestinian politics, which is considered a threat to the hegemony of the PA ruling elite. Additionally, an important aspect is the diplomatic and international political power that the PA seeks to monopolize - in spite of seeking the help of NGOs like the case of UN-CIERPP suggests. Diverse actors, especially Hamas (in regional politics), but also those less powerful actors like PNGO (in Northern powers), contest the PA quest for monopoly. For example, when the BDS movement says that it represents the Palestinian civil society, this does not pass without irritation to some PA actors that want to represent the whole Palestinian society.

The PA, alarmed by the World Bank fund in 1995, started hitting back on PNGO, either through some coercive measures or through co-optation and creating alternative bodies close to Fateh; an NGO umbrella first in Gaza and then in the West Bank. The
coercive measures were merely irritating in comparison to the invasion of the charitable institutions of Hamas in March 1996; but they represented a warning.

Moreover, Arafat insisted that the new law of NGOs should include the ministry of interior as the reference point, which was rejected by PNGO (Hammami 2000). PA circles started a labelling campaign against the NGOs. As Hammami realizes, the PA policy towards “human rights organizations there was an ongoing discursive strategy that attempted to separate them out as the ‘bad’ elements compared to the ‘good’ national institutions that provided charitable services during the occupation. In line with this trend, there has been the imprisonment, and in some cases the beating, of well-known human rights figures such as Raji Sourani and Iyad Sarraj. The regime has also orchestrated press campaigns accusing human rights organizations of being foreign agents or collaborators working against the ‘national interest’“. Hammami adds, “the PA initiated the first legal strategy [a law regulating the work of NGOs] in an attempt to domesticate the ‘good’ NGOs“ (18).

Fateh itself has felt great pressure during Oslo period. Its general secretary, Marwan Barghouti, who served, during his exile in the first Intifada, with the assassinated PLO’s second figure Khalil al-Wazeer in Tunis, has been in contestation with top PA Fateh actors. In addition, other intra-Fateh contestations were occurring. As Usher puts it (2003: 23):

Arafat used the tanzim leaders not only to tame Palestinian opposition to the process but also, on occasion, to act as a catalyst to improve his position in the negotiations with Israel. Yet at the same time, the tanzim leaders were adamant that Fatah should preserve its pre-Oslo identity as a nationalist movement independent of the PA—a loyal but always potentially seditious resistance […].

Established in 1991, the FHC [Fatah Higher Committee] was essentially Fatah’s “inside” intifada leadership. Steered by Barghouti, 122 Fatah regional conferences were held in the West Bank between 1994 and 1999, attended by some 85,000 Fatah activists and resulting in the election of about 2,500 new local leaders. A similar process occurred in Gaza but at a slower pace and with less participation [based on interview with Awni Mashni, FHC member]. The aim of this “revolution from below” was to force the convening of Fatah’s first general conference in eleven years to elect a new Central Council (FCC) and Revolutionary Council (FRC), the highest decision-making bodies in the movement. Had the general conference been held (it was not), the results would have been a foregone conclusion: a massive increase in the representation of the “inside” leadership in the FCC
and FRC at the expense of the “outside” leadership returned from Tunis, whom the tanzim blamed (far more than they blamed Arafat personally) for “defeatism” in negotiations and misgovernment in the PA areas.

From the side of some Palestinian factions (especially Hamas and Jihad), they have continued armed confrontations with the Israeli army during the first years of Oslo, though with a lower scale than the first Intifada. Most of the major factions directed their boycott then to the 1996 January PA’s elections (presidential and legislative), as they considered it part of a rejected agreement with Israel. As stated previously, even inside Fateh, Marwan Barghouti ran as an independent and not as a nominee of Fateh.

Moreover, where the norms of development, building state institutions and a liberal democracy have become the priority, the boycott of Israel has weakened. Still, boycott in relation to Israel was practiced by many persons on a daily basis. Besides, popular confrontations with settlers were sustained which went beyond boycott and entailed direct violent confrontations. However, politicized boycott was directed against the PA itself, typified in the 1996 elections boycott. Finally, this period internationalized the political fragmentation of the Palestinian actors. The World Back support for PNGO in its battle against the PA is but an example. Each major political power in the Palestinian society has been increasingly linked to either a regional or an international power.

2. The 1996 and 1998 confrontations

Soon after the early phase of Oslo accords, tensions arose again, especially with the Israeli governments of Shimon Peres. Tensions revolved around issues pertaining to settlements building, enforcement of long curfews in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the release of prisoners, and the implementation of the signed agreements. With Netanyahu coming to power in May 1996, tensions multiplied. The initial belief by the PA that the peaceful negotiations would lead into a Palestinian state had started to shake.
Even the first period of Oslo had not been a smooth period in relation to the Israeli governments of Rabin and Perez, as the PA, factions and civil society would start to realize more with time. The confrontations between both Israeli settlers in the occupied areas and the Israeli army on the one hand, and diverse Palestinian groups and individuals on the other hand, have not stopped even during the heydays of Oslo agreements’ period. This was a time characterized by the redeployment of Israeli forces, international recognition of PA’s issued passports and subsequent declarations of international aid to the PA.\textsuperscript{134}

The Israeli government of Peres postponed implementing the withdrawal from Hebron city scheduled for March 1996, until the Israeli elections. Netanyahu declared his

\textsuperscript{134} To have a sense of this tension in the month of June 1995 for example that was not an escalation to a degree of a sort of an uprising though it witnessed prisoners’ hunger strikes: On 4 June 1995, a “13-year-old Palestinian boy was killed and his eight-year-old brother was wounded in Hebron when an Israeli army bomb exploded near their home” (AFP). On the next day, “Israeli security forces arrested 45 activists of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in East Jerusalem” (AFP). On 13 June 1995 “[h]undreds of Israeli settlers launched a campaign to thwart government plans to redeploy Israeli troops in the West Bank by occupying empty houses in Barkan, near Nablus. Bulldozers were ploughing up land for a new pathway” (AFP), and on the same day “Israel put new restrictions on Palestinians who work inside Israel and turned away about 1,500 workers” (Reuter). Also, on the same day, an “Israeli settler fired shots at the home of Faisal Hussein, a senior PLO official, in East Jerusalem” (AFP), and on the next day “Israeli soldiers shot dead three Palestinians near Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. It was reported that one of the men was wanted by Israeli forces and the other two were members of the PLO unit Force 17” (Reuters), and after few days, “[m]ore than 700 Palestinian prisoners in the Israeli prison of Jneid in Nablus began an open-ended hunger strike to demand their release” (Reuters). After few days, “[d]ozens of Israeli settlers began fencing off land near Karney Shomron settlement in the West Bank which they said would be used for expansion of settlements” (Reuter), and “Unidentified gunmen shot dead Mr. Mahmoud El-Khawaja, a leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement as he left home for work in the Gaza Strip. Spokesman of the Islamic Jihad accused Israel of being behind the assassination and vowed swift revenge” (Reuters). On 22 June, “[m]ore than 100 Palestinians clashed with Israeli soldiers in the West Bank town of Ramallah as they demonstrated in support of the Palestinian prisoners who have been on hunger-strike since 17 June” (AFP), and two days after it is reported that “[t]wenty-three Palestinians and five Israelis were injured in clashes in the West Bank” (AFP). After a day, “Two Palestinians were killed and 51 others were injured by Israeli soldiers during a demonstration in Nablus” (AFP). Also, on the same day, “A Palestinian from Khan Yunis, killed himself and wounded three Israeli soldiers when he blew up a donkey-cart packed with explosives near a military base in the Gaza Strip” (AFP). After a day, an “Israeli settler opened fire at a Palestinian home in the Gaza Strip and killed a cow” (AFP). On the same day, more than 4,000 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails refused to accept food and joined the hunger-strike which started on 17 June” (AFP). After two days, “Palestinians in the West Bank including East Jerusalem went on a general strike in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners who were on the 10th day of hunger-strike. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat issued a warning that he would not sign an agreement on extending Palestinian self-rule before all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails were released”(Reuters). On 29 June, “Israeli soldiers shot and injured a Palestinian who tried illegally to enter the Gaza Strip with his daughter from Egypt” (AFP), and on the same day “Israeli special forces killed a senior member of Hamas movement in Hebron. Five Palestinians from Ramallah were shot and injured by Israeli soldiers during a protest for the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel” (Reuters). Source: The UN Division for Palestinian Rights, “Chronological Review of events relating to the Question of Palestine”, UNISPAL website, 30 June 1995, via https://unispal.un.org/DA/DPUN/unispal.nsf/f1ce874ab1832a53e852570bb006dfaf6/6413e30d4990beca852561f7006f704a?OpenDocument <last accessed on 19 February 2016>
electoral program that consisted of consolidating settlements and considering Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. Netanyahu won the elections and became the prime minister (1996-1998). Increased settlements, particularly in the West Bank, coupled with postponing implementing agreements, and practical measures in Jerusalem, brought again the issues of Jerusalem and settlements to the Palestinian various objections and to international and transnational actors. Two small scale uprisings (Habba in Arabic) occurred in 1996 and 1998.

Mustafa Barghouti, for example, recalls that period in an interview conducted in 2005. He said: “Between the signing in 1993 and the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, they built 102 new settlements and redoubled the size of the existing ones. Contrary to what many believe, Israel introduced its checkpoint policy during the Oslo period—before the Madrid negotiations, one could travel freely in and out of Jerusalem or Gaza. Now there are 703 checkpoints”.

Similarly, Baramki was involved in establishing a new body in 1996 that would engage in changing the perceptions on the peace process. He said (2010: 152): “International solidarity groups became less willing to help the Palestinians. They thought that the Oslo Accords had finally brought about peace. This was a major fallacy […] The Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, established in 1996, sought to explain what was really happening to solidarity groups from all over the world”.

The Palestinian Center for Human Rights has spent much energy in the post-Oslo period for making the PA’s institutions accountable. Starting from 1996, it has re-increased its focus on Israeli violations. In most of its press releases and reports at that time, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights considered that Palestinians have hopes for the peace process after Oslo accords, but then has started to call for the “international community to intervene” according to Fourth Geneva Convention. In its report related to the “tunnel

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135 “Mustafa Barghouti - Palestinian Defiance - Interview by Éric Hazan”; op. cit
“uprising” in September 1996, it indicated that it resulted in the death of 63 Palestinians and 36 Israeli soldiers.\(^{136}\)

During the September 1996 uprising, the PA itself temporarily contested Israel and the rule of the game, breaking with the line of negotiations. Yasser Arafat called Palestinians on TV to resist opening a tunnel under the square of Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, while the PA police clashed with the Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli government of Netanyahu deployed tanks around settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which was the first time since a long period. Nonetheless, it remained a temporal contestation by the PA, while the strategy of negotiating a peaceful agreement has continued not at least until Camp David negotiations in 2000.

Soon after the heydays of Oslo, it became clearer according to diverse Palestinian actors that Israeli practical policies have been more restrictive. Israel started a gradual restriction against the Palestinian labor after the first \textit{Intifada}, and after Oslo period following the operations of Palestinians associated particularly to \textit{Hamas} who exploded themselves in Israeli places between 1994-7, Israel frequently imposed collective closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Between 1994 and 1999, over 443 days of closure were imposed: Farsakh 2005: 98). As a paper by \textit{Miftah} says, quoting the Israeli human rights organization \textit{B’tselem}, “if past procedure [since 1972] had been to allow [Palestinian labor] entry into Israel except in extraordinary cases, now the rule was that Palestinians were not allowed to leave the occupied territory except in extraordinary cases in which the applicant met stringent conditions and received an individual permit”.\(^{137}\) Similarly, the study of Farsakh (2005: 66) on Palestinian labor to Israel indicates that the unemployment rate among Palestinians is correlated with the openness of the Israeli economy to Palestinians. The unemployment rate of Palestinians remained “less than 5 per cent between 1970 and 1990 […]. After 1993, the number of unemployed grew by over 7 per cent, reaching as high as 19.6 per cent in the West Bank and 32.5 per cent in the Gaza Strip in 1995 and

after 2000”. The study of Botmeh (2007: 14) indicates as well that the Israeli policy heads towards getting rid of the Palestinian labor in the Israeli market, though there are still workers there, as well as working in Israeli settlements. Palestinian workforce are in a state of contradiction between struggling against settlements and finding themselves working there (Hammami 2005).

In 1996, the National Office to Defend Land and Resist Settlements has been established inside the PLO, upon the initiative of Tayseer Kahlid; a member of the executive committee of the PLO, and a leader in the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; one of the historical leftist political factions part of the PLO. Later on, in late June 1999, the National Office has cooperated with the PA to impose a ban on Palestinian workers in Israeli settlements in Gaza, which has been approved by the PA (Aronson 1999: 120). However, it seemed a temporary arrangement that could not be sustained. Now lacking an array of legal rights, Palestinian workers with less opportunities or wages in the Palestinian areas continued to work in Israeli settlements.

With another round of obstruction in negotiation related to the refusal of the Israeli government to withdraw from 13 percent of the Palestinian land, and just preceding the outbreak of another limited uprising in Jerusalem and other areas in 1998, the European Commission issued a recommendation not to allow Israeli products from the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of 1967 to benefit from privileged agreements. By the end of the month, on 30 May 1998, after a governmental meeting, the PA called on the “international community” to "impose economic and political sanctions on Israel".

This position by the PA has repeated itself in the next year. For example, on 23 January 1999, the Palestinian cabinet issued a statement saying: "[t]he Palestinian leadership, in view of the current stalemate in the implementation of the Wye River

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141 Ibid.
accords is asking the European Union, the United States, Russia, Japan and economic
groups to boycott products from Israeli settlements." During the same month of January
1999, the PA via Sulayman Abu-Karsh, the Under Secretary for the Ministry of Economy
and Trade Ministry called for boycotting Israeli products from the settlements, while
calling on the “international community, the peace supporting forces, and all economic and
international groups and blocs […] to limit the damage caused by the existence of the
settlements and to boycott all their agricultural, industrial, and commercial products”.

A similar call for a partial boycott of Israeli settlement products came in June 1998
from inside the Green Line by the Higher Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens in
Israel; a political coalition for Palestinians inside the Green Line, and whom Ameer
Makhoul (coordinator of Ittijah) has been active in. The head of the Higher Follow-Up
committee told AFP that “our decision came as a result of the Israeli intransigence and
unwillingness to proceed in the peace process in order to achieve a just and comprehensive
peace to our brother Palestinians in the self-rule territories”. The AFP news indicated
that this decision by the Follow-Up Committee came less than a month after the European
Commission’s declaration that it intended to investigate if Israel is violating the
agreements by exporting Israeli settlements’ products as Israeli products.

Since 1998, before the European Commission’s declaration in May 1998, the
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) has started to call for sanctions related to
Israeli settlements. On 23 February 1998, PCHR attended a workshop in Cairo organized
by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies (that would have a role in Durban
conference in 2001) under the title “The Economic Sanctions against the Iraqi People: A
Human Rights Perspective.” PCHR reported what issues are raised by participants.
Interestingly, the term "apartheid" has appeared in relation to Israel and as a critique to
previous US policies. Moreover, PCHR reported that the participants "affirmed that the

143 'Ala’ al-Mashharawi, “PA Official Urges Boycott of Settlement Products”, Al-Quds newspaper via
144 “The release of Umm al-Fahim’s mayor assistant: The 1948 Palestinians boycott the settlements’
accessed on 21 February 2016>
minimum level that Europe must apply if it has no intention to impose economic sanctions on Israel, is to stop the privileges granted to Israel, particularly the Israeli export of products to Europe. According to the agreements, the Israeli-exported products to Europe amounted to 72 percent of its external trade".145

Both the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies and Ittijah among others will participate later on, in July 2001, to submit the Arab NGO caucus’ proposal to the NGO Forum in Durban conference in conjunction with the South African NGO Coalition (Sangoco). Between 1998 and the Arab caucus proposition in 2001, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights has been obviously developing its positions towards “boycott” and referring to Israel as “apartheid” after it had hopes previously for implementing the Oslo agreement.

During the confrontations in 1996 and 1998, Palestinian, Israeli, Arab and European non-state and official actors have started to raise issues related to boycott in relation to settlements (the case of Belgium is discussed in a following chapter). Amid these events of contestation, the official European position has been very slow and hesitant, avoiding the term boycott, though it had its effect on encouraging such calls by Palestinians, while Palestinian positions escalated with some Israeli calls as well.146

On 21 May 1998, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights was quick to respond to the European Commission’s declaration on Israeli settlements’ products, and issued a press release that "asserted that it is time for the international community, especially the European Union, to play a more powerful and responsible role in light of the policies of the Israeli government, which violate basic rules of international law and human rights. Moreover, it repeated its invitation to the international community to impose economic

146 For example, Peace Now continued to stick to the call for boycotting settlements’ products until 2015 while some Israeli academics developed their positions beyond settlements. See: Rachel Giora, “Milestones in the history of the Israeli BDS movement: A brief chronology”, 18 January 2010 (Updated 27 January 2010), Fliphtml website, via http://fliphtml5.com/ryvp/sryv <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
sanctions on the Israeli government as a legal [mean] to apply the rules of international law and to ensure respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{147}

In 1999, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights re-used the term “apartheid” in describing the "continuous Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights five years after the Oslo Agreements reflect an apartheid system on the ground. This requires active intervention from the international community to protect Palestinian civilians in the OPTs."\textsuperscript{148}

The international route for the boycott and sanctions norms has started to be mobilized. On the NGOs level, the declaration of the civil society conference of 1997 at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP (and a symposium for European NGOs on Palestine) stated that “[a]ny campaigns in North America, Europe and elsewhere should include the demand for economic pressure on Israel, showing the economic consequences of developments in the region. Demanding sanctions against Israel should be a tool used by grassroots organizations as a response to the policies of the Israeli Government. Urgent action was required to oppose the ratification by national parliaments in Europe of the Israeli Association Agreement with the European Union which is expected to enter into force on 1 January 1998”, and “boycott of Israeli products, in particular those produced in settlements”.\textsuperscript{149}

In this mentioned 1997 conference, already PNGO and the Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace were present, with Allam Jarrar, who became coordinator for PNGO later on. Already in 1997-1998, Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace headed by Gabi Baramki, and PNGO, have been members of “the International Coordinating Committee for NGOs”,\textsuperscript{150} which emerged from the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), and indicated the transnationalization (inside an international organization like the UN

\textsuperscript{147} PCHR, Annual Report (1998): 140; op. cit.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) of these actors and started to mobilize discussed norms to pressure Israel.

Similarly, in May 1998, during the NGO meeting for Latin American and Caribbean region organized by the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), the NGO declaration said that “participants expressed their grave concern over the prolonged deadlock in the peace process”, and called for “Boycott of Goods Made In Israeli Settlements”.

Yet, at that period, trust in peace talks and “appreciation for the work done by the Israeli peace camp” was a pillar.

Hence, “boycott” has started to re-appear in Palestinian circles after 1996, and extended to transnational links, while aspects of partial boycott has been discussed on the level of the European Commission. Actually, some campaigns have started to appear. For example, a “coalition of Muslim and Arab organizations [in the US] called for a worldwide boycott of Burger King” in 5 August 1999 for franchising a branch in an Israeli settlement in the West Bank. Burger King responded quickly by closing its branch. As will be discussed in the Belgian case in another chapter, responses to boycott have started to appear in the late 1990s and practical initiatives appeared during the period of the second Intifada.

In Palestine, more convergence between diverse actors started to appear on the issue of boycott. The Palestinian Observatory (Al-Marsad) has been established just before the second Intifada, and focused on the issue of boycotting Israeli products that have alternatives in the Palestinian market. The Palestinian Observatory included the following members: National Office to Defend Land and Resist Settlements (the aforementioned

PLO’s office), PNGO, Agricultural Relief PARC, *Miftah* (headed by Hanan Ashrawi), Farmers’ Union, and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees- UAWC (Joudeh 2006: ft. 1 p. 115, 121). Moreover, the Palestinian Association for the Protection of the Consumer started its boycott calls at the end of 1999.\(^{154}\)

As another moment of building coalition between NGOs and other bodies including political factions, the National Committee for Boycotting the Settlements’ Products and Encouraging the Palestinian Products in cooperation with the Palestinian Observatory (*Al-Marsad*) organized in The Orient House (*Bait Al-sharq*) in Jerusalem on 31 July 2000 a conference for boycotting settlements and their products, and launched a campaign entitled “boycotting the settlements’ products is a sacred national duty”. The conference was hosted by the late Faisal Al-Husaini, head of the Orient House and a member of the PLO’s executive committee. Participants also included the National Office to Defend Land and Resist Settlements (the PLO office). The meeting was attended as well by PA ministries, the commerce union, NGOs among others (Joudeh 2006: 116). Such an incident indicates the convergence of three boycott bodies that have been established in the last years, and who already have *habitus* in boycotting Israel since the first *Intifada*. Hence, the signs of activating a new wave of boycotting Israeli products have started appearing in the late 1990s.

Moreover, though PNGO had lost much of the popular mobilization character (compared to the first period of the first *Intifada*), it has been powerful in lobbying (the term used repeatedly by Hammami) and building coalitions, and it succeeded in overcoming the PA’s law on NGOs in 2000, at a time of regaining some unity again in the field. PNGO built coalition with the Union of Charitable Associations and lobbyists with the political factions (including *Fateh*), who declared a position in support for the PNGO’s lobbied new law, and defended the reputation of PNGO. Whereas, *Hamas* abstained from supporting them directly, it still supported them in the coverage of their newspaper *al-risalah* (Hammami 2000).

\(^{154}\) “Strengthening the Palestinian Product is a basis for the success of boycotting Israel” (in Arabic), *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* newspaper (London, 3 May 2014), via http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=163871 <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
The current in *Fateh* that is close to Marwan Barghouti supported PNGO in its struggle with Arafat for the NGOs law during the 1990s. The contestation with the PA on internal Palestinian issues has been shared atmosphere even inside the PA’s faction *Fateh*. Changes in the field had been accumulating gradually after the first Oslo period. Inside *Fateh*, the post-1996 period was a period of consolidating its opposition to the rule of the game. Usher (2003: 23) realizes that:

Opposition swiftly came, especially after 1996, with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud-led government. Popular disenchantment with the stalled peace process grew while support for Fatah as a faction declined. The *tanzim*’s contradiction was felt at various levels. Within the PA’s new institutions—and especially within the Palestinian Council (PC) elected in January 1996—*tanzim*-affiliated deputies led the criticism of the corruption, mismanagement, and lawlessness within the PA’s governance. On the street, *tanzim* activists took the lead in protests against Israel’s settlement policies, most violently during the three days of armed and popular confrontations that erupted in September 1996 after Netanyahu opened a “tourist” tunnel in Jerusalem’s occupied Old City. *Tanzim* cadres were also involved in sporadic Palestinian demonstrations against the PA, usually in response to security measures taken by the PA police forces against Islamist and Fatah activists. Above all, opposition was expressed through the slow, incremental, and positional struggle for democracy within Fatah itself, driven by the Fatah Higher Committee (FHC) and its young West Bank general secretary, Marwan Barghouti, who returned to the occupied territories after seven years of exile in 1994.

As Hammami (2000: 16) realizes, “within the possibilities of NGO politics there have been some notable achievements since Oslo. The formation of a well-organized NGO lobby under the umbrella of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) and the President’s recent signing into law of a relatively benign NGO law are quite significant, given the quiescence of popular political resistance to PA rule”. PNGO believed during Oslo period that focus should be on democratization of the PA, sound development policies and empowering NGOs themselves would make changes in the Oslo track and achievements it could bring.

In short, during this period (1996-2000) some break from the rule of the game has started to appear. Though it was a time characterized by frequent deadlock of the peace talks amid two major, but limited confrontations; the continued settlement enlargement in the West Bank (increased by 52 percent between 1993 and 2000: see Usher 2003); and the “boycotting” of Palestinian labor and frequent collective closures in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In spite of that, re-coordination by diverse Palestinian actors started the re-
appearance of the boycott norm, mostly related to Israeli settlements in the occupied land of 1967. Moreover, the signing the NGO law in 2000 by the PA, and the PNGO coalition building with charitable organization – which was supported by political factions, are indications of the unwillingness to further collide amid confrontations with Israeli policies. Finally, the international and transnational links between Palestinian, European and other actors from the Global South have appeared during this period through partial calls for boycott, while many of these actors had still believed in the viability of the peace process.

3. **The second Intifada**

3. A. The spread of boycotts in Palestine

In the Camp David summit that took place in July 2000 in USA, the Israeli government of Ehud Barak was under the assumption that it gave the Palestinian Authority an unprecedented offer. Arafat, on the other hand, found the offer less than what he can accept, amid great mistrust between the two sides. After the failure of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations culminating in Camp David, “Israel prepared to use tanks and helicopters to ‘crush’ the Palestinians and re-take land in Area A”; an intention that was expressed in military exercises or by declarations of senior Israeli defense and political officials (Pressman 2003: 124). Both the Israeli government and the PA have suspected military action by the other side. Demonstrations erupted after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Noble Sanctuary (Mount Temple as referred to by Israel) on 29 September 2000. As Amnesty International realized on 18 October 2000, “[s]ince 29 September 2000 more than 100 Palestinians, including 27 children, were killed by the Israeli security forces”. Moreover, inside the Green Line, another 13 Palestinians were killed in demonstrations against the Israeli police, which resulted in yet another major effect on relations between the Palestinians inside the Green Line and the Israeli authorities. During the first three

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156 Ibid.  
weeks of the second Intifada, the number of victims (113 persons) had become higher, in fact much higher than the number of victims during the first three weeks of the first Palestinian Intifada (31 persons).\footnote{157} 

Amid the harsh Israeli response to Palestinian demonstrations, in addition to previously escalating tensions and confrontations especially since 1996, with no prospective political horizon, and an increasingly radical mood within Fateh, the second Intifada got militarized quickly. This militarization was also inspired by the withdrawal of the Israel army from South Lebanon in May 2000 after many years of armed resistance. However, many popular actions have been present as well.

Directly after the beginning of the second Intifada, the boycott call targeting all Israeli products became a widespread norm. Reviewing collective conferences, demonstrations and initiatives for boycotting Israeli products in the late 2000 and early 2001 indicate the extent to which boycotting Israeli products had been embraced by wide Palestinian actors. They included political factions, ministers and officials in the PA, NGOs, city mayors, camps’ “popular committees”, trade unions, farmers union, industrials and commerce unions, and universities (Joudeh 2006: 116-131).\footnote{158}

With the second Palestinian Intifada, the rules of the game had been further contested, resulting not only in negotiations, but also in the emergence of various forms of resistance; boycott (as an act and a stand) had widely spread among diverse Palestinian actors, including the Palestinian Observatory (Joudeh 2006: 116-131). Marwan Barghouti, who headed the National and Islamic Higher Committee for the Follow-up of the Intifada in the West Bank, insisted on boycotting Israeli goods by Palestinians.\footnote{159} 

A major example of re-unification amid fragmentation in the field was the establishment of the “National and Islamic Higher Committee for the Follow-up of the Intifada” directly after the eruption of the second Intifada. The committee was constituted


\footnote{158} Joudeh documented diverse initiatives based on news published in Palestinian and Arab newspapers.

of 13 political factions with high-ranking representatives from, such as Marwan Barghouti from *Fateh* and Saeed Siam from *Hamas*. However, the PA had not directly attempted to lead the second *Intifada*, mainly out of fear of the Israeli and international reactions. Actually, one of roles of US/ international Michell Commission (a fact-finding commission formed in April 2001) was to investigate the causes of the conflict that had been escalating since September 2000. Hence, the PA - or the head of the PA and other divisions within it - encouraged, on the one hand, *Fateh* (particularly *tanzim*) through Marwan Barghouti to lead the *Intifada*. On the other hand, members of the PA’s security forces were included in the confrontations, and consequently clashed with Israeli soldiers and their militants arrested for various reasons, including breaking a ceasefire. This condition contributed to the ambiguity and lack of an effective leadership backed by a broad Palestinian consensus.

One of the early directives of the Higher Committee of the Intifada was to boycott all Israeli goods. Boycott was part of other tactics of confrontation with the Israeli side. Marwan Barghouti declared with an implicit threat in December 2000 that Palestinians traders have a deadline (mid-January 2001) to get rid of all Israeli goods. This meant challenging the Paris Protocol signed by the PA and the Israeli government. Barghouti also declared that the boycott is coordinated with PA customs, and that it is an open campaign not limited within a time-frame, also aiming to support the Palestinian economy.

The Palestinian Observatory, formed by NGOs and others, had as well escalated its calls for boycott of Israeli products, while taking common initiatives with diverse Palestinian actors. For instance, three weeks after the eruption of the second *Intifada*, particularly on 19 October 2000, the Palestinian Observatory published a call in Palestinian newspapers calling official and civil institutions, the private sector and the professional and popular unions to boycott Israeli products on the basis that buying these products supports the occupation. The Observatory also provided information to further convince consumers, such as indicating that the Palestinian market is the second most important market for Israeli products. Profits reach 3 billion USD annually. Moreover, the Observatory published a list of around 50 Israeli products to boycott, and another list of 26 products

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160 Siam was assassinated by the Israeli army in the war in Gaza in 2008-9
161 George Mitchell is a US ex-senate Democrat who played roles in Ireland’s peace efforts.
162 “The middle of the next month is the last date to get rid of the Israeli products in the [West] Bank and [Gaza] Strip”; *op. cit.*
from Israeli settlements (Joudeh: 115 & 121). The list included general and settlements Israeli products.163

In November 2000, the Palestinian Observatory participated in two marches. On 6 November 2000, a march in Ramallah was organized for the call of boycotting Israeli goods. The march was organized by the National and Islamic Higher Committee of the Intifada, the Teachers Union, the Industrial Chamber of Ramallah, the Palestinian Observatory, and Palestinian Women’s Research and Documentation Centre. The collective call for this march indicates the coming together of political forces, NGOs and unions on the issue of boycott, among other issues. The other march took place on 19 November through a mass march that was organized by the National and Islamic Higher Committee, the Observatory, the National Committee for Boycotting the Settlement Products, and unions. Marwan Barghouti spoke to the audience.

Similarly, on 10 November 2000, a meeting called for by the National Committee to Boycott Israeli Products (headed by Tayseer Khalid from the PLO) and the Observatory took place in Jericho to discuss the ways in which Israeli products can be prevented from entering the Palestinian market. The meeting was also attended by the Agricultural Relief PARC and the Agricultural Workers Union and traders. Additionally, on the same day, a lecture on boycotting Israeli products took place at the Jerusalem Open University in Jenin with representatives from the PA’s ministries of industry and education besides Agricultural Relief PARC. The Observatory also issued a publication in cooperation with the Union of Teachers to boycott Israeli products. The bulk of these activities by the Observatory were through disseminating information in newspapers, publications and lectures, in comparison with the more popular character of the work led by Marwan Barghouti for instance.

The industrialists and the PA’s ministry of industry were active in calling for boycotts as well. Besides meetings with diverse actors for a boycott campaign, the ministry of industry issued a public statement on 14 November 2000 that called for boycotting Israeli products and supporting Palestinian products and enhancing their qualities.

These campaigns included radio advertisements, as in the case of Nablus Radio on 23 November 2000. Also, in December 2000, a conference calling for the replacement of Israeli

163 Ibid.
trade agencies with Arab and foreign ones, took place in Nablus, North West Bank. The conference was hosted by the city mayor with the participation of deputies, politicians and businessmen. There have been numerous and wide calls for boycott in different Palestinian localities in the West bank and Gaza Strip.

Joudeh’s research (116-131) lists multiple boycott initiatives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the first two years of the second Intifada. In the years 2000 and 2001, he pointed out to the formation of more than four boycott committees encompassing wide actors. Joudeh’s study documented (up until the year 2004) the continuous activities by these committees, though they decreased after the year 2001. Yet, not all boycott initiatives have been sustained or had extended campaigns on the popular level. For example, Hammami and Tamari (2000) indicate that the first boycott initiatives during the second Intifada by Palestinian NGOs concentrated on publishing ads in Palestinian newspapers. Hanafi and Tabar (2003: 206) question why there has been “so little vocal support from Palestinian nongovernmental organizations for the local and regional boycott of Israeli goods”, which reflects some academic responses to NGOs’ boycotts.

Boycott activities especially those conducted during the first year of the second Intifada, as demonstrated by Joudeh (2006), are indicative of a growing momentum by the Palestinian Observatory as a major expression of NGOs momentum. The Palestinian Observatory is a campaign composed of diverse actors from NGOs, including the PLO and unions. Moreover, there was a sort of campaigning for boycott on the ground. Joudeh lists two marches, out of a total of three, where the Palestinian Observatory was one of the organizers. These marches, as most of the other activities of the campaigns, were organized with other political bodies and actors from unions.

Until the year 2004, NGO actors continued boycott efforts. For example, in May 2002, after the Israeli invasion of April 2002, the Observatory started another campaign in Palestine to boycott Israeli medications, the alternatives for which are available, with the slogan “who brings you death would not give you life”. In its launching campaign, the PNGO representative Isam Aruri spoke to journalists.164 In the year 2003, and in a context of contesting leadership, Mustapha Barghouti (from Al-Mubadara, PNGO and the

164 “Entitled ‘who provide death to you would not give you life’: A popular Palestinian campaign to boycott Israeli medicine” (in Arabic), Alriyadh newspaper (Riyadh, 28 May 2002), via http://www.alriyadh.com/Contents/2002/05/28-05-2002/page10.html <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
Medical Relief UPMRC) laid the blame on the leading committees in the “Popular Campaign for Boycotting Israeli Products” for not sustaining its actions, and considered it as the main reason behind the weakening of the boycott campaigns (Joudeh: 147). In 2004, Agricultural Relief PARC co-organized a meeting in Jericho with the aim of “re-activating the boycott committee” as declared in a meeting in Jericho’s boycott committee (Joudeh: 131). Moreover, Agricultural Relief PARC’s annual report of 2005 mentions its continued work on Israeli settlements products and its main focus on working with the Observatory for boycotting settlements’ products.165

Yet, the boycott campaigns had not been mass-based compared to the ones led by Marwan Barghouti, the General Federation of Trade Unions or the industrialists Union in Gaza for example. Moreover, it is obvious that since 2002/2003, the boycott campaigns had weakened inside Palestine. It is worth noting that though different actors including the Palestinian Observatory had been active to varying degrees, the leadership of the Intifada, including the leadership of the boycott campaigns, was subject to Israeli punishment like imprisoning Marwan Barghouti in April 2002. The official Palestinian leadership represented by the PA had vague oscillating and varying attitudes, depending on political and diplomatic tracks. After 2004, the PA’s new leadership was not interested in boycotts or confrontations with the Israeli side for the following years, but concentrated on “trust building” (i.e. in security, economics and negotiation) with the Israeli side (as part of the Mitchell plan and Road Map), despite the fact that Israel had not terminated the expansion of settlements as required by these plans. Additionally, “civil society” could not sustain a close relation with wide segments of the population in order to sustain and strengthen boycott campaigns. Moreover, Palestinian trade agencies importing Israeli products, that have been a main target of the calls, are influential actors, and many of their members are officials or linked to the PA.166

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The re-emergence of ‘anti-normalization’

In relation to the anti-normalization norm, it had spread again. On 21 October 2000, one day before the first Arab Summit in response to the Intifada, the National and Islamic Forces issued its first call to isolate Israel. They organized a mass march in Nablus city on 20 October and sent a letter to the Arab heads of states calling for “halting all forms of normalization with Israel, and calling the Arab summit to take practical and effective steps and procedures towards ensuring an international protection for the Palestinian people”. On the next day, they issued another letter to the “National, democratic, Arab nationalist, Islamic and Christian” currents in the Arab world, saying “we turn to you and call you […] to take your responsibilities to defend your people and brothers, and your holy places in Jerusalem, and assure you that your involvement and adherence with your Intifada in Palestine provide us with more insistence, challenge and hope”. The language used clearly demonstrates the perceived blurry boundaries between Palestinians and Arabs. The letter asked the Arab movements to “cut all diplomatic, economic, cultural relations with Israel, stopping normalization in all its forms, and re-establishing the Arab [League] boycott offices to their previous activities”, “considering the US government a partner in the Israeli aggression”, “boycott the US and Israeli products and using the Arab economic, oil and financial relations to support the Palestinian national struggle and to pressure the US administration”, among other calls.

After three days, when the Arab summit ended, another march took place in Jenin city on 23 October 2000 in protest against the “weakness of Arab decisions and calling for Arab states to cut their relations with Israel”. These calls for anti-normalization came from the upper Palestinian political bodies, which are more connected to Arab networks, and their boomerang was clearly through a regional Arab route to pressure the US, and even calling to boycott it, to pressure Israel. These show different position-taking in relation to boycott and anti-normalization norms by another political group with different social and cultural capitals.

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168 “A Palestinian Call to Arab masses” (in Arabic), al-Bawaba news website (21 October 2000), via http://tinyurl.com/pdp7xf4 <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
169 “Reports of events” (in Arabic), October 2000; op. cit.
Other anti-normalization initiatives included a meeting by the Palestinian Popular Committee to Resist Normalization (above-mentioned) with the Ramallah Industry and Commerce Chamber on 13 November 2000 for a boycott campaign “against Israeli and US products” (Joudeh 2006: 119). On 4 December 2000, an anti-normalization conference was held in Tulkarem city, West Bank, and was attended by the Mayor of Tulkarem who declared his position for boycotting Israeli products, besides the participation of the General Union of Palestinian Women and the trade chamber. Anti-normalization calls continued, where in 2005, for example, a wide anti-normalization conference took place in Gaza.

The anti-normalization norm affected actors connected to the BDS movement. For example, George Giacaman (2001), who became affiliated with PACBI, organized a discussion meeting for Palestinian and Arab thinkers in Amman in 2001 to discuss the Intifada and Arab support to it. Anti-normalization activities in the Arab region were quoted by diverse speakers.

The anti-normalization norm continued to be referred to during the second Intifada. In 2004, Ibrahim Dakkak, from PACBI, was one of the signatories of a letter signed by 637 Arab figures (in culture, academia, unions, parties, NGOs, deputies and officials). The letter was directed to the heads of the Arab League and UN, calling the Arab League “to cut every existing relations between a number of Arab states and the Zionist entity and annulling all existing normalization procedures” 170 among different demands related to supporting resistance in Palestine and Iraq. Similarly, in 2005, PACBI published on its website the coverage of a large anti-normalization conference in Palestine that took place in Gaza city in November 2005, 171 organized by different actors connected to some political factions and attended by Arab presenters.

Finally, and in relation to the transnational dimension, the actors calling for boycott against Israeli products in Palestine have frequently cooperated with each other in an obvious tendency towards uniting efforts, though of course there was competition amongst

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171 “During the first Palestinian conference to resist normalization in Gaza: Assuring the right of the Palestinian people to continue the liberation project and keeping the siege on Israel” (in Arabic), PACBI website (quoting Al-Ayyam newspaper), 16 November 2005, via http://www.pacbi.org/atemplate.php?id=71 <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
them. These widely dispersed boycott initiatives in Palestine, especially during the first two years of the second Intifada, crossed borders. Particularly in the Arab region, boycott and anti-normalization initiatives have been wide. Boycott initiatives started to appear in cities and regions of the North, (such cases will be discussed in a following chapter). One of the early major transnational routes that would affect Palestinian actors, discussed in this research, has been resembled by re-making an analogy between South Africa and Palestine on the issue of apartheid.

3. B. The route between Palestine and South Africa

By the year 2001, the term “apartheid” in relation to Israel was already mobilized, even by states, for instance during the preparation for the third UN-World Conference against Racism in Durban between 31 August and 7 September 2001. The previous two conferences in 1978 and 1983 concentrated on the issue of apartheid. The centrality of “apartheid”, the successful anti-apartheid struggle, besides holding the new conference in South Africa itself, all were in themselves suggestive on Palestinians to think of a parallel. This was specifically needed as it was during a time when the Oslo process was increasingly viewed as dysfunctional, and when the Intifada and the level of the Israeli reactions to it were mobilizing many Palestinians towards other paradigms. The idea of apartheid in relation to Israel was raised previously by Palestinians, and by a small anti-Zionist Israeli group (Matzpen party). However, with the new circumstances, and the newly fallen apartheid regime in South Africa, the idea suggested itself again and strongly.

For example, Khader Shqirat, the chairman of Law Society, described the atmosphere in a meeting for Palestine that was help in Brussels on 18 January 2001. Back then, different scenarios were discussed and someone had suggested the idea of an analogy with apartheid. He said that there was reluctance among the audience to mobilize it and the focus was on EU-Israel association agreement, but LAW decided to make a study about the relevance of apartheid to the case of Palestine while the preparatory work for the UN Durban conference had already started (in May 2000).172

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172 The Center for Policy Analysis in Washington, “International Law, Apartheid and Israel”; op. cit.
Regional mediations to Durban

In the regional governmental preparatory meeting (Asia-Pacific) in Tehran in January-February 2001 for the UN Durban conference, the term “new kind of apartheid” was explicitly associated with “a foreign occupation founded on settlements, its laws based on racial discrimination”, as one of the earliest collective international suggestions to mobilize “apartheid” in relation to Israel.173

The two tracks of international and transnational attempts to link Zionism with racism and/ or Israel with apartheid had been going in parallel and sometimes in coordination. Though the parallel NGO declaration in Tehran did not mention “apartheid” then, it stated that “the occupation of Palestine by Israel is the most serious problem of foreign occupation in our region”, and recommended for the UN Durban conference that “the problem of Palestine be taken up as the most urgent issue on the global political agenda”.174 The declaration also included statements on colonization and occupation as major sources of racism.

Some NGOs that had a leading role in the NGO Forum in Durban in August 2001 were present in the Tehran meeting. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and the Arab Organization for Human Rights participated in Tehran meeting, and the Arab Organization for Human Rights gave a talk.175 Raji Sourani from the Palestinian Centre for

173 Three recommendations related to Palestine/ Israel read:
“19. Recognize Jerusalem as a city of reverence and religious sanctity for three major religions of the world and call for an international effort to bring foreign occupation, together with all its racial practices, to an end, especially in holy shrines dear to the three religions;
20. Affirm that a foreign occupation founded on settlements, its laws based on racial discrimination with the aim of continuing domination of the occupied territory, as well as its practices, which consist of reinforcing a total military blockade, isolating towns, cities and villages under occupation from each other, totally contradict the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and constitute a serious violation of international human rights and humanitarian law, a new kind of apartheid, a crime against humanity, a form of genocide and a serious threat to international peace and security;
21. Recall with deep regret the practices of racial discrimination against the Palestinians as well as other inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories which have an impact on all aspects of their daily existence such as to prevent the enjoyment of fundamental rights, express our deep concern about this situation and call for the cessation of all the practices of racial discrimination to which the Palestinians and the other inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied by Israel are subjected;” [emphasis added]. See: Report of the Asian Preparatory Meeting (Tehran, 19-21 February 2001), GA, A/CONF.189/PC.2/9, 10 April 2001, via http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/234473/A_CONF.189_PC.2_9-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
174 WCAR Asia Pacific NGO Declaration (Teheran/Kathmandu), Asia Pacific NGO Movement for WCAR website, n.d., via http://www.hurights.or.jp/wcar/E/Kathmandu/TehKatdc.htm <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
175 Report of the Asian Preparatory Meeting (Tehran, 19-21 February 2001); op. cit.
Human Rights and Khadir Shqirat from LAW were associated with the Arab Organization for HR. The South African SANGOCO, which had a leading role in the preparatory process for the NGO Forum related to the UN Durban conference, was present as well.

The Arab Organization for HR had a major role in organizing two other regional Arab NGOs’ preparatory meetings for the UN Durban conference in Amman (Jordan) and Manama (Bahrain). The Amman NGOs meeting on 5-8 February 2001 came few days after the Asian regional meeting in Tehran, and was under the slogan “from Jerusalem to Durban to Eliminate Racism”. The meeting emphasized the Palestinian issue (besides tackling HR issues in the Arab region) and called for re-installing the UN-GA resolution of 1975 (cancelled in 1991 under the request of the US) of equating Zionism to racism, as an early sign in the new millennium for re-starting a new wave of isolating Israel internationally. As a quick background, the Arab Organization for Human Rights was established in Cairo in 1983, and developed branches and affiliate organizations in around 16 countries. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights is an affiliated organization. An evaluative study of the Arab Organization for HR demonstrates that the organization does not take foreign funding and alternatively depends on local sources of funding, though it faces financial difficulties. This is linked with a political orientation where it does not seek the boomerang pattern, as described by Keck and Sikkink. The organization was very active against the US-led siege and war on Iraq (al-Dusoqi 2008). It linked human rights with regional Arab concerns. Such an organization had an important regional role in the preparation process for the Durban conference, and also had connections to some Palestinian actors like LAW and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights.

Adalah’s paper that was submitted to Amman’s meeting mentioned several remarks on Zionism and the Israeli practices of excluding Palestinians inside the Green Line. Inside the Green Line, Palestinian NGOs had common goal of exposing Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian citizens of Israel, but also differed in their approach to the issue.

176 PCHR’s annual report of 2001, p. 65; op. cit.
178 “Adalah’s Submission to Amman NGO Networking Meeting for the UN World Conference Against Racism - 5 February 2001”, Adalah website, via http://www.adalah.org/eng/intladvocacy/unwcar.htm <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
The tendency of Adalah was to focus on guaranteeing a minority right of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, while the leadership of Ittijah by Ameer Makhoul aimed at linking the issue of the Palestinians inside the Green Line with other Palestinian issues in the frame of colonization.\footnote{See for example a representative of Adalah’s view on its focus then: Hassan Jabareen, “On the Problems of Arab Identity: The example of Durban”, Al-Hayat newspaper (London, 4 October 2001; translated into English), via http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/Hassan's%20Al%20Hayat%20Article%20about%20Durban%20October%202001%20English.pdf <last accessed on 21 February 2016>}

This discussion among Palestinian NGOs inside the Green Line in Ittijah reached “the determination in bringing up the Palestinian cause through all its components as one cause, and the determination in relation to work within the regional Arab group [for Durban], as a natural part of it, and attacking Israel as a racist regime…”.\footnote{Ameer Makhoul, “Four years on Durban conference”; op. cit.} At the same time, the call for considering the Palestinians inside the Green Line as a national minority was kept as another goal.

At the time, the Arab popular protests have been peaking in support of the Palestinian Intifada. As a researcher observes, “the second intifada triggered perhaps the largest and most radical spontaneous demonstrations in the Arab world since the first Gulf war” (quoted in El-Mahdi 2009: 93). “Egyptians were no exception”: El-Mahdi adds commenting on the Egyptian solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada. She explains that “the solidarity movement provided an opportunity for broad sectors of the Egyptian masses, especially students, to practice expression of disenchantment towards the [Mubarak] regime through demonstrations, on-campus activities and boycott campaigns directed against Israel and its American ally” (pp. 93-94). According to the research of El-Mahdi, the second Palestinian Intifada, followed by the demonstrations against the war on Iraq, were two major cycles of protest for the formation of a third cycle through a major Egyptian movement in 2004 (Kifayah meaning Enough) calling for elections and against the renewal of Mubarak’s presidential nomination.

The long survey of Joudeh (2006: 132-139) indicates that wide Arab boycott and anti-normalization campaigns have been mobilized in Amman, Damascus, Cairo and many other Arab capitals. In Egypt, on 15 October, less than a month after the eruption of the Intifada, the Palestinian news agency reported that an extended meeting was held by the Egyptian Union of Chambers of Commerce “to discuss boycotting Israeli and American
products in the Egyptian market”. In the same year, a decision was taken by the Egyptian Union of Chambers of Commerce, the workers unions as well as the Shipping Association, to boycott Israeli goods, products and ships in Egyptian ports (Joudeh: 132). The anti-normalization and boycott initiatives in Egypt took the shape of a “spontaneous uprising” by diverse actors from political parties, unions, anti-normalization committees, NGOs and individual initiatives, all reflecting a wide momentum that was maintained for some time. However, according to Egyptian writer Hussain Abdel Raziq, this momentum lacked an organized body to be able to sustain it (Giacaman 2001: 33). Yet, as El-Mahdi research (2009) demonstrates, the momentum accumulated towards a new Egyptian cycle of protest in 2004 that targeted the Egyptian regime’s oppression and its foreign policies.

In Jordan, the anti-normalization momentum witnessed another peak directly after the second Intifada. Jordanian professional unions, in direct connection with opposition political parties (leftist, nationalist and Islamist), published “normalization lists” for Jordanians engaging in links with Israel, and posted these lists in large type at the entrance of the unions’ headquarter. The Jordanian government replied in January 2001 by imprisoning the head of the anti-normalization committee and four other members for weeks before releasing them. However, the boycott initiatives have continued in Jordan, though weakened, and diverse lists of Israeli and US products were circulating, which posed pressure on the regime. At that time, the “lists” tactic to boycott was spread compared to campaigning tactic targeting specific companies or bodies.

Amid popular mobilizations in the Arab region, the Arab states moved to hold another summit for the Arab League in Amman in March 2001 to discuss the Iraqi and Palestinian issues. During the first period of the second Intifada, an Arab official meeting took place, as mentioned above. Arafat sought a diplomatic move by the Arab states, but he received an answer from the Saudis that there is no move other than calming and negotiating (Usher 2003).

Following the Arab protests in support for the Intifada, and after a few days from a US veto at the UN-SC on a resolution for an international observing force in Palestine, the Amman summit called for re-initiating the official Arab boycott regime. It was mostly

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181 “Reports of events” (October 2000; in Arabic); op. cit.
182 Jihad Mnassa, “Twenty years of resisting normalization with Israel in Jordan”; op. cit.
propagated by the Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Share who said: "Boycott is a strong and peaceful weapon that we should use", while Egypt and Jordan did not object. Similarly, the Arab Gulf States that officially and publicly quit most of the previous Arab boycott policy after the Oslo agreement also did not object. In the post-Oslo period, the Gulf States, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania had initiated some sort of economic relations with Israel, though without high level diplomatic relations (except for Jordan), as many other states in the Global South did. Hence, after the second Intifada, and particularly in 2001, the Arab League’s central boycott office (based in Damascus) has resumed its work on an annual basis from 2001 (until 2006) after a suspension of approximately nine years.

The international contestation on the issue of Palestine, and the analogy between apartheid and Israel, and Zionism/Israel and racism, continued throughout the year 2001 until the UN Durban conference was convened in August-September 2001, strengthening the agency of some Palestinian, Arab and South African NGOs during this process. As mentioned earlier, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, for instance, used “apartheid” in relation to Palestine in 1998 in a conference in Cairo with Egyptian human rights organizations.

One of the indicators in relation to the spread of the analogy of apartheid with Israel, among Palestinian circles, was a letter to the Palestinian people written by the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish on the fifty third anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba (15 May 1948). He referred twice to Israel as apartheid.  

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184 Darwish said: “The Intifada -- yesterday, today, tomorrow -- is the natural and legitimate expression of resistance against slavery, against an occupation characterised by the ugliest form of apartheid, one that seeks, under the cover of an elusive peace process, to dispossess the Palestinians of their land and the source of their livelihood, and to restrict them to isolated reservations besieged by settlements and by-passes, until the day comes when, after consenting to “end their demands and struggle,” they are allowed to call their cages a state […]. The nature of the war declared on the Palestinian people will be determined by the international attention it attracts, for it embodies the struggle between conflicting international values: on the one hand are the forces that aim to enable colonialist Zionism and apartheid to live on under new names and formulas, on the other forces that insist on the necessity of justice and truth in this part of the world” [emphases added]. See: Mahmoud Darwish, “Our catastrophe was the creation of Israel”, *The Guardian* (London, 14 May 2001), via http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/14/comment.israelandthepalestinians <last accessed on 21 February 2016>
Mahmoud Darwish had usually been attentive to important political moments, like the “Palestinian independence declaration” of 1988 that he drafted. That piece of writing in May 2001 suggested the awareness of the importance of the contestation taking place internationally on the issue of colonization and apartheid in relation to Israel. His writings were often widely distributed in Arabic and English. Badil re-published Darwish’s piece as well. Even in an international conference on Palestine in Havana, organized by the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) for South American and Caribbean region in June 2001, the piece of Darwish and its reference to apartheid was quoted by a speaker.

In May and June 2001, apartheid had become more frequently referred to by Palestinian actors. Another example when an entire issue containing many articles on apartheid in relation to Palestine appeared in Badil’s publication in issue 10 of June 2001 (al-Majdal publication). An article by a member of al-Majdal’s advisory board and an associate researcher at Oxford's Refugee Studies Center, was based on her visit to South Africa in March 2001, and entitled “‘At Home’ in South Africa: Reflections on the experiences of South Africa and Palestine”. The article referred to “apartheid regimes” in Palestine, and discussed the importance of benefiting from South Africa’s anti-apartheid experience that has built a transnational movement. On another page, the same issue reported on a visit by a South African journalist to the West Bank, quoting the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, which read: “Visiting the West Bank in May, Raymond Louw, former editor of the Rand Daily Mail, a South African newspaper at the front of the struggle against apartheid, found the situation in general to be incomparably worse than during the apartheid period in South Africa. Visiting Hebron, Louw noted that "[t]here was never a situation like this with apartheid. The control in black areas was not so forceful. Under apartheid, there was a recognition that the blacks would continue to live in their areas. Here the impression is that the objective is to push the Palestinians out." Also, in the same issue, Badil conducted an interview with Tikva Honig Parnass, an anti-Zionist Israeli, who described the situation in Palestine as apartheid. Badil participated in the preparatory

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187 Al-Majdal, issue 10; op. cit.
meetings for the UN Durban conference, and three of its members participated in Durban in August 2001.\footnote{Badil’s annual report of 2001; op. cit.}

Though the Palestinians in the WBGS were increasingly restricted by Israel in their movement inside the WBGS and especially to travel outside,\footnote{For example, PCHR explains the effect of this restriction on not participating in some preparatory meetings for the WCAR (PCHR’s annual report of 2001; op. cit.).} they were able to push for the issue transnationally and internationally. For example, Dianne LuPing, the Malaysian-New Zealander representative of LAW Society in international advocacy (who holds a master degree in Public law and was working for LAW between 2001 and 2003) was present at the South American and Caribbean NGO meeting (conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP), and “said that she was the only participant coming from the occupied territories. She had been allowed to leave because she was a foreigner. She said Israel’s campaign had moved from closures and curfews to a state of siege”.\footnote{“Havana meeting …”; op. cit.} Actually, many members of the media team of the Palestinian NGO delegation to Durban in August 2001 were Westerners or Palestinians with non-Palestinian passports, which is another example of the strength of transnational links these NGOs have.\footnote{“Palestinian NGO Bulletin 1 - World Conference Against Racism”, 20 August 2001, Badil website, via http://www.badil.org/en/press-releases/54-press-releases-2001/245-press189-01}

LAW Society has been pushing for an analogy between Israel and apartheid. In March 2001, Arjan el Fassed from Law Society (and co-founder of the website \textit{the Electronic Intifada}) wrote a mock letter from Nilsen Mandela to the American journalist Thomas Friedman. El Fassed referred to Israel as apartheid.\footnote{Arjan El Fassed, “Mandela’s First Memo to Thomas Friedman”, \textit{The Electronic Intifada}, 29 March 2001, via https://electronicintifada.net/content/mandelas-first-memo-thomas-friedman/4826} Additionally, LAW’s representative Diann LuPing said in the South American and Caribbean meeting (organized by UN-CIERPP) in June 2001 (as reported):

Israel’s policy of segregation and domination fulfilled the definition of apartheid aimed at making greater territorial gains and driving out the Palestinians. She asked the international community to join Palestinians in their fight against colonialism and apartheid. She suggested that the international community impose the sanctions and embargoes that brought South Africa to the negotiating table.\footnote{Ibid.}
During the second preparatory meeting for the UN Durban conference that took place in Geneva between 21 May and 1 June 2001, the earlier Asia-Pacific proposed draft was presented besides other drafts (the African, European and Americas besides others). The regional preparatory meetings’ reports have been accepted for discussion, while expected controversy was centered on “the issue of reparations and/or compensation for slavery and colonialism, the description of colonialism and the slave trade as a crime against humanity, the mention of Palestine and other occupied territories”, as reported by a representative of the Asia-Pacific NGO Movement for the UN Durban conference.\(^{194}\) In the second preparatory meeting for the UN Durban conference in Geneva, a heated debate between states from the Global North and South occurred on two major issues: apology and reparations for colonialism and slavery, and the issue of Palestine besides other issues like the caste and Tibet. However, the US administration threatened to boycott the conference if these phrases related to Israel and apology and compensations for centuries of slavery would be included. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, who was appointed as a general director for the UN Durban conference, presented a draft from previous regional and experts’ meetings. She omitted the phrases of Tehran regional meeting (Schoenberg 2002: 91). Asia-Pacific states objected and were able to secure some of the phrases between brackets as suggestions for a later discussion. Drafts continued to be negotiated for a third preparatory meeting in Geneva in early August 2001, while no agreement was reached on these issues in the second preparatory meeting, and brackets were kept for controversial sentences.

In relation to NGOs, a new NGO caucus on Palestine had been formed in the Geneva preparatory meeting in May-June 2001. There were also supportive regional caucuses such as the Asia-Pacific caucus and the Arab caucus. The Asia Pacific NGO Caucus has been briefed by LAW Society’s representative Dianne LuPing (the international advocacy coordinator for LAW Society), and the caucus “pledged its support to the panel being organized by the Palestinian group, given that the issue of Palestine was clearly one of the

\(^{194}\) Susanna George (of the women rights organization Isis International-Manila), “Report of the 2nd PrepCom (Preparatory Committee Meeting) for WCAR” (Geneva, 21 May to 1 June), Asia Pacific NGO Movement for WCAR website, n.d., via http://www.hurights.or.jp/wcar/E/2ndprepcomreport.htm
two major agendas of the Asia Pacific NGOs from Teheran and Kathmandu in the UN Durban conference process”.\textsuperscript{195}

During this second preparatory committee meeting in Geneva, the Cairo Institute for HR and SANGOCO continued to be present, while Ghassan Abdallah from the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights was part of the registered delegation of the Cairo Institute for HR. Also, \textit{Adalah} attended among the NGOs present.\textsuperscript{196} In addition, LAW Society has been actively present through its international advocacy coordinator proposing an analogy to apartheid, months after they started to study the idea and its relevance.

The issues of colonialism, racism, and apartheid in relation to Palestine continued to be a subject of a heated debate internationally. On 5 July 2001, the “Group of 21” (a restrictive group to suggest a drafting and chaired by South Africa)\textsuperscript{197} issued a draft to be discussed in the third preparatory committee to be held in August 2001. In the draft, associating Israel with racism was included between brackets. Examples of articles between brackets proposed in their draft include: “Urges Israel to revise its legislation based on racial or religious discrimination such as the law of return [for Jews] and all the policies of the occupying power which prevent the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons from returning to their homes and properties, in violation of their right to return”, “to bring the foreign occupation of Jerusalem by Israel together with all its racist practices to an end”.\textsuperscript{198} In the proposed draft of the second preparatory committee, these sentences were included between brackets: “colonization by settlers and foreign occupation constitute sources, causes and forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”, and “foreign occupation, especially when grave breaches of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 are committed, is among the forms and sources of racial and

\begin{itemize}
\item [195] \textit{Ibid.}
\item [197] It is not to be confused with the group of 21 countries from the Global South that emerged two years after. This one is a “Restricted Group [that] would be convened consisting of 21 country delegates (4 per region, with South Africa as the Chair). This group would be given the task of going over the entire Draft Declaration, clustering and regrouping issues, and deleting the paragraphs that were repetitive”. See: Susanna George, “Report of the 2nd PrepCom....”; \textit{op. cit.}
\end{itemize}
discriminatory practices”.

The United States and some European countries opposed strongly such suggestions besides the suggestion on reparations on colonialism and slavery, while Egypt, Syria, Iran and the Arab League had still been insisting on describing Israel as racist and raised the issue of occupation, and were supported from other states and regional groups from the Global South though some states and groups pushed for more compromising phrasing like South Africa.

During this process, the Cairo Institute for HR (CIHRS) called for the Arab caucus NGOs meeting in Cairo in preparation for the UN Durban conference under the banner “Together Against the last Apartheid Regime” on 19 –22 July 2001, with the presence – mostly- of Arab, African and international NGOs. The declaration took into consideration the “international conferences for the human rights movement in the Arab world organized by the CIHRS in Casablanca (1999), Cairo (2000) and Rabat (2001)”, as well as previous preparatory meetings “in particular the Amman Declaration by Arab organizations in Asia in February 2001”. As an Egyptian journalist covering the event realized:

The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies “had decided that no matter how behind Arab preparations were, an Arab "caucus" must take some sort of action towards forming an agenda […]. And with the 10- month long Intifada looming in the background it was perhaps inevitable that the plight of the Palestinians and Israel's history of "racist", "colonialist" and "apartheid" policies would dominate the four-day event […].The Cairo conference president Bahiedin Hassan believes that the NGOs meeting in Durban will adopt the Cairo Declaration. His confidence stems from the stance of the Asian and African working groups which attended the ARCAR. And during the ARCAR, the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) announced that it will send a fact-finding mission to the occupied Palestinian territories […]. But as the discussion developed on the third and fourth days, the link between Zionism and racism, on the one hand, and Israel's policy against the Palestinians as a form of apartheid, on the other, seemed to reflect the dilemma of the participants' agenda.

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201 Ibid.

The hosting organization, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, had already attended the preparatory meeting by the Asia-Pacific states for the UN Durban conference. It was, on one hand, the first international forum on the regional level to hint at such an analogy in the context of the second Intifada. On the other hand, it also hinted at the organization of the UN Durban conference in South Africa. Then, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies was present in the Geneva second preparatory committee discussion for the UN Durban conference in May 2001. Afterwards, it decided to push the process forward. Hence, the Cairo declaration of July 2001 was the first transnational (mostly Arab regional) endorsement of the analogy between Israel and apartheid, and sought to revive a new transnational and international wave of isolating Israel. Yet, the 12-page declaration that detailed Israeli practices and laws while relating them to racism and apartheid, did not detail any of the norms of boycott, sanctions or divestments. It declared its support for the Intifada, called on the EU state to take “effective measures” in relation to human rights article in the EU-Israeli Association Agreement. It also called the EU for “international protection” and urging it to refer Israeli officials to war crimes according to Geneva Conventions. Additionally, it called Arab hosting states of the Palestinian refugees to guarantee the “civil, social, economic and cultural rights” besides asserting the right of return, among other calls related to violations of Arab regimes of global issues.203

Though the Cairo call had raised the level of endorsed norms (i.e. making an analogy between Israel and apartheid), it still focused largely on the occupation of the WBGS (though detailing general Israeli laws related to racism). The conference had also a footprint of official Arab positions especially Egypt and the chairman of the Arab League. Opening speeches of the Cairo conference were by the Egyptian foreign minister and the secretary-general of the Arab League. The chairperson of the NGO department at the Foreign Ministry “described human rights NGOs as ‘the military wing of the Arab nation in the fight against Israeli racism’”. The head of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies described how a change has happened in relation to Arab NGOs in being

203Cairo Declaration against Racism; op. cit.
recognized by the Egyptian and official Arab regimes while they were perceived previously as a sort of ‘foreign agents’.  

_Palestinian – South Africa connections_

The issue of Palestine/Israel had raised much focus and contestation internationally then. Already SANGOCO has been present at the Asian-Pacific regional meeting, and at the second preparatory meeting in Geneva in May 2001. There, the Palestinian issue was cited as one of the meeting’s concerns at least since May. There, the Palestinian and Rwandan issues as examples of the failure of the UN in the lack of capability to prevent the proliferation of racism worldwide. SANGOCO attended the Cairo conference that provided a major push for SANGOCO to prioritize the issue. At the Cairo conference, some Palestinian NGOs have been actively present like _Ittijah_ (Payes 2005: 130), and Law Society. SANGOCO agreed with LAW Society for a visit to Palestine as a sort of fact-finding mission in preparation for the UN Durban conference.

SANGOCO started the visit to Gaza Strip, during which it met with members of the Palestinian legislative Council, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Agricultural Relief PARC, and civil society leaders including Haidar Abdel Shafi (the first president of _al-Moubadara_ in 2002). It also conducted visits to the two refugee camps of Rafah and Khan Younis. The SANGOCO delegation included SANGOCO’s president Mercia Andrew and the project officer for the UN Durban conference’s NGO Forum Major Kobese. They also met persons who were living near Israeli settlements in Gaza. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights’ press release reported that “participants noted the striking similarities between the current situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the discriminatory policies of the apartheid regime in South Africa”.  

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206 See also the assertion by Ameer Makhoul, “Four years on Durban conference…..”; _op. cit._


208 _Ibid._
Bank, SANGOCO delegation was invited into a press conference with LAW Society at the office of Agricultural Relief PARC. The speakers included the director of the Legal Resources unit at SANGOCO Charles Pillai and two other members, besides Khadir Shqirat and Arjan el Fassed from LAW, according to LAW’s press conference entitled “Israel’s Brand of Apartheid”. Two members of SANGOCO’s delegation to Palestine (Kobese and Pillai) would become on the drafting committee for NGO Forum at the UN Durban conference that was composed of 10 transnational members.

It is worth noting that LAW Society and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights had been cooperating closely during that period, and both had close regional Arab connections with the Cairo Centre for HR and the Arab Org. for HR. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights and LAW Society issued, for example, a common press release commenting on the internal Palestinian violence on 22 December 2001 when clashes erupted between PA’s security apparatuses and Palestinian factions leading to the killing of seven persons (including four civilians) and injuring 80 persons during the two day clashes in Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza. Their press release offers a sense of understanding of their positions towards Palestinian and international actors then, which was broadly shared by many actors to form the BDS movement later on. The press release condemned practices by both the PA security (yet it said that the PA “is the sole and legitimate authority”) and Palestinian factions and called for an investigation committee. As the press release explained, the clashes occurred as “part of efforts made by the Palestinian National Authority to ensure a cease-fire and put an end to mortar attacks on illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, amid the proposed Mitchell Report then (freezing settlement building, withdrawal of Israeli forces, end of Palestinian violence). The two organizations continued that they “condemn US and European pressure on the Palestinian National Authority to wage campaigns of political arrests and close civilian institutions [mostly those for Hamas]”. And they give their evaluation for the Oslo process saying that “the most important lesson that can be learned from the past 10 years,

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211 This slogan reminds of a similar previous slogan that was used by the PLO.
since the Madrid peace conference, is that bargaining away human rights and international humanitarian law for the sake [of] political expediency is useless. Any settlement that does not rely on international law will not lead to stability in the region”.  

This incident described by LAW and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights was a small example of what would occur frequently during the second Intifada until a large scale clashes in Gaza in 2007 took place that resulted in instituting two divided geopolitical Palestinian entities. Yet, the process of unifying initiatives has not stopped as well, as the two contradicting tendencies (of unity and fragmentation) have been operating simultaneously. Indeed, actors behind the BDS movement have been more inclined towards unification than further fragmentation, though they have not been immune from fragmentation forces themselves.

During the preparations for the NGO Forum in Durban, up until issuing the declaration in August 2001, diverse Palestinian actors from different orientations have been present (PLO and Hamas oriented actors like Hanan Ashrawi and the Palestine Return Centre in London, and civil society organizations), as well as from diverse geographies (WBGS, Lebanon as the Palestinian Organization for HR, inside the Green Line like Ittijah and Adalah, from London like the Palestine Return Centre). Some Jewish groups (from the UK) and anti-Zionist Israelis have been present pushing for the same agenda. For example, the Israeli professor Uri Davis was circulating copies of his book “Israel: An Apartheid State” during the pre-conference period.

The Palestinian group in Durban was part of the Arab group, and issued daily briefings (Palestinian NGO Bulletin) to inform Palestinians. These briefings were re-published by others like Badil. Members of the media team included representatives from Ittijah, Adalah, LAW Society, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights and the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights; hence, crossing the Green Line. These were very active organizations during the whole process towards Durban

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213 Yet, it is reported that there were some incidents against Jews (correlating Jews with Israel) during the conference period, and was reported by example by Judith Battler’s lecture in Birzeit University in her support for BDS.
214 See for example, “Palestinian NGO Bulletin 1 - World Conference Against Racism”; op. cit.
215 Ibid.
conference. However, all Palestinian NGOs have produced coordinated position papers that passed through discussions and agreements between them. Therefore, although these mentioned NGOs have been mostly active, they nevertheless represented many other Palestinian NGOs. They framed the networks of Palestinian NGOs within the WBGS and inside the Green Line, besides other Palestinian NGOs such as from Lebanon and the UK in a unifying position. The Durban conference process did not only set the basis for the transnational norm of boycott and isolating Israel, but it also set a uniting process for Palestinian NGOs together with other Palestinian political actors.

Moreover, no single narrative has excluded other narratives; it was in fact more of a consensus. Hence, the South African moment constituted not a fragmentation force, but tended more towards unifying.

Arafat’s policy, described by some as “strategic noninterference” or by others as a “lack of strategy”, consisted mostly of trying to benefit from the Intifada (and a green light to Fateh’s youth-military current known as tanizm) to pressure Israel and its US backing, in order to make concessions while at the same time maintaining things under his control; over Hamas and over Fateh and all militant fighters, in order to gain political gains through negotiations. It has not been an easy balance between huge pressure from the US, Israel and some European states on the one hand to “fight terrorism” (especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US), and to keep “strategic resistance” under his control. It is all the more difficult given the escalating tensions from arrests of militants and political members of Palestinian organizations, while restraining from responding to non-stop Israeli assassinations of Hamas, Fateh and other factions leaders, even amid agreed ceasefires. The fragmentation was an inevitable result of this policy though it still has elements of unification but under the command of Arafat.

The framework of unification was possible through the political will of the factions through the formation of the National and Islamic Higher Committee of the Intifada. This framework was also apparent in the boycott activities. Nevertheless, unification was being practiced besides a “magnetic force” in the field for fragmentation as well. Moreover, the unifying tendency has been coupled with an upper hand, though always contested and negotiated, by one faction or group. This has been the historical experience of the PLO where the smallest faction- following the requirements of the PLO- had representation in
the PLO. However, the PLO’s leadership has been always controlled by Fateh and Arafat particularly. With Oslo, however, this unification was largely broken.

The Durban conference represented to Arafat an opportunity. Already, the UN Durban conference has been generating wide international contestation particularly on the issues of Palestine and on reparations for centuries of colonialism and slavery. However, in the third preparatory meeting for the UN Durban conference, amid pressure from the US and other Northern states, the Arab states have started to change their language, except for Syria, and abandoned the insistence on racism and on other issues, but still kept the Palestinian issue a priority.216 Arafat spoke at the opening session and described Israel as practicing “ethnic cleansing” though he refrained from mobilizing a call for equating Zionism with racism. The US and Israel practiced a boycott by withdrawing from the international conference in its third day.

The Arab states considered the conference an overall success by contesting internationally the Israeli and the US positions and the US veto at the UN-SC. Yet, the Durban route had also followed some rules of the game in order to recognize the pathway, even though it challenged it at the same time. As an article argues, in relation to the Arab initiative to contest the US and Israel in Durban in 2001, it meant that “Arab states went to initiate battles, far away from the main location, at the UN to call for an international protection to Palestinians, and in Durban to condemn Israeli racism”.217 Moreover, as an observer of the route to Durban realized, the Arab official performance in preparation for Durban was weak. They failed to have a single Arab meeting to discuss the issue. A single proposition was made by Morocco for an Arab governmental meeting for the issue, but it was rejected. In relation to re-proposing an analogy between Zionism and racism, the Arab governments “appeared as if they were washing their hands and purifying themselves publicly from the allergy of committing such a taboo”, and they chose at the end the least

revealing words to describe the Israeli practices, which could not reach the level of wording by the Iranian foreign minister for example.218

This complex process, in the context of the second Intifada and a world conference against racism particularly in South Africa, with the participation of diverse and wide non-state and state actors, all installed a founding base for a new norm related to Israel: anti-apartheid. And it re-asserted the strategy of isolating Israel transnationally and internationally.

The Arab states, mostly Egypt and the Arab League were satisfied–against their usual habit- with the human rights NGOs activism, and the new Arab League chairman Amr Moussa commented on their role in the conference and the NGO Forum. His evaluation was that the success of the conference “should not be attributed solely to the efforts of the official Arab delegations, since NGO participation was equally effective…” Moussa added: ‘In today's world, NGOs are not at the fringe of hard-core politics.’”219 As Ameer Makhoul, from Ittijah, explains, the documents and reports prepared by the Arab NGO group at Durban conference presenting the argument of Israeli racist policies, were used by Arab and Global South officials to contest the Global North states that rejected associating Israel to racism or tackling the issue of colonialism.220

Hence, apartheid has started to circulate through Palestinian actors in the preparation process for the UN Durban conference, as LAW Society and Ittijah, while arousing the great attention of others like Badil, and reflected more widely in coordinated position papers by Palestinian NGOs. It was a wide Palestinian mobilization for this analogy, as mentioned by the prominent Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish in May 2001, and by Marwan Barghouti from the political level. On 13 August 2001, Barghouti declared publicly in an interview with the Bahraini newspaper Al-Wasat that the solution lays in removing Ariel Sharon from government:

- [The journalist:] And how do you think Sharon could be removed?
- [Marwan Barghouti:] Through continuing the Intifada, resistance and the Arab political isolation towards the government of Sharon and not dealing with it, and re-activating a

218 Mohamed Rida Mahram, “from the Intifada to the battle of Durban” (in Arabic), Al-Ahram (Cairo, 12 September 2001), via http://www.ahram.org.eg/Archive/2001/9/12/FILE2.HTM <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
219 Ibid.
220 Ameer Makhoul, “Four years on Durban conference….”; op. cit.
comprehensive Arab boycott to Israel and the US because it has been the patron of the Israeli terrorism.

- [The journalist:] To what extent does this boycott help?
- [Marwan Barghouti:] Without doubt it will help. Dealing with the Israeli government should be like what happened to the racist government in South Africa before the apartheid regime fell. The embassies in Cairo and Amman should be closed and all commercial representative offices [in some Arab countries] should be closed, and imposing economic sanctions and international siege on this racist state in the region […].

Hanan Ashrawi, who heads Miftah and a member of the PLO’s executive committee, addresses the NGO Forum on 28 August 2001 with a reference to apartheid, colonization, Zionism and the Ongoing Nakba. She said:

I come to you today with a heavy heart leaving behind a nation in captivity held hostage to an ongoing Nakba [catastrophe], as the most intricate and pervasive expression of persistent colonialism, apartheid, racism, and victimization […]. Zionism sought to implement its agenda of exclusivity by usurping not only the lands and rights of the Palestinians, but also by confiscating their utterance and distorting their historical narrative. [Quoting a major Zionist actor:] Zionist colonization must either be terminated or carried out against the wishes of the native population. It is important to speak Hebrew, but it is even more important to be able to shoot or else I am through at playing with colonizing (Vladimir Jabotinsky, 1939).

As mentioned, Arafat’s speech at the opening speeches of the UN Durban conference did not explicitly mention apartheid or Zionism’s analogy with racism. He was pressured to compromise in order to make the conference succeed. But he did use these terms: “racial discrimination”, “a racist colonialist conspiracy of aggression”, “mentality of superiority that practices racial discrimination, that adopts ethnic cleansing and transfer”, “Israeli occupation and its racist practices and laws, which are based on racism and superiority”.

Moreover, wide political and civil society actors have directly encountered the analogy between Israel and apartheid, as the example of SANGOCO’s visit to Palestine.

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221 “Marwan Barghouti to Al-Wasat: The solution is in removing Sharon” (in Arabic), as re-published at Al-Hayat newspaper (London, 13 August 2001), via http://tinyurl.com/gmes3gz <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

222 Address by Hanan Ashrawi at the WCAR - NGO Forum (Durban, 28 August 2001), via http://www.i-p-o.org/palestine-ashrawi.htm <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

223 Other than the US threats of boycotting the conference, the black American Rev. Jesse Jackson announced that Arafat committed, and through written documents, not to mention the analogy between Zionism and racism (Schoenberg 2002).

224 Arafat’s address to the WCAR, WCAR website, via http://www.un.org/WCAR/statements/palestineE.htm <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
indicated including meeting deputies, Haidar Abd el-Shafi (to institute *Al-Mubadarah* with Mustafa Barghouti the year after), and Agricultural Relief PARC among others. Hence, this uniting wide consensus on the analogy of apartheid and calling for international sanctions was a second step after an internal unifying Palestinian calls for boycotting Israeli products with the eruption of the second *Intifada*. While Palestinian NGOs had not been in the lead in the Palestinian boycott initiatives, although they participated with enthusiasm, they had the leading role at the UN Durban conference -NGO Forum. This was made possible particularly by the push of some of them (i.e. LAW Society, *Ittijah* and *Badil*), given the context of the compromises that were reached in the governmental conference. There was no mention of racism, colonization, Zionism and apartheid. Moreover, Palestinian NGOs mobilized (and developed further) their regional, Southern and transnational links in order to reach this leading role.

Moreover, as Arjan el Fassed (from LAW Society then) expressed, the Palestinian NGOs at Durban coupled their reference sanctions and *Nakba* “with specific reference to international human rights and humanitarian law standards and norms, including in relation to acts of genocide, systematic perpetration of war crimes, and the crime of apartheid”.

During August 2001, Palestinian and Arab NGOs have been active, networking with other South African and actors from the South including the Brazilian Landless Movement and the Afro-Brazilian Congress. Before and during the NGO Forum at the end of the month they were issuing daily briefs. As Khader Shqirat from LAW Society described the agency of SANGOCO, their level of calls was higher than the Palestinian calls. Moreover, Palestinian and Arab proposals in relation to the Palestinian issue were adopted. Khader expressed the effect of SANGOCO’s visit to Palestine in July 2001 where they were “shocked” and decided to advocate for the issue.

The NGO Forum declaration and program of action (that has not differed significantly from the draft of 6 August 2001), declared that “the Palestinian people are one such people currently enduring a colonialist, discriminatory military occupation and other racist methods that violate their fundamental human right of self-determination,

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226 The Center for Policy Analysis in Washington, “International Law, Apartheid and Israel”; *op. cit.*
amounting to a new form of Apartheid and other racist crimes against humanity”, considered the “basic root cause” of Israel’s “acts of genocide and practices of ethnic cleansing is a racist system”, “war crimes”, “systematic and institutionalised racism applied to Palestinian minority [inside the Green Line]”, charged Israel of “using methods of colonisation and crimes against humanity”, and condemned “the acts of those States who support the continued existence of these racist Israeli Systems as they supported the South African Apartheid System”.

Already, in the preparation process to Durban, different actors (i.e. Badil and LAW Society) pointed to the US boycott of the 1978 UN conference against racism because of the norms related to anti-apartheid sanctions. In this conference, the US, Israel, Canada, France, the EU among others led the international diplomatic campaign against equating Zionism with racism, an analogy between Israel and Pretoria, pointing to colonialism in relation to Israel, and tackling the issue of apology and reparations for slavery and colonialism. On the non-state actors’ level, the European NGOs caucus in Durban was frozen because of sharp conflicts between European actors who wanted to support the language adopted in the NGO Forum and those who opposed it. In this conference, few European individuals working for Palestinian NGOs have been working to promote the agenda of the Palestinian, Arab and South African non-state actors. However, European solidarity groups for Palestine have not been active in this conference. They were active in other spaces like the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) and sites related to the World Social Forum, which will be discussed in the next chapters. It is worth noting that the NGO Forum in Durban called itself the Durban Social Forum with the participation of Brazilian movements like the landless movement, as an early push from non-Brazilian actors to expand the World Social Forum in Brazil to other areas (Reitan 2007: 104-5).

In the draft call, it was directed towards “participants, relevant United Nations organs and member States to support the Palestinian call for the following remedies […].” Hence, and differently from other transnational calls, this call to be declared by around 2000

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229 Erika Harriford, “The Death of the European Caucus”, Internet Centre Anti Racism Europe (ICARE), a speech on 7 December 2001, ICARE website, via http://www.icare.to/speechemharriford.html
NGOs/ social movements have come close to endorse a Palestinian collective call, which set a precedent to be followed later on by the BDS actors.

The final declaration called for diverse norms and not only ‘comprehensive sanctions’, which indicated that there were diverse norms discussed and the prioritization of specific norms have not been decided on yet. The declaration asserted: “the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, statehood, independence and freedom and the right of the return as stipulated in UN Resolution 194”, “the Palestinian people are one such people currently enduring a colonialist, discriminatory military occupation that violates their fundamental human right of self-determination including the illegal transfer of Israeli citizens into the occupied territories and establishment of a permanent illegal Israeli infrastructure; and other racist methods amounting to Israel’s brand of apartheid and other racist crimes against humanity”, “this alien domination and subjugation with the denial of territorial integrity amounts to colonialism”, “We declare Israel as a racist, apartheid state in which Israel’s brand of apartheid as a crime against humanity has been characterized by separation and segregation, dispossession, restricted land access, denationalization, “bantustanization” and inhumane acts”. It called for: “The Palestinian Citizens of Israel should be recognized as a distinct national minority group”, “immediate end to the Israeli systematic perpetration of racist crimes including war crimes, acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing (as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court)”, “the immediate enforcement of international humanitarian law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories through the adoption of all measures to ensure its enforcement including all measures employed against the South African Apartheid regime”, “the immediate deployment of an independent, effective international protection force for Palestinian civilians and the dismantlement of the illegal Jewish Israeli colonies (settlements) and a complete withdrawal of the colonial military occupation”, “implementation of the various UN resolutions”, “the right of return for refugees”, “the reinstitution of UN resolution 3379 determining the practices of Zionism as racist practices”, “the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to investigate and bring to justice those who may be guilty of war crimes”, “the establishment of a UN Special Committee on Apartheid and Other Racist Crimes Against Humanity perpetrated by the Israeli Apartheid regime to monitor and to report
Apartheid and other racist crimes”, “establishment of programmes and institutions to combat the racist media distortion, stereotyping and propaganda, including the demonizing and dehumanizing of Palestinians as all being violent and terrorists”, “to impose a policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid state as in the case of South Africa which means the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, military cooperation and training) between all states and Israel. Call upon the Government of South Africa to take the lead in this policy of isolation, bearing in mind its own historical success in countering the undermining policy of “constructive engagement” with its own past Apartheid regime” [emphasis added].

With wide boycotts inside Palestine, setting norms for isolating Israel transnationally, while consolidating a level of unity between diverse Palestinian actors led by some NGOs, and framing their demands through a Palestinian narrative (i.e. Ongoing Nakba and colonization), major steps were taken on the road to the BDS call in 2005. These efforts were coupled with human rights and international humanitarian law norms besides anti-apartheid from the South African experience. Moreover, the power of Palestinian NGOs has been recognized nationally, regionally and transnationally, as wee as by officials (even if they do not agree with them).

3. C. From the apartheid analogy to the BDS formation

This long section of the chapter explores how the BDS call and movement appeared during the second Intifada after the spread of the boycott norm in Palestine and after the Durban conference in 2001. It discusses the contestations and attempts of a sort of unity by the actors to push ahead for the BDS call in the context of relational search for a new political current, contesting fragmentation by seeking unity while the magnet of the field simultaneously pushes for fragmentation. This section investigates as well the relational dimension with wider Palestinian constituencies, and the relations with transnational and international open and closed ways amid encouragement and contestations with these actors. These relational aspects in the field will be discussed while providing a narrative of

230 World Conference against Racism- NGO Forum Declaration; op. cit.
developing events since the year 2000 until 2005 (with an extension until 2008 when the BDS National Committee was formed).

This section focuses on the relational aspects. Tabar and Azza (2014: 121) argue against the “genealogical readings for the Palestinian struggle experience through the perspective of non-violence, so the national history was re-interpreted in a linear and simplistic from this angle”. Hence, it is important to explore the positioning of the actors behind the BDS movement in relation to other actors in the field.

Debating the role of civil society

It is useful to come closer to the atmosphere of the second intifada and the role of civil society organizations by recalling an example of a public debate that took place during the early heat of the second Intifada, in April 2001 around half a year after the beginning of the Intifada. This debate was published on the official Palestinian news agency Wafa, which revealed partially the related positions and part of the mood then. It hosted Raji Sourani from the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, while trying to represent the positions of PNGO generally, and the political scientist Ibrahim Abrash (al-Azhar University, Gaza), the researcher in development Itimad Mhanna, and moderated by the writers Tayseer Muhaisen.

Sourani said that particularly human rights organizations had devoted around 70 percent of their efforts during the post-Oslo period to revealing the human rights violations by the occupation without forgetting the violations of the PA. Their reports attest to the fact that the Israeli occupation after the Oslo period became harsher through a “racial discrimination regime” and “ethnic cleansing” regime, fragmenting the Palestinian territories (North West Bank from South West Bank, Jericho from the West Bank, Jerusalem from the West Bank, Jerusalem and the West Bank from Gaza), imposing economic siege, and that he and others expected the erupt of the Intifada. Then, he was asked by Muhaisen: “if the point of view of civil organizations or at least the human rights organizations that this Intifada resulted from the continuity of the occupation […], so did these organizations bet on the Intifada to get rid of it? Did they see a role for themselves in

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this uprising activism, the political struggle and the struggle on the ground?”. Sourani replied that from the early weeks of the Intifada they had quickly issued reports on the “excessive” and “unproportioned” Israeli response that resulted in a great number of human losses. These were sent to the UN Human Rights Council and international HR organizations.

Abrash argued that before the second Intifada, NGOs prioritized their activism against the PA, focusing on the individual human level, “maybe the reason was in their establishment or constitution and its relation with the peace process”. In another stage, Abrash added, the priority became the homeland, and “maybe because they thought that defending the homeland rights is the responsibility of the political society from authority and parties, not their responsibility, it created a sort of a dilemma and ambiguity […]. After the Intifada, we started to witness a positive transformation, because we saw the two sides in a crisis, they both felt there is a common enemy, so coordination started again between the two sides, maybe it is hesitant and shy. However, though most of the statements and conferences speak about the Israeli violation to the human right, I still feel there is hesitancy in the work of the NGOs towards the common enemy, meaning that as if there are red lines we are afraid to pass. Maybe these red lines are not [only] related to their structure, composition and their carried societal project, which is related to the funders, but [also] there are red lines related to the phase, there is perplexity, what do we want? Do we want to continue in the peace process serial story and strategic commitment to peace; hence, should the efforts be directed according to this vision? Or are we in a phase of transformation from the peaceful compromise to Intifada then a revolution? The ambiguity of the goal is what created a state of perplexity, and this perplexity is obvious in the work of both the PA and the civil organizations”.

Itimad Mhanna added that most civil society organizations “integrated in the developmental work in a direction that neglected to a large extent the national liberation dimension and many organizations believed that we are in a phase in preparation for a state, and the peace treaty is a phase to reach the self-determination right and sovereignty”. She added: “the Intifada event scattered all what has resulted from peace treaties on the level of development. The proof for this are the activities done by some organizations to consolidate the private sector, investments and avoiding discussing Paris treaty [the 1994
economic treaty between Israel and the PA], and some organizations active in the area of
democracy and consolidating the role of participation, etc., had been working in the
direction of developing the culture of the youth to fit with the peace treaty, normalization
and co-existence between the two peoples. [And there is the issue of] the position from
funders and funding policies where their concerns were centered on activities related to a
society that is ready to become a state according to the American and Israeli standards. To
what extent have the organizations worked during the last seven years in the direction to
sustain the national dimension through awareness raising, mobilization, and the nature of
the relation with the political parties […]. I do not believe that the civil society
organizations have the readiness to deal with an event like the Intifada”.

Sourani disagreed with much of the arguments. In relation to work on the ground,
Sourani mentioned the health and agricultural work committees that contributed much in
services and relief. He stressed again that civil society organizations worked systematically
for the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and in coordination with the PA
(especially the Planning and International Cooperation Ministry and ambassadors in
Geneva and New York). However, indicating dimensions of the forces in the field during
Oslo period, Sourani agreed that civil society organizations saw there was an opportunity
for a state in formation. Hence, they were “attracted, consciously or unconsciously in that
direction”. He justified it by saying that civil society organizations pushed for a state for a
people under occupation. He added that civil organizations have not taken a position
against Oslo accord. They worked in the legal and political reality and environment of
Oslo, but were critical to it. When the second Intifada started, they considered that the PA
has a duty to defend the people, and the PA adopted the norm “international protection”.
He argued that HR organizations gave all expertise in this area where there was integration
between the PA and human rights organizations. They also refused Mitchell Commission
since it is an allied political committee, not an independent UN fact-finding committee. At
the same time, Sourani stressed on the violations of the PA where he did not agree that
“people would be driven like sheep into prisons”. Among other things, Sourani also
pointed to the wide outreach these organizations have internationally that could be utilized
for the national liberation project.
This public debate did not reflect only the content, but also pointed out to a wide debate in the Palestinian society. The debate has already been published in the official news agency, and pointed out to increasing contesting forces in the field during the second Intifada. This debate reflected widespread criticism to the work of the NGOs such as the arguments of benefiting from foreign funding without being active politically or on the ground in resisting the Israeli policies, and that the spread of NGOs is a reflection of the Oslo process and its associated norms like development, accountability and state building, as though the occupation has ended. Moreover, the academic critique from Abrash partially reflected the critical tone of some academics to the perceived role of associations/ NGOs in resisting the Israeli colonization. Abrash provided cases, much before the first Intifada, where associations had major roles in the political confrontation against Zionists. For example, the Islamic-Christian Association in 1918 had a major role then, “which is a civil [ahlia] organization. From these associations the Palestinian national movement has emerged, and adopted them, since they were the basis until the revolution time and the PLO. The Students Union, Teachers Union, Women Union; all were the basis of the Palestinian national project, so we have an experience and should adhere to it. And I do not want to ask why all these unions have been aborted during the settlement [peace process]”.

During the Intifada, Abrash added, these associations “got interested in the big matters and strategic issues, but they did not go to streets. It was the duty of civil organizations to go to the [level] of the school, the university, inside camps and towns and in every area”. Regardless of the evaluation of the historical relations between civil organizations and their political roles, what Abrash expressed was an expected role in this dimension. This was a sort of a contesting force in the field. For actors more specifically related to this research, some academics have been quoted who are related directly or indirectly to PACBI atmospheres (i.e. Taraki, Jad, Hilal, Botmeh and Hammami). They similarly expressed critical views on transformations in NGOs and lack of mobilization during the second Intifada.

This debate also pointed out to how NGOs perceive their roles and their search for legitimacy, such as the argument that many have already existed before the Oslo accords as part of the society resisting occupation, and the importance they have given to human rights reports against Israeli violations or links with International organizations, officials
and transnational NGOs. Moreover, it demonstrated the debate within NGOs on “politics” especially with some transformations occurring among NGO during the second Intifada. Sourani detached himself from political organizational activism while focusing on HR tools that have political content that politicians could benefit from and utilize. However, he also pointed out to a debate inside NGOs to replace the PA and factions as old forces that do not fit anymore, which he did not agree with. This published debate also demonstrated the consensus on supporting the Intifada amongst the participants and contesting international powers’ role, which intensified the contestation in the field against the previous rule of the game that focused on negotiation, development, and state building.

Finally, though the debate was heated, and full of suspicion between a major NGO actor and critical actors to NGOs. There was a strong tendency as well to a sort of integrating and appreciating each actor’s role (as for example expressed by Abrash and Muhaisen). Such a critical debate exerts pressure in the field on NGOs to be more politicized and have political activity on the ground.

As the research reveals, contradictions between the forces in the fields and the agencies of actors are important to understand. For example, an NGO could say it does not engage in politics or political organization but finds itself organizing with high energy for Durban conference in 2001. An actor could be in a highly fragmented field while at the same time speaking about and calling for unity, or could be depending on funding from certain states while critiquing this funding, asking others to stop this funding or trying to stop this funding without much success. Certain actors could be doing something and saying something else which is not only part of contradictions between fields and agencies (if benefiting from the analysis of Bourdieu), but also as James Scott (1985) indicates, some peasants (his case is in Malaysia) muddle through the power of oppressive authorities like resisting the power behind the scene while pretending to obey it.

*New politicized roles and ambitions*

The actors who led the formation of the BDS movement have been re-focusing their energies towards the occupation during the second Intifada, while seeking some sort of mobilization and an outreach to a wider Palestinian constituency beyond services provision or press releases and conferences, though the latter has intensified during the Intifada. Not only have development programs during the Oslo period shifted to emergency, but also
some direct confrontation with the occupation appeared again. Already, some actors have been engaged in boycott activities by the Palestinian Observatory just before the second Intifada. They also intensified their activism in the first period of the second Intifada, including marches for boycott in November 2000 in cooperation with political forces, unions and other actors. Also, since 2000, there were protests by Palestinian actors, many from certain NGOs, organized with Europeans, North and South Americans among others in front of Israeli checkpoints or other sites of confrontations.232 Medical Relief UPMRC and Agricultural Relief PARC were among others that have been involved in the Grassroots International Protection for the Palestinian People.

Even on the level of debates, Muwatin organized one of the debates on the Intifada (also attended by the PA) with 600 participants (Hanafi and Tabar 2002: 6). Similarly, Badil has supported the “Week of return” in Tobas near Nablus with the participation of “friends of Badil in the North West Bank”, and also the march between Noor Shams camp to Tulkarem camp. Badil has also been involved in emergency activities in some Palestinian camps in the West Bank, particularly through aid (at the end of 2001, 75% of refugees were living under poverty line). Moreover, especially in May 2001, Badil supported financially and participated with the refugee organizations and the National and Islamic Emergency Committee in Bethlehem in demonstrations for the Nakba day.233

On the emergency dimension as well, the level of involvement of health and agriculture health committees have intensified during the second Intifada. In health services, the workers and volunteers of medical and health associations have been frequently targeted by the Israeli soldiers. For example, according to a report by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, fifteen health workers and doctors have been killed by Israeli fire after around a year of the second Intifada in addition to the halting of ambulances and detaining their drivers.234

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232 For example, in December 2000, at least two marches occurred in Jerusalem and Ramallah amid street confrontations with the Israeli soldiers. See: “Reports of Events” (December 2000; in Arabic), The National Palestinian Information Centre (Wafa news agency, Ramallah), via http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=3416 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>


234 “The Palestinian medical teams: Between the Israeli occupation fires and the mission of moving and rescuing the wounded and ill persons- the second report on the Israeli violations against the Palestinian
Moreover, since March 2001, the Israeli army intensified its blockade of Ramallah and installed a barrier near Surda village, separating Ramallah city from Northern villages including Birzeit University. This barrier affected hundreds of thousands including thousands of students and professors. NGOs based in Ramallah felt the direct effect this time. NGOs, Birzeit University academics and students have mobilized wide marches against it amid street confrontations with the Israeli soldiers (Hammami 2005, Hanafi and Tabar 2003). For example, Birzeit University closed in protest in the second day of installing Surda barrier, and then called – in cooperation with the ministries of higher education and public works- for a march on 12 March 2001 towards Surda barrier. Around three thousand students participated. Then Palestinians from Ramallah tried to remove the sand barriers which resulted in 30 injured persons by Israeli bullets and tear gas.235

NGOs mobilized for street protest against Surda checkpoint. Many organizations “used their email lists and took out advertisements in the local newspapers to mobilize people for a demonstration from Ramallah to the new checkpoint imposed on the road to Birzeit” (Hanafi and Tabar 2002: 5). Also, PNGO was cooperating with Ittijah across the Green Line for some protests before checkpoints including the participation of dissenting Israelis.236

After the Israeli invasion of April 2002, one of the emerging political initiatives was the Palestinian National Initiative in June 2002, by the late Haidar Abdel Shafi, Mustapha Barghouti, and Ibrahim Dakkak (who joined PACBI), including others like Edward Said. Moreover, the diverse health NGOs and agricultural NGOs mobilized their emergency activities. While Law Society that was active during Jenin camp invasion, entered there and documented Israeli practices while organizing delegations with international human rights organizations.237 Its director Khadir Shqirat (who played a role in Durban conference) became the lawyer of the political leader Marwan Barghouti after his arrest in April 2002, while also trying to have an implicit political initiative.


In relation to the Agricultural Relief PARC, it declared reviewing its previous policies. It stated that the grassroots in village become since Oslo accords “implementers of projects”, and NGOs neglected the political dimension. PARC stated in 2001 that “[s]ome of the nongovernmental organizations, PARC being one of them, revised their strategies of work and are trying to seek solutions to overcome the problems that they faced in working with the grassroots”\textsuperscript{238} In the following years, PARC engaged in the Stop the Wall campaign activities.

In the fall of 2002, the early steps leading to Stop the Wall campaign started in supporting the demonstrations of Jayyous village (near Jerusalem) and linked with other villages affected by the Israeli wall in the northern West Bank area. In January 2003, “the campaign convened a meeting in Tulkarem for the popular committees in the north, in which the local committees agreed to meet regularly to plan and coordinate activities together” (Norman 2009: ft. 51: 140-141).

The Palestinian Observatory for boycotting Israeli products, where PNGO has been active, started to re-focus its activities towards the protests against the wall through working with popular committees.\textsuperscript{239}

These examples provide somehow a different spirit in the political sense from the Oslo period. These actors sought more connection with wider Palestinian protests and actors in the political sense, though they were not leading protests and confrontations inside Palestine, but stayed on the margin. For example political forces such as the National and Islamic Follow-Up Committee, and some unions have been calling almost daily for marches and street confrontations, strikes or boycotts.\textsuperscript{240} They also coordinated with other actors in political issues related to confronting Israeli policies after a main contradiction between the PA and NGOs on the issue of the NGOs law emerged.

\textit{A third way}

What accompanied the new tendency of wider participation in the protest activities was a tendency to uphold a distinct political orientation as well, which varied in level

\textsuperscript{238} PARC’s annual report of 2001; \textit{op. cit}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{239} PARC’s annual report of 2005; \textit{op. cit}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{240} See for example some of the reported daily events in the first period of the Intifada in the previously cited “Reports of the Event”, \textit{Wafa} news agency.
across the actors. Expressing the economic power of NGOs or status of these civil society actors (i.e. social and cultural capitals), their widely provided services, their cultural and social capitals inside Palestine and internationally/ transnationally, and/or normative political differences (more inclined to secular, leftist, and peaceful ways of actions), have led them into forming a new power. This has been debated in “civil society” circles during the second Intifada amid the political mobilization that the Intifada brought.

As the earlier quoted public debate indicated – at the beginning of this section, the political question was raised in relation to NGOs’ role in the second Intifada. As Sourani said, “I do not hide a secret where some said that the Palestinian civil society and civil organizations should be prepared because the PA is incompetent and the political organizations face clinical death and the candidates are the civil organizations. I have resisted this idea limb to limb and warned. The major danger is that the civil work organization jump to the political action; hence neither civil society nor political power remains”. 241 However, this was Sourani’s point of view that they should not transform into a political power. On the other end, Mustafa Barghouti sought political leadership (i.e. he nominated himself to the presidency of the PA in 2006 elections). In between, there was the organizations and persons interested in political campaigns not political power. Others sought political role. Yet, the tendency for political role became more obvious during the second Intifada.

For example, The Palestinian National Initiative called for an “emergency leadership”, a uniting political program, and the reforming of the PLO to end the occupation and to preserve the right of Palestinian refugees. It criticized “half solutions”, referring implicitly to the PA, and called for negotiations to be subjected to the demands of the Palestinian struggle. It also called for “a conscious resistance” that is “far away from spontaneous” acts, which could be seen as implicit criticism to the military acts by some military factions.

Also, the “popular international solidarity” language appeared in this program of Al-Mubadarah, adding that the “continuation and widening of the popular international

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241 “The Intifada and the Civil [Ahli] Working Organization” (in Arabic); op. cit.
solidarity campaign with the Palestinian people and its just struggle, after that events has proven the decisive importance to win the global support for the Palestinian cause”.  

The Palestinian National Initiative called for an “emergency leadership”, since there was a perceived problem of leadership of the *Intifada*. It lacked unified goals or a set of tactical and strategic goals. Its program included “consolidating the role of civil society organization and its developmental role and consolidating the principles of independence and democracy in its internal work”. Similarly, one of the examples in seeking a political role for civil society was the initiative that was taken by George Giaceman who is both a philosophy Professor at Birzeit University, knowing Baramki closely since 1976 at Birzeit University (Giacaman 2013), and the director of *Muwatin* (and affiliated with PACBI later on). *Muwatin* (a steering committee member of PNGO) organized a meeting at the second month of the *Intifada* to tackle the issue of lack of clarity in the leadership and to find an alternative. *Muwatin* invited representatives of municipalities, unions and federations, the Palestinian Legislative Council and civil organizations among others, at the level of Ramallah district, “in order to form a local committee to fill the civilian leadership gap in relation to providing information to the population on how to act during bombing and after, in organizing confronting the siege, the lack in food supplies, and to provide precise information on how to avoid the panic resulting from rumors” (Giacaman 2001: 13). For Giacaman, the goals were clear to all, but the contestation on roles and leadership made the meeting risky. Hanafi and Tabar (2002) discuss this event while quoting Giacaman referring to "instability in the legitimacy (of the NGOs' role)” that resulted in the unsuccessful attempt.

Already in the mobilizations by civil society organizations against Surda checkpoint, Marwan Barghouti welcomed the enlargement of participants to include civil society organizations, an issue that was also called for by the National and Islamic Follow-Up Committee. For example, an early draft paper, discussed by the committee of the National and Islamic Forces at the beginning of the second *Intifada* in November 2000, called for “widening up the base for organizing the strategic activities of the *Intifada*, and the social and political forces participating in it […]”, which could permit going beyond the role of

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243 Pénélope Larzilliere; op. cit.
the national and Islamic forces in deciding on the weekly activities to effectively integrate with the Palestinian official and popular institutions [.....], which results in consolidating the leading reference of the Intifada, and diversifying the contributions from the powers [qowa], political factions, the mass-based institutions and bodies, and the different social forces.”

Similarly, the late Abu Ali Mustafa (General Secretary of the PFLP who was later assassinated by the Israeli army), while commenting on the mobilization against Surda barrier, emphasized that they aim to bring together all the forces, and allowing each to retain its specificity. Yet, the National and Islamic Follow-Up Committee, which constituted the de facto higher coordination body of the Intifada, which has witnessed a great number of its affiliates being killed or imprisoned, wanted a leadership by the political factions. It recognized their active role and sought to include others under the umbrella of these active factions, amidst a time where its relation with the PA’s leadership was ambiguous.

However, some NGOs wanted to distinguish themselves. As a newspaper report on the Surda checkpoint demonstrations indicates, NGOs aimed to keep their independence. For instance, Mustafa Barghouti insisted that "our activities are independent from that of Marwan Barghouti. It is our pressure which made him take into account civil society". While Renad Qubej (from Tamir NGO for popular education and a coordinator for PNGO) said that Marwan Barghouti “does not consider us as an entire part of his committee. We signed the press communiqués. However we did not take position on the political aspect like the call for Sharon to resign. Inside of the committee our voice is well heard”.

For Giacaman, the second Intifada revealed what he considered clear roles for the Palestinian bodies and de facto actors, and he saw no clear role for the political movements “with the exception of organizing demonstrations, mourning days and the race of flags and banners in the funerals and demonstrations” (Giacaman 2001: 14).

The push for a “third current” in Palestinian politics after Oslo accords, proposing a different line than Fateh and Hamas, has been coming up loudly in the course of the second Intifada. It has come up by different actors who are nonetheless not necessarily

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244 “The Palestinian forces discuss widening up the Intifada and call for boycotting the US and confronting its interests” (in Arabic), al-Bawaba news website (Ramallah correspondent Izzat al-Ramini, 18 November 2000), via http://tiny.cc/17j85x <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
245 Pénélope Larzilliere; op. cit.
246 Pénélope Larzilliere; op. cit.
coordinating a common understanding of the proposed third way. Actually, the earliest attempts emerged not from NGOs’ atmospheres but from political factions. However, the years of polarization in the Palestinian politics pushed an early attempt in the 1990s for an initiative to gather diverse persons including those from Hamas and Fateh in the legislative council. Another attempt came before the legislative elections of 1996, led mostly by the leftist factions. However, the differences on the issue of participation in the elections led the attempt to fail. Then, with the return of the general-secretary of PFLP, Abu Ali Mustafa, in September 1999, drafts were discussed to form an alternative current. However, the attempt for an alternative current, which was led by the strongest leftist faction that had a considerable level of credibility, was hindered among other reasons by his assassination in August 2001 by the Israeli army.

One of the examples of the theoretical and practical discussion for the third current is a publication (in Arabic) by the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University (2007) entitled “the third current in the Palestinian context”. It contains diverse critical articles exploring the reasons behind the failure of the formation of this current and possible exits.

What these early attempts resembled was a wider search for alternatives. The NGOs managed to create PNGO in 1993 to institutionalize their coordination amid their differences. They were able to win a law that resembled their proposed draft in 2000. Nonetheless, their role was mostly limited to confronting the PA’s attempt to limit the role of NGOs. With the political mobilization of the second Intifada, the civil society actors made some shifts. For instance, they re-connected with dimensions of their previous politicized habitus towards the direct political sphere of confrontations with the occupation.

Baramki (2010) demonstrates his position, for example, about Marwan Barghouti whom he respects but disagrees with his resort to armed resistance, as well as his disagreement with Hamas military operations then and with Hamas ideology. He stated that Birzeit is a nationalist university while Hamas had been against the nationalist project and did not recognize the PLO in the course of the first Intifada. In relation to the second Intifada, Baramki commented: “This accumulated anger led to the eruption of the second
Intifada […]. Led by uncompromising Islamists, it was vastly more violent and unselective in its targets than the first intifada had been” (Baramki 2010: 155).

After years of having some proximity to the Palestinian Authority in the direct post-Oslo period, some of the academics and politicized civil society organizations with their habitus inclined to non-violence and liberation of Palestine, started to have more distance from the PA dominant actors. Distance widened over time for various reasons including the approach to dealing with Israel or the internal performance of the PA including alleged corruption. Baramki says (2010: 151):

We continued to act [with the PA] as if things were proceeding normally.
To do so, I think, was our biggest mistake. Soon people became angry about the way in which the Palestinian National Authority (a government without a state) was handling things.

Some academics from Birzeit University have been part of the Madrid negotiating team (Baramki 2010), but were pushed aside by the Oslo secretive negotiating team. With the euphoria atmosphere of Oslo period they had played roles either with the PA institutions or international organizations (such as the World Bank),247 in NGOs focusing on democracy, development or related issues (i.e. Muwatin, Miftah, ARIJ, etc.), or executive posts (as for example Baramki did as aforementioned). However, many held their critical distance from many of the PA practices either internally or in issues related to negotiation with Israel. With more contestation in the field towards Israel or towards how the PA dealt with internal issues (i.e. participation, human rights or corruption) they became more critical of the track the PA was on. While mostly coming from leftist and/or secular atmospheres, as other civil society actors discussed in this research, they also took their distance from Hamas. Since they are more inclined to peaceful resistance (or “popular resistance” as widely referred to in Palestine), they maintained their distance as well from militant factions including Fateh’s military wing, though they do not reject the right to armed resistance as a principle.

For example, after the Israeli wide invasion of April 2002 and Palestinian military operations –including some individuals exploding themselves in Israeli places, a petition called “urgent appeal to stop suicide bombings”, issued on 19 June 2002 and published in

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247 The interviews by An Peter with academics from PACBI circles also provide additional confirmation; op. cit.
Palestinian newspapers, was signed by Hanan Ashrawi (from Miftah and PLO), Jamil Hilal and Salah Abdel Jawad (to be part of PACBI afterwards) and Rima Hammami, Iyad Sarraj (a prominent HR actor, part of PNGO), and Hani Al-Masri (part of Al-Mubadarah). Others, such as Mustafa Barghouti from Al-Mubadarah and the Medical Relief UPMRC, agreed to this orientation but did not sign the petition because he considered it one-sided. Yet, Barghouti declared his opinion repeatedly that he is against all armed resistance for strategic reasons though recognizing the right of militant struggle.

Already, Mustafa Barghouti stated the opinion that is shared by many academics and civil society actors; that he is not for militarizing the Intifada, arguing that the Israeli governments have been pushing for militarizing the Intifada since the early peaceful demonstrations for weeks but were met with large killing. Barghouti added that when all the Palestinian militant factions agreed in December 2001 for the mediated fire truce, the Israeli army assassinated the head of Fateh’s military wing in Tulkarm, Raed al-Karmi, in the third week of the truce to make it fail. Hence, the Israeli governments were able to escape from the agreements and political compromises such as freezing settlements and withdrawing forces as mentioned in Mitchell Report.

Karmi’s assassination was followed by a series of operations by Palestinians exploding themselves in Israeli public places including operations by Fateh that abstained previously from such operations. This was followed by the Israeli army launching the “defensive shield” operation that re-occupied the Palestinian cities and put Arafat under siege. Hamas came under increased international pressure. It was classified as a terrorist organization by the European Council in addition to the US administration and other actors. The head of a main Palestinian faction (PFLP), Abu Ali Mustafa, was assassinated by the Israeli army, while the new head Ahmad Saadat was imprisoned after a retaliation operation.

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248 “Urgent Appeal to Stop Suicide Bombings”, June 2002, via http://www2.trincoll.edu/~kiener/PalestinianAppealStopSuicide.html (last accessed on 22 February 2016)
250 Ibid.
251 See also an Israeli confirmation and debate on assassinating Raed al-Karmi, “the occupations narrates the details of the assassination operation of Raed al-Karmi”, Al-Aqsa Brigades (uploaded on youtube on 4 May 2014; translated into Arabic), via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fQy4gFOn674 (last accessed on 22 February 2016)
operation by assassinating the Israeli tourism minister Rehavam Ze'evi. Marwan Barghouti was imprisoned by Israel in April 2002 as well.

Additionally, with the escalation of militant clashes between the Palestinian factions and the Israeli army, the discussed actors declared vocally their position against “the anarchy of the weapon” (fawda al-silah as known in Palestine). This anarchy indicated the resort of some militants, particularly from circles in Fateh’s military wing, to weapons as an aggressive power inside the Palestinian society.

The discussion of the armed resistance in the Palestinian society has different levels. A level is related to the type of military operations and its relation to other tools (i.e. negotiation, popular resistance, boycott, etc.) or in relation to political efficiency, which is widely discussed including between militant factions and inside each faction. Another level is related to the discussion of misuse of weapons in internal Palestinian violations, as referred for example to the “anarchy of the weapon”. Another level is the one proposed usually by the PA as a rule of the game, following the common argument in states, which says that it is the only legitimate actor to monopolize weapons, and has been constantly challenged by diverse actors including those of Fateh, and it caused many frictions between the PA and militant Palestinian factions. This position is also supported by most international powers. It is accompanied usually by a level of imposing the language of non-violence on the Palestinian case (as argued for example by El-Sakka 2015), without much consideration to the efficiency debate for example. This rule of the game was strictly imposed since Oslo accords, but loosened during the early second Intifada period to re-impose itself again especially with Mahmoud Abbas coming to office. Another level is related to the moral basis of using certain operations especially those involving targeting civilians or even the adherence to armed resistance. In general but not absolutely, the discussed actors in this research follow the two last levels and mobilize arguments in relation to the first level to argue for the ineffectiveness of armed resistance in relation to popular resistance. Hence, they largely follow the rule of the game of the field while pushing for the norm of “popular resistance”. Moreover, these levels intertwine, like for example the discussed position of the petition “to stop suicide bombings”, which was supported by the EU as an advertisement in Palestinian newspapers, a matter that opened another level of discussion, as will be discussed below. Additionally, the discussed petition
argues that these operations are not politically effective (the first level) and asserts its position on the last level considering such operations as immoral.

As names signing the petition “to stop suicide bombings” demonstrate, academics and active persons from NGOs have been the majority in that aspect, as have been the case in examples discussed previously.

Already, the Palestinian National Initiative in 2002 has been an attempt to consolidate what it called itself a “third democratic current” in the course of the second Intifada under the leadership of Haidar Abdel-Shafi (in Gaza), Mustafa Barghouti (in the West Bank) and Ibrahim Dakkak (in Jerusalem), as Al-Mubadarah was declared simultaneously from these three localities on 17 June 2002. However, political factions that have been critical to both Hamas and Fateh would not join (like DFLP, People’s Party- the ex-communist Party, and Fida Party headed by Yasser Abd Rabbo). Here again, the forces of fragmentation and unification even between leftist circles have been working together. This would continue to repeat itself until 2005 presidential and 2006 legislative elections. In 2005, the PFLP tried to have a unity candidate from leftist and secular forces as a third power for the PA’s presidential elections, but it did not succeed and then backed Mustafa Barghouti (with diverse objections from its social bases). Three leftist powers nominated three competing candidates: Bassam al-Salihi from the People’s Party, Tayseer Khalid from DFLP (the head of the PLO’s boycott office), and Mustafa Barghouti from Al-Mubadarah. The latter got around 20 percent of the votes compared to around 64 percent to Mahmoud Abbas (Hamas did not nominate a candidate and Marwan Barghouti withdrew his nomination). Mustafa Barghouti told the BBC (English) after elections that he is proud of the results and would win the next time. He added that “[w]e are now the second most important political force in Palestine, ahead of Hamas”.252

In the January 2006 legislative elections, also the “third way” was proposed to unify the diverse currents critical to both Hamas and Fateh, many coming from leftist backgrounds. However, they have been highly fragmented and competing among each other. Hanan Ashrawi and Salam Fayyad (to become the Prime Minister) actually instituted

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a small party called “the third way”, competed with a block of leftist parties (DFLP, People’s Party, Fida Party and independents) who ran with a list named “the alternative”, PFLP ran alone, and a list ran by Mustafa Barghouti, Rawya al-Shawwa (the head of Agricultural Relief PARC) and independents named “independent Palestine”. These lists had common denominators: agreement on “the constants” (al-thwabit) like the Palestinian state and right of refugees to return, adherence to the “international legitimacy” (i.e. UN resolutions) in any peace and considering the unified PLO as the needed legitimate representative, agreeing on the principle of resisting the occupation (though they differ on how with the PFLP participating in the armed resistance), and the belief in democratic principles, against corruption, equality between citizens including men and women, and social benefits to less privileged groups and classes in the society with the exception of Salam Fayyad (Mousa 2007: 108).

Even in the same list of Barghouti and Shawwa, they directly split from each other after the elections. The two established major political parties won most of the 2006 legislative seats, with a majority for Hamas. The diverse persons in the “third current” scored some candidates, but the results reflected the general weakness of the “third way” current in its competition for the political power though they have a considerable social base if united. According to different analyses (i.e. Abdel Shafi 2004, Tabar and Hanafi 2002, Hamam 2007), “personified” politics (al-shakhsanah) is the major reason why these actors cannot unite. The Palestinian field had been strongly affected by persons dominating the political factions, the PLO or the PA for decades, and this phenomenon has extended itself into civil society at large.

Hence, these moves in trying normatively to gather diverse actors in different initiatives, unifying leftist currents and calling for a unified leadership, were heavily affected by the forces of fragmentation in the field that have been intensifying since Oslo accords. Fragmentation would stay strong during the different periods of the second Intifada as relevant academics indicate (Hammami and Tamari 2000, Hilal 2013, and Jad 2008). Compared to the first Intifada, through the National and Islamic Follow-Up Committee had a leading role in the second Intifada, it had not been the leadership and not
even named as such.\textsuperscript{253} Hence, the Palestinian upper level had been divided though it has still retained some degree of unity.

Yet, the attempts for unifying efforts in confronting Israeli policies have been proceeding side by side with efforts competing over political authority in elections or in wider political programs. The Follow-Up Committee of the \textit{Intifada} was a case, and as discussed previously, it formed the first Palestinian political call for the isolation and boycott of Israel in October 2000 directed to the regional Arab field (Arab League and Arab peoples). Already, the boycott of Israeli products has constituted a wide call by political actors, unions and civil society such as the Observatory to the Palestinian society during the second \textit{Intifada}.

\textit{Accumulated campaigning and coalition building}

Already, the NGO Forum declaration in Durban stated its intention in article 424 to \textit{“[c]all for the launch of an international anti-Israeli Apartheid movement as implemented against South African Apartheid through a global solidarity campaign network of international civil society, UN bodies and agencies, business communities and to end the conspiracy of silence among states, particularly the European Union and the United States.”}\textsuperscript{254}

In this more politicized atmosphere of the second \textit{Intifada}, such elements were present among the discussed civil society actors: campaigning and protest, indicators encouraging for the possibility of transnational or international sanctions and boycotts, a normative inclination for coalition building and uniting. In August 2002, civil society circles that are more connected to transnational NGOs and solidarity groups with Palestine in Europe and elsewhere came up with the first statement. They called - in the first annual

\textsuperscript{253} The leading force during the first \textit{Intifada} was named the Unified Leadership. Moreover, the PA was leading the political and diplomatic track but not the resistance track. The PA, under the leadership of Arafat, could not publicly adopt resistance, and Mitchel plan in April 2001 recommended that the PA fights “terrorism” in exchange of Israel freezing settlements. Additionally, while Arafat generally followed a strategy of supporting negotiations and resistance during the second Intifada, there was another line in the PA that supported only negotiations, which added to the fragmentation. Also, relations inside \textit{Fateh} and between \textit{Fateh}/PA and other factions, particularly Hamas, were tense as well and witnessed several militant clashes between the PA security forces and militant Palestinian factions including militants from \textit{Fateh}. Finally, with the course of the Intifada, a split would occur even between some PA’s officers and leadership where some of the first did not agree at certain stage of the Intifada to agree with orders from the PA leadership for fire truce (Pressman 2003).

\textsuperscript{254} World Conference against Racism- NGO Forum Declaration; \textit{op. cit.}
anniversary of the NGO Forum declaration in Durban - for boycotts, sanctions, embargo and halting all links with Israel. The call was directed at “international civil society”, and stated (emphasis in the original): 255

*Boycott Israel to Enforce Respect and Implementation of International Law, Human Rights, and UN Resolutions*

[...]

Among others, the NGO Program of Action [in Durban]:

1. Calls for the launch of an international anti Israeli Apartheid movement as implemented against the South African Apartheid through a global solidarity network of international civil society, UN bodies and agencies, business and communities to end the conspiracy of silence among states, particularly the European Union and the United States (article 424).
2. Calls upon the international community to impose a policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid state as in the case of South Africa which means the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, military cooperation and training) between all states and Israel (article 425).

One year after Durban, Israel is engaged in the destruction of Palestinian civil society and its political leadership and the re-establishment of direct military occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More than ever, Israel, protected by the United States and tolerated by the European Union, violates international law, human rights and UN resolutions.

Therefore, we as members of Palestinian civil society welcome all recent initiatives to boycott Israel which have been launched in many parts of the world. For the sake of freedom and justice in Palestine and the world, we call upon the solidarity movement, NGOs, academic and cultural institutions, business companies, political parties and unions, as well as concerned individuals to strengthen and broaden the global Israel Boycott Campaign.

*Israel Boycotts International Law and Human Rights – We Boycott Israel!*

The call was signed by sixteen organizations and unions. LAW, Badil, PNGO, ARIJ, the Medical Relief UPMRC and the Palestinian Federation of Women Action Committees were among those who signed. The General Federation of Trade Unions in Palestine that was active in boycott activities (and its head is close to Fateh) also signed. The Palestinian Prisoners Society and the popular committees in Palestinian camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip also signed, which indicates both a level of representation for prisoners and refugees in the West Bank and Gaza including political factions that usually have presence

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in these committees. It is obvious that the focus was on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but included a major trade union and a major association of the prisoners.

Its timing was the first anniversary of the Durban NGO declaration. It also came after two months of the Palestinian National Initiative in June 2002 and signing the petition “to stop suicide bombings”. It was a time of political mobilization. More political groups presented political programs. Significantly, though the call was directed to “international civil society” and states, it was first published in Arabic in Palestinian newspapers, before Badil translated it into English and published it in its website. Some NGOs feared the negative reaction of funders. Because of this, publishing it in Arabic could imply seeking legitimacy in the Palestinian society. There has been some suspicion regarding the role of NGOs and their connection to a “foreign agenda” more than to the Palestinian liberation cause. Already, in the first year of the second Intifada, NGOs issued a statement that they will not abide by USAID’s requirement to be “against terrorism” in the Palestinian context, which was part of the general contestation atmosphere in the second Intifada. Yet, PNGO could not reach a consensus on the issue, as some of the NGOs that signed the statement against USAID were actually seeking this aid (Hanafi and Tabar 2002).

Many NGOs and circles in the civil society lived hard contradictions between the contesting forces during the second Intifada and being under the dominant forces in the field; either through funding or through the rule of the game set in the Oslo period. The example of LAW, which was very active in the Durban process, lived the contradiction to the level of almost total liquidation of the organization. Khadir Shqirat’s tone contested, directly and publicly, American and European policies towards Palestine, while at the same time he received funding from them. He was taken by the contesting forces of the Intifada and became the lawyer of Marwan Barghouti after his arrest. In this regard, European consuls raised the issue of misuse of funding by LAW.

The quoted academics in this research- in discussing civil society organizations- view them as following to a lesser degree a Palestinian agenda while being more connected to the demands of external aid. Hanafi and Tabar (2002) argue in the case of the petition

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256 Interview with Ingrid Jaradat who worked then in Badil; op. cit.
257 See for example, the Center for Policy Analysis in Washington, “International Law, Apartheid and Israel”; op. cit, as well as previously cited example of LAW and PCHR’s statement on the intra-Palestinian clashes.
“to stop suicide bombings” that came after the April invasion, as withdrawing legitimacy from civil society organizations. As Salah Abdel Shafi, himself from a civil society organization and who had signed the petition of 2002 wrote, the “financial dependency of the new professionalized elites on foreign funding also harmed their reputation among the public, which saw them as being pro-Western and pro-American” (Abdel Shafi 2004: 33).

Other frequently raised arguments are related to “personalization” of NGOs (usually associated with their directors), and accountability to donors more than to members and society, which insert pressure in the field on civil society organizations and push for asserting their legitimacy. As Ameer Makhoul wrote in evaluating the process for Durban conference, organizations in Ittijah were financially punished by some donors (particularly US and Zionist circles) for preferring to work with the other Palestinian NGOs across the Green Line and the regional Arab NGOs in one caucus, rather than working with Israeli NGOs that were against the apartheid analogy, and for following the Durban route that associated Israel with apartheid, colonialism and racism. Makhoul wrote that NGOs bear great responsibility for not to be constrained by funding sources, adding that since many NGOs are not elected from a wide membership base, such as political parties for example, they should increase their sense of responsibility by being accountable to their communities and challenging Israeli policies.258 Similarly, Mohammad Jaradat (from Badil then) wrote that many NGOs are not accountable to their constituencies.259

Hence, civil society circles would live great contradictory forces in the field of power in Palestine besides the world field of power on Palestine. The latter field is discussed in the following chapters though some aspects are discussed in this chapter. The smaller civil society actors who are generally leftists (either in NGOs, social movement or academics) would push more for the unification of first leftist and/or secular civil society actors for the norms of boycott, sanctions and divestment since 2002 and 2003. Yet, because they have been less engaged in Palestinian popular mobilization compared to political factions and have somehow questioned legitimacy because of their connections with foreign funding, they have directed their momentum to unify Palestinian actors for a call that is directed

258 Ameer Makhoul, “Four years on Durban conference….”; op. cit.
more to the outsiders rather than competing on Palestinian politics that is more problematic. Their area of political activism was in a less crucial political aspect related to political positions or leadership in the Palestinian society.

These actors are also inclined to engage in campaigning as their mode of action. Badil was campaigning for the right of return among Palestinian politicians and society during the negotiation process, and based their value on rights-based understanding, and has been pushing for the apartheid analogy since 2001. The newly formed (early 2003) Stop the Wall campaigned particularly against the wall, and became associated quickly with the name “Stop the Apartheid Wall Campaign”.

Already, they have common aspects and differences from other civil society actors. They are smaller than the big NGOs and did not fit well in the big established NGOs. Moreover, Badil has been directing vocal critiques to PNGO since the 1990s on the issue of prioritizing the right of return and later on, on the issue of representation at the World Social Forums, which led to Badil’s engagement in another network. Additionally, the annual report of 2004 indicated that its membership application for PNGO has been “pending since 1999, has remained without formal response”.

Stop the Wall sought normatively to be active in protest activities, with some level of protesting and connecting with the popular protests while at the same time exercising other means of influence (i.e. in media and transnational networks). One of the coordination committee members of Stop the Wall has been quoted saying that they want to be a campaign and “didn’t want it to be an NGO” (Norman 2009: 141; interviewed back in 2007). It is worth noting that the coordination committee of Stop the Wall has persons active in political factions like the late Ahmad Maslamani from the Health Work Committees (affiliated with the PFLP).

Yet, they have not been the leading forces either of boycott inside Palestine, in Intifada activities or Palestinian politics. For example, Stop the Wall’s role was to try to coordinate activities while its main role was to provide visibility especially between transnational activists and media as it has strong links transnationally. As Ahmed told a researcher: “The idea of Stop the Wall was to establish a network of popular committees […] They let us know what is going on locally, and we assist them by helping them get media coverage, sending internationals, and writing reports on our website. (interview,
(Norman 2009: 142). This is also the opinion of one of the main activists in a village protest against the wall interviewed in this research, confirming Stop the Wall’s main role in media and coordination.260

These NGOs have been normatively trying to be social movements in the sense of mobilizing broad volunteer and popular constituencies and actions. However, they have not always been successful and varied in level, though they kept the general spirit of popular politicized actions. For example, as the funding of Agricultural Relief PARC and Badil has been increasing, their social bases have shrunk - as indicated by their annual reports261, they experienced managerial conflicts in some cases,262 or contributed to the decline of some active NGOs.263

Moreover, competition for foreign funding has contributed to more competition between NGOs/social movements, conflated with other differences between them. Badil has suspended its interest to join PNGO temporarily in 2004 - 2005, while Jamal Juma and Agricultural Relief PARC had some divergence in 2002 though Juma continued to be a board member for the following few years and they worked together in the Stop the Wall campaign.264

The research drew on some literature of academics and civil society actors who had critical views on the role of NGOs. For example, Sari Hanafi was quoted on critical remarks to NGOs’ participation in the Intifada. Hanafi was a leading person in Shaml (for refugees’ studies) and participated in the Cairo meeting in July 2001 for the Durban conference, and wrote with enthusiasm about it, in co-published works with Tabar. Similarly, Tabar wrote critically later regarding “popular resistance” atmospheres after the second Intifada. Such critical writings normatively seek more mass-based politics while connecting with national program. These academics sought a sort of activity that resembles more the social/political movements’ way of action rather than professionalized NGOs.

260 Interview on 17 June 2015; op. cit.
261 PARC’s 2001 and 2002 annual reports (2002 via www.pal-arc.org/annual/2002e.pdf) and Badil’s 2006 annual report; op. cit.
262 For example, Badil’s annual report of 2006 discusses briefly this issue inside Badil.
263 like LAW NGO, where its chairman Khadir Shuqairat was the lawyer of Marwan Barghouti and engaged in politics during the second intifada and issued vocal critiques to funding and European role before some European states move to persecute him for allegedly misuse of European funding. See also the 2002 “corruption scandal” related to LAW (Challand 2009: 66).
These actors wanted more direct connection with mobilization and protest, rather than NGOs’ connection with “beneficiaries” through provision of services, amid the more politicized atmosphere of the second *Intifada*. For example, Omar Barghouti (2010) expressed that some NGOs were reluctant to sign the BDS call due to funding considerations, while he distinguished the BDS movement from political factions “addicted” to armed ways of resistance, he wrote (2011). Hence, the BDS forces were distinguishing themselves from the mainstream NGOs, while being able to attract PNGO in the context of changing trends inside PNGO during the second *Intifada*, and at the same time distinguishing themselves from political factions while also attracting them to join. They sought to express a different political current than *Fateh* and *Hamas*, whilst coming from leftist and/or secular circles. Adnan Ramadan (from OPGAI) viewed that their difference manifested itself in their rejection of the negotiation track of Oslo and adherence to peaceful ways of resistance, as the “BDS call was sending this alternative voice […]. BDS offered Palestinians for the first time to present their leaders. Before that there were only the political parties”.

However, it was not the large NGOs rather actors resembling social movements, in coordination with critical academics, which would propagate the apartheid analogy. They took the lead amid unification and fragmentation forces in the field in Palestine. Because their position and legitimacy was weaker than mass-based bodies, they would take the lead. They have more social power through their transnational connections.

Moreover, these actors have strong transnational connections and have strong informative base in English (and sometimes other languages like Spanish). Already, transnationals have been mobilized into Palestine during the second *Intifada*, with common protests being jointly organized at Israeli checkpoints or other locations.

Many of the transnational actors would connect with Palestinian civil society actors rather than with Palestinian actors from factions for instance, thus empowering these civil society actors transnationally. Already, the emerging transnational and international spaces encourage the role of NGOs, academics and related circles, such as examples of the

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Durban NGO Forum, World Social Forum, European Social Forums and the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP), which will be discussed in chapter six.

It was a time of increasing transnational campaigns in solidarity with Palestinians, including the International Solidarity Campaign in 2001, and various “civil missions” from Belgium and other European countries. At that time, in 2001, PNGO was closely involved in a campaign called “Grassroots International Protection for the Palestinian People”, which aimed at “grassroots International Protection”. Agricultural Relief PARC indicated that for the year 2001 a “number of grassroots campaigns were arranged for more than 2,000 volunteers supporting the Palestinian case […]. Some of these observers were able to remove check points and military barriers, formed human shields in front of the occupying tanks to stop them from proceeding towards the Palestinians”.

Two transnational norms

Two international/transnational norms had circulated during the second Intifada. The first was the “international protection”/ “UN observing force” in Palestine. Associated with the HR and international humanitarian law values, the norm of international humanitarian protection, which has been encouraged by the UN among other actors, spread between Palestinian actors like the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, LAW Society, PNGO, Agricultural Relief PARC, Badil, among others besides the PA. The second norm relates to isolating and pressuring Israel through imposing sanctions, embargo and boycotts that was adopted in Durban NGO Forum in 2001.

For example, the European Coordination Committees on the Question of Palestine (ECCP) visited Palestine in September 2001, just after the Durban conference. In coordination with PNGO the information was disseminated through Arab media including

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266 “Civil missions” from Belgium to Palestine has been going on since the year 2001, as interviews in Brussels confirm. For example, the interview with Nadia Farkh in 3 March 2014 in Brussels. Nadia is the coordinator for Association Belgo-Palestinienne, who has been active in organizing the civil missions. Similarly, Flemish- based organizations, like Palestina Solidariteit, organized similar ones as the interview with Meryam Vandecan and Numan Othman affirm.

267 “Grassroots International Protection for the Palestinian People”, via: http://www.auphr.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3120&Itemid=33 <accessed on 8 Nov. 2014>. Also see PARC’s annual report (2001) that states: “The PNGO started a grassroots international campaign for the protection of the Palestinian people last June. This came in response to the American veto for sending international observers to Palestine” (p. 7).

268 PARC’s annual report of 2001; op. cit; p. 8.
the official news agency *Wafa*. *Al-Hayat* newspaper (based in London) reported on 1 September 2001 that ECCP decided to form “human shields” to protect Palestinians “after the slackened international community to defend them amid the Israeli bombing” rendered the Geneva conventions to protect civilians as paralyzed. At the same time, ECCP submitted a petition to *Carrefour* and *Delhaize* supermarket chains, signed by 4500 consumers condemning selling settlements’ products.269 Hence, the two norms were pushed forward, while the norm of transnational protection was encouraged. ECCP, like the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign have started boycott activities- though focusing on settlements’ products and not adhering to the apartheid analogy and the comprehensive norms as declared for example in the Durban conference. *Wafa* news also reported on 23 September 2001 that ECCP has been in a field visit in Shufat refugee camp in Jerusalem to see the destroyed houses due to the Israeli operations, which was coordinated by PNGO. Pierre Galand, the coordinator of ECCP, declared that they are forming human protection for Palestinians.270

Some Palestinian actors from civil society circles were inclined to the first norm (and adjusting it to the “Grassroots International Protection”) and/or to the isolation strategy of Israel. They have mostly worked on both. For example, academic circles would be active on the academic and cultural boycott norms through their interaction with UK academics since 2002 - which is explored in the next chapter. At the same time, Baramki for example, was calling for international protection at the meetings of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), which is also explored in the next chapters. Additionally, Birzeit University participated with the Grassroots International Protection activists in protesting against Surda checkpoint between Ramallah and Birzeit University.271

Stop the Wall campaign has been active transnationally on the sanctions and boycotts in the World Social Forums and European Social Forums- as also discussed in the following chapters, and also coordinated with transnational activists to protest in villages. PNGO and Mustafa Barghouti were active in the “Grassroots International Protection”

269 “Reports of Events” (September 2001; in Arabic); The National Palestinian Information Centre (*Wafa* news agency, Ramallah), via http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=3488 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
track. Moreover, Barghouti was a coordinator for hosting the World Social Forum in a special session that was held in Ramallah in December 2002 in solidarity with the Palestinians. He called back then for a transnational protection for Palestinians. At the same time, Barghouti also demonstrated concern for particularly the sanctions track, as is explored in the following chapters. Badil as well was active on both tracks.

However, the norm “international protection” was blocked in the Palestinian case. In 2001, the Arab League called on the UN-SC to adopt international protection, but faced the veto of the US administration. Obviously, Palestinian actors have been trying to come up with initiatives, internally or externally, but still lacked the clear way, as Ingrid Jaradat expresses. Neither the World Social Forum’s session in Palestine in 2002 nor the international solidarity movement has used the word “apartheid” at that time.

At the end of 2004, Badil wrote a critical self-evaluation on the “international protection” norm:

Our 2002-2004 Action Plan, however, did not take into account that the powerful international players, including the United States, would accommodate the new Israeli strategy almost without challenge. Unable to foresee other dramatic events (the 2001 terror attack on the World Trade Center, the US-led war against Iraq) and their implications for Palestine, BADIL assumed that international crisis management in the region would be guided by a minimum of respect for international law and previous political commitments. Based on this assumption, BADIL – like all Palestinian civil society and leadership – initially focused all advocacy and campaigning efforts at achieving an international response that would provide basic protection for the Palestinian people. We failed to understand early on that unilateralism had become the norm and underestimated the ease with which western states sacrifice universal standards – including basic Palestinian rights - to perceived political interests and alliances with Israel and the United States.

Similarly, Lisa Taraki wrote in 2004 in a letter arguing for the endorsement of academic boycott that “all forms of international intervention have until now failed to force Israel to comply with international law or to end its repression of the Palestinians, which has manifested itself in the brutal suppression of academic freedom, siege, indiscriminate

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killing -- just today, Israel murdered professor Khaled Salah, of an-Najah University, and his 16-year-old child in their home in Nablus”.274

In relation to the boycott norm, though the Palestinian boycott against Israeli products weakened- but continued- during the course of the second Intifada, it has continued to circulate in the contesting culture of the Intifada, and in connection to contesting international powers that pushed for cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli actors. As the example of Marwan Barghouti suggests, during the Oslo period, he was so close to many Israeli actors and peace movements in the hope for a peace accord, but with the second Intifada he became a leader of boycott. Uri Avneri (from the Israeli Gush Shalom -Peace Now movement), who used to know Marwan Barghouti, wrote after the imprisonment of Barghouti commenting on his call for boycotts: “Clearly, his attitude has hardened. So, one must assume, has the attitude of the Palestinian people at large”.275

As demonstrated previously, wide Palestinian actors were involved in boycotts during the first period of the Intifada, and though it weakened amid militant developments, this contesting culture reflected itself in other areas in the field beyond the Israeli products. In the second Intifada, Palestinian NGOs became distant from Israeli ones. At the beginning of the second Intifada, for instance, PNGO asked NGOs avoided seeking funding for common projects with Israeli entities (Hammami and Tamari 2000).

Makhoul (the director of Ittijah) wrote, in evaluating the Durban process in 2001 from the point view of Palestinian NGOs inside the Green Line, that “the criterion for many funding sides is not only the performance, projects and success [of Palestinian NGOs] but the position from Israel or in cooperating with the Israeli institutions”.

Similarly, the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON, which would be related to Stop the Wall) declared amid the April 2002 invasion that it would be “boycotting common environmental projects with the Israeli side”.277

As part of the spread of the boycott norm during the second Intifada, the cooperation with Israeli counterparts became a publicly raised issue and a problematic one. Mohammad

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275 Uri Avnery, “The New Mandela”; op. cit.
276 Ameer Makhoul, “Four years on Durban conference…. ”; op. cit.
Jaradat from Badil wrote on the eve of the BDS declaration: “Large sectors of Palestinian civil society, including business, public institutions and NGOs, depend on cooperation with official and non-governmental Israeli actors for income, benefits and privileges, while such cooperation and dependence is encouraged by international donors and ‘peacemakers’”.278

Birzeit University based part of its rationale, after indicating “its positive and productive relations with the EU” and on the continuous harassment of Palestinian universities and students under occupation amidst a lack of response by Israeli academic institutions towards the occupation. The statement said:

[...] cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian Universities is either not possible or is at the absolute minimum. That lack of cooperation is a direct result of the political situation and it is hoped that the international community would understand the dynamics of the relations between the occupier and those who are under occupation. Within these dynamics, cooperation is neither encouraged nor welcomed.279

Birzeit University based part of its rational, after indicating “its positive and productive relations with the EU”, on the continuous harassment of Palestinian universities and students under occupation while there has been lack of responses by Israeli academic institutions to the occupation. The statement said:

[N]o Israeli university body or professional association has dissociated itself from the occupation and its practices. On the contrary, several of the Israeli academy's illustrious members have served--and without censure from their colleagues--in high-profile positions as advisors to the military government, or as consultants to the intelligence services and the government. At the same time, whenever individual Israeli academics have attempted to strongly state their opposition to the on-going occupation, they have been discredited and shunned by their peers.

Towards the end of the second Intifada, Palestinian NGOs particularly from the health sector had a similar tendency. They expressed their opinion openly contesting the conditionality of donors to cooperate with Israeli sides. A petition against cooperation with Israeli counterparts was signed first by the Union of Health Work Committees (headed by Maslamani which is affiliated with Stop the Wall, the PFLP and OPGAI), and the second

by the Medical Relief UPMRC (headed by Mustafa Barghouti). Twenty Palestinian NGOs and unions signed including two bodies associated with al-Najah University while the two other NGO networks than PNGO (the General Union of Palestinian Charitable Societies and the National Council of NGOs), another major trade union other than the General Federation of Trade Unions (the General Union of Palestinian Workers). The petition was directed at the international actors and Palestinians, connecting general conditions of occupation with health, academic and other aspects. They stated:

We, the undersigned, medical and health service providers and members of professional unions and research and training institutions working in the health sector in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, would like to register our protest and deep concern over the increasing pressure exerted upon us to enter into Palestinian-Israeli cooperation schemes in the sphere of health […]. They fail to take into consideration the generally silent response of the Israeli academic and professional establishment to Palestinian scientific, medical, health, educational, economic, social and political strangulation […].

Hence, the boycott inside Palestine has gone beyond Israeli products to Israeli institutions throughout the successive years of the second Intifada; either in practice or in normative inclination. Yet, cooperation with Israeli individuals or small groups (that are considered “radical” in the Israeli politics) has continued during the second Intifada. For example, in the newly formed NGO in 2004 (OPGAI), one member organization is an Israeli-Palestinian anti-Zionist organization (the Alternative Information Centre).

Transnationally, boycott particularly against settlements’ products had started appearing since 2001. In the UK, for example, a campaign has been formed in July 2001 to boycott Israeli goods. In 2001 - 2002, diverse initiatives for boycotting Israeli products have been taking place in the Global North and some were reported in Arab press. For example, boycott activities took place in Norway by leftist and Green parties, in Italy by the customs authorities in relation to settlements’ products, in Sweden a major furniture store canceled its trade with a settlement trader, and in Canada, a Palestinian-Canadian initiative started to call for boycotts.

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On the international level, contradictory messages – reflecting contestations inside EU institutions - also affected the Palestinian actors. In 2001, the European Commission was debating the issue of certificates of origin of the Israeli settlements’ products and discussed the issue with the Israeli government, but asserted that no decision was taken.\textsuperscript{282} In April 2002, the European Parliament recommended weapons embargo against Israel and the PA besides suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, but without being endorsed by the European executive bodies. Though at the end there were no European practical policies in this regard, this news encouraged the Palestinian actors for the potential change on the official European level in relation to embargo or partial boycott. Moreover, the European Coordination Committees on Palestine (ECCP) has sustained calls to suspend the EU-Israeli Association Agreement, engaged in boycott activities and called for sanctions, while being in close contacts with Palestinian actors.

Additionally, starting from 2002, diverse academic initiatives calling for boycotting cultural activities with Israeli institutions have caused wide debate in the UK, France, Australia and elsewhere. This academic process has additionally encouraged Palestinian academics to join the call. Already, the 2002 Palestinian call regarded its academic boycott as being informed by the transnational academic boycott calls in 2002. Mona Baker (an Egyptian British professor) and Laurence Davidson (a Jewish American professor) have also encouraged a Palestinian momentum. For example, Baker indicated that she wrote to persons at Birzeit University encouraging a boycott call by Palestinians, so that British academics could further justify their calls in the UK and the US. In October 2003, “the first Palestinian Call for [academic] Boycott was issued by a group of Palestinian academics and intellectuals in the diaspora and the occupied Palestinian Territory”, as PACBI asserted a year after.\textsuperscript{283} Baker and Davidson were responsible of collecting signatures from non-Palestinian academics endorsing the October 2003 Palestinian academic petition. The

\textsuperscript{282} “Europe denies taking a decision to boycott Israeli settlements’ products and exporting weapons to Tel Aviv” (in Arabic), \textit{Al-Sharg Al-Awsat} newspaper (London, 2 August 2001), via http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=50415&issueno=8283#.VI1pEd2FNjo <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

\textsuperscript{283} PACBI, “Guidelines for Applying the International Academic Boycott of Israel”, 1 October 2009, via http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1107 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
petition referred to apartheid and called for boycotting Israeli academic institutions as a peaceful approach.\textsuperscript{284}

\textit{The ICJ}

Another important international magnetic force was the process of mobilizing the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion on the Israeli wall, which has been attracting actors throughout the year 2004. For example, in February 2004, Stop the Wall participated in an international symposium against the Wall in Hague, Netherlands.\textsuperscript{285}

The ICJ process was started by the PA, Arab League and the Non-Alignment Movement at the UN-GA. It was also pushed ahead by Palestinian civil actors through demonstrations that called for it (including a hunger strike). It also entailed communication with transnational and international actors in Hague. It was an important process for the mobilization at the global level. It also pushed ahead for a focus on one of the two

\textsuperscript{284} The statement read (via http://www.monabaker.com/pMachine/callforboycott.php):

“Statement by Palestinian Academics
This statement outlines the position of Palestinian academics and intellectuals on the international boycott of Israeli academic institutions. Our position is a consequence of decades of debilitating occupation, the dispossession of most Palestinians, Israel’s continuing atrocities, its campaigns to disrupt Palestinian educational and other civil institutions, its breaches of international law and of humanitarian standards, as well as the general discriminatory nature of its system. These practices are all well documented in UN resolutions, in reports of human rights agencies, and are starkly visible in the form of facts on the ground. Because the facts speak for themselves, but a solution is nowhere in sight, it is time for people of conscience to take a stand and influence both public opinion and government policies. It now must be so since the world’s powers have failed to take measures that hold Israel, like any other state, accountable for its abuses and force it to adhere to international standards. In the absence of any such accountability, it becomes the duty of citizens to act independently to expose and resist injustice. The boycott of Israeli academic institutions is a pacifist form of resistance already available the world over and has demonstrated growing potential. It sends a strong message of concern over the on-going destruction of Palestinian educational institutions and, in particular, helps expose to the world’s public the culpability of Israeli academic institutions in perpetuating! illegal occupation. This boycott entails a pledge not to support or participate in any conference, cooperative research, grant writing or grant evaluation, or other supportive activities, such as academic exchanges or visits, held at or involving Israeli universities and other state institutions. We believe this international boycott should be sustained until Israel withdraws from all lands occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, removes all its colonies in those lands, agrees to United Nations resolutions relevant to the restitution of Palestinian rights, and dismantles its system of apartheid. Meanwhile, we encourage dialogue with people (internationally and in Israel) who demonstrate readiness to participate in realizing these objectives.
We challenge other academics and intellectuals not to remain unmoved, or by their silence become complicit, but rather to take a stand and act in solidarity with the Palestinians, with Israeli dissenters, and with the growing international movement against the Israeli government’s colonial war in occupied Palestine. We urge fellow academics and intellectuals worldwide to adhere to and publicize this call to boycott, and to affirm it as an act of conscience”. <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

\textsuperscript{285} PARC’s annual report of 2004; \textit{op. cit.}
discussed international norms since the ICJ advisory opinion based itself on humanitarian international law but not on international protection.

As an example on how Palestinian actors interacted with the ICJ process, Jamal Juma wrote “the internal interaction [for forming the BDS] started directly after the decision of Hague court, and based on it, in working to issue a unified call representing the Palestinian civilian and popular position in relation to work strategies”.

Agricultural Relief PARC’s annual reports in 2003 and 2004 referred to the “apartheid” terminology only when speaking about the Israeli wall. They also capitalized on the mobilization in Hague and a hunger strike in Jerusalem to push for a ruling on the wall by the ICJ. Hazim Jamjoum, who was associated with Badil as well and was active in Palestinian-Canadian mobilization including the Israeli Apartheid Week, provided an understanding of the ICJ’s advisory opinion (Jamjoum 2011: 139). He wrote that the ICJ advisory opinion:

[Pro]osed a milestone in the development of the contemporary BDS campaign because the ruling laid the groundwork for an international solidarity movement aimed at holding Israel accountable to the Geneva Convention. The court stated that:

all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction. It is also for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end. In addition, all the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.

Jamjoum provides an understanding for the ruling by stating: “Rephrased in the affirmative, this means that states are obliged to cease relations with Israel until it complies with international law, and particularly international humanitarian law as expressed in the 1949 Geneva Convention. As a result, international civil society movements could base their campaign on a contemporary and clearly stated international ruling from the world’s most authoritative court”.

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Three days before the ICJ’s advisory opinion, PACBI (formed in April 2004) issued its call on 6 July 2004 describing Israel as a colonial state based on Zionism, and denies its responsibility for the *Nakba*, resembling a racial apartheid system like South Africa, and considering the wall as a racist colonial wall, and calling for the boycott of all Israeli academic and cultural institutions.\(^{287}\)

*The formation of the BDS call*

Already, the academic interactions between Palestinian and UK academics encouraged the formation of PACBI. Palestinian academics have been able to unify through the call of 2004 - a wide coalition of actors. The academic federation (the Palestinian Federation of Unions of University Professors and Employees), the Palestinian

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\(^{287}\) The complete statement read:

“Whereas Israel’s colonial oppression of the Palestinian people, which is based on Zionist ideology, comprises the following:

Denial of its responsibility for the Nakba — in particular the waves of ethnic cleansing and dispossession that created the Palestinian refugee problem — and therefore refusal to accept the inalienable rights of the refugees and displaced stipulated in and protected by international law;

Military occupation and colonization of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza since 1967, in violation of international law and UN resolutions;

The entrenched system of racial discrimination and segregation against the Palestinian citizens of Israel, which resembles the defunct apartheid system in South Africa;

Since Israeli academic institutions (mostly state controlled) and the vast majority of Israeli intellectuals and academics have either contributed directly to maintaining, defending or otherwise justifying the above forms of oppression, or have been complicit in them through their silence,

Given that all forms of international intervention have until now failed to force Israel to comply with international law or to end its repression of the Palestinians, which has manifested itself in many forms, including siege, indiscriminate killing, wanton destruction and the racist colonial wall,

In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community of scholars and intellectuals have historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in their struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa through diverse forms of boycott,

Recognizing that the growing international boycott movement against Israel has expressed the need for a Palestinian frame of reference outlining guiding principles,

In the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression,

We, Palestinian academics and intellectuals, call upon our colleagues in the international community to comprehensively and consistently boycott all Israeli academic and cultural institutions as a contribution to the struggle to end Israel’s occupation, colonization and system of apartheid, by applying the following:

Refrain from participation in any form of academic and cultural cooperation, collaboration or joint projects with Israeli institutions;

Advocate a comprehensive boycott of Israeli institutions at the national and international levels, including suspension of all forms of funding and subsidies to these institutions;

Promote divestment and disinvestment from Israel by international academic institutions;

Work toward the condemnation of Israeli policies by pressing for resolutions to be adopted by academic, professional and cultural associations and organizations;

Support Palestinian academic and cultural institutions directly without requiring them to partner with Israeli counterparts as an explicit or implicit condition for such support.” See: Artists for Palestine website, via http://artistsforpalestine.org.uk/why-israel/the-palestinian-call/#unique-identifier 869 <accessed on 19 July 2015>
General Federation of Trade Unions that has been active in boycott initiatives since the second Intifada, PNGO as a main network for NGOs, the unions of artists, journalists, lawyers, and the General Union of Palestinian Women, among other civil society organizations were mobilized.

Badil and small and medium NGOs, who are generally in leftist circles, and a Syrian NGO from the Golan Heights formed a new NGO network called the Occupied Palestine and Golan Advocacy Initiative (OPGAI) in 2004. In parallel, Badil’s connection with refugee circles transnationally has been strong. It had formed a coalition from refugee organizations in Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Europe and North America and had been meeting annually in the new millennium, which mobilized the Palestinian refugees’ transnational agency.288 In November 2004, Badil initiated “Mapping Current Israeli Boycott-Divestment-Sanction Initiative”,289 where one can see the three norms B-D-S together. During that period, transnational interactions for boycotts and sanctions were geared up. For example, a conference organized by the School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), London, on 5 December 2004, which was entitled “Resisting Israeli Apartheid: Strategies and Principles- An International Conference on Palestine”,290 brought together active persons from PACBI participated such as Omar Barghouti and Lisa Taraki. The three norms (D, S and B) appeared again in one of the panels entitled “Isolating Apartheid: Divestment, Sanctions, Boycott”. A similar conference for anti-war and alter-globalization movements in Beirut in September 2004 endorsed the B-D-S norms.

Badil added in 2004 that the call should “be based on a united call of all major Palestinian civil society organizations” across the Green Line, and should “include boycott

288 For example, in 2004, Badil’s annual report indicates that “the Coalition was composed of the following: Aidun Group-Lebanon, Aidun Group-Syria, ADRID, BADIL, the Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Refugee Rights and Yafa Cultural Center (Nablus), the Coordination Forum of NGOs Working among the Palestinian Community in Lebanon, High Committee for the Defense of the Right of Return-Jordan, Al-Awda Palestine Right-to Return Coalition-North America, Palestine Right-of-Return Coalition-Europe, Popular Committees in the West Bank and Gaza Refugee Camps, Union of Youth Activity Centers-Palestine Refugee Camps, Union of Women’s Centers-West Bank Refugee Camps”.

289 Badil’s annual report of 2004; op. cit.

of cultural, academic, sports, and other relations, because this challenges Israel’s image in the west”. 291

The Palestinian civil society actors wanted to lead a wide Palestinian coalition that also seeks internal and external recognition, which would yield stronger effect as well. Internally, it was an attempt by the emerging atmosphere in the civil society to unite the third way currents, preferably with the lead of new forces from the leftist and/or secular circles. But with the “possibility of NGO politics” (as Hammami indicated in another context in her article in 2000), they are weaker internally as separate bodies in relation to other political actors, though they have considerable power in a Palestinian wide coalition. For example, the newly formed OPGAI network in the spring of 2004, composed initially of 10 NGOs. Badil was a major actor in this coalition. The coalition stated that one of its major two goals was “building a progressive democratic social movement”, and accomplishing the goals it seeks “to promote cooperation and collaboration among sectors of the secular civil society including unions, associations, NGOs and the grassroots”. Moreover, OPGAI “seeks to form a core group” that is composed of “diverse representatives of Palestinian civil society to establish a common definition of a unified democratic social movement”. 292 Hence, it sought a progressive social movement to unite wide Palestinian actors where a core group from civil society actors takes the lead.

Outside Palestine, there was a transnational challenge to the legitimacy of the apartheid call and the actors behind it; i.e. whether they represented a wide Palestinian aspiration. Omar Barghouti (2006) wrote: “A genuine concern raised by solidarity groups in the West regarding the calls for boycott has been the conspicuous absence of an official Palestinian body behind them. “Where is your ANC?” […].” Similarly, a co-founder for the BDS call indicated both the contradictory messages that were coming from Palestinian actors besides the reluctance of some transnational actors that considered the BDS call “extreme”. Adnan Ramadan said: “Many of our friends and people who sympathized with us or were convinced of our rights were confused by the many calls that came from different parts of our community […]. Some people said that the call was very extreme because many groups would refuse to describe Israel as racist or as a discriminatory system

291 Badil’s annual report of 2004; op. cit.
292 OPGAI Profile; op. cit.
or to compare it with South Africa”. As an example of the hesitation accounting for transnational and international recognition, Mustafa Barghouti who was engaged in boycotts in Palestine as demonstrated above (for example through the Medical Relief UPMRC), said in the early 2005 in an interview in English: “We don’t call for a boycott, but for sanctions against the state of Israel”.

Hence, for internal and external recognition, these actors wanted a wide coalition stemming from leftist and/or secular circles in addition to their peaceful oriented normative action to advocate for Palestinian rights, and to lead and unite Palestinian politics towards calling for Palestinian rights.

The civil society organizations became weakened and even isolated geographically from one another due to Israeli checkpoints, bypass roads and restrictions on movement, as an active member of the BDS National Committee, Ingrid Jaradat, demonstrated during the first period of the second Intifada. However, they would regain the initiative. In the spring of 2004, OPGAI had workshops to contemplate strategies. A similar process occurred amongst Palestinian refugees in Canada. There, they halted their activism during the second Intifada to think strategically and came up with the Israeli Apartheid Week initiative in 2004/2005, as Rafeef Ziadah demonstrated.

The aforementioned spring 2004 workshops, which resulted in forming OPGAI came “[f]or the first time since the collapse of the Oslo process and the second Palestinian intifada”. Members of NGOs “compared their perspectives about the root causes of the protracted conflict, scenarios for solutions based on two-state and one-state models, and their relationship with Jewish-Israeli civil society”. They reached a conclusion that Nakba is “the single most dramatic event that determines Israeli-Palestinian relations until this day”. An intersection with the Nakba centrality was also echoed, for example, by George Giacaman (2001) from Muwatin and PACBI. Already, the right of return of refugees became a central issue in Palestinian politics after the fall of Camp David negotiations in 2000, where the refugee issue was disputed in that negotiation. The first

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294 “Mustafa Barghouti: Palestinian Defiance - Interview by Éric Hazan”; New Left Review; op. cit.
295 Interview with Ingrid Jaradat; op. cit.
296 Interview with Rafeef Ziadah; op. cit.
297 Mohammad Jaradat; op. cit.
mass mobilizations, in the first period of the *Intifada* insisted on the centrality of the refugee issue.²⁹⁸

With the decline of Oslo horizon, which was based on the two states solution, increased forces among the Palestinian political actors tended to reconnect the different Palestinian rights. In that sense, these emerging “social movements” like Stop the Wall, *Badil*, PACBI and *Ittijah* among others had stronger legitimacy in their calls during the course of the second *Intifada*. PNGO, though recognizing the right of return as a principle, focused on the hope of a negotiated solution for two states. Moreover, Mustafa Barghouti was calling the second *Intifada* “the Independence Intifada”, which emphasized the call for independent Palestinian state compared to the other dimensions like the return of refugees of discrimination within Israeli politics. Hence, these actors that emphasized the apartheid analogy, and emphasized the different dimensions of the Palestinian issue, took the lead in the BDS formation.

Already, PACBI was formed in the academic direction. Similarly, Stop the Wall (that is a coalition as well) would gain more momentum with the ICJ advisory opinion on the wall during 2004. OPGAI would emerge in the same period of PACBI’s formation in 2004, and- like PACBI- it would try to connect Palestinian actors for a unified call as well as be active transnationally especially in the World Social Forums and the European Social Forums, as explicitly declared in their goals.

OPGAI was in a way a defection from PNGO. *Badil* declared in 2004 that it would stop to pursue membership in PNGO while engaging in forming another network.²⁹⁹ Yet, *Badil* and OPGAI knew that they needed a sort of unity to have internal and external recognition, and on a normative basis.

At a time that these organizations considered Oslo accords as practically dead, they proposed an alternative of pressuring Israel internationally and transnationally based on their analogy with the South African case. Arafat, who was under Israeli military and political siege in his headquarter *al-Moqatah* in Ramallah since 2002, came under international pressure in order to appoint Mahmoud Abbas as a prime minister with

²⁹⁸ Review for example the “Reports of Events” for January 2001; op. cit.
²⁹⁹ *Badil* stated: “Given the vitalization of local civil society coordination, coalition building and organizing in 2005, BADIL decided to abstain from pursuing formal membership with PNGO”. See: *Badil’s* annual report of 2005; p. 27, via http://www.badil.org/phocadownloadpap/Badil_docs/annual-report/2005e.pdf <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
executive powers. Arafat was then allegedly killed in November 2004. Abbas was contested by Marwan Barghouti who wanted to nominate himself from prison against Abbas, but withdrew at the end. Mustafa Barghouti nominated himself against Abbas, along with candidates from the DFLP and People’s Party. With the coming of Mahmoud Abbas into power in January 2005 and with his program that is largely based on re-establishing the Oslo process (reaching a solution through negotiations but with insisting this time on a freeze on settlements building), these civil society actors became more energetic to contest this rule of the game after years of the Intifada.

The general contestation in the field produced additional forces to contest this rule of the game by the political factions (including a major current in Fateh), trade unions, refugee circles, which have all been active in contesting major aspects of the rule of the game during the second Intifada. These actors would join the new initiative led initially by specific civil society groups.

Already, the accumulation of initiatives have been directing towards a wider effort. In 2002, the first Palestinian call for the analogy of apartheid was issued, while it was still shy and lacking institutionalization as well as wide endorsement. With the academic track joining the process in 2003 and their second call in July 2004, and the activism of Stop the Wall internally and transnationally for the analogy with apartheid especially after the ICJ advisory opinion, the time became ripe for a wider initiative.

OPGAI organized a workshop in Beit Sahour, near Bethlehem, at YMCA office in May 2005 with other NGOs and actors, and invited two veterans from South Africa and the Netherlands (Bangani Ngeleza and Adri Nieuwhof) “who shared lessons learned from the South African Anti-Apartheid Campaign”. Mohammad Jaradat added that already the transnational boycott initiatives have been encouraging, and connected with PACBI in saying: “The fact that success is possible was demonstrated by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) which, against all odds and even if only in the first round, had succeeded to win the support of the British Association of University Teachers (AUT) for a resolution to boycott cooperation with two Israeli universities”.300 The workshop came out with recommendations to issue a call on the first

300 Mohammad Jaradat; op. cit.
anniversary of the ICJ advisory opinion, and they “emphasized the need for broad consultation and coordination with political parties, unions and NGOs for this purpose”.  

Then, there had been different intense meetings. Different drafts had been discussed for around three months. The BDS movement, led firstly by Palestinian academics (primarily through PACBI) and NGOs/social movements (like Ittijah, Stop the Wall and Badil), had “joined forces with PNGO” in the coordination meetings in Ramallah at PNGO’s office. Drafters of the call faced opposition to the call by some civil society actors who feared that this call would mean ending the two states solution and calling for a one state solution; hence, abolishing the PA and ending this political track that existed since the 1980s. It took a lot of discussions and energy to focus on the rights-based approach instead of the debate on political solutions (one or two states). As Erakat (2010) adds, “[u]ltimately, the Council of National and Islamic Forces in Palestine, the coordinating body for the major political parties in the Occupied Territories, along with the largest Palestine Liberation Organization mass movements, facilitated the acceptance of the BDS call by major sectors of Palestinian civil society within the Territories and beyond”. This shows again the interplay by many NGOs or civil society organizations such as unions and political factions. Already, major factions were associated with some NGOs. For example, Addameer human rights organization and the Union of Health Work Committees have implicit relations with the PFLP. Similarly, DFLP, Fateh and People’s Party have links with some NGOs.

This compromise away from the political solutions, and away from direct competition on the Palestinian political ruling power, was able to unify the Palestinian civil society in its wide sense. The discussed actors had a leading role in a call that was mainly directed to transnational and international actors where these Palestinian actors from civil society have strong relations.

301 Ibid.
302 Interview with Ingrid Jaradat; op.
303 Interview with Ingrid Jaradat; op. cit. See also: Badil’s annual report of 2005; op. cit, and this is asserted as well by Adnan Ramadan from OPGAI saying that “The outcome of our workshop was to send out the call for BDS. We coordinated with Palestinian networks to send the call together with the Palestine Non-Governmental Organizations Network, Ittijah — the umbrella of Palestinian civil society organizations in historic Palestine, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, OPGAI and Stop the Wall”. See: Adri Nieuwhof, “Boycott movement has empowered Palestinians, says co-founder”; op. cit.
After successive failed attempts by leftist political actors in the third current to unite and lead the rest in a unified front, these civil society actors were successful in this unity attempt through the BDS call (not a movement yet) that is mainly directed to outsiders but drawn from Palestinian actors. Moreover, the absence of a leading public political figure in this call reduced the fear that personal competition for the political power will be played out, since personification is strong in the field and usually causes tension in coordinating efforts. Already, these actors do not mostly compete over political governing, at least not directly with the exception of figures in PNGO, but seek a wide campaign and to assert a different active political current.

Major groups among the core actors envisioned their way of coordination differently from political factions. For example, Adnan Ramadan (from OPGAI) saw that the “BDS work gave a new model of group decision-making, of dealing with issues with an open mind, giving opportunities for creative ideas”. A BNC member of the BDS movement suggested that the civil society members, who are in leftist circles, with younger generation than established leaders of the Palestinian factions and PLO in general, sought new political participation. The core groups behind the formation of the BDS movement follow such aspirations, he adds. Moreover, according to him, the Palestinian NGOs have large resources (i.e. money) in addition to more dynamic ways of innovation open to younger generation, that enable them to be powerful and to seek political participation.

The BDS call, after being discussed and drafted by the major civil society networks (PACBI, OPGAI, Stop the Wall, Ittijah and PNGO) was able to gather 170 Palestinian organizations on 9 July 2005. With the exception of the PA, these included the professional and trade unions and political factions that have mostly much more mass-based affiliation and financial, political and even military resources, and they took the lead. It came on the first anniversary of the ICJ advisory opinion with explicit reference to it in addition to the analogy with apartheid.

Then, a series of meetings took place between September and December 2006. An acting steering committee was formed, and they prepared “a 2006 program for local activation”. The call of July 2005 started to have institutionalization and hence more

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304 Adri Nieuwhof, “Boycott movement has empowered Palestinians, says co-founder”; op. cit.
305 Interview with D. G. (18 November 2014, Brussels).
306 Badil’s annual report of 2005; op. cit.
power. Badil indicated that cooperation “with PNGO intensified in the framework of the BDS Campaign”.\textsuperscript{307} Normative unification and practical need for wider recognition went hand in hand despite the strong fragmentation forces in the field. Hence, a joint Palestinian delegation was formed to attend the World Social Forums for 2006. It is worth noting that the World Social Forums’ assemblies (particularly the anti-war assembly) were major early spaces for pushing the BDS norms transnationally and endorsing them.

In 2006, the Palestinian politics was busy in elections that led to Hamas winning the majority of the legislative council seats. Nonetheless, a unity government was formed (where Mustafa Barghouti served as the information minister). However, Israel, US and the EU boycotted Hamas and hence the unity government (and the EU stopped funding the PA and circulated the funds indirectly through civil society and other routes). The Palestinian internal politics were already tense, and reflected itself in militant clashes between Hamas and circles in Fateh with the PA’s security apparatus in Gaza. With the international pressure mounting to separate the political actors from each other, the situation exploded and fragmentation peaked between two authorities in Gaza and the West Bank after they fought a short civil war in the summer of 2007.

From 2005 until 2007, unity initiatives and fragmentation would go side by side. Some elements of the unifying tendency can be seen through the Cairo Reconciliation agreement between the Palestinian political actors of 2005 and the Prisoners Document in 2005 (mainly by political factions in jail headed by Marwan Barghouti in Fateh). The unity government was formed in 2006. In this contesting context for the fragmentation in the field, the BDS wide call came in 2005. However, these diverse unity initiatives could not prevent the great fragmentation of 2007 that manifested itself in a short civil war.

At the same time, since 2005, weekly demonstrations have been taking place in a number of Palestinian villages adjacent to the wall that would associate themselves with the name “popular resistance” that referred back to the first Intifada. The BDS actors would associate themselves mostly with the “popular resistance” atmosphere and differentiate themselves from the Oslo negotiation track and armed struggle. Later on, the coordination committee of the popular resistance became represented in the BDS movement.

\textsuperscript{307} Ibid.
The BDS movement came at a time when the cracks in the Palestinian political elites failed to have a unified leadership and program, but benefitted from a changing transnational landscape. Moreover, as a recent research argues (Tabar and Azza 2014), after the Israeli invasion of West Bank cities and camps in 2002 and the start of the building of the Israeli Separation Wall, “a feeling around the Palestinian elites close to the PA spread that the militant resistance and Intifada led Palestinians to a defeat, so there is a need to end the military resistance, and there is no alternative but to return to negotiation” (p. 120). On the other side, small scale “popular resistance” began in some towns. Participants in these demonstrations were mostly from towns, persons with a historical affiliation with Palestinian political factions and the local communities (p. 120).

Connected to this spirit that seeks popular resistance, the BDS call was able to sustain itself amid the great fragmentation in the field in Palestine. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the BDS call obtained in 2005 and 2006 wide transnational endorsement by the South African social movements, the Anti-War Assemblies of the World Social Forums and the European Social Forums, and an endorsement by the International Coordination Committee on the Question of Palestine (associated with the civil conferences of the UN Committee on Palestine CEIRPP) that played somehow a coordinating body transnationally. All encouraged the sustainability of BDS movement after the call of 2005. Moreover, more strategic boycott campaigning targeting specific goals started in 2006 and 2007 in some European places.

Then, the BDS call of 2005 was able to continue beyond a call. PACBI website had played the major role as a media outlet and produced email lists, while the BDS website was created in 2006 (in English). The major actors behind the BDS call held their first conference in 2007 in Bireh, near Ramallah, with 300 persons attending mostly from Palestine but also transnationals from South Africa and European places, and representatives from close allies in the Palestine Solidarity Campaign in South Africa and the newly established British Committee for Universities in Palestine (BRICUP) that endorsed PACBI’s call.

Baramki’s opening speech indicated working against the fragmentation forces. He “emphasized the timeliness of a Palestinian popular boycott movement, especially now, when isolation and fragmentation are imposed more than ever on the Palestinian people, in
order to bring about loss of hope, dignity and surrender".308 PACBI, OPGAI, PNGO and Stop the Wall were the major actors in organizing the conference and in coordinating it, and agreed to work on “an inclusive steering committee”, which will start to take shape the year after with the formation of the BDS National Committee, with representatives from the major networks and unions in the civil society and a representation from the National and Islamic Council (the political forces), hence entering into an institutionalized phase.

The first BDS conference in 2007 associated itself with popular resistance in Palestine. It also declared a program, to enhance boycotts against Israeli products that have alternatives inside Palestine, to be adopted on the popular level, the media and schools. It also emphasized frequently the anti-normalization norm, particularly against the security coordination between the PA and Israeli security apparatuses, and on the economic level in relation to Paris Protocol of 1994. In addition to the emphasis on the Palestinian circles, the conference endorsed a program to work in the Arab region and consolidate links with the Arab anti-normalization committees, and to “[s]upport other struggles in the ‘global south’ and struggles of marginalized communities in the ‘north,’ and encourage links with the global BDS campaign”.

It recommended working on specific boycott campaigns globally, and especially on the anniversary of Nakba. They also recommended a conference in November 2008 to coordinate global BDS activities. It is worth noting that in November 2008, a conference was held in Bilbao, Basque/Spain, for a larger European endorsement of the BDS, which is discussed in the following chapters.

From 2005 until 2009, the BDS actors have been trying to assert themselves inside Palestine and globally as the civil society reference, through institutionalizing themselves and making sure that the diverse actors adhere to the BDS call. After three years of the BDS call, at the beginning of 2008, the BDS National Committee (BNC) was launched,310 and in July 2008 it launched its website in English.311 The new BNC asserted itself as the guiding body for the BDS activities globally. Structurally, it is composed of Palestinian

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309 Ibid.
310 Jamal Juma, “resisting the separation wall is an introduction to the coming Intifada”; op. cit.
bodies mainly inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip that represent the bulk of forces, but also from Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and refugee circles.312

Around the period of the war of Gaza in 2008-9, boycott campaigns inside Palestine have regained more momentum. The PA issued a law in 2010 to boycott products from Israeli settlements. BDS activists welcomed the PA’s decision but did not consider it enough. With the subsequent wars on Gaza, the boycott momentum inside Palestine got stronger (which is not the focus of this research), and re-activated the internal Palestinian route after it got weakened during the second period of the second Intifada.

In addition to the re-activation of the internal Palestinian boycott, the Palestinian interviewees in this research – related to the BDS- consider that the BDS campaign is a major tool but not sufficient, which would require additional steps such as a reformed and unified PLO and additional means of resistance. Yet, they have been progressing in enlarging the Palestinian constituency in a major Palestinian movement.

312 In 2008, as it is declared: “The BNC included: Council of National and Islamic Forces in Palestine, General Union of Palestinian Workers Palestinian, General Federation of Trade Unions, Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), Federation of Independent Trade Unions Union, of Arab Community Based Associations (ITTIJAH), Palestine Right of Return Coalition, Occupied Palestine and Golan Heights Initiative [OPGAI], General Union of Palestinian Women, Union of Palestinian Farmers, Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (STW), Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), National Committee to Commemorate the Nakba, Civic Coalition for the Defence of Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (CCDPRJ)”.

Ibid.
Chapter V

Relations in the world field of power and cases from Belgium and the UK

In this research, there are three broadly discussed levels: the Palestinian, the transnational and the international. The last two chapters focused on the Palestinian context through revealing the contestations in the field of power in Palestine. However, the Palestinian context could not be separated from the transnational and the international dimensions. While the last two chapters focused on development of norms and pathways in the process of the emergence of the BDS movement, it could not ignore how the Palestinian actors relate to some EU policies, European transnational actors, regional and South African actors, in the development of the movement. Nevertheless, the focus was on the Palestinian actors in relational terms with other Palestinian actors (and partially to Israeli actors).

In this chapter, the focus would shift to the Palestinian actors in relation to other transnational actors in the course of developing pathways and norms. Hence, this chapter starts with a theoretical discussion of Bourdieu in IR literature before moving to two cases in the UK and Belgium.

1. Bourdieu in IR literature

In relation to the international sphere, since the 1990s and early 2000s, diverse actors, mentioned in this research, have included programs related to “international advocacy”, linking with international and transnational actors. It was discussed in chapters three and four how the actors had strong transnational links, and were also affected by international organizations or polities like the EU, the ICJ and the UN Durban conference, which were important in their developed pathways and norms.

Yet, how should these fields be conceptualized? Are they transnational or international, or both? Bourdieu did his research in national contexts, while the case at
hand is about a transnational movement active in international politics. Therefore, the question of the relevance of Bourdieu in international politics is raised.

Diverse political scientists have employed Bourdieu in international and transnational fields, and demonstrated how his theory is powerful to explain international and transnational fields.

Bourdieu started to get attention by IR scholars because they felt unsatisfied by other IR theories, in relation to the agency vs. structure dilemma. Bourdieu is discussed in relation to the different major schools of IR, as demonstrated by IR scholars. He is far from (neo) liberal theorists (i.e. Moravcsik and Keohane). This is based on his rejection to the methodological individualism thesis, though he intersects with them on the ground that non-state actors matter. The departure from rational choice theory is also a move away from neorealists like Waltz that sees microeconomic models as foundations in IR (Pouliot and Merand 2013: 25). Moreover, when realists claim that the international system is anarchical, Bourdieu suggests that it is hierarchal (Adler-Nissen 2013: 4).

However, each school has elements that intersect with Bourdieu’s analytical proposition. Because of his interest in intersubjectivity, he intersects with constructivist IR theorists like Alexander Wendt, but Wendt does not concentrate on relations of power and domination (that is compensated by “realist constructualists”; Pouliot and Merand 2013: 26).

Moreover, in relation to norms that are important to this research, Bourdieu agrees with the dimension related to the “social construct of” world politics, but it is “different from a constructivist focus on identity and norms because it brings power into the picture” (Adler-Nissen 2013: 4). Charlotte Epstein employs Bourdieu’s concepts of nomos and doxa (the untold). Norms are related to structured fields of power struggle; which are hierarchically inhabited by agents through their habitus (Epstein 2013). Similarly, Bigo (2013) argues that “the problematisation suggested by Pierre Bourdieu in terms of practices instead of norms and values or interest and rational choice, of relational approach instead of essentialism or interactionism, permits rethinking security differently” (Bigo 2013: 114).

In relation to the English School, “pariah” and “failed” states that are considered outside the “international society”, occurs in Bourdieu’s terms because exclusion is
intrinsic to the states forming the “international society” (Adler-Nissen 2013: 4). Finally, although Bourdieu intersects with aspects of regime theories in IR (i.e. Krasner), such as the argument that the world order is structured and not in an anarchy for example, his world fields concept insist on structured spaces based on domination and contestation (Pouliot and Merand 2013: 35).

Bigo (2011) summarizes his resort to Bourdieu in IR by saying: “Bourdieu’s preference for a relational approach, which destabilizes the different versions of the opposition between structure and agency, avoids some of the traps commonly found in political science in general and theorizations of international relations in particular: essentialization and ahistoricism; a false dualism between constructivism and empirical research; and an absolute opposition between the collective and the individual” (225).

If Bourdieu is employed by IR scholars in international and transnational concepts, how can his approach be relevant to this research especially that the research deals with a Palestinian movement with transnational connections and active in international politics?

As an aforementioned route through South Africa in 2001 suggests, the contestations occurred inside an international organization and on its margin (the UN). The NGO Forum at the UN Durban conference was a forum created by the international organization, and has been developing as well on a rhythm related to international contestations (i.e. since the regional Asia-Pacific regional preparatory meeting in Tehran in February 2001), while transnational actors have been pushing for specific norms. Hence, this event in Durban in 2001 combines both the transnational and international together though one can still discuss each in a relative autonomy.

Similarly, the quickly mentioned ICJ’s advisory Opinion on the Israeli wall combined the international and transnational actors together. This occurs as well at the civil society conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) that are called by the states in the UN Committee and attended by them as well. Even the emergence of a major actor cited in this research, the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP), is traced back and sustained by the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP). Other cases discussed in the following sections and chapters are more related to transnational actors, but through relational terms with international ones, as explored below. For the sake of this research it is more appropriate to think of a ‘world field’ combining both the transnational
and international dimensions while the research can still focus on discussing relational aspects among transnational actors that accounts for their agency in a world field. It is an important aspect in this research to link the structural aspects with the agency of the actors.

The BDS call of 2005 is, in itself, interested in international (calling for sanctions by states through the pressure of transnationals) and transnational actors (calling for boycotts and divestment) while incorporating in the call a decision of an international organization (the ICJ) and referring to the anti-apartheid struggle that has been mainly inspired through the process leading to Durban conference in 2001.

Back in 1995, Dezalay and Sugarman (1995) edited a research book on the transnational legal fields, where Bourdieu wrote a forward. Bourdieu (1995) wrote about a unifying world fields that also combined the national field: “The world field which is in the process of being constituted in the various areas of practice, or, to put it another way, the process of constitution of specific world fields (the economic field, the literary field, the legal field, etc.) into which the national fields have been drawn, while retaining a greater or lesser relative autonomy” (ix).

Bigo (2011) discussed a “global field of power” where the fields of power “are no longer closed by a sovereign tautological argument” (249). Bigo discusses arguments related to Bourdieu’s notion of a meta-field of power: “Bourdieu’s unifying notion of a meta-field of power integrating the other fields and manifested either as the state or as the ‘global.’” Contrary to some critics, Bourdieu has never said that the field of power was restricted to the field of national state power, and he has explained in his critical article against Coleman and social theory in general that the meta-field of power, as in the academic field of world sociology, is transversal and transnational, with dominant effects that are only partly connected with a specific (national state) location (Bourdieu and Coleman 1991). Nevertheless, he had the tendency to admit that historically the bureaucratic field of the royal and then the state administration in the European trajectory of national states, which for him was connected with the emergence of the reason of state and the role of lawyers, has given the central place for converting different forms of capitals to the head of state. But he has also explained that, now, different state agents are
being increasingly replaced by financial markets in this role of global conversion of capital that come from different fields” (249-250).

This analysis of world fields can combine the actors’ dispositions (trajectories and social positions) with interaction in national and international fields. Bourdieu writes: “To discover, for instance, that within each national field the partisans of the ‘global’ or of the ‘local’ are not randomly scattered, since international strategies are only truly accessible to those who, owing to a (highly) privileged social origin, have the aptitudes and competencies (especially linguistic) that cannot be easily acquired on the school bench” (Bourdieu 1995: x).

Hence, the national and transnational/international (or simply world) field is of prime interest. The BDS call, initiated in 2005, call, gathers Palestinian actors. However, they try to affect international politics and have close contacts with European and other transnational actors, and they are affected as well by the world field.

In Dezalay and Garth research (2011: 278) that employ Bourdieu in a transnational professional legal field, they propose a “synchronic approach”, where:

the key point we elaborate is that this circulation of governing expertise is not adequately explained as a movement from North to South, center to periphery. The process is connected to contests over global hegemony, but it does not operate in the simple fashion that is often posited. Most often, it is a process of coming and going where the most influential carriers of the technologies of governing expertise frequently play the double role of exporters and re-importers—and vice versa [emphasis added].

This point seems highly relevant to this research where the case suggests a quiet similar interaction between actors in different fields. Moreover, the relation is not an imposition from North to South. It is a more relational path, back and forth, South and North. All actors are affected in different ways, while at the same time the relational dimension between different positions is explored.

Of course, the BDS movement is a contesting movement to the dominant powers, different from the legal professional field discussed by Dezalay and Garth. However, its battle seems a relational one with transnational and international actors and related to contestations on a global scale while employing the global contest for national benefits (i.e. Palestinian rights or their own maneuvering for a new movement). It seems like a process
of coming and going between the national and the global, passing through the regional sometimes. The BDS movement – as a whole- that concentrates its actions globally, not locally, supports this initial remark. At the same time, it is a Palestinian movement. The national context is important, and its components are mostly active locally.

Palestinian and transnational actors are related to the more dominant actors, through institutional settings or other informal relations. NGO forums exist on the level of the EU, and are recognized as one of the venues. Transnational (non-state) actors, such as NGOs or social movements, recognize the power of the EU and the US, and seek their leverage on Israel but through contestation, while no single actor has the final say as Bigo (2011) reminds. Moreover, inside the world field, actors are also positioned in a hierarchal relational way.

The next section in this chapter starts with a discussion of changes in the world field, and then the chapter focuses on cases to investigate their importance for the development of the BDS norms and pathways. It discusses the pathway of the UK, which is important for the academic track, and the Belgian route to see initial cases of boycott and calls for sanctions, and then it concentrates on the wider European route through the particular interaction of the BDS actors with European Coordinating Committees (ECCP). In the last case of ECCP, two important cases are relevant to be discussed in chapter six, which are the interactions of the BDS movement and ECCP through the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) and World Social Forums including the European Social Forums. Such interactions empowered the BDS actors, provided potentials for the transnational route and lifted up their norms to be endorsed by European actors and transnationally.

2. **Boycotts from the Arab into the world field**

In this section, the agency of Palestinians in relation to the UN, isolation policies towards Israel (including boycotts and anti-normalization), regionalism and boomerang through Northern powers is traced in a changing historical flux.

The world field on Palestine has been always in flux and changing, but it has been in full force since the beginning of the twentieth century. Palestine was part of the Levant
Question in the 19th century, and then the colonial policies of the main Northern powers worked on dividing Al-Mashriq (Levant region), deny the aspiration of its peoples to unity, and put Palestine under the preparation to create a “Jewish National Home” in Palestine.

The previous regional isolation policy

After the popular Palestinian boycotts in the early twentieth century leading to Arab official boycotts since the 1940s, the previous Arab boycott policies have not only encouraged the countries from the Global South, but also many other actors such as Japan and Northern companies. Those developments took place though the US Carter administration initiated anti-boycott laws to fine American companies that adhere to the Arab League boycott, as the Stop the Wall campaign realized. However, they weakened and almost halted with Oslo Agreements.313

The 1960s and 1970s Arab confrontational policies including isolating Israel internationally have contributed as well to changing the European policies. Between 1957 and 1967, the EEC has largely ignored the Palestinian issue, while major Western European states allied with Israel. With the confrontational atmospheres preceding the 1967 war, producing “instability” in the region, Egypt closed the marine exit for Israel in the Red Sea. France- the main weapons supplier to Israel back then- imposed weapons embargo on Israel. The PLO confrontations since the 1960s asserted the Palestinian demands. The EEC first mentioned Palestinians in 1971, and furthermore called for a “homeland” for Palestinians in 1977, and a “just solution” and finally started mentioning the PLO and its participation in negotiations in 1980. In 1982, during the confrontation in Lebanon, the EEC called for a political solution for a “just and lasting peace” and froze the trade agreement with Israel (of 1975)- in addition to a UK embargo on weapons to Israel in 1982- and postponed signing a financial agreement with the Israeli government (Khader 2013, Skolnik and Berenbaum 2007). The European Parliament’s recommended in January 1988 not to sign a protocol and to freeze scientific and academic cooperation with Israel in

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313 Stop the Wall’s report demonstrates that “estimates of the yearly loss to Israeli GDP as a result of the boycott have fluctuated from around 3 to 10.55%.” It also adds that the Israeli financial losses from the Arab-initiated boycott since 1950 are “at somewhere between $45 and $49 billion. The boycott office in Damascus has suggested the figure could be as high as $90 billion”.

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1989, and the European commission applied it in February 1989 (Skolnik and Berenbaum 2007), which also came in the context of the first Palestinian Intifada.

Moreover, the Arab confrontational policies including the October 1973 war and the engagement of the Arab states and other allies in an international isolation policy against Israel through boycotts or oil embargo, which was encouraged by the PLO (Shehate 1975), coincided sometimes with Arab interests (i.e. more control on their oil: Sayigh 1986) or collided with their self-interests in other instances as Stop the Wall’s report of 2007 indicates.

The Palestinian and Arab confrontations have also contributed to the mobilization of the UN General Assembly to recognize the agency of the Palestinian struggle. After the 1973 war (where the PLO participated in), an Arab Summit took place in Morocco in October 1974. It asserted the PLO’s demands of being recognized as the representative of Palestinians on the one hand and the call for non-interference by some Arab regimes inside the PLO on the other hand. It also confined the responsibility of the liberation of Palestinians mainly to the PLO but with Arab support. This summit would dictate the Arab regimes policies especially in the 1970s, which continued the Arab responsibilities since the 1948 and 1967 wars and their consequences.314 After a month of this Arab decision, the UN General Assembly issued its resolution (Resolution 32236) on 22 November 1974, which recognized the PLO as the representative of Palestinians. In this atmosphere, two UN-GA resolutions were issued in 1975: equating Zionism with a form of racism and creating the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP).

Inside the PLO (and generally in the Arab sphere), tensions have always been present between morality of rights- as discussed above in the habitus chapter- and pragmatic politics amid continuous pressure from the Arab and world fields. It has been a tension that reflected itself in the “anti-normalization” norm as discussed in the example of the UK route below (particularly the example of Mona Baker and the different versions of

314 The Arab summit declared: “To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated […] To support the Palestine Liberation Organization in the exercise of its responsibility at the national and international levels within the framework of Arab commitment […]. That all the Arab states undertake to defend Palestinian national unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestinian action”. See: “Seventh Arab League Summit Conference Resolution on Palestine” (Rabat, 28 October 1974), UNISPAL website, via https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/63D9A930E2B428DF852572C0006D06B8 <last accessed on 19 February 2016>
The tension has been between politics amid harsh realities on the one hand and what has been considered legitimate and moral Palestinian rights of liberating Palestine, on the other hand, for neither recognizing Israel nor its settlers’ colonization of historical Palestine. This last line of thinking has been re-enforced by the example of the Algerian liberation, not only from French colonization but also from the French settlers.

However, the world field’s weight had been pressuring the PLO and Arab states steadily to recognize the UN resolutions and make concessions. The PLO had resolved this tension initially by adopting the political program of 1974 (the Ten Points Program) that declared the goal of instituting a Palestinian authority in any liberated land in Palestine in order to establish a Palestinian state- to pursue the goal of liberating the whole historical Palestine. The aim was to have more regional and international recognition and to escape the contradiction of operating in states that focus on their security and sovereignty- when faced with the PLO’s transnational armed revolution strategy. After that program, the PLO gained much recognition. It also opened a space for a role in the US proposed diplomatic negotiations for solutions that were pushed after the 1967 and 1973 wars (that did not include the PLO back then). Such early pressures were presented by Roger’s Plan to Egypt in 1969-1970 on the basis of accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338, which resulted in the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel (following the War of Attrition after 1967 war) though it was rejected by Israel and accepted with reservation by Nassir on the premise of alienating Israel from the US in addition to a reservation related to not including the concerned Arab states in the Plan. Then the idea of Geneva Peace conference after 1973 war was circulated.

Though with the many contestations between different Arab regimes and the PLO, ranging from sovereignty issues to political and security ones, which generated diverse views and confrontations/civil wars in some countries and fragmentation tendencies inside the PLO, the minimum policy of boycotting Israel and isolating it internationally was intact until Egypt went into the separate route of Camp David negotiations.

The historical Palestinian experience since the 1960s initially sought liberation through employing the full agency of dispersed Palestinians (mainly through armed struggle), and succeeded to a good degree in unifying dispersed Palestinians. It demonstrated the strength of the agency since 1965, when Palestinian military operations
started, amid serious structural limitations. Neighboring Arab regimes have not allowed military operations from their lands. Yet, this agency has been normatively and practically directly connected to a regional Arab role. After the 1967 war, the tendency in the Arab regimes was to encourage the Palestinian armed struggle (and also to benefit from it in the Arab War of Attrition against Israel after 1967). Normatively, Palestinian factions thought of the Arab role mainly through waging war against Israel and isolating it. Diverse liberation models were employed (Vietnamese, Algerian, Cuban, or Chinese), sometimes in dogmatic ways by imitating one of them besides raising the armed struggle as the only way (i.e. see discussed models: alSharif 1995).

Hence, the transnational agency of dispersed Palestinians themselves was sought, in addition to the goal of confronting Israel directly by Palestinians and regional Arab involvement through military means. The boomerang- in the sense of Keck and Sikkink- was weak in that sense. If a boomerang was to be considered, then it was through direct Palestinian resistance to affect regional Arab route to confront Israel directly, in addition to the Global South role in isolating Israel besides some superpowers like the USSR, which all could affect Northern policies besides directly confronting Israel.

The emergence of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee and ECCP

As mentioned above, the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) was created in late 1975 by the UN General Assembly, at a peaking moment in isolating Israel internationally. Members of the UN-CEIRPP have been appointed by the UN-GA, and the committee was a tool to maintain the Palestinian issue alive in the UN and internationally amid political stalemate, which resulted in an annual international day in solidarity with the Palestinian people, as well as many conferences and annual meetings. The UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) was also mandated to propose a programme of implementation to the UN-GA and reports to the UN-Secretary General in relation to Palestinian rights. The committee has been mandated to establish contacts with, and receive suggestions from, states, IO and the PLO.

315 The UN General Assembly’s resolution A/RES/3376 (XXX) on 10 November 1975, UNISPAL website, via https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/B5B4720B8192FDE3852560DE004F3C47 <last accessed on 19 February 2016>
The vote creating the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) was an example of the different positions inside the world field on Palestine, back then, amongst a clear Global Northern states’ rejection to Palestinian aspirations. The importance of the UN-GA for the Palestinian issue and the role of the Global South (states, liberation movements or NGOs) was lifting up Palestinian calls internationally and transnationally, and (in the 1980s) as a space of interaction between states and NGOs. It was created after two years of the October 1973 war between Arab states and Israel that has been accompanied by Arab oil sanctions against Northern states, and after a year of accepting the PLO as an observer to the UN-GA.

93 states voted for the decision of creating the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), 18 states voted No and 27 abstained. This atmosphere reflected itself as well in the chairing committee of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) with a Senegalese chairperson and the committee’s bureau membership (currently) of Cuba, Malta, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Namibia, the PLO among others varying with time. The long chairing country (Senegal) besides other states (Cuba, Indonesia, and Afghanistan) have cut their relations with Israel after the October 1973 war or before and conditioned resuming them with achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Nicaragua cut its diplomatic ties in 2010, following Israeli raid on the Turkish civilian ship to Gaza. Hence, this committee represented most distanced states in relation to Israel inside the world field on Palestine.

At the beginning, the meetings of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) were attended almost exclusively by states and international organizations (besides the PLO and some liberation movements like the South African ANC). Its proceedings included coordination on issues related to resolutions raised to the UN-GA, in addition to

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316 The Global South, the Soviet Union, China, Non-alignment movement members among others have voted Yes. Most of the states of the then European Economic Community (EEC) voted NO (while Ireland, Italy and France abstained). Four Mediterranean European states voted Yes (while France and Italy abstained). All Eastern European states voted Yes. North American states voted Yes. North American states (the US and Canada) voted No while other Global North states abstained (Australia and Japan). Most Global South states voted Yes; where no state in Asia and Africa voted No (few abstained). In South America, voting Yes and abstaining was divided between twenty states, while five states voted No. Pretoria did not attend the session. See: The voting record for the resolution A/RES/3376(XXX) of 10 November 1975, UNBISNET website, via http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=108V0691N26Y9.82&menu=search&aspect=power&np=p=50&ipp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=VM&term=A/RES/3376%28XXX%29
quarrels between representatives of states (i.e. representatives of Iran and Iraq/PLO and Syria in 1983). However, and parallel to global changes, non-state actors, particularly NGOs (including Palestinian and Israeli NGOs), started to be invited to the meetings during the early 1980s. Such non-state actors started to become central to the work of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) beside states. The UN-GA resolution 34/65 D of 29 November 1979, requested the committee (particularly the Division for Palestinian Rights) to have a closer cooperation with NGOs within the United Nations framework.317 At that time, there was a confusion about “non-governmental organizations” that were not considered of significant. For example, the chairperson referred to liberation movements as the South African ANC and PAC as non-governmental organizations; while apologizing for not giving space for NGOs to speak inside the meeting (for lack of time). Besides this, some questions were raised in relation to the financial feasibility of inviting NGOs. However, the committee moved quickly into a position of encouraging the attendance of NGOs, and even enhancing their coordination, starting from 1983 when the committee organized the International Conference on the Question of Palestine held in Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983 (as requested by a UN-GA resolution in 1981). The PLO left Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and encouraged the new avenue of transnational NGOs, which were praised in a speech of the PLO’s chairman Yasser Arafat.318

The committee planned regional NGOs meetings in conjunction with regional inter-governmental meetings while preparing for the conference of 1983. During the preparatory process, “the role of NGOs became increasingly important”.319 For example, in the regional African meeting of April 1983, the Palestine Solidarity Committee (of South Africa) participated. This South African committee had a frequent participation at the meetings of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) and had a particularly early call for sanctions, severing diplomatic ties and consumer, cultural and academic boycotts” at the civil society conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in

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318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
September 2002 (attended by Gabi Baramki as a steering committee member for the conference).\textsuperscript{320} It furthermore had a role in the Durban NGO Forum of August 2001 that called for “comprehensive sanctions” against Israel similar to the case of Apartheid South Africa. This committee is still active.

During the preparatory process to Geneva meeting in 1983, a regional preparatory symposium in North America took place, which “gathered together 75 organizations representing a variety of important North American constituencies”. The newly chosen North American Coordinating Committee “reflects the diversity of North American non-governmental organizations working together on this issue”.\textsuperscript{321} The “regional Preparatory Meeting for Europe of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine” took place under the push by the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), and issued a declaration stating that they “[u]rgently appeal to the Governments of Europe to join the other Governments of the world so that real content can be given to the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people […]. “In this connection”, they state, “we deplore the fact that the Governments of Western Europe and North America that maintain the closest relations with Israel and have special responsibilities in the Middle East are not participating in the preparation of a conference that is meant for dialogue”\textsuperscript{322}

The first International Conference of civil society on the Question of Palestine took place in Geneva in August 1984. NGOs attended the conference and also convened their first meeting and constituted, under the auspices of the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP), the interim committee for the International Coordinating Committee on the Question of Palestine. The conference also reflected the rising role of civil society organizations internationally in the shadow of the UN, which was also discussed in the case of the UN Durban conference in 2001.

Among the 60 participating NGOs at the conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in 1984, there were two friendship associations with Birzeit

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{322} “The United Nations and non-governmental organization activities on the question of Palestine”, \textit{op. cit.}
University (in France and Switzerland), the Palestinian “Law in the Service of Man” association (of Raja Shehadeh heading currently Al-Haq NGO) that was active later on in Durban conference in 2001, and Association Belgo-Palestinienne (Belgium). The European coordination body at that time, which also attended, was the European Coordinating Committee of Friendship Societies with the Arab World (based in France). Shehadeh will be selected as a board member of the newly formed International Coordinating Committee on the Question of Palestine in 1984 during the first NGO meeting on the Question of Palestine under the auspices of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP).

During the later meeting, where an NGO declaration was issued, NGOs stated that “NGOs from the EEC region have envisaged during this conference an organization in the near future”. They also called “upon the Committee [UN-CEIRPP], through the Division [for Palestine Rights], to facilitate co-operation and co-ordination of NGOs on a regional basis”.323

The European Coordination Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine (ECCP) was established in 1986, by a push of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), and along a US coordinating body (now the US campaign to end the Israeli occupation) they persist compared to other regional committees that have been trying to function in regions that lacked sustainable official regional integration. Since then, transnational groups working in the atmosphere of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) had close relations with the PLO. The former chairpersons of International Coordinating Committee of NGOs on the Question of Palestine, John Gee, also the ex-general secretary of the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign, for example, supported Oslo agreements later on. Similarly, the ex-chairperson of ECCP, Pierre Galand, had close relations with the PLO and its focus on the two states solution.

In September 1987, “the International Co-ordinating Committee and the European Co-ordinating Committee co-produced a European symposium. The entire programme was designed, financed and executed by non-governmental organizations and the ICCP”.324

323 Ibid.
324 “International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People” (New York, 30 November 1987), op. cit.
The UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) has continued to organize an annual international day for the Palestinian people (in November), as well as international conferences, symposiums and seminars, in addition to civil society international conferences on the question of Palestine. Such events were held every year and attracted Palestinian actors besides regional and transnational actors on the Palestinian issue.

These conferences that have been focusing in the 1970s and 1980s on calls directed especially to Western governments to recognize the PLO as a sole representative of the Palestinians, hold an international conference for just and comprehensive peace, recognize a Palestinian state, and referred to UN resolutions (GA and SC) on ending the occupation and the return of refugees.

Developments related to the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in relation to the actors of the BDS during the second Intifada are discussed in the next chapter.

*The integration of the PLO into the UN*

After a period of Arab engagement, Arab regimes were retreating from active involvement starting from the mid-1970s, tensions continued to arise between the PLO and different hosting regimes as the Westphalian states’ logic operate on the principle of the monopoly of violence without shared powers with non-state actors, and influential Arab regimes were pushing the PLO to accommodate itself to the reality of Arab regimes and their increased adherence to the self-interest of the states (or regimes), and re-directing their route gradually through taking into account the weight of the world field through Northern countries, and particularly through the US political and diplomatic initiatives since the late 1960s.

With the Israeli invasion of 1982, the PLO started a process of withdrawals from Lebanon, and the PLO lost any place to fight from within the neighboring Arab countries (after losing earlier the Jordanian arena), and went to a new exile in Tunis. Reagan declared his initiative in 1982 that opposed a Palestinian state and called for the self-governance of Palestinians in conjunction with Jordan that still considered the West Bank an occupied part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
At that time, pro-US Arab regimes were having an increasing role especially after the Egyptian influence withered away. Hence, ‘regionalism’ had started to change its meaning from Nassir’s regionalism led by Egypt into other regionalisms that would reach a polarization between two conflicting regional projects (led by Saudi Arabia and Iran). Saudi Arabia called in 1981, and then in the Arab Summit of September 1982 in Morocco, for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, which was implicitly encouraging the acceptance of the UN resolutions. The president of Tunis, where the PLO established its new offices, called for accepting the UN resolution 181 as a legal base. Obviously, not many influential Arab states that are supportive to the PLO continued discouraging the acceptance of UN resolutions and opening up to the US policy, except Algeria and Iraq. Moreover, all Arab regimes showed no sign in engaging in any serious confrontation with Israel (with the exception of the nascent Lebanese resistance circles from leftists, Syrian nationalists and Islamists). On the hand, the PLO had established more diplomatic conducts through participating in the UN-GA since 1974. Actually, the Commission for Palestine and the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP) were established in respect to the UN resolution 181, and its annual UN international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people was celebrated on the anniversary of UN resolution 181 (29 November 1947).

Starting from 1974, the PLO’s Ten Points program was also intended to find a role in the political processes going on. It was the beginning of a realization that Arab regimes are not serious in liberating Palestine, so the PLO should seek a practical position (towards a Palestinian state) until regional forces change. It is worth noting that more opening towards Northern countries, the UN, and the Global South had begun, especially after the admission of the PLO as an observer at the UN-GA.

The post-1982 invasion period marked some shifts in policies towards the center of the world field on Palestine. The PLO opted then to re-direct its focus on the West Bank and Gaza Strip by deepening relations there, re-instituting relations with Egypt, European circles and some of the “Israeli peace movement” (Haj Aissa 2008). Prominent representatives of the PLO were assassinated in Europe, as discussed earlier, in an attempt to block developing relations. Obviously, the moment of the PLO’s acceptance of UN resolutions had come closer. It awaited the spark of the first Palestinian Intifada to push the
PLO’s into an attempt to open up relation with the US that put as a condition the acceptance of the UN resolutions 242 and 338 and denouncing violence. The US administration of Ronald Reagan started public dialogue with the PLO after the PLO accepted the US condition to denounced violence in 1988. The EU called in 1989 for a full participation of the PLO in peaceful negotiations.

In this second stage (1974-1993), there has been a gradual dislocation process from the regional Arab dimension into the Palestinian national dimension.\textsuperscript{325} The first Palestinian \textit{Intifada} of December 1987 gave a push again to the PLO’s attempt to be recognized by Northern powers and to achieve an independent Palestinian State. However, this historical tendency towards international mediated talks for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, without the other Palestinian rights, would be a cause for another major Palestinian defection like Hamas rejection in its first statement in December 1987.

Moreover, diverse contestations have occurred around the PLO delegate, which was formed in 1991 as part of a Jordanian umbrella delegate, under US-Israeli pressure and against the decision of the Palestinian National Council (the PLO parliament). That time that witnessed the 1990 war in Iraq, the fall of the Soviet Union and the shift into a more unipolar world system led by the US was increasingly pressuring the PLO. The PLO leadership had accepted different aspects of pressure against the will of the public PLO delegation or the PLO’s Palestinian National Council. In 1988, the PLO implicitly accepted UN resolutions,\textsuperscript{326} and denounced violence (to be officially done through a quickly arranged meeting of the Palestinian National Council in 1996).

In fact, a number of factors encouraged the overarching tendency amongst the PLO leadership to start making negotiations and agreements. On one hand, such a tendency is due to the weakening of the PLO and the fear of its leadership from the emerging leadership of the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza. Another factor is more related to the

\textsuperscript{325} MA thesis by Mohammad Arjan, \textit{the image of the state in the official Palestinian discourse} (in Arabic, BZU, Sociology department, 2006), quoted in Hilal 2013: ft. 1: p. 9.

regional deteriorating Arab condition during the Second Gulf War that brought Arab states into direct clash, starting with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and following with the US-led war on Iraq. This condition resulted in the alienation of the PLO -Iraq’s ally- by influential Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria). Finally on an international level, the US was establishing its unilateral dominance of the international system after the fall of the Soviet Union. All the above factors, among others, led to the Oslo Accords. Furthermore, this third stage (post-1993) has witnessed another dislocation: “transforming the US and Israel to ‘participants’ in the process after three decades of exile and contradiction”.

The recognition of the PLO by the US and European countries and the establishment of an authority inside the limited area in the Gaza Strip and West Bank for the hope of a negotiated solution for a Palestinian state and the refugees issue had a major consequence. The accumulated policies for decades to pressure Israel by various means, isolate it and linking up with transnational and international allies for the Palestinian goals were now placed on a shelf. Moreover, the PA lacked consensus among Palestinians, even among the Palestinian official negotiation team, and its relation with the Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been increasingly built on distrust (Parsons 2005). For the first time, the Palestinian issue transferred from the mean of resistance to attain liberation into the means of “building authority institutions”, “development”, negotiation strategy (Hilal 2013), and increasingly neo-liberal policies even when lacking a central bank, currency and minimal requirements of a viable economy (Khalidi and Samour 2011).

This situation would reflect itself on the Palestinian actors discussed in this thesis. The Gulf war consequences, with the Arab states involvement, reflected itself in a wide feeling of despair among Palestinians. Furthermore, the dominant powers in the Arab field made sure that Palestinians as a whole pay the price for their rejection to the US-led war; either politically by not referring to the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians and an implicit threat of being marginalized in Madrid talks (Parsons 2005), or financially. On the other hand, the Northern route has become the new magnetically working force through the US role in Madrid talks and the Washington negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli governments.

327 MA thesis by Mohammad Arjan; op. cit.
From a financial perspective, as the example of Baramki demonstrates, Arab sources of funding to Birzeit University sharply declined after the Gulf war, and its dependence on European funding increased particularly after Oslo agreements. Similarly, in relation to NGOs, as Hanafi and Tabar summarize it (2005: 64), “[i]n the period until the Gulf War of 1991 there was a diversity of funding sources […]. After the Gulf war, Arab funding dropped to near Zero and PLO funding decreased steadily. At the same time, Western funding sources continued and since the 1990s has become the main source of assistance to PNGOs [though in net it shrank]”.

The strong Palestinian agency,328 with a weakened Arab agency, would testify to subsequent Israeli-Palestinian armed confrontations (reaching the latest wars in Gaza) with high score of Palestinian victims (and Lebanese victims during the 1982 war). The PLO would realize its limits single-handed, hence, integrating more and more into the official Arab regimes’ line through negotiating a two states solution. This has been intensified with the increasing Saudi role in the region after the withdrawal of Egypt. Such a role included pushing for the adoption of UN resolutions during the Israeli 1982 invasion, steering the Arab states in the US-led war on Iraq in 1991, and instigating “the Arab Peace initiative” in 2002 while Israel was invading the West Bank. And was later reaffirmed by the Arab League’s summit in Riyadh in 2007 which announced that “an agreed solution to the problem of refugees according to the UN resolution 194” should be reached. Interestingly, in trying to demonstrate the moderate character of the Arab peace initiative, the negotiation Unit of the PLO says: “the Arab Peace Initiative provides a framework to solve the question of refugees on ‘agreeable’ basis between all concerned states including Israel”.329 On that matter, during Riyadh summit of 2007, Abbas agreed and Haniyeh from Hamas reserved,330 and the Palestinian civil society organizations (68 NGO, unions, network and small centers), through the initiative of Ittijah and Badil, signed a letter prior to the summit

328 The waves of Palestinian resistance in 1965-1967, Al-Karama battle in Jordan in 1968, the continuous confrontations with Israel in 1978 and 1982 demonstrated a strong will by the PLO to resist amid strong structural limitations.
addressing the Arab head of states to urge them not to concede on the issue of refugees. The letter’s first article stated that “Israel’s declaration that it is ready to involve in the Arab Initiative if deleting the article on the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their home according to the UN-GA resolution 194 is not but deception”.

The problematic that faced the Palestinians was that they wanted to preserve the Palestinian decision-making from Arab states’ manipulations (by raising the slogan of “independent Palestinian decision”) without the withdrawal of the Arab states from active engagement, if not pushing for a military confrontation with the PLO (like the Jordanian, Syrian and partially Lebanese regimes did). The PLO’s slogan of “independent Palestinian decision” transformed gradually into confronting Israel alone. The struggle became more and more the “Palestinian-Israel conflict” replacing the previous belief in the Arab-Israeli conflict (al-Sirae alArabi al Israeli). The shift, escalated from Egypt’s Camp David track, meant passing through the US (states’ boomerang towards the US), separate Arab-Israeli tracks and seeking the Westphalian self-interest of the state. The Egyptian president Anwar Sadat became famous for his repeated saying that 99% of cards in the Middle East are held by the US. Then Sadat raised the slogan “Egypt First” after Camp David, which will be followed by “Lebanon First” (briefly in 1982 and then in the second half of 2000s), “Jordan First”, etc.

Hence, the previous isolation policy to Israel has been abandoned even by the Palestinian leadership during Oslo period. The opposing Arab anti-normalization norm was part of broader oppositional Arab momentum to internal and foreign Arab policies, which was one cause of the Arab revolutions (i.e. El-Mahdi 2009). However, during the time of the Arab revolution of 2011, the Palestinian agency represented by the official leadership,

331 “A Memorandum by the Palestinian civil society institutions to the Arab Summit in Riyadh” (in Arabic), ANHRI website, 24 March 2007, via http://anhri.net/palestine/ittijah/2007/pr0324.shtml <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

332 For example, Sadat said in January 1976: “Through my relations with America, I discovered that America holds 99% of the solution cards, and is capable of settling the Arab- Israeli dispute”. He repeated his saying in March 1977 saying “that the United States hold ‘99 percent of the cards’ in the Middle East and indicated that he relies on President Carter to advance the peace process there by ‘bringing Israel to reason’”. See: Interview with Anwar Sadat, Assiyassa newspaper (Kuwait; 8 January 1976), via http://www.sadat.umd.edu/archives/remarks/AAFT%20Assiyassa%20Interview1.8.76.pdf.PDF; and “Sadat Says the U.S. Holds 99% of the Cards in the Middle East” (New York, 28 March 1977), JTA website, via http://www.jta.org/1977/03/28/archive/sadat-says-the-u-s-holds-99-of-the-cards-in-the-middle-east <both last accessed on 22 February 2016>
including leading factions in the PLO, was not in any place close to the old strategy that the Palestinian agency of resistance would encourage Arab change, but was internally frightened from the revolutions, or some of them, almost as any other Arab regime.

The Arab regimes were essentially sinking towards more silent foreign policies vis-à-vis the US and Israel; seeking Northern states’ boomerang, and internally towards more authoritarianism, corruption and liberating the economies, while also causing continuous pressures on the Palestinians politically and/or socially. The Arab-Israeli conflict, with a core part in Palestine, has had a highly effective impact on Arab politics, either positively (encouraging calls for reform and change, coordination between Arabs, etc.) or negatively (more militarized atmosphere and coup d’état).

The Palestinian uprising waves before 1948 affected the Arab societies and regimes, which were newly liberated from colonization, to officially adopt boycotts and an isolation policy towards Israel among other confrontational policies. On the other hand, the subsequent Palestinian waves of resistance have not been accompanied by successful Arab waves of protests or Arab sound policies towards Palestine after the first wave represented in liberation movements from colonization that obviously started to be deteriorating during the 1960s and early 1970s. The 1970s and early 1980s Arab protests’ wave, against internal socio-economic and political conditions and against foreign policies towards Palestine, were cruelly repressed by succeeding Arab regimes. Similarly, the late 1980s-early 1990s wave of protests in different Arab states have not consolidated in changing the regimes or their policies except for some short-lived political momentums (i.e. in Jordan, Algeria, Tunis and Egypt), which ended in some cases in civil wars like in Algeria. But generally speaking, the regimes continued heavily with their previous policies. Diverse Arab oppositional forces have not been able to succeed in imposing alternatives, obviously

333 For example, the Egyptian revolts of 1972 (the student revolt) and 1977 (known as the Bread Intifada), which were connected with protesting the regime’s foreign policy, and the Syrian wide strikes and protest since 1976 (by leftists, Arabists and Islamists) that protested against the regime on the basis of social and political role and against the Syrian regime’s policy in Lebanon and towards the PLO, led to wide massacres in 1982 after the confrontation became militarized and wide arrests of opponents. Similarly, the Lebanese calls for social, political and economic reforms since the late 1960s and early 1970s ended in a long destructive civil war that the PLO was part of it; in its causes and consequences. These are general observations, and not a core part of the research, but for the concept of cycles of protests, see: Tarrow 1996. For the Arab cycles of protests, see: El-Mahdi 2009 and Tarabulsy 2012.
because of the considerable oppression and the restricted open political life, but also because of the lack of well-coordinated oppositional fronts and of solid immunity to authoritarian or sectarian tendencies that diverse Arab regimes encouraged during different periods.

True, the first successful independence Arab revolts or coups d’état (i.e. Syria in 1943, Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, Algeria in 1961), had changed much of the foreign policies of the previously colonized states. However, the subsequent waves of revolts in Arab countries after the 1960s (independence, political and/or socio-economic), largely failed in making major changes in regimes or in foreign policies and active policies towards Israel. Simultaneously, the PLO became more “realistic”; less interested in transforming the Arab realities through the Palestinian agency and more leaning towards preserving itself away from Arab regimes’ interference in its affairs. The PLO retreated at the end to a bounded area of armed resistance almost alone against Israel after 1973 war (with the exception of the Lebanese resistance supported by an adjacent state and a regional power). Obviously, the program of the PLO to fight alone without even regional support (i.e. from Syria) against a strong Israeli army supported by superpowers could not deliver much except for keeping the Palestinian political issue alive, its representative organization alive and to gain some achievement through a Palestinian state that seemed possible though hard compared to the other demands (right of return, instituting a secular state in the whole historical Palestine).

The whole Arab field has gone explosive during the latest wave of protests (the Arab revolutions from 2011). Initial signs in Tunis and Egypt (directly after toppling down the head of the regimes), which have not lasted long, demonstrated different policies towards the Palestinian issue.334 However, this time, the Palestinian leadership itself was frightened from a Palestinian revolt against it, and ironically sided with Arab regimes in Egypt and elsewhere. A major line in the BDS movement got enthusiastic with the Arab revolutions but has been cautious in order to see results.

334 For example, competing Egyptian presidential candidates visited Gaza during 2012 war to gain popularity and propose more Egyptian involvement to the side of the Palestinians, including a clause in the new Tunisian constitution for the support of the Palestinian liberation.
Hence, Arab anti-normalization momentum contributed in keeping the issue of the moral rights in Palestine alive in Arab societies (including Palestine), but without much practicality since regimes have remained without major change in this regard. Yet, this momentum has largely affected wide segments in societies (especially within those that signed treaties with Israel) not to accept normalization with Israel. Furthermore, it pushed most regimes to have at least a minimum policy of not opening up with Israel that however, was not translated into official policies active in isolating Israel andpressuring it and its active powerful supporters.

*The boomerang through the Global North*

The US administrations became the dominant actor to propose how to proceed in “resolving the conflict”, and they frequently threatened the different actors (especially the Palestinian actors) if they do not abide. They can veto any UN Security Council decision if it is not in accordance with their vision. Moreover, the US administrations played an important role in breaking any remaining coordinated Arab policy against Israel. Israel’s insistence, since 1949 armistice cease fire, to deal with each Arab state individually reflected itself in the US initiatives in the 1970s and was explicitly reiterated during the Madrid talks of 1991. Of course, this American policy, largely responsible for breaking Palestinian and Arab coordination over policy making. The Camp David agreement was an important stepping stone in this regard.

The US has not shown signs of even pushing the different sides to abide by the UN resolutions. Since the 1970s, specifically in relation to Palestinians, all US peace initiatives have insisted on a Palestinian “self-rule”, does not abide by UN resolutions. Therefore, following the US route, and considering the US to be the mediator and administrator of the negotiations, political initiatives, etc., is nothing but largely abiding by the weight of the world field on Palestine. Seeking the US (and the EU) as the direct boomerang by the PA (and PLO), has been mostly the Palestinian official pathway since Madrid talks in 1991.
What is at a major stake, in the world field on Palestine is to have a say in how to resolve (and/or) manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in connection to the pathway, while exchanging the different capitals actors have. Having a say means more power and enhancing the position of the actor in international politics and in national politics, such as being recognized by other actors. The US administration(s) and congress(s) are in the dominant position in having the say on how to resolve and manage the conflict. They reached this position especially after initiating the Madrid talks in 1991, but it had been building up on previous experiences like in Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

After the peace talks and Oslo I Agreement in 1993, there would be two major shifts, in terms of relations, into more international and transnational fields, particularly into the world field of power on Palestine. The US monopolized the track with its imposed rules of the game. And there was another financial shift where the EU became the main funder for the Palestinian territories including civil society organizations.

Since the Madrid conference and Oslo agreements, the isolation of Israel loosened around the world. Previously, in 1982 for example, the American president Ronald Reagan recognized publicly the international isolation of Israel in his televised speech of his peace initiative in order to justify his few points that Israel did not approve of (in line with Camp David’s accord content to provide self-governance for Palestinians). He said: “The State of Israel is an accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries and has been denied by every Arab State except Egypt”.335 Actually, the US proposed a solution then that was based on the Palestinian component in the Camp David framework that had been rejected then by the PLO and the Arab states. It included: a five years interim period of Palestinian self-governance in conjunction with Jordan, the freezing of Israeli settlements building during this period, the securing Israeli borders (hence justifying security control in the Palestinian territories and no return to pre-1967 borders), the acceptance of UN resolution 242 with territory exchanges and security guarantees to Israel,

and negotiations as the only way for peace. As usual, US initiatives came mostly in Israel’s favor in terms of timing: one day after the PLO’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982. Other examples are the Madrid talks came after the war against Iraq in 1991, and the Road Map of 2003 came after the occupation of Iraq and the Israeli invasion of the West Bank and the isolation of Arafat.

The UN-GA resolution declaring that Zionism is racist was dropped after Oslo accords. Many Global South countries re-established diplomatic relations with Israel, including Arab states like Jordan, while Mauritania, Qatar and Morocco started low level relations. Furthermore, other states around the world enhanced trade and military relations with Israel included Brazil, India, China, Russia and the Eastern European states. The EU signed the EU- Israel Association Agreement, and the UK and France abandoned their previous arms embargos.

The newly emerged PA, replacing most functions of the PLO, followed the US mediated route through negotiations with Israel. After the second Gulf war, that witnessed Arab regimes participating in a US-led war (i.e. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), and after the signing of the Oslo accords, the Arab League Central Boycott Office did not even meet once for eight years. One year after the Oslo Agreement, the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) declared: “Whereas the Arab boycott of Israel was enacted by the League of the Arab States, and its review to take into consideration developments and requirements of the Middle East peace process must take place, the GCC member states will support all or any initiative for such review presented in the League of Arab States. Further, the GCC believe that a sponsorship of such initiative by Arab parties directly involved in the bilateral negotiations, whether selectively or individually, shall facilitate the required review and ensure a greater chance of success”.

Obviously, the bulk of the world field during the Oslo period became mediated primarily through the US, with the help of Northern countries (though with some distance),

and with less and less involvement and mediation from the side of the regional or Global South and the UN.

A new wave of contestations during the second Intifada

The illusions of Oslo would soon start to disappear, starting from 1996 and 1998 and more clearly with the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. Around that period, Arab boycott and anti-normalization campaigns, in Cairo, Amman and other Arab cities, would regain intensity (Joudeh 2006: 132-139), mostly steered by political opposition initiatives, amid repression from some authorities like in Jordan and Egypt that, nevertheless, could not stop the momentum.337 Moreover, the Arab League’s boycott resumed its work in 2001 in response to the Intifada. As will be explored in these two chapters (five and six), besides the previously discussed section (chapter four) on the Durban route, there would also be regional Arab mediations and some involvement since the second Intifada, as showing some signs in contesting the centers in the world field on Palestine.

At the same time, some boycott initiatives have started to emerge in Northern countries around the period of the second Intifada, like the cases of London and Belgium discussed in this chapter (calls started to appear in Belgium at least since 1997). Similarly, on the official levels, the European Commission declared in 1998 that the Israeli settlements’ products are violating the trade agreements; a decision that was for example welcomed by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. The EU first mentioned the need for a Palestinian viable state in 1999 (followed by the US in 2002).

With the second Intifada, the EU parliament passed in April 2002 a recommendation to freeze the EU-Israel Association Agreement and to impose arms embargo on Israel (and the PA), which was echoing calls emerging from the European actors for Palestinian rights like the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP). Yet, the European executive bodies

337 See for example in the case of Jordan: Jihad Mnassa; op. cit.
ignored the parliament’s recommendation and perused a policy somehow parallel to the US “war against terrorism”, pushed primarily by the UK, as demonstrated in this chapter.

What also emerged along with the second *Intifada*, and after around a decade of the US hegemony on world politics, is the consolidation of the transnational alter-globalization movement, the transnational anti-war movement and the re-appearance of initiatives from different regions in world politics. This research discusses, in this context, two transnational initiatives primarily emerging from South Africa and Brazil (the two states would become part of BRCIS): the Durban conference in 2001 and the World Social Forums since 2001. The two governments of South Africa and Brazil encouraged these forums through civil society organizations that pushed ahead in their turn for more links with Palestine and the BDS actors.

The hegemonic power of the US would go further into wars after 9/11 terrorist attacks, which would have devastating effects on Palestine during the second *Intifada*, as explained in the next chapter. From another perspective, this would also trigger a wide transnational anti-war movement that would connect with Palestine and actors related to the BDS, as discussed in this chapter and the following one.

Besides the UN affiliated civil society fora, the spaces given by the World (and European) Social Forums’ empowered the BDS actors, who were led mostly by politicized NGOs, social movements and critical academics. As Hammond (2007) demonstrates, the World Social Forums and the UN have empowered these actors in the last decade:

The WSF has brought together two main currents of activity: the direct action movement against globalization that has called massive demonstrations against international summit meetings, and the emergent worldwide civil society, embodied mainly in the nongovernmental organizations that have mushroomed throughout the world since the 1980s […].

The World Social Forums and their affiliated European Social Forums, in the context of a new US war on Iraq and its transnational contestation, will be discussed in chapter six due to its relevance to the transnational relations between the BDS actors and European and other actors.

It is not only transnational fora and conferences that had important effects on the BDS norms and pathways, but also local, national and trans-European groups that started their boycott campaigns during the second Intifada or after the BDS call in 2005. Some dimensions of these effects are discussed in this chapter, particularly in relation to Belgian campaigns (and partially UK campaigns) in the foundational period of the BDS movement.

Hence, the boomerang through Northern states is not only encouraged by latest developments in international forces, but also through transnational contesting forces; both had their effects on the BDS movement.

1. Relations in the UK route

General Background

The UK official bodies have been closely related to the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Balfour Declaration in 1917. The early Palestinian boycotts have emerged as part of different revolts against the British rule of Palestine that had been paving the way to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. After the 1947-8 war and the establishment of the state of Israel, and while Israel did not fulfill the condition of returning Palestinian refugees, the UK continued to be a close ally to Israel and partook in its war against Egypt in 1956. Although the relation between the UK and Israel has its ups and its downs, however the UK remains a close ally to Israel.

Paradoxically, while the UK official policies have been close to Israel, a pro-Palestinian movement has been developing in the UK. This concerns the BDS movement as well. Important individuals and groups to the development of the BDS movement from
activists and small political movements, academics, trade unionists, NGOs and churches emerged from within the UK.

It had been a gloomy period for Palestinians in the UK after the *Nakba* and reaching to the 1967 war. As per the example depicted in the memoir of Ghada Karmi (2002) that indicates different societal and official reactions to Palestinians during that period, when even her British husband cheered up for the Arab defeat of 1967. After 1967, Karmi was active, amid her search for identity, in instituting a Palestinian solidarity movement.

Saeed Hammami, the PLO representative in the UK since 1973 participated in building relations with British actors including politicians till his assassination in 1978 in the UK. Moreover, since 1978, Birzeit University has opened associated friends offices in London and Michigan and other places to support them. In the 1980s they signed sister-ship agreements with European universities (Baramki: 116-118)

The UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign has been a major British solidarity group (and not a Palestinian UK-based group). It was established by a small group of leftists in the UK in 1982, among the Israeli preparations to confront the PLO and its Lebanese allies through invading Lebanon again in 1982. Many of the members have been anti-Zionist Jews who believed in a secular one state solution in historic Palestine.

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, changes have escalated in pro-Palestine solidarity. Many leftists either in the Labour Party or other circles besides others left their earlier positions of supporting Israel. The UK government imposed a military embargo on Israel, which was de-activated after signing Oslo agreement. However, with Oslo accords, the chair of the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign John Gee, who was also coordinating the International Coordination Committees on the Question of Palestine emerging from the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP), pushed for the support of the accords and won a majority inside the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign. With the

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338 Interview with the ex-general secretary of PSC Betty Hunter (Wales/UK via phone; 31 August 2015)
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
failure of the Oslo accords and the subsequent confrontations of 1996 and 1998 in Palestine and then the second Intifada, the position of Palestine Solidarity Campaign has started to change again on the rhythm of the Palestinian contestations, and Betty Hunter became the general secretary.

The second Intifada period

In the two following Palestinians Intifadas, the momentum of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle has been accumulating up and particularly escalated in the second intifada then during the war on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009.

The UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign’s ex-general secretary Betty Hunter (2000-2011) asserts that her awareness of Palestine started during the first Intifada. This followed her long activism in trade unions (from the left), and on issues of race, her opposition to the war in Vietnam and her backing of the South African anti-apartheid movement.342 Her experience corresponds to somehow similar backgrounds of other actors discussed in this section; that of having close links with the Global South in their previous trajectories. After the second Intifada, the membership the Palestine Solidarity Campaign “grew from 350 to over 5,000 with more than 40 branches around the country”, 343 which reflects similar trends elsewhere in discussed European places. Pro-Palestine activism has escalated after the second Intifada. At the same time, smaller groups that consider themselves more grassroots and less established than the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign, and have been emerging on the margins of PSC (either working inside it or left it), have instituted an early BDS group in the UK after 2005.344 Those interviewed in these circles have a similar habitus of close solidarity links with the Global South as well.

Hunter said: “When the Palestinian people started the second Intifada in September 2000, the world was forced to look again at the shame of the ‘peace process’. International

342 Interview with the ex-general secretary of PSC Betty Hunter; op. cit.
344 Interviews with three activists in London who preferred to keep themselves anonymous when speaking about their relation with the PSC.
civil society had to ask, how can we support the Palestinian people in their struggle for justice, how can we support their resistance in a non-violent and democratic way?”. The norm “non-violence” has been stressed over repeatedly by PSC.

After less than a year of the second Palestinian intifada, in July 2001, the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign launched the Boycott Israeli Goods campaign (BIG), which was instituted then by a small group before spreading out. The campaign varied between selective boycotts (of settlements goods) and boycott of Israel, depending on the local activists’ views and tactics.345

The popular boycotts in Palestine during the first period of the second Intifada in 2000 created a new wave of solidarity across different regions of the globe. In response, a global atmosphere of boycott started to spread. The Arab regional and South African responses were the strongest, with quick and wide boycott and anti-normalization initiatives in different places in the Arab region since October 2000. But the European responses had started to accelerate as well: with signs of divestment have started to appear especially at university campuses between students at least since April 2001 in North America.346

Between 2001 and 2005, close interactions between Palestinian and British actors have been accumulating and had its effects in encouraging the Palestinian actors in the formation of the BDS. This is, of course, in addition to the primacy, since April 2002, of the Palestinian experiences discussed earlier, and the South African and regional connections and other transnational connection as evident in the discussion below.

Palestinian actors, mainly from NGOs and academics had been seeking UK connections from similar groups in addition to political parties and officials. For example, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights and LAW headed to London in November 2001,

345 Interviews with Betty Hunter (Wales, 31 August 2015), Hilary and Steven Rose (London, 21 August 2015) and Rafeef Ziadah (London, 18 August 2015).
346 Erakat (2012) points out to a banner appearing at Barkley University in February 2001 with the calls “‘Divest from Israeli Apartheid.” In April 2001, the Concordia University’s Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights, a student body led by Samir Elatrash, was active in pushing the student union to issue a resolution of boycott of Israeli goods. Similarly, the United Methodist Council of Bishops did not use the norm “boycott” but urged in May 2001 the US Congress for “cutting off of all funding to the Israeli government” until the Israeli government complies with actions mainly related to settlements in the 1967 occupied areas 346.

Similarly, UK solidarity groups and academics have sought close connections with similar Palestinian groups while mostly avoiding Palestinian political factions. The ex-general secretary of Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Betty Hunter, mentions the examples of connecting with Jamal Juma, Ingrid and Mohammad Jaradat from \textit{Badil} and Mustapha Barghouti.\footnote{348 Interview with Betty Hunter; \textit{op. cit.}} Actually, it is interesting to read the claims by Palestine Solidarity Campaign that considers in retrospective terms that it “formally launched the BDS campaign in the UK at a House of Commons event in September 2000”, years before the BDS call in 2005.\footnote{349 “Palestinian call”, PSC website, n. d., via http://www.palestinecampaign.org/campaign/palestiniancall/ <accessed on 1 September 2015>} Such an appropriation sense felt by some transnational activists can also be read by an activist that writing in \textit{Badil}’s website in relation to a consumer boycott campaign with Oxfam in Belgium in 2003. She wrote: “Belgium is slightly exceptional since we initiated a campaign calling for the boycott of Israel in 2003, preceding the united call of the Palestinian grassroots organizations in 2005. Our BDS campaign received confirmations from all major Flemish Non-governmental organizations”.\footnote{350 The article is signed by the name of Sophia Abdellah, “Complicity and Apartheid: On campaigning for Palestinian Rights in Belgium”, \textit{al-Majdal} magazine ((Issue 54, Autumn 2013), Badil website, via https://ongoingnakba.org/en/publication/periodicals/al-majdal/item/1982-art9.html <last accessed on 22 February 2016>}

This appropriation reveals on one hand, a feeling that these actors have of being the early institutors of the BDS movement, moreover, it point out towards an implicit assertion of power in relation to the Palestinian BDS activists on the other hand.

\textit{The academic track}

In 2002, the boycott momentum continued and reached academic, cultural and scientific persons and institutions, which is the focus of this section. Starting from April 2002, different academic boycott initiatives have been accumulating with different norms that were below the level of the explicit call for boycott. For example, in 2002, starting in
April, three discussed academics raised the issue of academic boycott; one with a higher level and the others with more moderate proposals. Such an initiative will accrue and interact with Palestinian and other transnational ones.

This period coincided with peaking confrontations during the second Intifada and the beginning of the Israeli invasion of cities, towns and camps in the West Bank, with the biggest starting on 29 March 2002, in Nablus old city and Jenin camp and going on for around three weeks.351

The British professors Hilary and Steven Rose published a petition in April 2002 that initiated a cycle of somehow similar initiatives. Hilary Rose, a sociologist, has been working on scientific agreements on the EU level and realized that there were many Israeli projects. She reflects on that moment saying that in South Africa, sports were favored by the Pretoria regime and targeting sports hurt them, while Israel favors scientific and cultural spheres and this domain, if targeted, would hurt them.352 Already, the professors had a history of activism in the 1968 revolt in Europe, anti-Vietnam war, and anti-apartheid. Steven, a Professor of Biology, went to Palestinian camps in Lebanon in the period of the Israeli invasion and had close familiarity with the situation in Palestine. He is a British Jew who had frequent quarrels with Israeli scientists on politics while working on projects together.353 Hilary and Steven published a letter in the Guardian on 6 April 2002 after few days of collecting signatures. The letter called for a “moratorium” on partnership between the EU and the Israeli scientific institutions till Israel abides by the UN resolutions and peace talks. The letter then did not mention “boycott” but said:

Despite widespread international condemnation for its policy of violent repression against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories, the Israeli government appears impervious to moral appeals from world leaders. The major potential source of effective criticism, the United States, seems reluctant to act. However there are ways of exerting pressure from within Europe. Odd though it may appear, many national and European cultural and research institutions, including especially those funded from the EU and the European Science Foundation, regard Israel as a European state for the purposes of awarding grants and contracts. (No other Middle Eastern state is so regarded). Would it not therefore be timely if

352 Interview with Hilary and Steven Rose (London, 21 August 2015).
353 Ibid.
at both national and European level a moratorium was called upon any further such support unless and until Israel abide by UN resolutions and open serious peace negotiations with the Palestinians, along the lines proposed in many peace plans including most recently that sponsored by the Saudis and the Arab League.354

120 academics signed the petition, including some established scientists (some of them withdrew after the debate). Hilary and Steven were surprised by the momentum of support. Until July of the same year, 400 academics had signed, which caused debate and also hate mails to Hilary and Steven Rose.355

The next day, on 7 April 2002, also amid the Israeli invasion and confrontations, the Palestinian artist Emily Jacir along with American artists issued a petition calling for cultural boycott and with direct reference to South Africa. The petition was entitled “Boycott all Israeli Art Institutions, End the Occupation”. The petition was signed by hundreds of artists especially in Northern countries. The petition read.

[...] Like the boycott of South African art institutions during apartheid, and the boycott of Austrian art institutions when Haider was elected, the art world must speak out against the current Israeli war crimes and atrocities [...].

We, members of the international art community are calling on Israel for a complete withdrawal back to the 1967 borders as well as a dismantlement of all West Bank settlements. We will boycott all Israeli art institutions and cultural events until that time.356

On 10 April 2002, calls have also been issued by the European official bodies with the EU parliament adopting a recommendation to the EU Council and EC while mentioning the terms “embargo“ (on the PA and Israel) and “suspension“ (points 7 & 8):

7. Calls on the Council to institute an arms embargo on Israel and Palestine;
8. Calls on the Council and the Commission urgently to convene the EU-Israel Association Council in order to put its position to the Israeli Government, asking it to comply with the latest UN resolutions and make a positive response to the current efforts undertaken by the

354 Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”: p. 2, BRICUP Newsletter, no. 82, December 2014: pp. 1-5.
355 Interview with Hilary and Steven Rose; op. cit.
EU to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict; calls on the Commission and Council, in this framework, to suspend the EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement;357

However, the European Council did not abide by the recommendations with clear objection especially by Germany (Müller 2011: 13).

On 16 April 2002, 300 French academics and scientists published an appeal to the EU to temporarily freeze the privilege granted to Israel by the EU. The statement read:

In view of the indifference the Israeli government shows to all international appeals to end its violent repression against the Palestinian population, we call on the EU to temporarily stop all institutional co-operation with and material support to Israeli academic organisations […] As long as Israel refuses to comply with the UN resolutions and to end the occupation of Palestinian territories, the EU should suspend this privilege.358

In Australia, Ghassan Hage, a Lebanese Australian anthropologist, and John Docker, a Jewish Australian cultural theorist, issued a statement at the Higher Education supplement of the Australian on 22 May 2002, and was signed by 90 Australian academics, calling for “an Australian boycott of research and cultural links with Israel”,359 which started with the same sentence of the guardian petition. Similarly, the French statement on 16 December 2002 by the administrative council of the prestigious Marie Curie University-Paris VI issued the resolution:

The Israeli occupation of territories in the West Bank and Gaza renders it impossible for our Palestinian colleagues in higher education to teach or pursue their research: the renewal of the European Union-Israel Association Agreement, in particular as regards research (6th Framework Program for Community RTD) is a form of support for the current political policies of the State of Israel and would contravene Article 2 of this agreement (relationships between the parties, as well as all the stipulations of this agreement, which are based on the observance of human rights and democratic principles guiding their domestic and foreign

policies and which are a key feature of this agreement)” (Paris VI university press release).  

In these global initiatives, the reference to boycott and South Africa has started to appear. As Hilary Rose realized, the moderate early moratorium she and her husband have suggested has started to arise calls for boycott. She discusses the other transnational petitions’, as she for example indicates that the French petition is closer to what Professor Mona Baker suggested.

In fact, Mona Baker, is the other professor who had raised much debate in the UK on the cultural boycott issue. She is a professor of translation studies at the University of Manchester, of Egyptian descendant. Since 2002, she took the foremost level related to boycott and practiced it in academic circles in the UK. She asked two Israeli academics starting from 23 May 2002, Miriam Shlesinger of Bar-Ilan University and Gideon Toury of Tel Aviv University to leave her Journal *Translator* and *Translation Studies Abstracts*. She based her decision not on personal basis, but on the basis of their affiliation with Israeli universities that are complicit in the oppression of Palestinians. The response was a storm reaching calls by Tony Blair and the House of Commons that issued statements against Baker’s move, but she also received support from other academics. She quoted Ilan Pappe as a supporter. She also received support from the Jewish American professor Lawrence Davidson, which culminated in their participation in SOAS 2004 conference.

The interaction between Hilary and Steven Rose and Mona Baker with Palestinian counterparts was clear and evident during that period. Mona Baker signed the April 2002 petition, and she interpreted the moratorium in the petition of April 2002 as a boycott that she practiced. She was later, in December 2004, involved with the Palestinian Professor Nur Masalha from SOAS in organizing a SOAS conference. Hilary Rose was a speaker along with Lisa Taraki and Omar Barghouti from PACBI. Moreover, the interactions that occurred between 2002 and 2006, and thereafter, demonstrated the development of the

360 Tanya Reinhart, “Academic boycott: In support of Paris VI”, *The Electronic Intifada*, 4 February 2003, via https://electronicintifada.net/content/academic-boycott-support-paris-vi/4387 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

361 Interview with Mona Baker; *op. cit.*
academic and cultural boycott norms in the UK. Such interactions also had their effects on the Palestinian cultural boycott and the BDS movement.

Within a month of the Guardian’s “moratorium”, Hilary and Steven Rose wrote, “the annual conference of the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) called on ‘all UK universities and colleges to review their academic links with Israel.’ Later that year the text of the moratorium call was endorsed in its entirety by the Association of University Teachers (AUT)”.

Mona Baker has encouraged a Palestinian momentum. For example, she points to having written in 2003 to a professor in PACBI circles encouraging for a Palestinian boycott call, arguing that the British professors were attacked by initiating a boycott without the backing of a call from the Palestinian side. In October 2003, “the first Palestinian Call for [academic] Boycott was issued by a group of Palestinian academics and intellectuals in the diaspora and the occupied Palestinian Territory”, which was also discussed in the previous chapter. In fact, Baker had a major role in encouraging such a call.

Mona Baker communicated in the following year of 2004, with the Palestinian professor Nur Masalha at SOAS for coordinating a conference in December 2004, along with the PACBI and other actors.

The Palestinian interaction with this development is reflected as well in the Palestine Solidarity Campaign’s response and the head of Birzeit University’s comment. Steven and Hilary Rose wrote:

A delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign visiting the occupied territories reported the enthusiasm with which the moratorium call and its endorsement by the academic trade unions was received. The hope it offered was confirmed by a brief but poignant note from the president of Birzeit University, Professor Hanna Nasir, exiled by the IDF to Jordan in 1974, and with his University shut down for three years until December. He wrote ‘we thought Europe had forgotten us.’

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362 Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”: p. 2, op. cit.
364 Interview with Mona Baker (Manchester/ UK, 24 August 2015).
365 Ibid.
According to Hilary and Steven Rose, this Palestinian encounter contributed towards a shift in the position of Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) from boycotting Israeli goods into cultural boycott.\textsuperscript{366} Actually, PSC newsletters have started to include “academic boycott” headlines, in reference to Hilary and Steven Rose’s petition and defending Mona Baker’s boycott,\textsuperscript{367} though few articles in relation to BDS movement appeared in the PSC’s issues in 2006 and 2007.\textsuperscript{368}

Hilary and Steven specifically mention that the role of Lisa Taraki and Omar Barghouti was crucial in pushing for the “boycott” norm.\textsuperscript{369} Parallel to the analogy with the ‘apartheid’ by Palestinian actors, the other route of extending the boycott was through linking it with South Africa and calling for an academic boycott. Mona Baker was from the first people to do so. She posted on her website in April 2002 an article by the South African Desmond Tutu entitled “Apartheid in the Holy Land”, which was published at \textit{the Guardian}.\textsuperscript{370} Her website was one of the references in the UK to academic boycott. Lisa Taraki - from PACBI- also pointed out to the important role Baker played in the UK.\textsuperscript{371}

Already, the first collective Palestinian call (directed to outsiders) in 2002, following their push in Durban conference in August 2001, pointed out to the South African analogy. PACBI call in July 2004 stressed again this analogy.

During that period, academics around the world have been mobilized. For example, and relevant to this research, consecutive academic conferences have taken place between 2003 and 2004, which seemed like a relative opportunity for Palestinian actors. The Faculty for Israeli-Palestinian Peace (FIPP), a US-based network, has been active in organizing three conferences in January 2003 in Tel Aviv, in East Jerusalem in January 2004 and in Brussels on 3-5 July 2004.\textsuperscript{372} The conference was explicit in its attempt to

\textsuperscript{366} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{367} For example, a newsletter in July 2002 entitled “BIG campaign for Palestine” refers to both actions.


\textsuperscript{369} \textit{Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{371} Interview with Lisa Taraki, \textit{op. cit.}

come out with an academic response during the events of the second *Intifada*, and was entitled “An End to Occupation, A Just Peace in Israel-Palestine: The Role of Academia”.

Hilary and Steven Rose wrote about the interaction with academics from PACBI. They “had met some of the key Palestinians working to establish PACBI, including author and activist Omar Barghouti and Birzeit University sociologist Lisa Taraki” during the East Jerusalem conference.373 Similarly, Lisa Taraki affirmed such interactions of cooperation during that period.374

PACBI call was launched in July 2004. Omar Barghouti said as the *Guardian* reported: “‘The group was established in the spring of 2004,’ says Barghouti, 'in response to a serious academic boycott effort launched earlier in the UK that year, initiated by Steven and Hilary Rose’”.375 It is evident how these interactions between Palestinian actors, UK and transnational actors (i.e. Lawrence Davidson from the US) have encouraged the launching of PACBI, in addition to other factors inside the Palestinian field (as discussed in the previous two chapters).

The PACBI call was proposed in the Brussels conference of (FIPP), which generated a wide debate inside the conference and the call of academic boycott was not adopted. Hilary and Steven Rose described this conference session in Brussels by saying:

> The opportunity to support PACBI’s call in Europe came immediately, at a follow up FFIPP meeting in Brussels in July [2004]. The organisers were hostile to the boycott, but with support from the many Palestinian students present, sociologist Etienne Balibar and JFJFP’s Richard Kuper (neither at that stage supporting the boycott), Steven read the full PACBI call to the conference, and the workshop discussing the boycott dominated the rest of the meeting.376

This failure in adopting academic boycott in Brussels, however, encouraged discussion and opened up potentials for adopting academic boycott in Europe. Furthermore, it was directly followed by an increase in the number of enthusiastic actors in the UK for the Palestinian rights.

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374 Interview with Lisa Taraki; *op. cit.*
375 Peter Beaumont, “To boycott or not….”; *op. cit.*
376 Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”; p. 3, *op. cit*; and my interview with them asserts the unwelcoming atmosphere by organizers of Brussels conference.
A conference organized at SOAS was held directly after the Brussels one, on 5th of December 2004, and was entitled “Resisting Israeli Apartheid: Strategies and Principles”. It included Mona Baker, Hilary and Steven Rose, Betty Hunter (from Palestine Solidarity Campaign), Karma Nabulsi and Ilan Pappe (from the Institute of Palestine Studies at Exeter University), Lisa Taraki and Omar Barghouti (from PACBI), Nur Masalha (Palestinian professor at SOAS), Victoria Britain (the foreign editor at the Guardian), among other Jewish supporters for academic boycott. It was sponsored by supportive Palestinian organizations in the UK, the PSC, Palestine Society at SOAS, SOAS university teachers association and public services workers at SOAS, and PACBI.

As the conference was the first academic conference to legitimize PACBI’s call in Europe, it was also the first formal declaration of the newly established the British Committee for Universities for Palestine, UK (BRICUP). The BRICUP was established “as a strong UK partner to PACBI, working in liaison with PSC”. BRICUP early members included as well a founding member person from the PACBI (Islah Jad).

Hillary Rose gave a talk saying that “[w]e are here today at SOAS to set in train nothing less than an international boycott movement of historic significance”. The next year, a voting at the UK Association of University Teachers (AUT) took place and passed a resolution of academic boycott to Israeli institutions. However, a later vote in the same year cancelled the resolution, which suggests difficulties and hesitation in this route.

Though this section focused on interactions with actors from the UK, the interactions have been transnational and in relation to the UK. For example, Gabi Baramki has been actively interacting with transnational actors inside the civil society conferences of the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP) that gradually developed positions reaching to the BDS norms. SOAS was also participating in these conferences as for example Iain Scobbie, Professor of International Law at SOAS has participated in different ones. The case of the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP) is explored in the following chapter.

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377 Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”: p. 4, op. cit.
378 Ibid; see also: “Who We Are”, PACBI website, via http://pacbi.org/pacbi140812/?page_id=2553 <accessed on 2 August 2015>
Similarly, in the 2004 SOAS conference, Betty Hunter pointed out to sanctions and boycotts that came out of the European Social Forum in London in October 2004, which reflected the mediation of other transnational actions (in this case at the European Social Forum) that have been parallel to the Palestinian-British interaction. The case of interactions inside the World and European Social Forums is explored in the following chapter as well. Yet, what is relevant here is as well the anti-war movement in the UK. Hunter who was part of the Anti-War Coalition against the war in Iraq, and represented Palestine Solidarity Campaign there, states that at the beginning, the anti-war movement felt sceptical to connect the war in Palestine with the war in Iraq but quickly moved and embraced the Palestinian issue. She adds that the mobilization for the anti-war movement was one of the most important forces that gave rise to the Palestinian issue. Millions in the UK have mobilized against war on Iraq. Similarly, she pointed out to the importance of the anti-war movement inside the ESFs in raising the level up for Palestinian demands.380

The interaction with British actors, mediated as well by other transnational and international actions, which will be further explored below, had continued till the formation of the BDS call and thereafter. The coalition of Palestinian actors in the UK, with solidarity groups such as Palestine Solidarity Campaign, academic and political actors like Trotskyites (the Fourth International and the Workers Socialist Party) started to extend to trade unions and academic unions. Briefing some of these developments, Hilary and Steven Rose wrote:

The following oscillating fight in the academic trade unions was considerably strengthened by members of the Socialist Worker’s Party joining BRICUP, but the presence of a party with its own much larger agenda also brought the usual problems for a single issue campaign. In 2005 the annual AUT [Association of University Teachers] council meeting passed a resolution, initiated by BRICUP supporters, calling for the boycott of three Israeli universities, Haifa, the Hebrew University and Bar-Ilan, a resolution that was overturned a few months later by a specially convened AUT meeting after intense lobbying by Zionist anti-boycotters. NATFHE [Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education] by contrast remained steadily committed to the Palestinian cause, passing a further resolution in 2006 urging teachers to consider their moral responsibilities before embarking on collaborations with Israeli institutions. Resolution and counter-resolutions followed the subsequent merger of AUT and NATFHE within UCU, and increasing amounts of BRICUP’s energies were focused on this struggle.381

380 Interview with Betty Hunter; op. cit.
381 Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”: p. 4, op. cit.
“Boycott of Israel” became institutionalized in an academic body in addition to the endorsement by the chairman of a major solidarity group in the UK (Palestine Solidarity Campaign PSC). The director of PSC Betty Hunter was participating in the 2004 SOAS conference and made the analogy between Israel and the apartheid: “Solidarity movements across the world need to work to create a popular consciousness that what is happening to the Palestinian people at the hands of the illegal Israeli occupiers is the new apartheid - a new apartheid which must be ended. Our task is to isolate Israel and to make it a pariah state, by creating an awareness of the reality of the occupation for the Palestinians. This is why the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC), with the support of many other organisations and prominent individuals, launched the Boycott Israeli Goods Campaign (BIG Campaign) in July 2001. We undertook this campaign on the understanding that we need to work on both boycott and sanctions and at different levels: the grassroots; civil institutions and organisations; the British parliamentary and the European levels”.382

The Palestinian responses, among circles of NGOs to participate in forming the BDS, were quick. These responses appeared as well on Mona Baker’s website. For example, Agricultural Relief PARC issued a statement “to express their full support to the proposal of the largest British Association of University Teachers (AUT) to boycott two Israeli universities (Haifa and Bar Ilan) passed on April 22, 2005”383. Another response was from the Union of Palestinian Professors stating that “the Federation of Unions of Palestinian Universities’ Professors and Employees applauded the recent decision by the British Association University Teachers to boycott two Israeli academic institutions meeting the Palestinian Call for Boycott endorsed by over 50 Palestinian academic and cultural institutions”.384

The transnational interactions continued. Already, in 2002, connected petitions and statements have circulated across Europe, Australia and North America, as discussed above. Even the name of BRICUP was inspired by a similar French group called the

Collectif Interuniversitaire pour la Cooperation avec les Universités Palestinienne (CICUP) during a meeting of Hilary and Steven Rose in Paris.\textsuperscript{385} After the establishment of the PACBI and then the BRICUP, those two bodies worked together in trying to affect North American academics. Already, Lawrence Davidson from the USA was a main speaker at the SOAS conference in 2004. As PACBI relates to these developments, it wrote:

The beginnings of the academic boycott of Israel can be traced to 2002, the year in which Israel launched its destructive assault upon Palestinian cities, towns, refugee camps and villages, targeting the institutions of Palestinian society and wreaking havoc on communities, residential neighborhoods, and urban infrastructure. The April 2002 statement by 120 European academics and researchers urging the adoption of a moratorium on EU and European Science Foundation support for Israel was followed by a number of pro-boycott initiatives in the same year by academics in the USA, France, Norway, and Australia. Particularly noteworthy have been the annual congresses of UK academics’ unions, where boycott-related resolutions have been debated and passed since 2002. PACBI’s key partner in the UK, BRICUP has been instrumental in the ongoing struggle to popularize the academic boycott in the union movement in the UK and beyond.\textsuperscript{386}

The dynamic has continued since 2005, with academic unions taking actions and counter actions. Another conference at SOAS was organized in 2007, which was sponsored by both PACBI and Palestine Solidarity Campaign; all constituted continuous encouragement to PACBI and BDS actors. The 2008-09 Gaza war “served as a catalyst for further activism, and the period since then has witnessed a tremendous growth of initiatives in the spirit of BDS and targeting Israeli academic institutions”, PACBI wrote.\textsuperscript{162}

\textit{The debate on anti-normalization}

In the UK, there was a momentum of anti-academic boycott on the one hand and critiques to boycotting individuals on the other hand. This had its effects on the position of the PACBI. In fact, the PACBI- alongside its allies in British and world academics- was challenging the doxa of boycotting Israel in the Northern mainstream context, while simultaneously seeking legitimacy in the world field. Many critics pointed to the small number of Israeli academics who resist Israeli colonization policies, a stance well

\textsuperscript{385} Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”: p. 4, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{386} PACBI, “Guidelines for Applying the International Academic Boycott of Israel”; \textit{op. cit.}
understood by the PACBI and reflected as well in the conducted interviews. 387 Actually, on normative terms, many think of the Israeli academics as complicit. For example, Hilary Rose says that they serve in the army in high positions; hence in planning positions. 388

Omar Barghouti argued (in an interview in 2007) that there is a lack of Israeli academics response during the second Intifada. As reported, Barghouti “also dismisses claims by the Israeli left that its academics have been in the forefront of the fight against the occupation, citing a survey carried out by Israeli sociologist Yehouda Shenhav that demonstrated, he says, that between 2002 and 2004 - in the midst of the worst violence of the second intifada - only eight out of the 133 sociologists in the five largest universities in Israel took a moral stand against the occupation, a ratio that was found among other social scientists”. 389

What Mona Baker did with boycotting two Israeli academics affiliated with Israeli universities was a major example to inform PACBI and its allies of the heavy price of such a strong form of boycott. There have been two major positions in response to Mona Baker’s boycott move. On the one hand, her move was accused of attacking academic freedom. On the other hand, she was criticized by some allies that she did not distinguish between “critical individuals” and institutions.

As an article in Al-Ahram Weekly summarizes, the reactions to Baker’s move were huge even from the House of Commons and the PM Tony Blair himself. “Given the level of pressure and intimidation it is remarkable that Baker stood her ground”, the report stated. 390

The report realized, while interviewing Baker in Cairo: “Many of the attacks on Baker are because her decision allegedly targets individuals. Israeli academics are generally left-leaning and among the constituencies more supportive of the peace process.

387 For example, Rafeef Zaidah and Samia Botmeh from PACBI and BDS pointed to this; interviews; op. cit.
388 Interview with Hilary and Steven Rose; op. cit.
The academic boycott is seen by some to be targeting the wrong people. Schlesinger [who was dismissed from the journal], for example, for years a personal friend of Baker, was previously chair of Amnesty International in Israel. But Baker makes a point to distinguish between individuals and institutions, a distinction not carried by her detractors who see any action against an Israeli institution as anti-Semitic. But, she cautions, "anybody who thinks they are going to make any change in vicious, horrific policies like those of Israel and the US without affecting individuals is simply being naïve. In the choice between this or silence I know what my choice is,’ Baker says firmly’.391

In fact, the boycott and sanctions experience against apartheid South Africa, which many actors hold to as a reference, did not draw a clear distinction between individuals and institutions. For example, the sanctions to this particular state of apartheid have even been against South African ships indiscriminately. Moreover, sanctions have affected individuals. In particular, there is a UN General Assembly resolution that “[r]equests all States to take steps to prevent all cultural, academic, sports, and other exchanges with the racist regime of South Africa”, “[a]ppeals to writers, artists, musicians and other personalities to boycott South Africa” and “[u]rges all academic and cultural institutions to terminate all links with South Africa” [italic in the original], 392 in addition to calling on states to cut academic and cultural links with South African institutions. The resolution even goes further to call for not exempting South Africans from visas, to stop tourism in South Africa and to stop emigration to South Africa. This did not mean that white South

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391 Ibid.
392 "Cultural, Academic and other boycotts of South Africa”; UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/35/206E, the 98th plenary meeting on 16 December 1980, via http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/35/206 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>. A larger quotation from the resolution reads: “The General Assembly, […] Considering that the suspension of cultural, academic, sports and other contacts with South Africa is an important measure in the international campaign against apartheid, […] Noting that the racist regime of South Africa is using cultural, academic, sports and other contacts to promote its propaganda for the inhumane policies of apartheid and "bantustanation", 1. Requests all States to take steps to prevent all cultural, academic, sports, and other exchanges with the racist regime of South Africa; 2. Also requests States that have not yet done so: (a) To abrogate and cancel all cultural agreements and similar arrangements entered into between their Government and the racist regime of South Africa. (b) To cease any cultural and academic collaboration with South Africa, including the exchange of scientists, students and academic personalities, as well as cooperation on research programmes. (c) To Prevent any promotion of tourism to South Africa, (d) To terminate visa-free entry privileges to South African nationals, (E) To prohibit emigration to South Africa, 3. Appeals to writers, artists, musicians and other personalities to boycott South Africa, 4. Urges all academic and cultural institutions to terminate all links with South Africa, 5. Encourages anti-apartheid and solidarity movements in their campaigns for cultural, academic and sports boycotts of South Africa […]”.

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Africans were boycotted as a whole. In fact, some of them were even pioneers in the anti-apartheid struggle, but they were publicly defecting people, similar to the case of the Israeli academic Ilan Pappe who cut his institutional links with Israeli universities and became a major proponent of BDS. Actually, the academic boycott against South Africa has witnessed similar debates on comprehensive boycott or selective boycott in different circles. As Mona Baker responded, the issue of boycott is always controversial but it always entails a personal dimension. Omar Barghouti who repeatedly mentions his previous activism on the South African anti-apartheid issue, during his study at the Columbia School in the USA, said that when they were active in the South African movement, every South African academic was under boycott (except those endorsing the struggle), yet the BDS movement calls for an institutional boycott not an individual one.393

Baker will be criticized as well by some who support the academic boycott but do not want it to reach the individual level. For example, Hilary and Steven Rose defended Baker’s courage and continuity to defend Palestinian rights,394 but at the same time added: “As the Guardian letter offered no advice as to how to interpret the moratorium call, in the early days there were some perhaps over-enthusiastic responses. Linguist Mona Baker sacked two Israelis, both critical of Israel’s policies, from the editorial board of the journal she edited and owned”.395 Hilary and Steven Rose re-asserted their institutional not individual-based boycott from the moratorium in 2002 to the BRICUP establishment in 2004:396

Note that the initial moratorium call and the subsequent BRICUP statement referred specifically to an institutional boycott, not to one aimed at individuals of any specific nationality or ethnicity. We saw the “exceptionalist” clause in the initial PACBI call, which excluded Israeli academics working directly with Palestinians for peace and justice from the boycott, as a generous gesture not wanting to condemn all academics working in Israeli universities, even though most were silent when protest was needed. Interestingly, the AUT’s call for the academic boycott of apartheid South Africa was also exceptionalist.

393 A lecture by Omar Barghouti at the University of Ghent (organized by MENARG and CRG), Belgium, on 27 November 2015.
394 Hilary Rose, “Building the Academic Boycott in Britain”, op. cit.
395 Hilary and Steven Rose, “BRICUP…”; op. cit., p. 3.
This pressure of removing individual Israelis from the academic boycott calls came also from the French philosopher Etienne Balibar who gave the closing presentation at the mentioned conference in Brussels in July 2004, and who had lectured in Israeli universities at that time.\(^{397}\) He articulated his position between supporting the petition of April 2002 and being critical to individual boycotts:

Personally, I am very sensitive to the argument that you cannot without inconsistency condemn “suicide bombings” as a form of military resistance and reject such non-violent forms of moral and political pressure as boycott, as I admitted in a recent discussion with Omar Barghouti and other signatories of the Open Letter supporting Academic Boycott. I am especially sensitive to the argument that Israel should not be allowed to instrumentalize the genocide of European Jews to put themselves above the Law of nations. On the other hand, I see a “performative contradiction” in demanding a boycott that includes those who most consistently act to support Palestinian resistance and express solidarity with the Palestinian population within the Israeli academia, however minoritarian they can be, or seeks to isolate them from their colleagues whom they try to influence. But, in this case even more than the abovementioned, I think that we have no right to reject such calls if we don’t offer an alternative politics. At the very least it must include a permanent pressure on “our” institutions (Universities, States, alliances such as the European Union, international organizations) to decide sanctions for the violation of International Law, the destruction of Palestine and the colonial oppression. For this reason I renew my support of the call for a moratorium on the European-Israeli agreements that include privileged cultural and scientific relations. I am aware that this is a very narrow path.

(Balibar 2004: 15)

Another example of the rejection of the boycott of individuals came from a supporter of an Israeli academic who supported the Paris 4 university motion, Tanya Rienhart. On that matter, she wrote:

At the individual level, there are pockets of resistance and opposition in the Israeli academia, as anywhere else in the Israeli society. Indeed, close to four hundred (out of the tens of thousands of) Israeli academics signed a petition supporting conscientious draft objectors. But the individual intentions are not what is under consideration here, because the boycott is institutional. (I do not support individual boycott, like stopping overseas collaborations with individual Israeli scholars.)\(^{398}\)

Similarly, the American Jewish philosopher Judith Buttler commented on Baker’s move by saying: “In dismissing these individuals, she claimed, she was treating them as


\(^{398}\) Tanya Reinhart, “Academic Boycott: In Support of Paris IV”; *op. cit.*
emblematic of the Israeli state, since they were citizens of that country. But citizens are not
the same as states: the very possibility of significant dissent depends on recognizing the
difference between them”. Baker replied by referring to the Israeli reply of Tanya
Reinhart who opted either for consistent full boycott of individuals and institutions or
excluding individuals. Baker said that in the realm of activism she developed more
friendship with Israelis after calling for boycott. Actually, Baker who continued to point
out to the fact that “almost all” Israeli academics are involved in Israel’s policies (through
serving in the army or other means) re-directed her position later to Israeli academic
institutions.

The issue of excluding individual academics has been related to the pressure from the
field dominance, in addition to normative considerations from the different actors. For
example, Barghouti believes in a one state solution with equal rights between all
inhabitants. Calls for boycotting Israel has been correlated by many European officials as
signs of “anti-Semitism”. Such a claim that PACBI and its allies have been trying to
challenge through insisting on their work with Jews and Israelis in order to counter the
weight of such accusations. In addition, they intended to have a common space of work
with supportive and ally Israeli academics such as Ilan Pappe.

PACBI made adaptations to such pressures since it needed recognition in the
Northern academic spheres. PACBI has been negotiating on whom exactly to boycott from
Israeli academics. In its first call on 6 July 2004, it has targeted Israeli institutions and
without an “exceptionalism” clause. It particularly mentioned to “Refrain from
participation in any form of academic and cultural cooperation, collaboration or joint
projects with Israeli institutions” and to “Advocate a comprehensive boycott of Israeli

19-21, via http://www.lrb.co.uk/v25/n16/judith-butler/no-its-not-anti-semiticsemitic <last accessed on 22
February 2016>
400 Mona Baker, “Crying Wolf: Anti-semitism, the Jewish Press in Britain, and Academic Boycotts”, Mona
<last accessed on 22 February 2016>
401 Mona Baker and Lawrance Davidson, “In Defense of the Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions “,
CounterPunch, September 17, 2003, via http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/09/17/in-defense-of-the-boycott-
of-israeli-academic-institutions/ <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
institutions at the national and international levels, including suspension of all forms of 
funding and subsidies to these institutions.” 402

In a following development, it included an exceptionalist clause stating to “Exclude 
from the above actions against Israeli institutions by any conscientious Israeli academics 
and intellectuals opposed to their state’s colonial and racist policies”.403 In a 2009 
adaptation, PACBI’s guidelines included an assertion that all Israeli institutions “unless 
proven otherwise” are complicit, and said: “An Israeli academic is entitled, as a taxpayer, 
to receive funding from his/her government or institution in support of academic activities, 
such as attendance of international conferences and other academic events, so long as this 
is not conditioned upon serving Israel’s policy interests in any way, such as public 
acknowledgement of this support by the organizers of the conference or activity/event. 
Mere affiliation of the academic to an Israeli institution does not subject the conference or 
activity to boycott”.404 In its 2014 version, the PACBI said “the BDS movement, including PACBI, 
rejects on principle boycotts of individuals based on their identity (such as 
citizenship, race, gender, or religion) or opinion. If, however, an individual is representing 
the state of Israel or a complicit Israeli institution (such as a dean, rector, or president), or 
is commissioned/recruited to participate in Israel’s efforts to “rebrand” itself, then her/his 
activities are subject to the institutional boycott the BDS movement is calling for”, adding 
a previous assertion that: “Mere affiliation of Israeli scholars to an Israeli academic 
institution is therefore not grounds for applying the boycott”.405

As mentioned, the PACBI’s first call did not endorse exceptionalist clause. For 
example, Omar Barghouti and Lisa Taraki quoted Ilan Pappe stating: “The boycott reached 
academia because academia in Israel chose to be official, national. Prof. Yehuda Shenhav

402 “Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) | 6 July 2004” (website 
Posted on 21-12-2008), via http://pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=869 <accessed on 19 July 2015>. See also the 
first PACBI call on the website of “artists for Palestine” via http://artistsforpalestine.org.uk/why-israel/the- 
palestinian-call/#unique-identifier 869 <accessed on 19 July 2015>, which has been quoted as well by other 
websites such as: < http://artistsforpalestine.org.uk/why-israel/the-palestinian-call/#unique-identifier> 
<accessed on 11 February 2016>

403 “The Palestinian Call for Academic Boycott Revised: Adjusting the Parameters of the Debate”, PACBI 
via the Electronic Intifada, 28 January 2006, via https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-call- 
aademic-boycott-revised-adjusting-parameters-debate/5851 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

404 PACBI, “Guidelines for Applying the International Academic Boycott of Israel”; op. cit.

405 PACBI, “PACBI Guidelines for the International Academic Boycott of Israel (Revised July 2014)”, 31 
checked into it and found that out of 9,000 members of academia in Israel, only 30-40 are actively engaged in reading significant criticism, and a smaller number, just three or four, are teaching their students in a critical manner about Zionism and so on." 406 Moreover, in this article debating the AUT’s decision to boycott and then canceling it in another session in 2005, the Palestinian actors were aware that the UN sponsored boycott against South African academics. They wrote: “when the world boycotted South African academics — as part of the overall regime of sanctions and boycotts endorsed by the United Nations at the time — a degree of violation of academic freedom was indeed entailed. That was accepted by the international community, though, as a reasonable price to pay in return for contributing to the defeat of apartheid and the attainment of more basic freedoms denied black South Africans for generations” 407 The point view they argued for is that “privileging of academic freedom as a super-value above all other freedoms is in principle antithetical to the very foundation of human rights. The right to live, and freedom from subjugation and colonial rule, to name a few, must be of more importance than academic freedom. If the latter contributes in any way to the suppression of the former more fundamental rights, it must give way”. 408 Moreover, they think that academic freedom cannot entail racism and hate speech that is systematically part of the Israeli universities (they give two examples of Haifa University and the Hebrew University).

In 2005, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), in reaction to the British AUT’s decision of boycott issued a statement against academic boycott under the banner of academic freedom. However, it was debated and the AAUP decided to hold a debating conference on this issue in 2006. People from the BRICUP and the PACBI were invited to Italy for a discussion related to academic boycott discussed by AAUP, alongside with anti-boycott speakers. However, under pressure by pro-Zionists, Hilary and Steven Rose wrote, that the sponsoring associations (Ford Foundation and Rockfiller) withdrew their financial support and “even to discuss the boycott issue was taboo”. The conference was abended but the AAUP continued through planning to publish the papers. Israeli

407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
academics refused participating and the Journal *Academe* appeared without them, while papers by Omar Barghouti, Rema Hammami, Sondra Hale, Hilary Rose and Lisa Taraki were published.\textsuperscript{409}

Omar Barghouti wrote an article arguing against the “inconsistency” of the AAUP and its lack of positions about the suppression of Palestinian academic freedoms by Israel, which is a norm that does not appear in the AAUP’s charters that only focuses on intra-state cases. However, this debate besides other objections affected the PACBI’s position in deciding to delete a sentence from its 2004 call related to individual boycotts. The PACBI issued a statement clarifying the deletion of the fourth clause in the PACBI Call, excluding from the proposed measures against Israeli institutions “any conscientious Israeli academics and intellectuals opposed to their state’s colonial and racist policies”.\textsuperscript{410} Omar Barghouti wrote (2011: 94): “Legitimate criticism from the AAUP and other organizations and individuals of the ‘exclusion cause’ in the Palestinian call for boycott, coupled with PACBI’s resolute opposition to alleged ‘ideological test’ or ‘blacklisting’, convinced the campaign to omit the clause altogether”.

By trying to be acceptable by Northern circles, as a main concern, the BDS movement adapts to some *doxa* while challenging them as well. As a leader in the BDS movement writes, “the West … remains the main battleground for this nonviolent resistance” though the rest should not be ignored (Barghouti 2011: 61).

However, this would not go without continuous tension. Some examples suggest that boycotters insist on the institutional affiliation, as Mona Baker for example.\textsuperscript{411} The example of Mona Baker draws also the issue of intersection between diverse powers in the world field on Palestine. Mona Baker, who graduated initially from the American University of Cairo was active in Egypt in the 1970s against Sadat’s politics, and was co-editing an Egyptian magazine *Al-Rababa*. She and the co-founder were imprisoned in the early 1970s for few months in relation to Egypt’s foreign policy towards Israel and

\textsuperscript{409} Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”: p. 4, *op. cit.*; and “Critics of the AAUP Report”; *op. cit.*  
\textsuperscript{410} “The PACBI Call for Academic Boycott Revised: Adjusting the Parameters of the Debate”, *op. cit.*  
\textsuperscript{411} Interview with Mona Baker; *op. cit.*
Palestine. She had been in contact with anti-normalization circles in Egypt like Radwa Ashour. She was positioned in her legacy of Egyptian anti-normalization as well as being in the UK field. What happened during 2002 “helped” her “re-articulate” the notion of anti-normalization; insisting on the relation between the individual and the institutional aspect. Hence, her interpretation differs from PACBI’s later adaptations and also with the spread of the anti-normalization norm in Arab countries. She says that persons like Ilan Pappe should surely be allies not to be boycotted.

This would become an issue actually inside Birzeit University (BZU) in late 2014 when the Israeli journalist Amira Hass was invited to give a talk at BZU, and then she was asked by some members of PACBI to leave since she was introduced as affiliated with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. Though Hass is a mainly critical Israeli journalist to the occupation, boycott atmospheres at BZU asked her to leave because of her affiliation with an Israeli newspaper related to Israeli concerns. The boycott initiative at BZU (initiated mainly by the boycott committee at BZU that is part of PACBI) caused tension with the administration of the university, which is part of more established relations world-wide, and then apologized. This is an example of the tension even inside PACBI between the normative inclination and adaptations to the world field on Palestine; in contestation and incorporating some rules of the game. It also indicates the diverse positions inside a movement of wide constituencies.

Worth noting is not only the developments in the world field of power on Palestine that influence the PACBI’s position, but their experience in the Palestinian field and their habitus in boycott besides the different power dynamic operating in each Palestinian group (i.e. in West Bank vs. the Palestinians inside the Green Line), in addition to the Arab anti-
normalization spheres. PACBI and the BDS movement chose to situate themselves between these spheres. This is why PACBI proposed, in 2007, diverse anti-normalization norms’ guidelines depending on each field, with wide common denominators that was adopted by the BDS. The highest level of calling is in the Arab field. There, the call largely follows the boycotting of Israeli embassies in Arab countries that engaged in agreements with the Israeli governments. This suggests looking at aspects of the anti-normalization norm to understand how the BDS movement situates itself inside the world field amid diverse forces, which will be discussed below while concluding on the world field on Palestine.

In a lecture at the University in Gent, Belgium, in November 2015, Omar Barghouti said that the BDS calls for what the previous anti-apartheid movement did (boycotting all academics). Barghouti said he was aware of this similarity since he was active on the previous one at Columbia University. Someone from the audience asked him about the contradiction between supporting a previous total boycott in the case of South Africa and calling now that it is unethical to boycott individuals. Barghouti replied that he would have not boycotted individuals in the previous South African anti-apartheid struggle.

These interactions between Palestinian, British, American and other actors, demonstrate clearly the effects of these transnational connections, in flow, on the development of PACBI and the BDS. These were early stage interactions, but have increased with time though the research focuses more on specific periods of interactions.

2. Relations in the Belgian route

General background

As a quick general background to Belgium in relation to Palestine (as a country that also has the capital of the EU), and in a way similar to the UK, Belgian policies have been historically supportive to Israel. Pro-Palestinian activism in Belgium has become evident in the 1970s. The Association Belgo-Palestinienne (ABP) was established in 1975. The current director of ABP, Nadia Farkh, who is a Belgian/ Palestinian-Lebanese,
demonstrates that at that time the atmosphere was pro-Israeli in Belgium.416 As the case of the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign, where anti-Zionist Jews were active in its establishment, ABP was established by Marcel Liberman, a leftist Jewish Belgian. Liberman was previously influenced by the Zionist propaganda of the progressive kibutz before changing. As Nadia explains, there were leftists going to Israel for the “socialist settlements” and discovering that there is something wrong going on.

Farkh explains that ABP is a Belgian Solidarity body not a Palestinian body that was established by Christians, trade unions and intellectuals. Similarly, the Flemish association in solidarity with Palestine was established during the first Intifada under the name Vlaams Palestina Komitee (VPK) [the Palestine Flemish Committee]. Another group (CODIP) was established later, with a higher level of norms related to Palestine. The two groups merged in 2010 under the new name Palestina Solidariteit.417

The ex-Palestinian ambassador to Belgium, Leila Shaheed, who was active in Palestinian politics (a member of Fateh) adds that the early role of solidarity owes itself to Palestinian individuals whom many had sacrificed their lives for the issue. Shaheed extends this remark to the European and other Northern contexts.418

A key example lies in the Palestinian Naim Khadir who was, later on, assassinated in Brussels (allegedly by Israel). Farkh says that the first meetings by the founders of the ABP were occurring in Khadir’s house and they used to close the curtains since the Police was monitoring them outside the house. Shaheed explains that Khadir came to Belgium to

416 Interview with Nadia Farkh (Brussels, 3 March 2014).
417 Interview with Myriam Vandecan and Numan Othman; op. cit.
418 Interview with Leila Shaheed; op. cit. Shaheed adds that in Paris there was Mahmoud al-Hamshari, who was murdered in an ugly way, where Izzedine Qalaq, a Palestinian from Syria and took place of Hamshari after his assassination. There was Wael Zaytir in Rome as the second main man, who was also assassinated (allegedly by Israel). These persons were simple, without media offices, without recognition, and with little money, but they were super active, shaded adds. They were sent by Yasser Arafat. They became friends with European intellectuals like Jean Genet, Jean-Luc Godard, Alberto Moravia, and made better links with persons than the existing Palestinian embassies these days with some more considerable financial capabilities, Shaheed says, and then they connected with politicians. In the Anglo-Saxon context, there was Saed Hamammi in London (also assassinated), In the US, the Palestinian scholars Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Edward Said established the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, which became active in connecting Palestinians and Arabs- like the Lebanese Clauvis Maqsd- in the US for the issue of Palestine. Israelis were astonished how such persons were able to mobilize sympathizers in Europe and organize events attended by tens of thousands. This is why they decided to assassinate these Palestinian persons, which is something that does not happen these days, Shaheed adds.
study theology and was surprised that people do not know about the occupation and Palestinians, so he dedicated his stay for the Palestinian issue and quit the idea to become a priest.

Similarly, Numan Othman (from *Palestina Solidariteit*) mentions that during the 1960s and 1970s it was difficult to speak about the Palestinian issue.\(^{419}\) However, some activism started to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, Shaheed argues that splits in solidarity for Palestine in Europe (as well in the US) occurred after Oslo Agreement. Edward Said and others criticized it strongly. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Edward Said were connected to the PLO, and were members of the Palestinian National Council, but after Oslo, some have rejected Oslo agreement while others supported it, which contributed to the transnational fragmentation of the Palestinian activism.

For example, in Rome that witnessed in the 1982 wide pro-Palestinian demonstrations that were called on by communists, the Palestinian organizations got weakened amid sharp political cleavages. Some Palestinian groups tried even to occupy the Palestinian embassy after Oslo.\(^{420}\) The connections between Palestinians in Europe - as well in the US- and representatives of the PLO got also weakened after Oslo, which applies to Brussels as well.

Currently, on the European level, there is no unified Palestinian-based network of organizations that gather the Palestinians in Europe, but a solidarity network between European Coordinating Committees (ECCP). Yet, there is an annual conference of Palestinians, able to gather hundreds each year, organized mainly by the UK based Palestine Return Center (PRC) that was established in 1996. However, amid splits in relation to Oslo and factional politics, resembling the fragmentation in Palestine, and due to the closeness of the PRC from certain Palestinian factions (allegedly from *Hamas*) that are under a “terrorist” list in Europe (and thus having their role is still constrained in Europe as well in the UK), the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign became the major body for the Palestinian issue.

\(^{419}\) Interview with Myriam Vandecan and Numan Othman; *op. cit.*

\(^{420}\) Interview with Mjriam Abu Samra (a founder of Wael Zaytir group in Italy) and Sharif (Amman, 25 June 2014).
Additionally, the PRC is more connected to Palestinian and Arab political issues. In one of their conferences in Brussels on 18 May 2013, they have raised issues related to the Palestinians in Syria, the Arab revolutions, besides the European context. Obviously, their relation with the PLO representatives in Brussels is troublesome. They publicly criticized the refusal of the PLO office to accept participating in the conference. The PLO and specifically the *Fateh – Hamas* split is a highly dividing topic for Palestinians also in Europe. For example, a Palestinian in Brussels, who is highly critical to the PA, mentions two incidents indicating the effects of these divisions in collective activism of Palestinians in Brussels. Besides fragmentation, there is no real sense of a Palestinian community in Belgium compared to the Nordic countries such as Germany for example. The role of the Palestinian gathering in Brussels is more related to symbolic events, as described by Palestinians interviewed in this research. As a report on Palestinians in Belgium realizes:

> Unlike the situation in other European countries where full-blown Palestinian communities, possessing lists of names and addresses, organized activities, and even presidents or local leaders exist, it is hard to claim that such a community exists in Belgium.\(^{421}\)

Hence, Palestinian activism is currently based mostly on solidarity groups. Palestinians currently do not get involved much in political action in Belgium. For example, a major Palestinian activist in one solidarity group realizes the lack of Palestinian involvement in their activities.\(^{422}\) The ex-coordinator of the BDS movement in Europe, Michael Daes, says in wonder: “I do not know why the Palestinian activism in Europe is not led by Palestinians”\(^{423}\).

Yet, the two major solidarity organizations in Belgium (French and Flemish) have few Palestinians inside them who are very active, such as Farkh and Othman.

Moreover, based in Brussels, there is also the European Coordination Committees (ECCP), which was established in 1986 and would become larger with time. The last president of ECCP, Pierre Galand, is also the president of ABP, who has been active in a

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423 A chat during the conference “The European Parliament/EU obligations towards occupied East Jerusalem”, organized by ECCP, Mundubat and ABP (hosted by MEP Maria Arena); Brussels, 17 November 2014.
number of NGOs (including the head of Oxfam-Belgium), a Belgian ex-deputy and previously in a number of solidarity actions in Africa and Latin America. He is a professor of international law, and developed close relation with the PLO office in Brussels, which indicates the cultural and social weight he has. ECCP became the main network in Europe for the Palestinian issue. ECCP is “composed of 46 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), unions and associations from 20 European countries” in 2013 and became 52 groups as updated in 2015.424

There are also INGOs, like Oxfam, that would play a role of close coordination with Palestinian organizations. The example of the interaction of Badil and Oxfam-Solidarity in Belgium demonstrates the potentials and limitations in Belgium at that time. It also demonstrates an example of an unconventional relation between a funder and a funded organization. The agency of the funded organization is clearly evident and can even affect the funding organization to take unprecedented positions. Of course, the effect of the funding is not to be underestimated. Much of the concentration of Badil’s transnational efforts also takes place in Northern countries besides among refugees in Arab countries and Northern states.

The ex-director of Badil at that time, Ingrid Jaradat, points out to the interaction and its effects on the position of Oxfam (a funder of Badil then).425 Such link has encouraged the boycott campaign, according to a co-founder of BDS.426 Additionally, major solidarity actors in Brussels point out to the effect of Oxfam shops in Belgium.427

Just before the second Palestinian Intifada, Badil has been active to raise the issue of the right of refugees to return. While being funded by Oxfam among others, Badil combined both the professional type of NGOs besides having some popular base in refugee camps (Hanafi and Tabar 2005), which was consolidated in 1999. It has organized local meetings in refugee camps in Palestine for setting guidelines for building an “international

425 Interview with Ingrid Jaradat; op. cit.
426 Interview with Ingrid Jaradat; op. cit.
427 Interviews with Nadia Farkh, Myriam Vandecan and Numan Othman; op. cit., and Jan Dreezen (Brussels, 5 March 2014).
movement for the issue of refugees” in addition to communicating with Oxfam-solidarity in Belgium and other organizations for a European and transnational movement for the same issue. In 1999, Badil declared that:

A strategy workshop organized by Oxfam Solidarity in March 1999 set the foundations for two European Solidarity campaigns, a Campaign for Palestinian Economic Development, and a Campaign for Palestinian Refugee Rights. Participants at this workshop included Palestinian and European NGOs (Forum of Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon, PARC, BADIL, Belgo-Palestinian Association [ABP], Flemish Palestine Committee [to become Palestina Solidariteit], UCL Cermac, a.o.), Belgian trade unionists, representatives of the ECCP (European Coordinating Committee on Palestine), representatives of the Palestinian delegation and the Arab League in Brussels, Belgian and EU parliamentarians, as well as delegates from the European Commission.428

Moreover, Badil explains that “the Brussels workshop adopted BADIL’s information packet for a Palestinian-International Campaign for the Defense of Palestinian Refugee Rights”.429 This workshop is an example of how much transnational links have been consolidating to work on an issue not usually typical in the European context: the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

Specifically in relation to “boycotts” and “sanctions”, and in close explicit parallel to Palestinian mobilization, Belgian actors started to implicitly call for a sort of sanctions and boycott, in addition to starting promoting the term “apartheid” in relation to Israel.

In relation to “boycott”, a four-page publication printed in French in 1999 and entitled “Les Palestiniens sont ils condamnes a l’Apartheid?” (“Are the Palestinians condemned to Apartheid?”),430 aimed at sending letters to the Belgian foreign minister to take appropriate measures not to import Israeli settlements products under the label of “made in Israel”, in addition to participating in research related to settlements’ products in Belgium. This publication and campaign was done together by both the French and Dutch speaking solidarity groups ABP and VPK, “with the support of” the Union of Progressive

429 Ibid.
430 The publication has no date, but Nadia Farkh demonstrates that it is published in 1999, which also corresponds to the duration of its content.
Jews in Belgium (Union des Progressistes Juifs de Belgique - UPJB), Oxfam Solidarity and the NGOs umbrella in Belgium CNCD, and with the involvement of Solidarite Mondiale (MOC), FGBT-Bruxelles, Vie Feminine, Solidarite Socialiste, FOS, SCI, NCOS, Magasins du Monde and Oxfam-Worldshops.

This campaign asked not to buy or sell Israeli settlements products (avoiding to mention “boycott” at that stage), and it demonstrated clearly how much the rhythm of Belgian solidarity groups accompany developments on Palestine. In its fourth page, the publication referred to the European Commission’s demand to Israel in 1998 to respect not exporting settlements products under the benefits of the EU-Israeli Association Agreement. The publication also referred to both the Israeli organization Gush Shalom’s “boycott“ (as it uses the term) of 1997 and the Palestinian Marsad’s (the Palestinian Observatory) call for boycott. It specifies some products that should not be bought or sold, such as Ahava Dead Sea bath crystals, while it asked people or organisations to contact them if they are interested in receiving a list of settlements products that they had compiled from Gush Shalom and Agricultural Relief PARC lists.

The question related to “apartheid” and the avoidance of mentioning “boycott” explicitly at that stage reflected the internal debates inside the Belgian organizations. Some were for boycotts while others preferred not to resort directly to “boycotts”- as is till recurrent in a 2014 campaign called “Made in Occupation” by Belgian NGOs. Another instance is the debate inside the VPK. According to Myriam Vandecan and Numan Othman, the president was reluctant to boycott until there was a vote inside the organization (during the second Intifada) that successfully addressed the boycott.

In relation to “sanctions”, back in April 1999, the ABP and Naim Khader Foundation published an economic study (printed in English) entitled “Palestine: a strangled economy”, edited by Pierre Galand, and co-edited by Oxfam-Solidarity, European Coordinating Committees (ECCP), and Vlaams Palestina Komitee (VPK). The study demonstrated the lack of hope in the Oslo process after 5 years. The Palestinian economy was impoverished despite increased EU funds. The editorial forward signed by Galand

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431 Interview with the coordinator of the campaign Rabab Khairy (Brussels, 27 March 2014).
432 Interview with Myriam Vandecan and Numan Othman; op. cit.
reads in one paragraph: “In 1985, during the fight against Apartheid in South Africa, Europe adopted a system of positive and so-called negative measures towards Pretoria. Today, Europe, one of the principal economic, scientific and cultural partners of Israel; a principal donor in Palestine, can and should adopt a similar policy in the region with regard to Israel. Israel is sensitive to such measures, which led it, in particular in 1990, the reopening of the Palestinian universities that they had closed”. The editorial does not mention “sanctions” directly, but it implied that the EU should take “negative measures” towards Israel, which reflected the thinking of Belgian solidarity groups at the edge of the second Intifada.

This relationship between the different Belgian, Palestinian and European actors took additional dimensions during the second Intifada.

*The second Intifada in Belgium*

The second Intifada accelerated the momentum of activism in Belgium. Inside the Flemish organization (VPK), for example, demands were raised for a more active role reaching to the decision to boycott Israeli goods in 2003. Nadia Farkh, the coordinator for the ABP who started working with the ABP in 1997, says that when she arrived she “has started with nothing. There were no archives, we’ve started again from zero”. The first act she did was to write a petition related to the occupation of the 1967 land, where 4000 signed. She says: “things changed a lot in the second Intifada. I was positively surprised”.433

Since the second Intifada, the ABP organized “civil missions” to Palestine (with the European coordination body ECCP). A lot of delegations were sent directly after the second Intifada. Farkh explains that they have started “civil missions” in December 2000. Delegations had included 2 journalists, 2 unionists, 2 university professors, 2 member of NGOs, and 2 Parliamentarians. There were around 10 delegations each year; each with around 30 people. Farkh explains that at that time Oxfam in Belgium was helping them.

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433 Interview with Nadia Farkh; *op. cit.*
In a similar way to the Palestine Solidarity Campaign in the UK, the diverse missions from Brussels (from NGOs to parliamentarians) have sought meeting with NGOs in Palestine (and some official PA bodies). Farkh explains that they were meeting NGOs, popular committees, visiting UN OCHA [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs], and the PLO Negotiation Unit. She explains that they avoided political factions that she claims “have non-attractive language”.

Specifically, Farkh mentions coordinating with PNGO, GIPP (Grassroots International Protection for Palestinians) that Mustapha Barghouti and other NGOs were active in. Farkh also realizes that NGOs have been always active. She says that some Palestinian NGOs have more money than the PA ministry of agriculture. She adds that they were more grassroot s in the second Intifada than what they are now, an observation that got approved by colleagues of hers at the ABP office in Brussels during an interview that was conducted with her (by the researcher).

Similarly, the Flemish solidarity groups (CODIP and then Palestina Solidariteit) have been organizing visits to Palestine since 1997, and they mentioned the Agricultural Relief PARC and the PNGO as bodies that they had met. The Belgian organization Intel, which is an explicitly politicized organization, also mentions visiting civil society organizations, and the UN OCHA, and not Palestinian political parties, which is considered to be more helpful in initiating new Belgian persons who are not knowledgeable about the context. This was also done to avoid “old style” politicians, as Mario Franssen explains, even though they were very aware that political factions or their affiliates were present in NGOs.

The “civil missions” or “solidarity groups” formed one point of interaction between Palestinian and Belgian actors, and demonstrated to Palestinian actors how much Belgium, European and Northern atmospheres have been changing and willing to take actions.

The first action in Belgium - during the second Intifada- that gave hope to Palestinian actors was the legal suitcase in a Belgian court against the Israeli prime minister Ariel

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434 Interview with Myriam Vandecan and Numan Othman; op. cit.
435 Interview with Mario Franssen from Intal (Brussels, 10 March 2014).
Sharon for his role in the massacre of Sabra and Shatila during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. At that time, Sharon had been elected prime minister and had led the invasion of the Palestinian cities, towns and camps in April 2002. While the Belgian solidarity groups were not the major actors behind this move, nevertheless, the idea that an Israeli official can be prosecuted for war crimes had a tremendous effect on the Palestinian morale. This incident received a huge coverage in Palestinian and Arab media. In the abovementioned (chapter four) Cairo conference in preparation for Durban, there were lawyers and persons who were active in the attempt of prosecuting Sharon, and the Cairo declaration stressed on the importance of this action.

Relevant to this research, Badil’s website has been full of articles following up the news of the legal suitcase. However, the case was short lived amid the declaration of the illegibility of the Belgian courts to sue Congolese or Israeli officials. It, however, attracted Palestinian actors more towards potential allies in Brussels. Moreover, Brussels became the center of the European Coordination Committees (ECCP) and a center for European activism for Palestine.

The other point of interaction were the sanction and boycott campaigns that developed in Belgium and Europe, slightly before the second Intifada (an implicit calls for boycotts against settlement products and sanctions), and that had accelerated gradually with the second Intifada till it reached the adoption of the BDS, when the boycott momentum was initially interrupted in Belgium.

In 2001, a publication in French by the ABP entitled “Un Avion pour Gaza” (A Plane to Gaza) declared explicitly a “boycott” limited to settlement products: “we pursue the action to boycott products ‘Made in Israel’ from settlements”. The campaign continued, besides other campaigns in the UK, Europe, US, the Arab countries and other places, and encouraged Palestinian actors for new potentials in Europe. For example, Badil issued a press release at the beginning of April 2002, amid the Israeli land invasion in Palestine, which read:

436 http://www.badil.org/en/component/search/?searchword=sharon&searchphrase=all&start=80
437 Originally in French: “Nous poursuivons l'action de boycott des produits "Made in Israel" provenant des colonies de peuplement”.

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We are overwhelmed and empowered by the tremendous expression of solidarity we witness daily in all parts of the world. Confined to our homes by military curfews and in the midst of the rumbling of Israel’s tanks and the terrifying sound of shooting and shelling, and with the United State’s Apaches and F-16s roaming above our homes, we have seen you. On our TV screens we have seen the tens- and hundreds of thousands of you marching in al-Ribat, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, New York, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Antwerpen, Berne and everywhere on this globe for the sake of justice in Palestine.

Against the background of governments’ unwillingness to provide international protection for the Palestinian people and apply sanctions against Israel, we call upon the global solidarity movement to launch and coordinate a broad CAMPAIGN TO BOYCOTT ISRAELI GOODS AND SERVICES everywhere in the world for the sake of a better future for the Palestinian, Arab and Israeli people in the region.

BADIL Resource Center welcomes the launching in the United States of the “Boycott Israeli Goods (BIG)” grassroots campaign. BIG advocates consumer boycotting of Israeli agricultural and industrial products, divestment of US funds in Israeli companies and in State of Israel bonds, as well as boycott of tourism, until Israel will end its occupation of all areas occupied in 1967 and respect international law and human rights, including the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and lands. Similar boycotts have been launched in Europe, the West Coast of the United States, many African and Asian countries, and in Israel itself.

It is time now, based on the broad consensus of civil society organizations at the third World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa, to TRANSFORM THE IMPRESSIVE GLOBAL DEMONSTRATION OF SOLIDARITY with the Palestinian people into a BROAD AND SUSTAINED ISRAEL BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN similar to the boycott movement that finally removed the repressive apartheid regime in South Africa. Consumers and activists should not only boycott Israeli products and services, but also use the opportunity to educate others about repressive and apartheid-like Israeli policies supported by governments worldwide, especially by the United States.

Among the organizations that were encouraged was Oxfam-Solidarity, which was very organized and widely spread. Mario Franssen, from Intal, recalls that the first meeting occurred during the Israeli invasion of April 2002, particularly during the Jenin Camp confrontations, and the campaign was launched after. Already, Oxfam was a key actor in the previous anti-apartheid boycotts in Belgium and elsewhere, and the boycott norm was part of its habitus. Franssen recalls that the parallel of Palestine with the South African

Apartheid was not present at the time of starting the campaign, but the boycott was present.439

Oxfam’s boycott campaign encouraged major Belgian NGOs to join the campaign particularly against Israeli fruit (CNCD and 11.11.11 for the French and Dutch speaking parts), and reached its peak in November 2003 with the participation of around 50 groups. However, the campaign that has been gaining momentum was interrupted by pressure from Oxfam international, after pressure from the Simon Wiesenthal Center (SWC); a Zionist North American Centre that is engaged in building the so called “museum of tolerance” on a confiscated historical Palestinian (Muslim) cemetery in Jerusalem, which started a campaign against Oxfam.440 The major Belgian NGOs withdrew from the campaign after Oxfam’s withdrawal. The solidarity groups continued in their calls for boycott, or as Mario says these included those that are “the most militant” or “small groups on the local level” more than the “mainstream organizations, the giants”. These smaller actors continued but with a setback or low-level activity, and later, re-energized the boycott, especially after the BDS call came to provide legitimacy to their calls, but they were deprived from Oxfam and the big NGOs, as also Jan Dreezen indicates.441 Dreezen, who has been working with Oxfam for years, had been active particularly in the South African anti-apartheid movement in Belgium.442

3. Early boycott campaigns after the BDS

After the BDS call, the wave of boycott campaigns in Belgium was re-initiated gradually, stating in 2008, by diverse actors like Intal Palestina Solidariteit and individual activists, which re-encouraged Palestinian BDS actors for a continuous favored grounds in Belgium among other places for the boycott norm.

439 Interview with Mario Franssen; op. cit.
442 Interview with Jan Dreezen; op. cit.
Intal, a Belgian leftist organization connected to the Global South, has started one of the earliest targeted boycott campaigns in Belgium after the BDS call, and after the initial cycle of fruit boycotts in Belgium in 2003 that was discussed above. Intal initiated the campaign “Israel colonises – Dexia finances” in November 2008 against the Dexia bank that was accused of financing Israeli settlements. Intal got a proof of Dexia’s investments in Israel and in the settlements, through a Coordination of Boycott Israel platform (in Belgium) with the help of the Flemish solidarity organization that became later Palestina Solidariteit, which in its turn got the proof of Dexia’s involvement in settlements through the Israeli organization “Who Profits” that is associated with the BDS. Twenty organizations signed the initial statement though five of them attended the meeting, but a year later sixty nine organizations joined. 1000 people signed an online petition and 1200 joined a Facebook page on the issue, while some 120 customers at Dexia denoted 5 euros from their accounts to the campaign.

The background of the campaign was in line with BDS movement’s aspiration, and was done through contacts with some its affiliates. However, the website of the campaign against Dexia did not mention the BDS norms as one major activist asserts. She adds that it is difficult to mention BDS norms explicitly since the campaign would have been compromised. For example, some Belgian communities that are shareholders of Dexia raised the issue for discussion (some 34 communities out of the 556 local and provincial authorities that stayed silent on the matter), but if the campaign had been mentioning the BDS norms explicitly, many of them would not have joined. Yet, the spokesperson for the Dexia campaign is explicit on the connection with BDS. He said a year after the launch of the campaign: “Since the call for BDS has been launched, activists on a global scale became active in boycotting Israeli products”. The campaign was initiated by Belgian

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443 This platform existed in 2003 during the earlier boycott initiatives but was almost frozen after the failure of the first boycott campaign (interview with ‘Sophia Abdallah’; op. cit.)
445 Interview with ‘Sophia Abdallah’; op. cit.
446 “One year Dexia campaign: Interview with spokesperson Mario Franssen”; op. cit.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid.
449 Interview with ‘Sophia Abdallah’; op. cit.
450 “One year Dexia campaign: Interview with spokesperson Mario Franssen”; op. cit.
groups autonomously, though with some coordination with the Palestinian BDS actors. The campaign also confined itself to the Israeli settlements issue in order to have a larger support.

Intal was established officially in 2006 and had its roots in the Anti-Imperialist League, which had close connections with the Global South, and started its relation with Palestine in the 1980s when it sent doctors to the refugee camps in Lebanon in coordination with the PLO during the period of the Israeli invasion to Lebanon, as Mario Franssen from Intal recalls. He himself had previously worked with Oxfam and other organizations and had started his relation with Palestine through a visit just before the second Intifada.  

These campaigns that were initiated by European groups had a direct route for boycott and connections with the BDS actors, which were not necessarily passing through the transnational fora. It was an important factor for the partial endorsement of the BDS norms inside Europe. Intal had no active participation in the international networks for Palestine, either in Durban, UN related fora, European Social Forums. According to Franssen, this is due to the immoderate costs which comes with the participation in such fora (traveling, etc.). Additionally such fora are considered to be “not efficient”, and about “discussion for discussion”. Intal focused more on the practical side such as targeted boycott campaigns, which became the BDS movement’s preferred way of action instead of the lists to boycott that were spread in Palestine and the early boycott initiatives in Belgium and the UK for example.

The Dexia campaign is an example on a shift in the way of action. In the previous campaigns, such as the 2003 campaign, Sophia explains that activists got tired after two or three years of working on streets against stores, with bad publicity, without proper communication with the directors, the lack of media coverage, and without achieving much success. While the Dexia campaign had limited success, it was more focused and got media attention. For this reason, they decided that each organization would take the lead in a campaign. This way of action had its effects on BDS movement as well.

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451 Interview with Mario Franssen; op. cit.
Later on, other campaigns emerged in Belgium, mainly against dates from Israeli settlements in the 1967 occupied land, that was initiated after the Gaza war in 2008-9, besides campaigns for weapons embargo, against the G4S, in football (against Israel’s membership at UEFA),\(^{452}\) and lately in the academic boycott. Whereas in each of these campaigns, the initiative has been launched by a specific organization or individual(s).

The debate between campaigning ways of action and changing the regime itself is also a usual debate between reformist and revolutionary tendencies, where sometimes they intersect or one leads to the other. The second *Intifada*, for example, is a sort of revolution (revolution as a wide popular mobilization aiming at getting rid of a regime) that aimed at getting rid of the occupation regime among other issues. Hence, the spontaneous tendency was to get rid of Israeli products with the whole regime of occupation. Chapter four traced the initiatives taken by the Palestinian Observatory that issued a list of 50 Israeli products to boycott, which had alternatives in the Palestinian market. The *Intifada’s* goal, in relation to boycotts, was to get rid of most of Israeli products. This which was pushed by the higher political coordinating body of the *Intifada*. It partially succeeded during the first two years of the *Intifada*, but then the whole forces of the *Intifada* endured heavy Israeli blows that targeted as well its coordinating leadership (i.e. imprisoning Marwan Barghouti). This is in addition to other internal factors and the dependency on the Israeli economy- that was quickly discussed in chapter four.

Yet, campaigning components were present as an element in the early Palestinian boycotts, though they were not focused on one product for example. Limited lists of products were circulated, such as the list of 26 Israeli settlements products, or the targeting of specific products such as the Israeli dairy brand Tnuva to be replaced with other available Palestinian brands.

Of course, different from Palestine, there is in Belgium no wide base for a revolutionary action in general or in relation to Israel in particular. Franssen explains, which intersects with other interviewed persons, that if Israel as a whole is targeted, then the supporting base would be very narrow, while if specific targets particularly related to

\(^{452}\) Interview with “Sophia Abdallah” (Brussels, 7 March 2014), A. J. from ECCP (Brussels, 7 March 2014), A. P. (Brussels, 24 March 2014).
the occupation of the 1967 land, then the base becomes wider. The recent Belgian ‘Made in Illegality’ campaign based itself largely on a legal language related to the occupation of 1967 land, without mentioning boycott. It was able to re-form a broad coalition of established NGOs besides small organizations and individual activists, after the failure of the 2003 campaign by Oxfam and others. It came also after the EU issued its guidelines in 2013 on labeling the Israeli settlements exported to Europe.

Franssen recalls that the campaigning way of action was further encouraged on the margin of a Russell Tribunal on Palestine meeting in London in 2010. Differently from a meeting in Barcelona in 2009 that was full of political discussion, Palestinian and transnational BDS activists did a roundup in London’s meeting about the ongoing campaigns in different countries. Hence, the meeting attracted activists who wanted to do something, not only to discuss politics and solutions. London meeting was also a moment for the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) to be more convinced and integrated into the BDS movement’s way of campaigning. Between the period 2010 and 2013, the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) had engaged in different campaigns. ECCP worked on the EU agreements with Israel, and targeted the G4S security company in relation to the EU institutions. The G4S campaign is shared by many BDS groups in Europe.453

Already, new young people have been joining ECCP or the Russell Tribunal on Palestine as volunteers or working there or both such as Aneta Jerska, Kasia Lemanska, Frank Barat among others, whom have been energetic on the Palestinian issue. Their work

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453 As Aneta Jerska indicated, ECCP campaigns included:

- Public campaign against Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) signed by EU and Israel in 2011. Together with thousands of NGOs who joined the campaign, campaigners and human rights defenders sent more than 50,000 messages to their Members of European Parliament;
- Suspension of the EU-Israeli Association Agreement, which grants Israel favorable tariffs for the export of products to the EU. Article two of the Agreement calls for suspension in the case of human rights abuses;
- An EU ban on settlement products and Israeli companies which export them. The July 2013 EU guidelines are an achievement and initial step in that direction (see below);
- Call for an EU arms embargo of Israel that is supported by the European Network Against Arms Trade;
- Campaign against G4S security contracts for EU buildings following an EU decision not to renew a previous G4S contract in April 2012;
- Campaigns against upgrading EU-Israeli economic relations and EU funding of Israeli research programs such as Horizon 2020 and particularly the inclusion of Israeli companies involved in the settlements or other violations of international law.”. See: Aneta Jerska, “Campaigning for Palestinian Rights in Europe”; op. cit., and interview with Aneta Jerska (Brussels, 17 March 2014).
on that matter coincided with the endorsement of the BDS norms that they have been pushing for. For example, the current coordinator for the ECCP, Aneta Jerska, who is also a co-founder of the Polish solidarity group with Palestine together with Ewa Jasiewicz – a Polish British living in London and active on Palestinian, Iraqi and local UK issues for marginalized communities. Aneta has been pro-Israeli until high school when she visited Palestine, and then became active in the solidarity movement while being careful not to work with anti-Semitic Polish atmospheres. Frank Barat, the coordinator of Russell Tribunal on Palestine, has become politicized after 9/11 terrorist attacks, and became critical to the US war on Iraq and critical to Israel.  

Franssen from Intal adds that events such as the 2006 war in Lebanon, the 2006 Palestinian elections and the political mobilization it caused, 2008-9 war on Gaza, pushed many people to become politicized and wanting to do something. The boycott campaigns constituted a practical answer. Moreover, these campaigns have been achieving successes, partial or complete, in many cases (and failed in other ones such as the EU upgrading a scientific and industrial agreement with Israel ACAA), which encouraged this way of action. For example, after the campaign against Dexia bank, and since May 2009, the bank started a partial retreat and declared it would stop such activities in settlements (not Jerusalem).  

The BDS movement in Europe inherited the campaigning atmosphere that appeared in earlier boycott initiatives in diverse places, but added to the campaigns a political program that wanted to change major aspects in the colonizing regime. After 2005, BDS campaigns would start in Europe, mostly by less established European activists (i.e. not having long-standing institutional settings). The example of Belgium demonstrates how less established people in the Flemish organization, for example, have pushed for the BDS, and then a split occurred inside the group, before finally winning a general vote for the adoption of the BDS. Similarly, a small BDS forum was formed in Belgium, mainly by

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454 Interview with Frank Barat (London via skype from Brussels, 4 and 5 March 2014).
456 Interview with Michael Daes (London, 1 September 2015).
individuals and small organizations, with no large institutional formation, but has not sustained for a long period.\textsuperscript{457}

In the UK, links with the established trade unions were among the reasons for the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC)- and depending on the local branch- to be somehow careful in endorsing the BDS norms explicitly. Local branches of the UK PSC (and PSC in 2009) or the Scottish PSC participated in campaigning like the case of the campaign against Veolia,\textsuperscript{458} in addition to a separate network for the BDS activists was formed though many of its local activists were active in the PSC but had different views on endorsing the BDS.\textsuperscript{459} Compared to the Belgian BDS network, the UK one is larger and much more active.\textsuperscript{460} Moreover, as interviewees assert, individuals in such a network in the UK have generally connections with Palestine (if not Palestinians), connections with the Global South, are young, leftists and/or inclined to direct action, including some British anti-Zionist Jews.

Moreover, two interviewed BDS actors\textsuperscript{461} demonstrate the importance of campaigning for activists, as spaces that have clear projects to work on, and that demonstrate to other European actors “what the BDS is about”; which is about practical campaigns to work on.\textsuperscript{462} Campaigning by European activists on specific boycott issues made the BDS norms being more recognized by skeptical or hesitant actors.\textsuperscript{463} Lately, Omar Barghouti said that he is against lists and for targeted campaigns.\textsuperscript{464}

The earliest campaign after the BDS call was the one against the companies Alstom and Veolia that were engaged in the Jerusalem railway project. Alstom lost lately a

\textsuperscript{457} Interview with “Sophia Abdallah”; \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{459} Interview with one of the main activists in this network who preferred to speak unanimously (London, 7 September 2015). This piece of information is confirmed by other interviewees.
\textsuperscript{460} Interviews with Ewa Jasiewicz (London, 15 September 2015), Naomi Wimborne-Idrissi (7 September 2015), and Michael Daes; \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{461} Interviews with Rafeef Ziadah and Michael Daes; \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{462} Interview with Michael Daes; \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{463} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{464} Lecture at the University of Gent; \textit{op. cit.}
contract worth of USD 10 billion in Saudi Arabia in 2011,\footnote{Palestinian BDS National Committee, “BDS Victory: Alstom loses Saudi Haramain Railway contract worth $10B”, 27 October 2011, via http://www.bdsmovement.net/2011/alstom-loses-saudi-haramain-8253 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>}{465} besides many other losses that the two companies are facing. It has been initiated by a regional organization (the Arab League) in March 2006 during a summit,\footnote{“The resolutions of the Arab Summit in Khartoum” (in Arabic), Al-Zaytouna, 30 March 2006, via http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/4789.html <accessed on 12 December 2015>} and was paralleled with European campaigns, starting from the Irish Palestine Solidarity Campaign that succeeded due to its pressure to cancel a contract between Veolia and a trade union in August 2006, and was followed by a series of successes due to campaigns (in Netherlands in November 2006, in the USA in June 2007, in France in October 2007, …).\footnote{“Veolia Campaign Victories”; op. cit.}

The Palestinian BDS National Committee provides a detailed narrative on the process leading to targeting these two companies:

In 2008 the BNC, the largest Palestinian civil society coalition, with partners in Europe and Israel, launched the \textbf{Derail Veolia and Alstom} campaign, due to the two companies’ involvement in Israel’s illegal Jerusalem Light Rail (JLR) project, which explicitly aims to “Judaize Jerusalem,” according to official Israeli statements, by cementing Israel’s hold on the illegal colonial settlements built on occupied Palestinian land in and around Jerusalem. Since then, Veolia has lost more than $12B worth of contracts following boycott activism in Sweden, the UK, Ireland and elsewhere. Alstom, too, suffered substantial blows when the Swedish national pension fund AP7 excluded it from its investment portfolio, after having been excluded from the Dutch ASN Bank due to the company’s involvement in Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land, and has recently announced its intention to withdraw from the project.

The decision is in line with a decision adopted by consensus at the Arab Summit held in Khartoum in 2006 which condemned in the JLR project and called on “the two French companies [Alstom and Veolia] to immediately withdraw from the project,” and demanding that punitive measures be taken against them “if they don’t comply.” The Arab Summit also urged the French government to take the necessary measure in this respect to honor its obligations under international law. In March 2010, the UN’s Human Rights Council denounced Israel’s JLR project for being “in clear violation of international law and relevant United Nations resolutions.”

In commenting on the fierce competition between the Alstom-led consortium and its Spanish-led rival over the second phase of the lucrative Haramain Railway project, Emirati newspaper, Al-Ittihad, referred to “multiple factors” affecting the decision to award the contract, suggesting that political factors may have been taken into consideration.
The BNC and several partners have used private and public channels to urge the Saudi leadership to exclude Alstom from the second phase of this large project which will connect by rail Mecca with Medina after Alstom had won the much smaller contract for the first phase.

In 2009, BNC member organizations, Stop the Wall and the Civic Coalition to Defend Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem, have produced in-depth research about Alstom’s involvement in Israel’s illegal JLR project. Copies were sent to Saudi officials, prompting Palestinian leaders to address Saudi authorities urging them to exclude Alstom from their contracts.

Jamal Juma’a, Stop the Wall coordinator and BNC Secretariat member commented on the news saying: “This huge victory will be celebrated in the BDS campaign worldwide. We are hopeful that this will be the first of many decisions to kick Alstom out of the Arab world and beyond, sharply raising the price of its collusion in Israel’s violations of Palestinian rights.”

Campaigners from Europe and North America met in London in 2010 with Palestinian BDS activists, and included campaigners against: Alstom (starting in the Arab region and Ireland in 2006), Agrexco, Dexia Bank, Ahava (mostly in North America), G4S, and Veolia among others. Though it is not the focus of the research to investigate campaigns per se, it is helpful to point out to their effects on the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) and other diverse actors such as the UK PSC, who have been already engaged in some campaigns during the second Intifada, to get closer to the BDS movement and its European allies’ way of action and endorse these norms that can combine specific targets with long term wider political goals.

Brussels is also the capital for the EU, where the European Coordination Committees (ECCP) has its center in Brussels. Four meetings occur each year between the members European solidarity groups in ECCP. In addition to the previously exposed campaigning way, the interaction between BDS actors and the ECCP is discussed, in relation to two transnational routes: inside an international organizations route and the interactions with the World (and European) Social Forums, in the next chapter.

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468 Ibid.
Chapter VI

Interactions with European actors at the UN-CEIRPP and WSFs

In the previous chapter, the relations between Palestinian actors with British and Belgian actors were explored, mostly during the second *Intifada* period. In one of the pathways through the UK, it demonstrated a success in an academic track and its important effect on the BDS actors. It demonstrated that academics (i.e. civil society at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee In one case, Mona Baker has been pushing to raise the boycott norm to the highest point since the early beginning. These cases demonstrated European actors who have *habitus* in connection with the question of Palestine, beside previous activism in issues related to the Global South including the South African anti-apartheid activism and legacy. They have been also less established actors than universities (administrations) or other political bodies.

A somehow similar conclusion is found out through the Belgian case though it demonstrated less optimistic potentials because of the occurrence of two issues: Sharon’s prosecution in Belgian courts and an early boycott campaign. Similar to the UK discussed case; the *habitus* of the actors is either connected to Palestine (Nadia Farkh, Myriam and Numan Othman, and Mario Franssen) or to the Global South (i.e. Jan Dreese, Intal, Pierre Galand, and Oxfam). Yet, the less established among them have been less hesitant to endorse the BDS norms, while the most established like Oxfam retreated under pressure in the world field. In the case of the Flemish organization, which is much less resourced, the less established persons were able to change the hesitant decision of the head of the organization and to become themselves heading the organization.

In this chapter, a continuation to the relational aspects between Palestinian and European actors is pursued, but through mediations of other actors in different regions and forums, which is important to the question of pathways and norms, besides its contribution to the endorsement of the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) to the BDS norms. Already, the pathway to Durban in 2001 was important to the movement but the European non-state actors in relation to Palestine were not significant in relational terms with Palestinian actors.
In the following discussion of two spaces - one inside an international organization (the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP) and the other in a transnational space represented by the World Social Forum and the affiliated European Social Forums - the research follows the relational terms through mediations until the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) endorsed the BDS.

1. The route of civil society at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee

Through the international organizations, a spark has already been triggered at the NGOs Forum in Durban in 2001, parallel to the UN conference against racism. The UN related bodies would become an important arena for civil society participation, debates, coordination and declarations, including an active participation by BDS actors that would be increasingly attracted to transnational and international interactions.

Additionally, international organizations have major influence on European actors for Palestine in interaction with Palestinian BDS actors, as the researcher has traced with the interactions in the civil society conferences at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP); in order to understand pathways and their effects on Palestinian and European actors (besides others).

In general terms, the UN is one of the major factors that pushed for giving more transnational power to NGOs (Hammond 2007), either in national, regional or international spheres. In relation to this research, some UN agencies, including the General Assembly, have relevance to the development of the BDS norms. They pulled Palestinian actors to new opportunities where they have been affected by the UN norms and affecting at the same time dimensions in these organizations. In addition, such UN-related events had their effects on European actors for Palestine and in relation to BDS.
The emergence of sanctions and boycotts

After the first Palestinian Intifada, the civil society calls for sanctions have started to circulate at the civil society conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), as discussed previously in chapter three. However, with Oslo accords, such calls have weakened among NGOs. Additionally, referring to the UN resolutions (including UN-GA 181 of partition of historical Palestine and 194 of return of refugees and UN-SC 242 and 338 for ending the occupation), and respecting the Geneva Conventions, international law, and international humanitarian law, have been frequent calls in the proceedings, declarations, workshops and statements of international civil society conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), symposia, and the annual meetings of the international days of solidarity with the Palestinian people, which also constituted a major part of the Palestinian NGOs’ habitus.469

Before Durban forum of 2001, the terms “apartheid” started to appear not only among Palestinian actors, but also among transnational actors. This occurred during the international conference of NGOs at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in Madrid in July 2001 (after the second Intifada). The Cuban Juan Carretero Ibáñez (Secretary-General of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, Havana) said that Palestinians “found themselves locked up in a kind of bantustans”.470 Similarly, Don Betz, the chairperson of the International Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine pushed it further by making the analogy between Israel and Pretoria. He “cited the example of a group of students at the University of California at Berkeley, Students for Justice on Palestine (SJP), which had adopted a

469 For example, the NGOs declaration at the UN-CEIRPP international civil society conference (Madrid in July 2001) stated that “We mobilize our collective efforts on the Question of Palestine, as we have since 1983, on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions. We are convinced that these resolutions offer the clearest pathway to a true and just peace for all in the region.” See: “The United Nations NGO Meeting in Solidarity with the Palestinian People” (Madrid, 19 July 2001), UNISPAL website, via https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/1ce874ab1832a53e852570bb006d1af6/f40dbdc850a07c4685256b11007276a5?OpenDocument <last accessed on 19 February 2016>. Also, the NGOs’ declaration in a similar conference in September 2002 stated that “We believe that the United Nations, its Charter, its resolutions, as well as the Geneva Conventions and other sources of international law, provide the best framework for resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict”. See: “International Conference of Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People” (New York, 24 September 2002); op. cit.
470 “The United Nations NGO Meeting in Solidarity with the Palestinian People” (Madrid, 19 July 2001); op. cit.
strategy that had proved successful in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. They were calling on the university to adopt a position on the question of Palestine parallel to its past stance on apartheid.”

Again, at the Madrid conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in 2001, the following actors have also been participating: The Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace (headed by Gabi Baramki), Allam Jarrar (member of the Steering Committee of PNGO), the Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ), also part of PNGO, the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP), and the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign among many others.

Many calls and plans during that period had been mostly focusing on “protecting the Palestinians” either through transnational activists in Palestine or through calling for an international force in Palestine, which had attracted some Palestinian NGO actors. However, the calls for sanctions, boycotts, or/and divestments started to appear lightly again. At the Madrid conference of 2001, the NGOs’ declaration confined itself to: “We support the European NGOs’ call for the suspension of the EU-Israeli association agreements” and conducting “a boycott of settlement products”.472

Particularly after the Durban forum of 2001, the calls for sanctions, boycotts and divestment would become sharper and the norms have started to disperse from transnational actors that are weaker than international actors, as then it started to take shape at the subsequent civil society conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) or at the World Social Forums.

The chairperson of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), Papa Luis Fall, the representative of the Senegalese state, addressed a regional African NGOs meeting (under the auspices of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP) in June 2002 in Morocco that carried the “apartheid” analogy and related norms like boycott. He said that his committee is responsive to the African NGOs calls. He added: “Boycott campaigns of Israeli products had attracted increasing attention and were becoming recognized as a

471 Ibid.
472 Ibid.
legitimate tool for influencing Government policy […]. The initiatives by African NGOs were gaining momentum and the Committee [UN-CEIRPP] was aware of the moves to show parallels between the current Israeli policies and those of the apartheid regime of South Africa”.473 Na’eem Jeenah from the South African PSC said in that same regional meeting: “At the World Conference against Racism [in Durban in 2001], African NGOs had symbolically launched a movement called the International Movement against Apartheid Israel, with the aim of isolating Israel. A move for consumer and trade boycotts received wide support throughout South Africa. An academic boycott had gained ground. There was also talk of mobilizing in South Africa a cultural boycott against Israel. The campaign operated also at the Government level”.474 Additionally, the president of the Moroccan Association for the Support of the Struggle of the Palestinian People, Ben Jellou Andalouss Mohammed, demonstrated that: “The Association had also encouraged social movements to express support for the Palestinians and to undertake a boycott of all Israeli products”.

In that African regional meeting, Allam Jarrar, the Vice-President of the Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, sent a letter because he was blocked from travelling by the Israeli occupation, while Abdel Raof EL-Arnaout from LAW Society said that “an international network of organizations should be set up to establish theme days to influence opinion makers”.476 The chairperson of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) stated that he insists to carry on encouraging civil society organization to hold the international conference in September 2002.

At the following civil society conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in New York in September 2002, the representative of the South African Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC- South Africa) continued the mediation by carrying the message of making an explicit analogy between Israel and Apartheid. Na’eem Jeenah said that the “message that was useful for the South African solidarity movement with

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474 Ibid.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
Palestinians was ‘same story, different country’, and linking apartheid South Africa with Israel would be a useful hook for solidarity activists in various parts of the world to articulate their message […]. All the strategies used for the movement against South Africa’s apartheid must be brought out, dusted down, adopted and reused. These included the call for sanctions, severing diplomatic ties and consumer, cultural and academic boycotts. It had to be remembered that international isolation of South Africa could not have worked without internal resistance. International isolation of Israel could not succeed if it was not accompanied, on an ongoing basis, by resistance from within the Palestinian society. The duty of solidarity activists was to strengthen the isolation of Israel on the one hand and assist the Palestinian resistance on the other. ”477

Similar to the PSC- South Africa’s agency, Juan Carretero Ibáñez from a Cuban solidarity organization repeated what he said the year before at the conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP). He stated in 2002 that “Israel must be punished just as the apartheid regime of South Africa had been punished. Its membership in the United Nations must be suspended, and those responsible for murders must be tried as war criminals”.478

Others who mentioned “apartheid” specifically in relation to the occupation was the coordinator of the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions (ICAHD), Jeff Halper, who had also been present in the ESFs (i.e. the European Social Forum-London in 2004 and called for sanctions) and the World Social Forums (i.e. in Porto Alegri in 2005) among other conferences. He became supportive to the BDS norms though with caution (confining them to occupation and selective use479). He said that “occupation was becoming institutionalized as a permanent situation of apartheid […] the more liberal [Israeli] elements were willing to entertain the notion of a Palestinian Bantustan”.480

On his turn, Pierre Galand from the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) mentioned different humanitarian initiatives by the ECCP that also generated public

478 Ibid.
479 Badil’s annual report of 2005; op. cit.
awareness. In relation to sanctions, he did mention them directly but argued: “One of the main initiatives of European civil society had been to pressure the European Parliament to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement in view of Israel’s disregard for the Barcelona Declaration”. He said that it is important to “define the priorities of activities on the question of Palestine”, which hints to the many programs and arguments put forward, ranging from humanitarian aid and protecting Palestinians (through transnational activists or calling for an international force) to sanctions and boycotts. He also mentioned the idea of having people’s court in relation to Palestine (which will take place after seven years: the Russel Tribunal on Palestine and would call then for BDS). The Israeli Terry Greenblatt (from Bat Shalom) mentioned their work in “promoting everyday acts of resistance to the occupation, such as boycotting products manufactured in the settlements”.481

Moreover, the conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) would be spaces for state and non-state coordination, as the example of the process leading to the ICJ’s advisory opinion. In the 2002 civil society conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in New York, 291 representatives of 113 civil society organizations participated, besides 50 governments and Palestine, 4 inter-governmental organizations and a United Nations program attended as observers.482 Giabi Baramki was present as a steering committee member of the conference (representing the Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace), besides Al-Haq, PSC- South Africa, the Cuba solidarity organization, the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) and the French Platform for Palestine.

The NGOs’ action of plan, at the 2002 conference, adopted what those called for sanctions and boycott. It mentioned that they will work in their countries to have actions “including boycotts, divestment, and suspension of aid and trade until the occupation is ended. This includes pressure on Governments to implement such sanctions”.483

481 Ibid.
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
Another recommendation, which was raised originally by the international law professor Richard Falk (who would become the UN rapporteur for human rights and called for BDS norms afterwards), called the UN-GA to refer the case of settlements and occupation to the ICJ. The conferences and meetings of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) played resource spaces for the committee to proceed in the UN-GA. The Israeli wall, which was declared by an Israeli governmental decision on 23 July 2001 on the pretext of providing security against Palestinians exploding themselves in Israeli places, had not raised the attention of transnational civil society organization then. It was first referred to the UN-Security Council on 14 October 2003 (a draft resolution condemning the Wall as illegal), a US veto blocked it. Then it was referred to the UN-GA, and a resolution, raised by the Arab League and Non-Aligned Movement on 8 December 2003, requested that the ICJ gives an advisory ruling regarding the Wall. It was adopted by 90 votes, eight were against (including the US and Australia) and 74 absented (including the EU member states, Russia, Canada, Japan and Venezuela). In February 2004, the ICJ started the public hearings at Hague, while the superpowers (Russia, China, US, UK, and France) have avoided attendance including the EU members.

The contestation inside the UN General Assembly between states, amid frequent US vetoes inside the UN-SC, led to referring the case concerning the illegality of the Israeli wall to the ICJ in December 2003. In July 2004, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion on the illegality of the Israeli wall, and the UN General Assembly (including the European bloc this time) endorsed a resolution calling for dismantling the wall. This process and the

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484 This included China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia (representing Non-Aligned Movement), Iran (representing the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), Kuwait (representing the Arab League), Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and Zimbabwe among others.
487 “General Assembly Adopts Text Requesting International Court of Justice to Issue Advisory Opinion on West Bank Separation Wall”; op. cit.
advisory opinion caused huge momentum between civil society actors, and gave a boost to Stop the Wall campaign, and the BDS call was issued exactly one year after the ICJ’s advisory opinion while quoting it. This case raised expectations, as this case was related to an older case when Pretoria occupied Namibia, and the UN-SC referred the case to the ICJ.

Nasser Al-Kidwa, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, “in his presentation before the ICJ, when he pointed out that ’an advisory opinion can lead to positive developments and perhaps even a chain of events similar to that resulting from the Court’s Advisory Opinion on Namibia.’ A similar view, but from the other side, was taken by [the] Israeli Minister of Justice Yosef Lapid who articulated the concern, shared by many, that an ICJ ruling against Israel could be the first step towards Israel being treated as a pariah state like apartheid South Africa.”

Many conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) had taken place then, with active participation from actors to form the BDS call in July 2005. The regional conference for civil society at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) was held in the Cape Town in South Africa in July 2004, just before the ICJ’s advisory opinion. Civil society organization pledged to organize “a conference of civil society organizations to build a broad movement of solidarity with the Palestinian people on the African continent”, and declared that the “specific forms of such isolation [to Israel] could include sanctions, disinvestment, consumer, sports and academic boycotts and the breaking of diplomatic ties.”

Next conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) took place after few months in New York in September 2004, where ICJ’s advisory opinion was frequently quoted. The conference issued NGOs’ action plan stating that they “will encourage divestment and targeted sanctions against the Occupying Power, and we will urge our Governments to impose restrictions including arms bans, the withdrawal of economic privileges, including bans against items produced by settlements, and travel restrictions

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489 “The UN Forum of Civil Society in Support of Middle East Peace” (Cape Town on 1 July 2004), UNISPAL website, via https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/2A27F91D9403EC1685256ED3005D5064 <last accessed on 19 February 2016>
against violators of the Geneva Conventions and other instruments of international law.”

Though the calls were specific to the occupation and settlements, mentioning “sanctions” and “bans”, not boycott, this conference call gave a push in the ESF-London in October 2004, with close interaction with European actors including the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) and actors to form the BDS, as discussed in the next section of World (and European) Social Forums.

Inside the 2004 conference, Stop the Wall was pushing for a higher level of endorsement to the boycott (i.e. not a partial boycott to settlements). In a workshop chaired by a representative of the Stop the Wall (Victor de Currea-Lugo), it came out with a conclusion that “the education phase would focus on the role and importance of the ICJ itself; the South Africa experience, focusing on the legal aspects […]. NGOs could organize activities with other NGOs to develop a consumer information campaign, promote a sports, cultural and economic boycott, and target private enterprises involved in the construction of the wall and the occupation”.

Reflecting the differences and reservations on this issue by other actors especially in some European countries, another workshop (chaired by Chris Doyle from the Council for the Advancement of Arab- British Understanding) concluded that: “Civil society could mobilize itself in a variety of ways such as the boycott of Israeli goods, including where possible. Every group may not be able to participate in such a call. It was accepted that there was little chance of the imposition of Chapter VII sanctions at this stage”. The Council for the Advancement of Arab- British Understanding, which was a frequent member of the conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), has been cautious on the BDS norms, while preferring the selective boycott of settlements’ products. For example, after years of the BDS movement being more established, the chairperson writes an article favoring the boycott of Israeli products in the Israeli settlements but stating at the same time: “Just as state pressure was building up on settlements, Israeli

491 Ibid.
492 Ibid.
apologists have tried to blur with lines between action on settlements and the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions Campaign (BDS). The rationale is simple. As it stands, and it is unlikely to change soon, it is politically toxic for key states, especially the U.S., Germany and Britain, to endorse boycott campaigns against Israel. That is a political reality”.493

In comparison to early meetings of the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP) in the 1970s and 1980s, when the EEC European states had largely avoided the meeting, a gradual change in their attitude could be observed, especially with the first Intifada and after. For example, in the conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in September 2004, the participation included governmental representations from 7 Middle Eastern countries, 6 South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay and Jamaica), 15 Asian countries, 4 African countries, and 5 European countries (Cyprus, Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal and Liechtenstein), including China and Russia. Three regional international organizations participated: The African Union, League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

In the aftermath of the September 2004 conference included: The Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace (headed by Gabi Baramki) in the steering committee of the conference, Stop the Wall, Al-Haq and Applied Research Institute- Jerusalem (ARIJ) that are part of PNGO. On the Israeli side, the Alternative Information Center and the Israeli Committee against Home Demolitions have been present along with Jewish organizations like the Jewish Voice for Peace. From the UK and Ireland, the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding and Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign participated; both in the steering committee of the conference, and a representative from SOAS. From the US, the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation participated, in the steering committee of the conference, among others including representatives of churches, in addition to civil society organizations from Asia, South America and Africa. The representation is mixed from wide range of actors, with those that tend to boycott Israel to those who oppose it but prefer selective boycotts or divestments (especially from the US) or sanctions/ suspension of privileged agreements and aid to Israel or arms ban to Israel.

Moreover, more established INGOs like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Oxfam have been avoiding these conferences.

In the following months of September 2004 conference, the chairperson of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) attended a conference in Malaysia between 28 and 30 March 2005. He said that “initiative was in line with the Committee’s efforts to mobilize civil society groups to promote the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people”.494 The conference was organized by Peace Malaysia, the Malaysian NGOs’ umbrella, and opened by the Malaysian PM, and attended by over 500 civil society persons from 34 countries.495

The conference was held in Malaysia, which does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, and was at that year the head of the Non-Alignment Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Significantly, the conference was officially opened by the Malaysian PM Abdallah Badawi, which indicated again the spaces of interaction between non-state and state actors in the world field of power on Palestine. Badawi expressed “the hope that civil societies would become more activist in the Palestinian issue in order to break the deadlock in the peace negotiations, which had become a cause for world insecurity. He pointed to the successful role of civil societies in creating the anti-landmines treaty, the Kyoto Accord, and the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court”, according to the coverage of the conference.496

Similarly significant, the PM Badawi expressed that “[l]ike the struggle against apartheid,” he said, “the struggle of the Palestinian people against Israeli occupation of their country enjoys enormous support from the global community. Therefore a more concrete expression of this support by global society is timely and fitting.”497 Hence, this

497 Ibid.
points to the potential acceptance of “apartheid” by state actors as was the case in Durban conference of 2001.

The conference was attended by Jad Isaac, director-general of the Applied Research Institute (ARIJ) that is part of PNGO, and Ramzy Baroud, editor-in-chief of PalestineChronicle.com (a major website to advocate BDS). Jad Isaac was attending the last conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in New York in September 2004 and preceding ones. This conference got the attention of Palestinian actors like Badil that covered it in its annual report of 2005.498

The NGOs’ action plan in Malaysia aimed to reach ambitious goals, though still not up to the level aspired by the BDS movement. The Putrajaya Action Plan stated that “the root cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the Israeli occupation from 1948 onwards of Palestinian land and the consequent subjugation and oppression of the Palestinian people”. It added that the United Nations resolutions would be the start point to resolve the issue. The plan stated that “the Apartheid Wall must of course be fully dismantled. Palestinian refugees should be allowed to return to both Israel and the new Palestinian state while those who choose to remain in their land of domicile should be allowed to do so, with appropriate compensation”.499

The Putrajaya Action Plan pointed out to a potential explicit involvement of the Global South through seeking “to establish an International Centre on Palestine for Civil Society in the South (ICPCSS) to be located in Malaysia”, whose board members “will be drawn from civil society groups in the South”, in order to do different tasks including: “Coordinate the activities of existing Palestinian support groups and networks in the South […]. Study in depth and detail how civil society groups in the South could organize a selective boycott of Israeli goods and divestment from that country in order to pressure Tel Aviv to withdraw completely from the West Bank and the Gaza”.

However, in practice besides normative inclinations, the routes leading to the BDS norms to the Global South have followed less formal orientations, and in continuous interaction with Global Northern actors, as the examples of World Social Forums- to be explored below, UN Durban conference in 2001 and encounters and conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) suggest. For example, at the conferences of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), almost in each conference, there are explicit notifications or calls for the importance of NGOs from Europe and North America. This issue has been a goal of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in itself by the creation of regional coordinating committees on the question of Palestine since 1983, which contributed to creating the European committee ECCP in 1986.

As was evident in the period of 2004-2005, transnational encounters and conferences, either inside the UN-GA and its associated bodies, have consolidated in the direction for discussing sanctions, boycotts or divestments, after their focus for long period on the priority to call for an “international protection force” in Palestine. For example, in the declaration of NGOs at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in September 2004, they indicated a number of coming dates to mobilize transnationally (and internationally with the UN) stating that these “dates reflect week-long periods of mobilization chosen by Palestinian NGOs to coordinate civil society actions throughout 2004-2005”.

In this atmosphere of encounters and conferences during 2004 and 2005, the norms of BDS, raised by Palestinian actors with the help of their allies, became more acceptable to diverse transnational actors (though some had still been hesitant), while HR, international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Geneva conventions, the role of the UN including the UN-GA resolutions 181, 194, 242 and 338 have been established norms for most of the Palestinian NGOs.

After Malaysia conference in March 2005, as the Senegalese chairperson of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) said, it “was agreed that the conference would be held in early summer in Europe [in 2005], in order to reach out to civil society

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Ibid.
organizations in Europe and the Middle East. He also reported on the Peace in Palestine NGO Conference, which had been held in Kuala Lumpur on 28-30 March”.\(^{501}\) In the May meeting, eight additional NGOs sought the recognition of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP). It was obvious that Palestinian actors wanted endorsement of their coming call from the European actors for Palestine.

On 9 July 2005, the BDS call was issued, just days before another international civil society conference at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in 12 and 13 July 2005 that was convened after the same anniversary of the BDS call: a year after the ICJ’s advisory Opinion on the Israeli wall on 9 July 2004.

A Palestinian wide call for the BDS norms and the advisory opinion of the ICJ clearly affected the new international civil society of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in Geneva in July 2005. The NGOs’ call described the wall as “Israel's annexationist Apartheid Wall”, which became the “symbol of the continuing crisis of Israeli settlements”,\(^{502}\) the statement read, and re-emphasized the apartheid analogy by saying that there “is a danger that the current de facto apartheid conditions on the ground could be transformed into a normalized reality”.

The plan of action of the NGOs was one of the early transnational meetings to adopt the BDS call, just after four days of the Palestinian call. The Call for Action was brief and concentrated on adopting the BDS call and making it transnational:

We recognize that, as an international network, our strength lies in our ability to work collectively in unified campaigns and actions. To that end, we urge international, national and regional social movements, organizations and coalitions to support the unified call of Palestinian civil society for a global campaign of Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions [BDS] to pressure Israel to end the occupation and fully comply with international law and all relevant UN resolutions. We have identified the coming year to mobilize for and inaugurate

\(^{501}\) “Palestinian Rights Committee Considers “Critical Issues Requiring Concrete Action” by International Community”; \textit{op. cit.}

this BDS campaign. We call on our partner organizations to intensify all our activities, focusing on the BDS Campaign so that together, we will End the Occupation.\footnote{Ibid.}

Na’eem Jenah, from the PSC- South Africa, participated in reading the draft Action Plan to discuss it by participants. He said that “finally, Palestinian [solidarity] groups and the Palestinians, themselves, were calling collectively for boycotts, divestment and sanctions against Israel. Today’s Action Plan had been inspired by South Africa’s struggle against apartheid, and resistance to injustice and oppression […]. From the Conference onward, it was time to intensify efforts, with the Action Plan [as] the main focus for the coming year. He urged those Palestinian groups that had issued the call this week to lead the campaign at the global level”.\footnote{“UN International Conference Adopts Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS”, PACBI website, 13 July 2005, via http://pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=77 \textlt;last accessed on 22 February 2016\textgt;}

Already, Gabi Baramki spoke clearly that while “United Nations resolutions and international law continued to be violated by Israel with little international reaction, Palestinian civil society had started a movement for boycott, divestment and sanctions. The campaign had been initiated by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) to boycott Israeli institutions and was now spreading to other areas, as had happened during the apartheid regime in South Africa. Mr. Baramki said that the campaign should be supported by international NGOs and, eventually, by their Governments, to force Israel to end the occupation and abide by United Nations resolutions”.\footnote{“The United Nations International Conference of Civil Society in Support of Middle East Peace”, (Paris, 12 and 13 July 2005); \textit{op. cit.}}

The executive director of Peace Malaysia, Ram Karthigasu, attended the meeting as well, alongside core supporters of the BDS movement from South Africa, Cuba, Arab Lawyers Union (that was active in the process of Durban conference in 2001), US and European allies (i.e. the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, and Palestinian Return Centre in the UK, Netherlands Palestine Committee, \textit{Campagne civile internationale pour la protection du peuple palestinien} headed by the Lebanese- French
Nahla Chahhal, Ahmad AbdelRahman from Alternatives, among others). Palestinian core initiators of the BDS call were present advocating the call such as Gabi Baramki and Omar Barghouti coming from the academic track, with PACBI call being issued before a year, alongside Palestinian NGOs like Raji Sourani the head of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (that had a role at the UN Durban conference in 2001), with official encouragement by the chair of the committee and the Palestinian official representatives.

Significantly, Ravan Farhadi as a representative of Afghanistan (that does not have diplomatic relation with Israel) and the chairman of this conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) endorsed the plan. They also encouraged the global network for its adoption and implementation. The NGOs conference was held under the auspices of the committee. Farhadi stated: “The Action Plan pinpointed issues requiring urgent international attention. It also enlisted detailed plans that should guide civil society organizations, like a “navigator”, in their strategy planning. More important than the discussions and the Action Plan -- as a piece of paper did not feed Palestinian children or halt the wall’s construction -- was the implementation phase, he said. Participants should keep alive the energy of the past two days and create a series of influential global movements, by bringing together those working on the same subject and transforming them into one “global force” in support of the Palestinian people. He was convinced that the International Coordinating Network for Palestine (ICNP) could play a major role in that regard”.

This network ICNP played a catalyzer role for the following years. In the early phases of forming the BDS, and in their first conference in Palestine in November 2007, the BDS conference recommended that “[f]or the time being, the International Coordinating Network on Palestine (ICNP) serves as (symbolic, temporary) network for coordination of the global BDS campaign”. This indicates obviously the role of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) for the BDS in transnational links. The Division for Palestinian Rights at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) created this committee that replaced the older International Coordination Committee of NGOs on the

506 Ibid.
507 The BDS Steering Committee, “First Palestinian Conference for the Boycott of Israel (BDS)”; op. cit.
Question of Palestine. However, according to an actor (wrote in 2005), the committee “has not yet crystallized as an effective body” (Halper 2005: 66).

Obviously, there was a pressure on the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP). The Senegalese official representative did not chair the session of July 2005. He said “Part of the cause of the Middle East problem was that there was a major misunderstanding in the minds of people on all sides. The President of the Republic of Senegal had therefore called on the international community to promote dialogue between peoples of all religions in order to advance tolerance”.  

“On behalf of the Palestinian leadership”, Hind Khoury, the minister at the PA to the same conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in July 2005 “expressed the Palestinian leadership’s concern and anxiety regarding the threats to the Palestinian Rights Committee [UN-CEIRPP], and hoped that everyone would stand firm behind it to maintain its good work, for the sake of peace, justice and human rights”. She was “heartened” by the participants energy and assured them the support of the PA leadership “in any way possible, despite its limited resources”.  

As representatives of states or official bodies, they did not advocate a similar plan to pressure Northern powers- if not confronting the Israeli colonization directly- to change their positions on Israel, but they encouraged- to varying degrees- the broad civil society actors to go forward with this plan, which echoes the process of the Durban conference in 2001. This suggested the contradiction between the willing normative side and the disabled or trapped political side. The official actors did challenge the domination in the world field of power on Palestine except in a small degree. Another incident such as this occurred previously when the Egyptian foreign minister encouraged the Egyptian and Arab NGOs to go forward in their mobilization for an apartheid analogy in the Durban conference in 2001 and to call for sanctions, and they tried to issue resolutions at the UN-SC but faced vetoes from the US. At the same time, the Egyptian regime had diplomatic, economic and political relations with the Israeli governments and did not act practically to isolate Israel.

509 Ibid.
regionally (as it used to do before Camp David treaty), but it called in the preparatory process for the Durban conference for sanctions against Israel internationally.

Hence, an early transnational call endorsing the BDS came under the auspices of a states-led UN committee, with the push by the Palestinian NGOs/academics and their allies. Similarly somehow, the Durban conference in 2001 had occurred because of the mobilization between states, besides of course the Palestinian, Arab, African civil society actors and their allies, especially SANGOCO and through the mobilization of PSC- South Africa.

Additionally, the European coordination in the Durban conference in 2001 has been largely divided and dysfunctioning. Until the conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in July 2005, European coordination on Palestine had progressed largely, yet it had not been consolidated. The European representation at the conference of July 2005 was lacking behind, as expressed by Pierre Galand- the head of the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) who complained about the European misrepresentation in the conference.\(^{510}\) The European coordination to endorse the BDS norms had to wait for additional years to arrive. Galand, played both roles as a head of ABP and ECCP, in addition to being a Belgian senate, and has expressed in the conference his normative side for going with the analogy of the anti-apartheid struggle against South Africa for the Palestinian issue. At the same time, he was cautious and expressed his worry about the European public opinion that needed more effort to learn about the Palestinian rights.\(^{511}\)

The process inside the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) leading to the potential adoption of BDS norms had definitely encouraged the BDS actors. In its highlights about the BDS norms transnationally, Badil highlighted that the conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) was one of the early transnational endorsements by stating that “International civil society fora and campaigns which have explicitly endorsed the Palestinian Civil Society BDS Call in 2005 include: United Nations

\(^{510}\) Ibid.

\(^{511}\) Ibid.
International Conference of Civil Society in Support of Middle East Peace (13 July 2005)\textsuperscript{512}

Additional civil society conferences at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) continued afterwards and provided potentials and encouragement for the BDS actors.\textsuperscript{513}

As the bulk of the Global South countries pushed for the vote on the ICJ’s decision, and with the supportive votes of the European countries after the decision was released, a somehow similar process has occurred in the transnational mobilization for Palestine inside the World Social Forums, but with a difference of some European active participation in the process before ECCP adopting the BDS call in 2008.

2. Relations at the World and European Social Forums

While European initiatives for Palestinian rights demonstrated potentials for the actors of the BDS; hence attracting BDS actors as the cases of London and Belgium demonstrate, the European initiatives to respond positively to the BDS call have been interrelated with other transnational mediators to lift up the level of boycott of the European calls in relation to Palestine and helping those European initiatives from within.

As the South African Durban conference in 2001 played a role as a major “crane”, and South African actors have continued to carry the norms such as the discussed case of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), Brazilian actors besides Asian and Arab actors would carry on lifting up the Palestinian calls transnationally and inside Europe. One particular space for this process has occurred through the World Social Forums


\textsuperscript{513} The proceedings of the committee had attracted the attention of the BDS. For example, on the website of the BDS, the conferences (especially the action plans) have been posted: “International Coordinating Network on Palestine – 2008 Global Call to Action!”, November 4, 2007 , via http://www.bdsmovement.net/2007/international-coordinating-network-on-palestine-2008-global-call-to-action-67 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
(WSFs) and their affiliated European Social Forums (ESFs), and in between the Anti-War Movement during the preparation for the US-led war on Iraq.

For example, Badil (with the network OPGAI as a major network in forming the BDS) became attracted to the World Social Forum, particularly in 2004 and 2005 and after, and became alerted to mobilizations around the world. Badil wrote: “The World Social Forum has given rise to numerous regional social forums including the European Social Forum (ESF)”\textsuperscript{514} Both the World (and European) Social Forums would become spaces for heated debates related to the BDS norms.

This section does not focus on World (and European) Social Forums \textit{per se}, not even on their relation to Palestine in general other than providing a general background; rather, it seeks to see important links between these gatherings and European solidarity groups for Palestine, on the one hand, and Palestinian actors behind the BDS, on the other hand, to particularly understand developments in European actors in relation to the BDS actors during the second \textit{Intifada} and after, and how this has affected BDS actors. What brought this section into attention of the research is the realization that since 2004, the ESF had been in interaction with European actors for Palestine amid a debate on boycott and sanctions, and in relation to the BDS actors. It was a process until 2008 in Bilbao that the European actors (mainly inside European Coordinating Committees ECCP) would reach a consensus on BDS after a process related to World (and European) Social Forums and Anti-War transnational interactions.

\textit{Background of the WSFs/ESFs and Palestine}

Since its inception in 2001 in Porto Alegre in Brazil, the World Social Forum has quickly developed a focus on the Palestinian issue as a major “global justice” issue. At that time, the atmosphere of a coming war on Iraq and the second Palestinian \textit{Intifada} that was in its peak then helped to provide a momentum to the global concern with Palestine.

Unlike the Durban conference in 2001; an occasion that could not repeat or find sustainable momentum because it was initiated by the UN (i.e. the “Durban II” conference in 2009 excluded the BDS-related Palestinian actors and limited the NGOs participation). Moreover, unlike the annual UN related conferences for civil society where invitations to participant organizations were more selective according to the UN’s NGO criteria, the restrictions are much less in the World Social Forum. The WSF has provided sustainability to global networks interested in “alter-globalization”, “global justice” or “anti-imperialism”, as it also provided for specific Palestinian actors a sustainable space of global networking and actions.


Already, the NGO Forum in Durban in 2001 also called itself Durban Social Forum, as an early push by diverse regional actors to spread the Forums beyond Brazil and diversify its issues. And directly following the start of the Israeli invasion to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in March/April 2001, the World Social Forum had its first special event in Palestine in April 2002. On 8 April 2002, “a call launched by the Brazilian Organizing Committee of the World Social Forum to join a Brazilian delegation of parliamentarians and members of Brazilian organizations active in the World Social Forum, which was getting ready to go to Palestine”.515 Already, some Brazilian figures have been in Palestine either with Yasser Arafat under siege or in the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, where some of the momentum of the Brazilian call was in solidarity with Brazilians as well.516

This quick call by Brazilian actors in the World Social Forum (WSF) in April 2002 was followed in the same year by a more organized event by the WSF. A WSF’s

516 Ibid.
“Thematic Forum” was held in Ramallah in December 2002. Thematic forums were few in the early period of the WSF. In addition, holding two events by the WSF in Palestine in 2002, one year after the launch of the WSF, clearly demonstrated the high interest of the WSF in the Palestinian issue among other global justice issues. The 2012 session in Porto Alegre in Brazil was unusual in raising the slogan “WSF-Free Palestine” as the banner of the transnational gathering, while in the 2013 meeting in Tunis the march was related to the land day in Palestine.

The World Social Forum defines itself as an “open space”.\(^{517}\) As a general description of the WSF argues (Santos 2008: 249):

The WSF is not a party or an international of parties, although militants and activists of many parties all over the world take part in it. It is not an NGO or a confederation of NGOs, even though its conception and organization owes a great deal to NGOs. It is not a social movement, even though it often designates itself as the movement of movements. Although it presents itself as an agent of social change, the WSF rejects the concept of an historical subject and confers no priority on any specific social actor in this process of social change. It holds no clearly defined ideology, either in defining what it rejects or what it asserts.

The driving motor behind the inception of the World Social Forum are Brazilian NGOs,\(^{518}\) implicitly related to the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) with exceptions like the Landless Farmworkers Movement (MST) that was on the left of most of these organizations. They have connected with “new social movements” (i.e. of the post 1968 student revolts) and center-left NGOs (there is a thin line between them and not always easy to distinguish) such as ATTAC- France. ATTAC had more limited forums previously in relation to the World Economic Forum in Davos, besides other organizations such as Focus on the Global South in Asia, and Alternatives in Canada. It gathered in a way the Brazilian NGOs with new social movements arising from Seattle demonstrations and

\(^{517}\) The WSF states: “The World Social Forum is not an organisation, not a united front platform, but ‘…an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and inter-linking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a society centred on the human person’”. See: “WSF – A Brief Background”, The WSF-India website, n. d., via wsfindia.org/downloads_docs/1.rtf <last accessed on 24 February 2016>

\(^{518}\) For example, the Forum’s Charter of Principles “was first formulated by the eight members of the WSF Brazil Organising Committee in April 2001 (ABONG, ATTAC [-Brazil], CBJP, CIVES, CUT, IBASE, CIG, and MST, April 2001)” (Whitaker 2004: 121).
elsewhere in Europe (such as in Genoa) in the new millennium. This is a wide spectrum though with its own limits or “bounded diversity”.

Another major trend in the alter-globalization movement is more related to the movements such as the Zapatista movement and its global connections. These more revolutionary movements are excluded from the World Social Forum. 519

The World Social Forum is a sort of open leftist gathering, much more moderate than the “old left” after the defeats (i.e. Guevara, 1968 student revolts, etc.), degradation (i.e. Third World liberation movements turning into dictators and/or corrupt regimes) or liquidation and assassinations (i.e. Lumumba, Indonesia massacres, Allende, etc.) that the left around the world has witnessed during the last decades.

And though the Brazilian actors behind the World Social Forum are mostly, not exclusively, linked implicitly to a Brazilian political party (PT), they tried to explicitly exclude political parties, and adhered to non-violence, though some political movements and parties would “infiltrate” as happened in the World Social Forum in India in 2004. Similarly, some political movements (such as Trotskyists) played a part in the European Social Forum in London in 2004 and other places. Such political movements (either in Europe or in Brazil) held high-level of solidarity in relation to Palestine and anti-imperialism, especially during the US-led war on Iraq in 2003. As a research on World Social Forum realizes (Global Research 2010):

The WSF’s diversity has its limits. Some groups of “civil society” — or of the people, to use a clearer term — are to be excluded: “Neither party representations nor military organizations shall participate in the Forum.” (The April 2002 Bhopal declaration of Indian organisations constituting WSF-India says that “The meetings of the World Social Forum are always open to all those who wish to take part in them, except organisations that seek to take people’s lives as a method of political action”. ) Thus any struggle which defends or advances its cause by use of arms would be barred: for example, had the Vietnamese liberation struggle existed today it would not be able to attend the WSF, even were it to wish it; nor would today’s Palestinian or Iraqi resistance fighters [...].

Yet the same charter states that “Government leaders and members of legislatures who accept the commitments of this Charter may be invited to participate in a personal

519 The Zapatista believe in armed struggle while minimizing it such as the case of Zapatista the 1994 revolution of which some consider as the first manifestation of alter-globalization movement since Zapatista opposed NAFTA agreements and generated global solidarity networks.
capacity.” The Bhopal declaration of the World Social Forum in India emphasizes that the WSF does not intend “to exclude from the debates it promotes those in positions of political responsibility, mandated by their peoples, who decide to enter into the commitments resulting from those debates.”520 In other words, they are not participating in their “personal capacity”, but in their official capacity. Given that these persons are leaders of political parties, and given that as heads of state they lead military organisations, this would seem to negate the earlier clause banning party representations or military organisations.

Hence, the “world field” conception, linking state and non-state actors, enhance our understanding of these developments, starting from the fact that the World Social Forum emerged in a new power such as Brazil that will join later other international allies in BRIC. In fact, BRIC term is said to first appear in 2001 by Jim O’Neill arguing that: “In 2001 and 2002, real GDP growth in large emerging market economies will exceed that of the G7” (2001: 1). Of course, there is no direct relation between the WSF and BRIC (i.e. WSF Brazilian actors first approached ATTAC not Chinese, Indian or Russian actors), but it is not also a mere coincidence in world politics that the WSF would have a Brazilian spark.

In relation to non-violence, in the European field, non-violence in relation to movements has become a mainstream belief shared by officials and peace movements. Officials do not necessarily practice it themselves if not the opposite is true especially in operations outside Europe or in instances of confronting the alter-globalization protests in Europe. The norm spread between NGOs and many social movements. Similarly, center-left NGOs and some leftist movements in Brazil share this conception with the Brazilian PT party. The first World Social Forum to occur outside Brazil took place in India, which cannot escape the interpretation to be as an ally to Brazil, and also as a country adopting largely Gandhi’s non-violence that is central to the WSF’s Charts of Principles.

Additionally, the Brazilian NGOs, and South American social movements for instance, which would incorporate the Palestinian calls, went almost parallel to their states’

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positions on Palestine—though with differences.\textsuperscript{521} South American countries have been the most advanced countries after Asian countries in trying to isolate Israel especially after the wars in Gaza. Some of them even cut their diplomatic relations with Israel.

Such composition of the World Social Forum and its affiliated bodies such as the ESF, specific social forces from the civil society trying to affect national and world politics, would encourage in a way similar Palestinian actors trying to affect Palestinian and world politics; hence, empower them transnationally especially that the Palestinian issue has gained momentum globally.

In different places in Europe and around the world, there have been increased activities and initiatives related to the Palestinian issue in the new millennium and parallel to the second \emph{Intifada}. Palestine became a central issue for many movements for peace and against war, or anti-globalization - global justice movements. As the research of Gwyn Williams (2008) on alter-globalization movements in one of the global hubs for these movements demonstrates, Palestine solidarity activities were central among activities in Larzac, South France, starting from the new millennium. This attracts Palestinian actors, as for example recognized by the Palestine Monitor (of Mustafa Barghouti) in 2002 stating: “Throughout September and October [2002], marches of hundreds of thousands people supporting Palestinian rights in cities throughout Europe and North America show the penetration of Palestine's legitimacy in global discourse.”\textsuperscript{522}

Additionally, the importance of the Global South dimension of the World Social Forum’s sessions is obvious. Moreover, the World Social Forum encouraged regional, national and thematic sessions, which have occurred along the way, including the dynamic European Social Forums (ESFs) since 2002. The ESFs took place in Florence, Italy in 2002 with its associated Social Movements Assembly that recognized the Charter

\textsuperscript{521} For example, in the WSF-Free Palestine in Porto Alegri, in 2012, both the Brazilian ruling PT party and WSF organizing committee agree on the theme of “free Palestine” while the PT and related non-state actors prefer the PA strategy of an independent Palestinian state and other NGOs and social movements encouraged the BDS inside the Forum. See: Alex Cachinero-Gorman, “A Tale of Two Movements: Divergent Trends at the World Social Forum-Free Palestine”, \textit{Jadaliyya}, 2 April 2013, via http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10969/a-tale-of-two-movements_divergent-trends-at-the-wo <last accessed on 22 February 2016>


WSFs/ESFs, the anti-war movement on Iraq and Palestine

The first ESF to occur in Florence, the year after Genoa demonstrations in 2001, was a clear case of the global connections that the World Social Forum had encouraged. It was held under the banner: "Against war, racism and neo-liberalism." It intended, among other issues such as the Tobin tax, to counter the US-led preparations for war on Iraq. Along the ESF’s “Social Movements Assembly” that is a parallel space of movements in the ESF (the ESF itself does not take positions), which called for the huge European and global protests on 15 February 2013 against the war on Iraq. And the protests against the war on Iraq would connect to the calls in relation to Palestine as countering the hegemonic weight led by the US with the participation of some European governments, which also affected the EU’s position on Palestine during the second Intifada.

For example, three actors in the Israeli Apartheid Week in Toronto and North America (Hanieh, Jamjoum and Ziadah 2006: 58) realized that “[e]very major mobilization against the war in Iraq has seen the Palestinian struggle placed up front in opposing the US war machine, and most activists new to the movement are introduced to the Palestinian struggle and history through anti-Zionist perspective”.

These atmospheres of anti-war on Iraq and Palestine gained momentum by a rising anti-war movement globally and in Europe, which would also benefit from the spaces provided by the WSFs and ESFs. Already in the UK case, it has been pointed out how the anti-war movement has been pushing for the Palestinian demands not after a long time of

its establishment; either in the accounts provided by the ex-general secretary of Palestine Solidarity Campaign Betty Hunter, or by Mona Bakar, Hilary and Steven Rose.

Among its different transformations, the World Social Forum’s Charter’s “expressed desire to maximize diversity has largely been realized in its practice. For example, while the first WSF held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001 was organized by a coalition of 12 NGOs and social movements from South America and Europe and attracted 15,000 people, participation grew tenfold to 150,000 in 2005 and was overseen by the new WSF International Council drawn from over a hundred NGOs, networks, social movements, and campaigns from around the world” (Reitan 2007: 512).

If Oslo agreements had to do, partially, with the effects of the second Gulf war in 1991, the US-led policies during the second Intifada had also to do with the war on Iraq. Politicians preparing for war on Iraq viewed that defeating Iraq and occupying it would also mean the defeat of the second Palestinian Intifada.

As Alastair Crooke, who engaged in facilitating ceasefires between the Israeli and Palestinian sides between 2001 and 2003, and “was a member of the Mitchell Commission on the causes of the second intifada and a special adviser to Javier Solana, the former EU foreign policy chief”,524 wrote in 2011, instead of the UK PM Tony Blair learning from the peace experience of Northern Ireland, he followed an opposite route with the Palestinians, while the EU diplomacy has largely followed the US path then though with reservations here and there. What concerned Blair was to subjugate Palestinians alongside occupying Iraq. Crooke wrote:

I was in Downing Street with the prime minister’s foreign affairs adviser, David Manning; the overcoated figure bursting into our meeting was Jack Straw. He wanted to tell Manning that he had persuaded Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, to add Hamas to the EU list of terrorist movements. His tale of his conversion of Fischer was wrapped in expressions of outrage at Hamas. It wasn’t so much the proscription that shocked me. A ceasefire, which I had helped facilitate, had broken down […]. Manning, I knew, believed strongly that there could be no solution to the Israel-Palestine issue without Hamas involvement and had firmly supported EU efforts at inclusive peace-building. Officially, the EU remained committed to a political solution, but it now seemed that two key member states were heading in the

opposite direction – towards a militarised resolution. The wind had changed [...]. We were in a new era, and it required new thinking: ‘The road to Jerusalem now passes through Baghdad,’ the official insisted. He was speaking just before the 2003 invasion. The message was clear: the Islamic resistance in Palestine was to be neutralised, and psychologically defeated, by the massive display of Western force in Iraq, rather than brought into the political process [...]. Manning’s Downing Street successor, Nigel Sheinwald, told me angrily that security in Palestine could be achieved by eradicating the ‘virus’ of Hamas from Gaza, and eliminating its ‘disease’ from the region. He had no interest in helping to create legitimate Palestinian security services, representative of a cross-section of the community. The language was Washington’s. The Palestinian conflict was seen not as a problem in its own right, but as a subset of a war against ‘extremism’ – another domino to be pushed over in order to strengthen the ‘moderates’ [...]. The shift in the British position, under American pressure, sabotaged European policy.

This quotation does not concern Hamas only, but the whole Palestinian field. A major line in the official Palestinian side, represented by Arafat, would be blamed, and the green light was given to Sharon to isolate him (that allegedly poisoned him). Fateh’s military wing (Al-Aqsa Brigades) would be included in the European list of terror as well, alongside the leftist PFLP and the Islamic Jihad. A new Palestinian policy was required, as mentioned in the published Road Map with 100 Israeli reservations, on 30 April 2003, after Mahmoud Abbas took office as the PA Prime Minister and after the land invasion of Iraq finished. The Road Map, which was addressed by the US and Quartet believed in establishing a Palestinian State, demanded to “dismantle [Palestinian] terrorist infrastructure”, which was carried later on by Mahmoud Abbas, while the key Israeli requirement in the Road Map was to freeze building settlements in the 1967 areas, which will not be respected till now, besides withdrawing from the newly occupied land. This approach provided a basic pillar for a Palestinian civil war amid high Palestinian polarization.

As those Trans-Atlantic officials linked war on Iraq with the Palestinian issue, the contestation in the world field by social movements at the ESF, conversely, mobilized strongly against the war on Iraq and linked it with higher calls for Palestinian rights. Many of the European social movements that protested against the war on Iraq lifted up Palestinian calls as well.
As Jamal Juma (the coordinator of Stop the Wall) wrote, the link between war on Iraq and Palestine was tightly linked. He wrote:

An appalling plan for Palestine is shaping up behind Israeli slogans of "disengagement"; behind the British initiative to revive "the Road Map"; and behind the U.S. drive to force through the completion of Israeli plans that finalize the Bantustanization of the Palestinian people. All three are combining to push for an end to all Palestinian resistance, which is seen as a pre-condition for controlling the Middle East from Jerusalem to Baghdad. The U.S. administration in particular is highly aware that any possible chance of success for the occupation of Iraq, and for U.S.-Israeli plans to shape the future of the Greater Middle East, depend on their ability to create "stability" for the Israeli colonial project of annexation, expulsion, and occupation in Palestine.  

In the UK, which hosted the ESF in 2004, the momentum for protesting the war on Iraq had already been strong. Stop the War Coalition in the UK, as many other European social movements, linked both issues tightly together. NATFHE, the teachers union in the UK that adopted hesitantly initial boycott in 2002, had already mobilized against war on Iraq. The coalition included many organizations and movements among them the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Campaign against Nuclear Disarmament (CND), who will be central as well in organizing the ESF in London in 2004.

The mobilizations against war on Iraq gave rise to social and political movements in Europe, at that time. For example, ATTAC that was more concerned with socio-economic issues (such as Tobin tax) became more engaged with war issues. ATTAC, as a major organizer in the ESF and WSF, had witnessed gradual change in relation to the Palestinian issue. Yet, it has been gradual and witnessed friction with other currents as illustrated by a description of a leftist movement: “Central to the work of ATTAC is the question of the taxation of capital movements, (the Tobin Tax, control of tax havens), the re-imposition of nation-state controls on financial markets, reducing the “Third World” debt, fighting the WTO and its free trade agenda including NAFTA or MAI, GATS, exposing unfair North-South trade.” However, ATTAC “tried hard to keep Palestine well down the agenda for the really big sessions [at the ESFs]. They showed a consistent desire to avoid giving too much

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prominence to exposure of state racism, immigrants’ rights and explicit references to fascism and Islamophobia,” according to the post.\textsuperscript{526}

At the same time, ATTAC demonstrated responsiveness to the new momentum for Palestine. On 5 April 2002, amid the Israeli invasion of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, ATTAC published a statement describing the mobilization for Palestine that has emerged from the alter-globalization movements. It stated that hundreds were present in Palestine trying to separate the Israeli army from the Palestinian civilians.\textsuperscript{527} ATTAC stated that though the conflict in the Middle East is not in its mandate, it could not be silent on this war, and asserted that it signed the call by the World Social Forum’s Assembly of Social Movements in Porto Alegri in February 2002, which stated: “The situation of war has further destabilized the Middle East, providing a pretext for further repression of the Palestinian people. An urgent task of our movement is to mobilize solidarity for the Palestinian people and their struggle for self-determination as they face brutal occupation by the Israeli state. This is vital to collective security of all peoples in the region”.\textsuperscript{528} ATTAC ended its statement by a concern on anti-Semitic incidents in France.

ATTAC also posted on its website the Statement by the Asian delegation to the World Social Forum in February 2002, before holding the first ESF in Florence. The Asian statement said: “By waging war on Afghanistan, the poorest country in the world, the US has given Israeli Zionism license to unleash a new reign of terror on the occupied peoples of Palestine”.\textsuperscript{529} They also responded to the Brazilian World Social Forum International Council call to join a mission to Palestine during the Israeli invasion in April 2002,\textsuperscript{530} but they had also their concerns not to raise problematic positions inside Europe in relation to Palestine.

\textsuperscript{526} “Florence ESF: Attac pulls the movement to the right”, 04 November 2003, via http://www.fifthinternational.org/content/florence-esf-attac-pulls-movement-right <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
\textsuperscript{528} “Call of Social Movements”, 5 February 2002, via http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article472 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
Larger established INGOs (such as Amnesty International and HRW) were different from either the new social movements or NGOs in solidarity with the Palestinians, and had no major role either in Durban conference in 2001 or in the World (and European) Social Forum. Amnesty International has been continuously distancing itself from events that had high-level solidarity calls (i.e. boycott) for the issue of Palestine, as what they did in Durban conference in 2001, the UN civil society conference on Palestine in September 2004 and the London’s Social Movements Assembly within the ESF in October 2004.

The researcher witnessed a discussion, during a sit in Brussels for Palestinian prisoners, between Amnesty International and a solidarity group with Palestine in Brussels in March 2013. Amnesty’s representative, who was highly concerned about the Palestinian prisoners’ issue, did not want initially to participate if there was a content related to a call of sanctions and boycott against Israel.

Yet, Amnesty International would also be affected by the rising concern for Palestine, and witnessed gradual slow changes. The research of Hanafi and Tabar (2005) demonstrated how HRW and Amnesty International stayed lagging behind in relation to addressing the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their places but also witnessing gradual changes with time. In relation to this research, Amnesty International issued a call on “arms embargo” to Israel and Hamas in 2009, and a call to “suspend transfers” of weapons to Israel in 2014, which received the attention of the BDS, though Amnesty does not use the words “sanctions” or “boycott” on the case of Israel while it called for selective sanctions against officials in relation to other oppressive states around the world, such as in Nigeria and Libya.

533 See for example on the website of the BDS the search tag “Amnesty International” via http://www.bdsmovement.net/search-results?cx=016977559765540805900%3A5afyspqqt17c&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=UTF-8&q=amnesty+international&sa=Search&siteurl=www.bdsmovement.net%2F&ref=&ss=2921j530667j21 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
Major organizers for the World (and European) Social Forum, as ATTAC, provided the Palestinian issue and actors more space inside the ESF to become a major concern for the subsequent ESFs. Combined with more concerned social and political movements with the Palestinians issue, the ESF would become a vibrant arena for the Palestinian issue.

As an example of the more radical movements that constitute another current in the ESFs, the International Socialist Tendency (a Trotskyist group), which is an alliance of international socialist groups in Europe; strongest in the UK with the Socialist Workers Party, with others in Africa, Asia and South America, mobilized strongly against war on Iraq, with big networks mostly inside the UK (Stop the War Coalition) and in Europe. They have played a major role as well in passing resolutions for boycotting Israel inside the British unions between 2002 and 2005 and after, though Hilary and Steven Rose demonstrate the friction between a party and single-issue campaign.534

Such political movements took the new opportunities available with the emergence of the ESF, and pushed for forming Social Movements Assembly and Anti-War Assembly to escape the “open space” character of the World (and European) Social Forum that avoid taking positions. Hence, such movements were able to lift up the level of norms (such as boycott) for the Palestinian calls during that period, while being empowered by the mobilizations against war on Iraq, the emergence of the ESF and the increasing momentum of solidarity with Palestine during the second Intifada.

The second World Social Forum call got interested in the US war on Iraq and linked it with Palestine.535 Sergio Yahni, from the Alternative Information Center that has played a continuous supportive role for the boycott and sanctions positions, and a member of the International Council of the World Social Forum, stressed on the importance of the Brazilian and South American support for the BDS norms since the arrival of hundreds from Brazil and South America to Ramallah in 2002.536 He stressed on the role of the South in general, from South America and Basque, Spain, in the support for the BDS norms.

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534 Hilary and Steven Rose “BRICUP- the early years…;” op. cit., P.4.
535 Ibid.
536 Interview with Sergio Yahni; op. cit.
The developments related to anti-war in Iraq asserted at the agenda of the Florence ESF, which made the mobilization against war a priority, especially after the UK and the US started to declare their intentions to invade Iraq. In the social movements assembly associated with the ESF in November 2002, the date of 15 February 2003 was assigned for a wide European anti-war mobilization. Anti-war groups in the UK had a major role in pushing for such a priority (i.e. the UK Globalize Resistance group). Following the Florence meeting, the Cairo Conference was held in December 2002, with European actors and others from Asia, and also declared its intention to form a transnational anti-war movement against invading Iraq. Similarly, the World Social Forum in Porto Alegri in January 2003 assigned the date of 15 February 2003 for global mobilization against the war on Iraq.

The wide range of protests on 15 February 2003 against war on Iraq, ranging from conservative estimate of 6-9 million participants (according to the BBC) and reaching an estimate of 30 million around 600 cities in the world were unprecedented coordinated global protests against war. This huge event gave more confidence and role for the anti-war movement in Europe and elsewhere, which would be one of the most eager movements to push for the BDS norms inside the World (and European) Social Forums and beyond, as explained below.

Aurora, from the Netherlands Palestine Committee, for example, wrote: “The eruption of the 2nd Intifada led to a dramatic increase of Palestine solidarity activity, which was additionally boosted following 9/11, as the anti-war movement re-invented itself - this time with the focus on Afghanistan, Iraq and the broader Arab/Muslim region. The prominence of Palestine activists at the forefront of the anti-war movement resulted in the two movements being inherently intertwined and mutually strengthened. As the anti-globalization movement transpired, as well as the phenomenon of Social Forums, Palestine solidarity activists once again took the center stage and Palestine gradually became one of the key issues of the European left.”537 Actually, some would be politicized and engage in

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537 The analyses entitled “A Brief History of the European / Global Palestine Solidarity Movement” by Aurora sent to me on 11 October 2014.
the Palestinian issue, and later on with the BDS, as a result of protesting the US “war on terror” policies.538

Similarly, Hilary and Steven Rose indicate that a core member to form BRICUP is the anthropologist Martha Mundy who had connected to the Middle East and “[f]ollowing Martha’s experience in a highly effective Iraqi solidarity group”, they benefited from it in the formation of BRICUP in 2004.539

BDS norms at the WSFs/ESFs

Hilary Rose attended the anti-war conference in Cairo in 2002, besides the main figures in the UK Stop the War Coalition, including the General Secretary of NATFHE, Ghada Karmi. The Cairo Declaration focused on opposing the war on Iraq and Palestine and called for a boycott to Israel. The declaration stated that the “US unwavering support of the system of apartheid imposed on the Palestinian people will undoubtedly fuel conflict and lead to the escalation of violence in one of the most sensitive areas of the world”, and called in its action plan to “[i]ntroduce the boycott of US and Israeli commodities in solidarity campaigns in support of Iraq and Palestine, with emphasis on the right of return for Palestinians”.540 The Cairo Declaration of 2002 was the second transnational gathering, after Durban in September 2001, to make an explicit reference to Israel as apartheid (besides colonial) and to explicitly call for a comprehensive boycott against Israel. The December 2002 Cairo conference that issued the Cairo Declaration was entitled “against US hegemony and war on Iraq and in solidarity with Palestine”, which was inspired as well by the initial European anti-war demonstrations.

In these atmospheres of arising anti-war movements, the actors took advantage of the World (and European) Social Forums to push for connecting the alter-globalization momentum with the anti-war momentum. The Palestinian issue would also be boosted thanks to this connection.

538 Interview with Frank Barat; op. cit.
539 Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, “BRICUP – the early years”; p. 3, op. cit.
Yet, the acceptance of the BDS norms varied between a transnational space and another. The first Social Movements Assembly associated with the ESF was in Florence in 2002, and had two paragraphs on Palestine, with two major trends representing two moods combined together in the call though both had a common denominator of solidarity with the Palestinians.

The first trend is represented by the “Action for Peace and many other European networks involved in the civil mission in Palestine”. It called for a process “for a European-Palestinian-Israeli network”. It raised the following points: “‘Stop the occupation – Two peoples two states – Actions for Peace’, civil missions for population’s protection, against international human rights’ violation, participation in the Social Forum in Palestine (December 2002)”.

The other trend was by the “organisations participating in the seminar Palestine at the FSE [ESF]” and it was associated with the call: “to organise a European network in solidarity with the Palestinian people. Support to the Intifada, to stop Israeli occupation, for a just peace, the return of the refugees, the dismantling of all colonies, the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as capital. To send international delegations, to boycott Is[r]aelian products and for br[e]aking up economic and trade relations between the EU and Israel, to support progressive and secular Palestinian forces, freedom for prisoners like Marwan Barghouti and Ahmed Sadat”.

There were common themes in the two trends but with a friction related to the call for boycott and sanctions (represented in the second call), and this friction would continue for the coming few years.

After the World Social Forum in Porto Alegri in 2002, it would be decided to host a thematic session in Palestine, which has drawn the Palestinian actors, such as PNGO, into this transnational space. It also engaged more European actors in the Palestinian issue. Already, there were “civil missions” to Palestine from various European countries, escalating with the second Intifada, and few boycott initiatives such as the Boycott Israeli

541 “Call of the European Social Movements 12-11-2002”; op. cit.
542 Ibid.
Goods campaign in the UK in July 2001 and in the US the same year. Additionally, there were various formed movements for the Palestinian issue such as the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), the Grassroots International Protection for Palestinians, which were active in sending activists that demonstrated before Israeli check points for example, as discussed in chapter four.

As a draft by PNGO published in Palestine Monitor (of Mustafa Barghouti) indicated, PNGO has been engaged with the Brazilian actors at the World Social Forum and the International Council of the WSF for proposing the thematic session in Palestine in December 2002, with the involvement of many regional actors including the European Social Forum:

[T]he remarkable idea of meeting in Ramallah grew out of a concept raised by the International Council of the World Social Forum before our second meeting in Porto Alegre - Brazil 2002. During the meeting in Porto Alegre II and after discussions with delegations from the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) and the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), the participants suggested a thematic Social Forum in the West Bank and Gaza. The Forum's secretariat decided to hold the forum in Ramallah-Palestine during December, and PNGO was made responsible for the logistics of the forum. In Bangkok, the international council decided to establish an international support committee to assist in the organization of the thematic forum. PNGO was asked to elaborate a concept paper with a proposal. ANND, the European Social Forum, the Asian Social Forum, the African Social Forum, and the World Social Forum Secretariate were selected to be the main parties of the international support committee. 543

The World Social Forum has developed to incorporate the Palestinian issue and actors with time. As Mustapha Barghouti puts it for the WSF thematic session in Ramallah 2002, the first aim was “[t]o integrate the Palestinian National cause in the Global Agenda of social movements and civil societies”, while the fourth goal was to “strengthen and support the link with the World Social Forum, as it is the most important framework for international social movements and civil societies organizations”. 544

The World Social Forum also contributed to raising the calls of those actors inside Europe that have already a tendency to incorporate Palestinian calls for the “three integral parts of the Palestinian people” as the BDS call puts it.

543 “World Social Forum on Palestine (Ramallah - Palestine) – Draft”, op. cit.
544 Ibid.
As indicated above, the first social movements call at the World Social Forum in 2001 did not mention the Palestinian issue, while the concentration was on protesting neoliberalism.\footnote{Call of the Social Movements at the First World Social Forum: Porto Alegre Call for Mobilisation, 30 January 2001, via http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article469 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>} However, with the war on Iraq looming and the developments of the second Intifada, the connection had been made.

The Brazilian actors called then for the thematic meeting in Ramallah in the same year, in interaction with Palestinian actors such as PNGO including Mustapha Barghouti. There were “obstacles imposed for the realization of a Forum in Palestine” in 2002, but an “International Support Group” was assigned for the Palestinian Forum.\footnote{Report of the Meeting of the International Council of the World Social Forum (Bangkok, 13 to 15 of August 2002), via http://www.icae.org.uy/icaepdfs/icbangkok.pdf <last accessed on 22 February 2016>} As Zelitro Luz Da Silva from the Brazilian landless movement, MST, told the attendance at the World Social Forum Palestine Forum: “The Palestinian cause is an increasing concern of the Brazilian people. I want to assure you that the Palestinians receive total and unconditional support from my organisation, and the other social organisations in Brazil.”\footnote{Palestine Social Forum 2002, Resist web, 26 December 2002, via http://www.resist.org.uk/uk/anti-war/palestine/palestine-social-forum-2002/ <last accessed on 22 February 2016>}

Already, MST has been active in the NGO Forum in Durban 2001.


The third World Social Forum’s call of action, in Porto Alegri in January 2003, re-asserting the link between the war on Iraq and the Israeli war on Palestine, called for participation in the 15 February 2003 worldwide protests against war on Iraq, and called
for solidarity with the Palestinians.549 The fourth World Social Forum’s call for action, in Mumbai in January 2004, sustained the link with Palestine and called “to give maximum support this year to the mobilisation for the Palestinian people, especially on 30th March, Palestinian Land Day”.550 Yet, these calls that sustained the call for solidarity with the Palestinians and linked it to protesting the war on Iraq, lacked specific tools and programs in relation to Palestine until then.

Just preceding the ESF in London in October 2004, four related events to Palestine occurred, which additionally lifted up calls at the ESF. The first was PACBI’s call in April 2004; the second event was the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Israeli wall in July 2004, and European states’ votes for it at the UN General Assembly. The ICJ’s advisory opinion had a global impact on arising hopes. The third event followed the first in September 2004. The International Conference of Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People (organized by the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP) was held in New York. The issues of boycott and sanctions have been raised (discussed in the previous section of this chapter). The fourth event was the anti-war conference in Beirut/ Lebanon in September 2004.

The Beirut conference of anti-war and alter-globalization movements in September 2004, was attended by Stop the Wall, popular committees in Palestine, HR NGOs (i.e. Insan HR NGO, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights), politicized development NGOs (Najda, Bisan, …), Palestinian women organizations, Palestinian refugee groups and PLO officials in Lebanon (Aidun Group, Group 194, PLO’s refugees department), political factions (Fateh, PFLP, DFLP), farmers and lawyers unions, among others from the Palestinian side. The conference was a first wide transnational meeting, attended by “over 260 delegates from 43 different countries”, according to Stop the Wall,551 to endorse the B.D.S. norms before the BDS call. The Action Plan started with the Palestinian issue and stated:

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550 “Call of the social movements and mass organizations” (Mumbai; 21 January 2005), via http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article471 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
The following proposals presented by the working group on Palestine were adopted and endorsed by the conference:
- the launch of an International Movement against Israeli Apartheid.
- the economic, academic, cultural, political and diplomatic isolation of Apartheid Israel by the effective imposition of boycotts, divestments, and sanctions
- international mobilizations on 9-16 of November 2004 as part of International Week against the Apartheid Wall as well as on 15 May 2005 to commemorate the anniversary of the Nakba
- the formation of an international working group to coordinate these campaigns.552

A month after Beirut’s conference and the civil society conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in New York that called for partial sanctions and divestment (not boycotts), the fourth ESF took place in London in October 2004. As the Stop the Wall posted, “‘Justice and Freedom for Palestine!’ and ‘Get the Troops Out of Iraq Now!’ were the dominating slogans and placards of the over one hundred thousand protestors that went to the streets at the end of the 3rd European Social Forum (ESF) held in London from the 15th to the 17th of October. This powerful demonstration against war and occupation reflected the centrality of Palestine and Iraq in Europe’s largest annual gathering discussing global justice.”553 Juma spoke at the rally and called for sanctions and boycott against Israel. Mustapha Barghouti addressed the rallies as well and called for sanctions, arms embargo, and academic non-governmental cooperation with Israel. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, which came previously to London directly after Durban conference in 2001, was present as well.

At the ESF- London in October 2004, and the following World Social Forum - Porto Alegri in January 2005 - the Palestinian actors (mostly helped by the European anti-war coalitions besides those European solidarity groups with Palestine that have demonstrated a tendency towards sanctions and boycotts) raised the calls for boycott, sanctions and divestments against Israel. The assemblies have responded positively but with varying responses towards the norm of “boycott” though the norm “sanctions” have been increasingly accepted by more European and international actors. These positive responses,

though with some limitations, encouraged the Palestinian actors to proceed with these norms, as demonstrated for example by the coverage of the ESF by the Stop the Wall.

The Social Movements Assembly Declaration of the ESF in London started with stating: “Today war represents the harshest and most real face of neo-liberalism. The war and the occupation of Iraq, the occupation of Palestine, the massacre in Chechnya, and the hidden wars in Africa are crushing the future of humanity”. 554 The issue of Palestine was a central issue at the ESF-London. There, “people had to sit on the floor, or stand at the back during the plenary [on Palestine]”. 555

As Stop the Wall explained, “[i]n the plenary—the opening session for the ESF—the call for sanctions and boycott against Israeli Apartheid were repeated by Mustafa Barghouti and Jamal Juma’ as well as by all other speakers. In this spirit, and at the workshop on Boycott, the foundations of coordination for a European Boycott were laid”. 556

During the ESF-London, the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) reached an agreement on sanctions. The ECCP meeting included groups from Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Scandinavian countries. They “adopted a unified policy of sanctions against Israel. The results of the meetings were presented to and adopted by the European Social Forum, in which thousands of people from all over Europe participated”. 557

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556 Palestinian Grassroots Anti-apartheid Wall Campaign, “The Call for Sanctions and Boycott on Israeli….”; op. cit.
Yet, the “boycott” norm was still regarded as problematic by some European solidarity groups with Palestine though it got more momentum, and the norm “divestment” was strengthened by the calls coming from the US. The “Anglican and Presbyterian Churches in America have also called for divestment campaigns, modeled on the popular sanctions against Apartheid South Africa, which eventually brought that country into line with International Court of Justice rulings”.558

Similarly, the “boycott” norm became more spread between actors at the ESF. Stop the Wall wrote: “The focus in all discussions was on strategies to adopt for effective solidarity with the Palestinian people, including how to start boycott and sanctions campaigns that exert concrete pressure on European governments”.559 As the coverage of the event by Palestine Monitor (of Mustapha Barghouti) puts the news piece “a press conference with Mustapha Barghouti”, it indicated the adoption by the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) of the norm “sanctions”, and “a popular grassroots activity to pressure governments into imposing the following types of sanctions on Israel: “1. Suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement […] 2. Ending of all military cooperation with Israel […] 3. Divestment from Israeli companies and sanctions against purchasing and selling Israeli products. 4. Governmental academic non-cooperation with Israel”.560 The latter was basically the position of the Palestinian National Initiative (Al-Mubadarah) back then.561

The Social Movements call at the ESF-London mentioned “the apartheid” wall; hence making the link with South Africa, and stated “We support the Palestinian and Israeli movements fighting for a just and lasting peace. Following the judgment of the UN International Court of Justice and the unanimous vote of the European countries in the UN General Assembly we call for an end to the Israeli occupation and the dismantling of the apartheid wall. We call for political and economic sanctions on the Israeli government as

558 “The Launching of a New International Campaign of Sanctions Against Israel: Summary of Press conference with Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi”, op. cit.
559 Palestinian Grassroots Anti-apartheid Wall Campaign, “The Call for Sanctions and Boycott on Israeli…”; op. cit.
560 Ibid.
561 “Mustafa Barghouti: Palestinian Defiance - Interview by Éric Hazan”; op. cit.
long as they continue to violate international law and the human rights of the Palestinian people.”

The dilemma between “sanctions” and “boycott” continued. Some European organizations in solidarity with Palestine adopted a call for a comprehensive boycott (compared to a selective boycott to Israeli settlement products), while others had reservations on the boycott while adopting the new position of sanctions taken at the ESF-London. For example, the general secretary of the UK Palestine Solidarity Committee Betty Hunter said during the SOAS conference two months after the ESF-London: “From the European Social Forum we had a call to focus our solidarity work on sanctions and boycott”. Already, the three norms of “sanctions”, “boycott” and “divestment” became an increasingly consolidated Palestinian call, yet with some differences between actors.

These diverse initiatives, with wide European and transnational networks would give hope to (or “pulling”) the actors behind the BDS call to be encouraged to proceed and consolidate their calls. However especially there were some differences in calls between Palestinian actors, which caused some confusion on the one hand, and has been taken as a pretext by some European and transnational actors on the other hand not to adopt the boycott call.

This heated debate related to adopting sanctions and boycott carried on, after the European Social Forum- London in October 2004, to be discussed again at the World Social Forum in January 2005 in Porto Alegri. Already, PNGO, Stop the Wall and the Alternative Information Center became part of the International Council of the WSF, and the Palestinian calls had more allies inside the WSF including the anti-war movement, the South African trade unions, the Arab NGOs Network and some European movements, while many others were more cautious.

At the World Social Forum- Porto Alegri in 2005, Palestinian actors from PNGO, Stop the Wall and the newly formed OPAGI (including Badil), among others, would continue to push for the three norms (boycott, sanctions and divestment) associated with

562 “ESF London – Call of the Social Movements”; op. cit.
the “three rights-based” goals: end occupation, return of refugees and equality, as they presented their calls to the World Social Forum, but amid opposition.

In another place, the ex-director of Badil, Ingrid Jaradat, stressed again on the obstacles faced by some European positions, while commenting on debates inside the assemblies of movements at the World Social Forum- Porto Alegri:

The debate in these assemblies thus appeared to be dominated by priorities and constraints of political activism in Europe. Calls by Palestinian delegates to isolate Israel and for a clear distinction between anti-Zionist/anti-colonialist Israeli allies and an undefined “Israeli Jewish peace movement” were perceived as a nuisance.

The anti-war movement (including those in Europe), Brazilian, South African (COSATU), Arab actors among others would be important allies to Palestinian actors at the World Social Forum- Porto Alegri. There would be two calls coming out from the social movements’ assembly and the anti-war assembly. Both endorsed the main calls raised by the Palestinian actors, including a call for sanctions, boycott and divestment, as required by Palestinian actors. Hence, the next wide transnational social movements gathering to adopt the three norms (B, D and S) occurred in Porto Alegri at the WSF on 31 January 2005, after the Beirut declaration in September 2004 and the call of Durban in 2001 that called for “comprehensive sanctions and embargoes” as was the case for South Africa Apartheid.

The two calls at the World Social Forum- Porto Alegri 2005, however, differed a bit in their tone. The first one supported “Israeli activists for peace” and the second supported “the Israeli anti-colonialist, anti-Zionist activists who share this struggle”. It is worth noting that the Israeli movement among the WSF International Council is the Alternative Information Center which has been supportive to the BDS, in addition to the activism of Israeli Committee against House Demolition that was also supportive to Palestinian rights.

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564 See: Badil’s annual report of 2005; op. cit.
565 Ingrid Jaradat Gassner, “Another World is Possible,” Badil website (Spring 2005), via http://www.badil.org/en/component/k2/item/893-%E2%80%9Canother-world-is-possible%E2%80%9D <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
in the ESF-London and WSF-Porto Alegri, however with some hesitations. Mostly, the Israeli supportive activists adhered to “selective boycotts” focusing on the occupation.\textsuperscript{566}

The two calls have common body with small differences reflecting a higher level of endorsement by the anti-war movement,\textsuperscript{567} and demonstrated that the “three rights” became part of the agenda of the transnational movement.

Already during the years 2004 and 2005, major transnational and international mobilizations have been occurring in relation to Palestine and debates around calls for sanctions, boycott or divestments. As will be demonstrated, these mobilizations and debates would have their direct impact on the Palestinian actors to form the BDS.

\textit{The road to ECCP endorsement}

After the Porto Alegri’s World Social Forum in January 2005, encounters between European and Palestinian actors, which were mediated by various Southern actors, have taken place additionally in the Mediterranean Social Forum in mid-June 2005 and in the civil society conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in mid-July 2005 (the one discussed previously). In between these transnational mobilizations, the BDS call has emerged on 9 July 2005 after the concentrated discussions by Palestinian actors

\textsuperscript{566} Badil’s annual report of 2005; op. cit.
\textsuperscript{567} The social movements call stated: “We support the struggle of the Palestinian people for their fundamental and national rights, including the right to return, based on the international law and in the UN resolutions. We ask the international community and governments to impose political and economic sanctions to Israel, including an embargo on Arms. We call social movements to also mobilize for de-investments and boycotts. These efforts aim at pressuring Israel to implement international resolutions and to respect the decision of the International Court of Justice for the immediate stop and destruction of the illegal apartheid wall and the end of occupation. We support Israeli activists for peace and the refusnik for their struggle against the occupation.” See: “Call of the Social Movements”, 31 January 2005, via http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article371 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

The anti-war assembly stated in relation to Palestine:” We support the Palestinian people's struggle for justice, self-determination, a sovereign independent state with Jerusalem as its capital and the implementation of the right of return in accordance with UN resolution 194. We call upon the international community and governments to impose political and economic sanctions on Israel, including an embargo on armaments. We call upon the social movements to mobilize also for divestment and boycotts. These efforts aim to force Israel to implement international resolutions, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, to stop and take down the illegal wall and end all occupation and apartheid policies. We support the Israeli anti-colonialist, anti-Zionist activists who share this struggle” (See: Ingrid Jaradat Gassner, “Another World is Possible,” op. cit.).
that have taken place in Palestine for a few weeks to come up with the BDS call, as explained in chapter four.

The Mediterranean Social Forum, as an early expression of the World Social Forum’s regional meetings that was decided in 2001 but was postponed till 2005, was held in Barcelona/Spain between 16 and 18 June 2005, and attracted a large number of actors from the BDS and European actors. Palestinians who attended included: Jamal Juma (from Stop the Wall), Ameer Makhoul (coordinator of Ittijah then), the late Ahmed Maslamani (from the Union of Health Work Committees – UHWC- and a steering committee member of Stop the Wall), Mustafa Barghoudi (Al-Mubadarah, the Medical Relief UPMRC and PNGO), Salman Abu Sette (from the PRC in the UK), Addameer human rights NGO among other participants. Already, core components of the BDS norms have been present, with one of the workshops focusing on “Definition and coordination of the sanctions, boycott and divestment campaign in the Israeli State.”

The workshop was organized by Red Mewando, a Basque-based NGOs umbrella in Spain, which partners with the Palestinian Health Committees UHWC and the Israeli-Palestinian anti-Zionist organization the Alternative Information Center (AIC) among others, who were participants in the workshop. European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) was participating in the workshop as well. Red Mewando represented the Basque movement “Middle East Without Wars and Oppressions”, which was active in the anti-war movement that resembled the atmosphere around Iraq and Palestine back then, and consisted of six NGOs including Mundubat and the Basque-based Palestinian Cultural Centre (Biladi) and was supported by the Basque regional government, and would continue to support the route of BDS norms to Europe.

In the Mediterranean Social Forum of June 2005 two calls have emerged, demonstrating common factors like opposing the war in Iraq and Palestine, and differences in relation to the Palestinian issue, which reflected the different orientations between

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European actors for Palestine. Additionally, the unified Palestinian call hinted to the “wall of apartheid”, “exercise popular pressure on the distinct [Mediterranean] governments” to apply the recommendation on the wall by the UN, and “call for exercising a strong pressure on the different states so that they will take serious decisions against Israel”. The Palestinian unified call represented a sort of compromise between one state and two states adherents (calling for a Palestinian state and right of refugees to return according to UN resolution 194), and used the analogy of “apartheid”, adhered to the logic of pressure by transnational and international actors against Israel, but still not calling explicitly for B., D. or S.

The first call by the Social Movements was ‘lighter’ in relation to the BDS norms (they are not mentioned) and called for “the right of the Palestinian people to construct its independent state in peace; for the return of the “diaspora” to Palestine. For the right of all the people to self-determination. Against all the walls and all the occupations”. The anti-war movement had higher calls with explicit ones for boycotts and sanctions, and called for: “Suppression of the preferential commerce accord between Europe and the state of Israel. Cancellation of the European military cooperation with Israel, at least until it respects human rights and international law. Continuation of the campaign of sanction and boycott of Israeli products”.

The case of the workshop on B, D and S, in addition to the differences between the social movements call and the anti-war movements call demonstrated that those European actors from the circles of anti-war movements (on Iraq), have connections with Palestine, and less established actors were the ones pushing more among European actors for the adoption of B, D, and S norms.

The European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) had reached the position of sanctions, suspension of EU-Israel Association Agreement and arms embargo on Israel, but has not yet reached a consensus on boycott of Israel. Some actors inside the ECCP would push for boycotts or have been active in consumer boycotts during the last years, as the

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571 Ibid.
572 Ibid.
example of London and Brussels demonstrate (chapter five). Additionally, the ICJ advisory Opinion on the illegality of the Israeli wall affected European actors for Palestinian rights as it affected the Palestinian actors and encouraged for an international response against Israel. The BDS actors, especially after having their call in July 2005, would continue to communicate with ECCP to adopt the BDS call.

On 8 October 2005, a new attempt has occurred between European solidarity organizations, under the umbrella of ECCP, to have a common position and the conference was entitled “Enlargement meeting on solidarity with Palestine”. The chairman Pierre Galand opened the October 2005 meeting and pointed out “the aim of mobilising Europeans within the framework of a broad campaign for the application of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion”.

Some Palestinian organizations were invited like Jamal Juma representing Stop the Wall campaign, Allam Jarrar (from Al-Mubadarah, the Medical Relief UPMRC and PNGO) and Raji Sourani from the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights but Sourani could not make it. The Palestinian National Initiative (al-Mubadarah) was also represented through Jamal Abutaa (in additional to Jarrar). Obviously, not many Palestinian partners are left without calling for BDS.

Jamal Juma tried to push ahead for adopting BDS. He “proposed to create an international movement/campaign for the isolation of Israel, asking for boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS). This would indeed answer the call for the BDS norms signed by 171 Palestinian organizations”, and he “also made the link between the actions needed to support Palestine today and the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa”.574

In general, in the European context, there would be tension between the “D” (for divestment), “S” (for sanctions) and “B” (for boycott), as usually referred by activists. The

573 “Enlargement meeting on solidarity with Palestine”, A report by ECCP (The European Coordination of Committees and Associations for Palestine), Brussels, 8 October 2005, via cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/articles/article0028676.doc <last accessed on 22 February 2016>

574 Ibid.
D is the common denominator, while some groups agree to the S, others have reservations, and the most difficult is the B.\textsuperscript{575}

In relation to the October conference of 2005, as the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) report explains, “[t]he choice of asking for “sanctions” without integrating that demand with a call for “boycott” was questioned. It transpires that for various reasons (such as national history [of each European country] and sensitivity for instance), several countries could not support a call for boycott. On the European level, it is important to focus on a campaign that can possibly be launched in every European countr[y]. This should not prevent countries where calls for boycott are feasible from continuing their campaign and even forging forward.”\textsuperscript{576} Some actors in countries such as Germany, France and Italy saw that they could not go with a call for boycott of Israel then.\textsuperscript{577} Additionally, the BDS movement was criticized as not being adopted by the PA or PLO as was the case of ANC in the South African experience.

However, in 2005, there have been some European solidarity groups asking for endorsing the BDS norms that included the \textit{Vlaams Palestina Komitee} (VPK) [the Palestine Flemish Committee], the Netherlands Palestine Committee, Mewando, anti-war activists in Europe and the UK, British academics forming BRICUP, among others. These European actors’ pushing for BDS norms was partially manifested in calls in the ESF-London in October 2004 and in the Mediterranean Social Forum- Barcelona in June 2005. The European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) was in the heart of these discussions, in addition to the ECCP’s presence at the conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in July 2005 that called for adopting the BDS call. This internal European pressure for adopting the BDS call besides transnational pressures, and consolidated Palestinian call would increase the push on the ECCP for adopting the BDS.

Already, in the World Social Forums’ assemblies, the BDS norms became a consolidated call, as evident in the WSF-Caracas/ Venezuela meeting in January 2006. There, the social movements’ assembly stated clearly: “Inspired by the fight against

\textsuperscript{575} As for example explained by Aurora from the Netherlands Palestien Committee (informal discussions).
\textsuperscript{576} “Enlargement meeting on solidarity with Palestine”; \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{577} \textit{Ibid.}
apartheid in South Africa, we support the Palestinian civil society’s campaign of boycott, disinvestment and sanction to the Zionist colonial project that the state of Israel promotes”. The WSFs mobilization would reach the ESF-Athens in May 2006. The debates at the ESF-Athens and the push ahead for the BDS norms would continue. The social movements’ assembly had the highest calling in the ESFs for the Palestinian rights. It called for consumer and cultural boycotts against Israel (though it has not explicitly endorsed the BDS).

The declaration of 7 May 2006 stated: “We appeal to the working people and youth of Europe to build up an emergency campaign of mass actions to force the [Israeli] occupiers to withdraw their troops from the occupied territories, to blockade the blockaders by workers’, students’ and consumers’ boycotts of Israeli trade, communications and cultural exchange”. Remarkably, the Social Movements Assembly at the ESF-Athens had a higher level of solidarity than the assembly on Palestine that was organized by the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) with the participation of Palestinian actors in October 205. The assembly on Palestine (in Athens) declared its position on sanctions saying that it would aim at “[r]eiterating the European campaign on sanctions against occupation and violation of international law, launched by European coordination, in particular on economic association agreement and military agreements”. The workshops program for Palestine at the ESF-Athens, organized by ECCP, included workshops on “Right of return and Palestinian refugees”, “Israel’s Apartheid infrastructure – Preventing peace by building walls”, “Political and economical sanctions in Europe against Israeli occupation: principles, assessment and solidarity actions”. Usage of the term “apartheid” in a title of a workshop, in addition to “political and economic sanctions”, indicated the readiness of European actors for the Apartheid analogy and hence BDS norms, however with reservations by some as the consensus in the declaration did not call for “boycotts”, which constituted a major doxa in many European countries in relation to Israel. There has

been wide Palestinian participation including from Stop the Wall, Palestine Return Center (UK) and the PLO, which indicated again the intensity of Palestinian-European coordination and encounters then. These differences will be postponed to another conference two weeks later by the European actors in coordination with the Palestinian civil society actors (which also indicated the importance of ESFs on their effects on the ECCP).

The tension would appear publically in PACBI’s published “open letter” on 26 May 2006 addressed to the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) conference in Geneva. PACBI’s letter asked the European body to endorse the BDS. The PACBI letter stated that it “fully supports the growing movement in Europe for applying effective pressure on Israel to bring about its full compliance with international law” including arms embargo and divestment, but pointed out that “it ignores key dimensions of Israel’s oppression, particularly its persistent denial of Palestinian refugee rights and its racial discrimination against its own Palestinian citizens”, adding that calls for governments is not enough and there should be tools for citizens (non-state actors) to boycott and divest.582

The Geneva conference was attended that time by core Palestinian BDS actors such as Badil, Ittijah, Stop the Wall, as well as the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) and Agricultural Relief PARC, with the European national groups: the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign, the Belgian Association Belgo-Palestiniennne, the French l’Association France-Palestine Solidarité (AFPS) and Campagne civile internationale pour la protection du peuple palestinien (CCIPPP), the Swiss Groupe pour une Suisse sans Armée (GSsA- CUP) and the Italian Action for Peace.

In the Geneva conference, a campaigning session was moderated by Ittijah, besides a workshop entitled “Responses to violations of international law: Boycotts, Divestments and Sanctions”, and the final statement endorsed the BDS movement’s concerns by reading: “We support the BDS (boycott, divestment, sanctions) call signed by 170 Palestinian organizations and associations and we support the civil society demonstrations

aimed at bringing pressure on governments and the international community to compel Israel to obey international law. We adopted the call of the European social movements and the findings of the "Palestine" seminars that were largely discussed at the European Social Forum in Athens on 5-7 May 2006 and at the international conference held in Geneva on 26-28 May 2006".583

Yet, there were still reservations on the BDS call by some European solidarity groups with Palestine, and for the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) as a whole. The ECCP was careful about explicit adoption of the BDS norms, though there is a clear gradual tendency to adopt them by Palestine solidarity groups in Europe, in the World (and European) Social Forums, civil society conferences at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), in addition to increasing groups around the world including some political parties such as the Green Party in the US and the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (part of the governing coalition then).584

The BDS Palestinian actors got more consolidated after some divergences among themselves, as discussed in chapter four. A unified Palestinian delegation headed this time to the World Social Forum- Nairobi/ Kenya in January 2007, and included the steering committee of the BDS, PNGO, Ittijah, OPGAI (Badil part of it), the Palestinian NGO Forum in Lebanon, and the Arab Association for the Protection of Nature (based in Amman/ Jordan).585 The Anti-War Assembly declaration included “Strengthen boycotts, sanctions, and divestments against Israeli occupation!”586 Additionally, ECCP and BDS actors organized seminars together. One of the seminar (with the participation of the UK organization War on Want) entitled “Palestine and the Call for Sanctions on Israel” and the Speakers included BDS advocates: Jamal Juma from Stop the Wall; Iman Hamouri from

PNGO, Sergio Yahni of the Alternative Information Center.\textsuperscript{587} The convergence became closer between ECCP and the BDS actors.

Moreover, the BDS actors got more confidence especially after the first conference in Palestine in November 2007 after establishing the BDS National Committee (BNC) in 2008 involving wider Palestinian constituencies. It had also received endorsement from transnational networks including European ones either in the UN, WSFs or ESFs and being recognized by these influential networks. The BDS movement started to take transnational initiatives. For example, one of the early initiatives taken by the BNC was in July 2008 when the BNC issued a statement asking to stop the EU-Israeli action plan- as speculated in the Association Agreement - while gathering the endorsement of 115 Europeans groups (mostly active in the Palestinian issue).\textsuperscript{588} These groups included major groups in the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) and much beyond it. Among them: The French groups AFPS (\textit{Association France Palestine Solidarité}) and CCIPPP, the Belgian groups \textit{Vlaams Palestina Komitee}, \textit{l’union des Progressistes Juifs de Belgique}, Intal, CODIP and \textit{Association Belgo-Palestinienne} among others; the UK groups UK and Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign, the Anti-War Coalition, LSE SU Palestine Society and Friends of \textit{Al-Aqsa}; Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign; the Netherlands groups the Netherlands Palestine Committee and Palestinian Association; diverse Spanish and Italian groups; Jewish European groups; the International Solidarity movement (ISM); European Christian groups, among others. This was a wide manifestation of recognition by groups that are wider than the groups that constitute the ECCP itself, while around half of ECCP groups signed.\textsuperscript{589}

In this atmosphere, the final consensus of ECCP awaited the push by the invitation of the regional Basque government, upon the initiative of Mewando, which organized the B, D, and S workshop in the Mediterranean Social Forum in 2005. The invitation was

\textsuperscript{587} “NGO ACTION NEWS” (No. 2-3/2007 (136-137)), UNISPAL website, via https://unispal.un.org/ngoactionnews.nsf/0/B4856BS6A2253879852572890061A7EE <last accessed on 19 February 2016>


\textsuperscript{589} As compared for example with the groups of ECCP in 2013. See: “ECCP stands in solidarity with French BDS campaigners facing state repression”, 26 June 2013, via http://www.eccpalestine.org/eccp-stands-in-solidarity-with-french-bds-campaigners-facing-state-repression/ <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
organized with the actors from the BDS (BNC including *Ittijah* and PNGO) besides the Alternative Information Centre and ECCP in a meeting in Bilbao (Basque region)/ Spain in October 2008, which was called “Bilbao Initiative: Towards a Just Peace in Palestine” (between 29 and 31 October 2008).  

In Bilbao in October-November 2008, the BDS actors and ECCP finally reached a consensus. The ECCP endorsed the BDS norms while at the same time they stressed on “context-sensitivity” according to each actor’s context. For example, a certain actor in a country might find that it is more efficient to campaign for boycotting specific Israeli settlements’ products, not Israeli products in general, while endorsing the BDS call at the same time.  

The chairperson of ECCP, Pierre Galand, expressed his thanks to the Palestinian BDS actors’ taking into consideration the gradual transformation to reach consensus in ECCP to endorse the BDS call, because it corresponded to the European public opinions, through the initiative of the regional government of Bilbao.  

Omar Barghouti explains (Barghouti 2010: 4) that “BDS is based on three basic principles: context sensitivity, gradualness, and sustainability. Conscientious academics, intellectuals, human rights activists and civil society organizations in any given country, the movement recognizes, know best how to apply BDS most effectively in their particular circumstances, taking into consideration their respective political realities, constraints and potential.” He presented the Bilbao initiative where “[s]everal BDS recommendations were adopted”.  

The European solidarity groups were part of the European field, trying to challenge its hegemonic power, but also they were part of this field and as such it was not easy, especially for the more established organizations, to advocate what is considered a *doxa*-outside the field itself. Indeed, they could face the possibility of being ignored or even

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prosecuted. In comparison, the level of endorsing Palestinian norms was higher in the cases of the South African or South American groups. Among these groups, the rules of the game are a bit different inside the South African and Latin American countries where leaders of many of these countries support the Palestinians explicitly.

After Bilbao at the end of October 2008, the BDS norms continued to be pushed with more weight. The UN-GA president, the Nicaraguan father Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, opened the session of the international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people, organized by the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), through stating: “Although different, what is being done against the Palestinian people seems to me to be a version of the hideous policy of apartheid”.592 In the afternoon session, he repeated what he said with an explicit endorsement of BDS. He said:

I spoke this morning about apartheid and how Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories appear so similar to the apartheid of an earlier era, a continent away.

I believe it is very important that we in the United Nations use this term. We must not be afraid to call something what it is. It is the United Nations, after all, that passed the International Convention against the Crime of Apartheid, making clear to all the world that such practices of official discrimination must be outlawed wherever they occur.

We heard today from a representative of South African civil society. We know that all around the world, civil society organizations are working to defend Palestinian rights, and are trying to protect the Palestinian population that we, the United Nations, are failing to protect.

More than twenty years ago we in the United Nations took the lead from civil society when we agreed that sanctions were required to provide a non-violent means of pressuring South Africa to end its violations.

Today, perhaps we in the United Nations should consider following the lead of a new generation of civil society, who are calling for a similar non-violent campaign of boycott, divestment and sanctions to pressure Israel to end its violations.593

593 “At the 57th Plenary Meeting on Agenda Item 16, the Question of Palestine” (New York, 24 November 2008), via http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/statements/agendaitem16241108.shtml <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
As another evidence of established BDS norms between 2010 and 2013 (though beyond the focus period of the research), the Russell Tribunal on Palestine - coordinated by Pierre Galand (coordinator of ECCP then), who had this idea since the early 2000s - had conveyed in Barcelona, London, New York, Cape Town and Brussels, with an additional session in Brussels in 2014 after the Gaza war, and accused Israeli of being an “Apartheid state”, and called to adopt the BDS call among other recommendations.

On the margin of a session in London for the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, a meeting took place by less established European actors to discuss campaigns against companies that are accused of aiding Israeli policies against Palestinians (Agrexco, Alestom, Dexia, Veolia, G4S, etc.). This demonstrated some efficiency and a practical way of action for activists that further affected ECCP’s position.

3. **Contesting rules of the game and doxa**

Palestinian actors have been pushing European actors to reach a consensus on the BDS norms. As was evident in the research, the processes at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), World (and European) Social Forums have witnessed a lot of contestations amid cooperation. Already, sensitivities have arisen during the encounters between Palestinian and some transnational activists in Palestine amid cooperation during the second Intifada. As a workshop on “civil protection” at the civil society conference of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in 2004 concluded, “there were two key concerns: that all volunteers should be fully aware that these activities must be to assist Palestinians and their activities be driven by an agenda defined by the Palestinian NGOs”.

Badil’s annual report of 2005 explains part of this contestation, where it argued that:

Many other civil society campaigns, in particular in Europe and North America, however, continue to fall short of adopting a consistent rights-based approach and fail to appropriately address the root-causes of the conflict (e.g., exclusive focus on the 1967 occupation and international humanitarian law at the expense of a historical context which includes the Nakba of 1948 and human rights law, leading to a misinterpretation of international law).

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594 “The United Nations International Conference of Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People” (New York, 13-14 September 2004); op. cit.
Omar Barghouti has commented frequently on the reference point that some Northern figures tried to assert (such as Noam Chomsky and Norman Finkelstein). In another place, he wrote (2010): “In several instances, these voices have ignored or undermined the Palestinian BDS call and leadership as the reference for the global movement, in an attempt to project themselves as an alternative, Israel-centered reference”.

*In relation to the doxa of boycott*

It was not easy for the European Coordinating Committees (ECCP) to reach a consensus on the BDS norms. As the Palestinian actors have been working in their fields, the European actors were similarly working in the centers of the world field of power on Palestine. As actors in the ECCP were cautious specifically to use the “boycott” norm, it is part of the *doxa* of the European and world field of power on Palestine. The *doxa* of the field projected itself in three major areas, and it is related to rejecting the isolation policy against Israel.

The first level, and the strongest *doxa*, comes from pro-Israeli circles that associate in the public discourse the similarity between being critical to Israel and “anti-Semitism”. A discussed example is the attack by the Zionist Simon Wiesenthal Center in North America on Oxfam-Belgium in 2003 when it engaged in a boycott campaign in Belgium.

Another example is the Israeli representative in a discussion of the enrollment of *Badil* to hold a consultative status to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN. The Israeli representative during the discussion at the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations “expressed concern about the organization, as it politicized the issue of refugees and made ‘aggressive, vitriolic’ statements against his country, using ‘intolerant, anti-Zionist, as well as what could only be described as anti-Semitic’ language and images”. 595 The Israeli representative was backed by the two most supportive states, the US and Germany though they expressed their concerns in different language (the US representative asked about *Badil’s* link with the International Solidarity Movement and the German representative asked about the statements of *Badil* regarding the legitimate ways of resisting the occupation). This example also points to the *doxa* related to violence.

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Germany, a state providing Israel with nuclear submarines, was worried about Palestinian violence. Seeking status in the UN bodies, which gave a boost to the BDS actors, has its own effect in facing the *doxa* of states.

In the UK route, Mona Baker says that one of the Israeli professors whom she dismissed from her journal told her that either she backs down or the issue would be raised up “to higher levels”, and when Baker refused, she recalls that during the next two days she received a storm of high level accusations not only from the UK but also from the US.\(^{596}\)

The second level is official European and Northern policies that either make the previously discussed analogy between anti-Israel and anti-Semitism or stress on their opposition to boycotting Israel and isolating it in general. Moreover, they frequently associate these boycott acts with delegitimizing Israel. They have been insisting continuously on the “negotiation” norm between the Israeli and Palestinian sides though there is an obvious imbalance of power between a colonizer and a colonized. For example, Ed Miliband, the UK ex-Labor Party’s chairperson, expressed his position that “we should have no tolerance with those who question the legitimacy of the state of Israel, and that we should have no tolerance of proposals for boycott”.\(^{597}\) Similarly, in the case of the UK, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party oppose boycotting trade with Israel.\(^{598}\) The UK peripheral parties, on the left, like the Green Party and the Workers Socialist Party support BDS.

However, the field is in flux, and the accumulation of contestations makes a difference. For example, toward the end of the process of writing up this thesis, a new UK chairperson of the Labor Party is Jeremy Corbyn, who was one of the speakers in the 2004 SOAS conference “Resisting Israeli Apartheid”. Corbyn continued supporting the boycott of Israeli settlements and was actually questioning one of his competitors on her lack of support for a Palestinian state. This change in position suggests possible changes in the rule of the game in the UK, which is an influential state in the world field of power on

\(^{596}\) Interview with Mona Baker; *op. cit.*


\(^{598}\) See the positions of these parties on boycotting Israel via: http://www.caabu.org/what-we-do/advocacy/uk-elections-2015/political-parties/conservative; and http://www.caabu.org/what-we-do/advocacy/uk-elections-2015/political-parties/liberal-democrats <both last accessed on 22 February 2016>
Palestine. In his speech at the parliament, Corbyn incorporated a major pillar in the BDS call when he said: “A settlement has to involve an awful lot more than just the recognition of the state of Palestine. People should cast their minds back to Sabra and Shatila in 1982 and to the Nakba in 1948. The victims of those processes are still living in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria; the Palestinian diaspora across the world is huge. They also have rights—they also have the right to return home and a right to recognition. That is extremely important. They should never be forgotten […]. Another issue is, of course, trade. Britain is a trading partner of Israel. We sell arms to Israel; we buy arms from Israel. Although some licenses have been suspended or withdrawn, the arms trade goes on. If we are making engines for drone aircraft in this country and those drones are used for surveillance over Gaza and used to bomb the people of Gaza, as they were during Operation Protective Edge, we are complicit in what goes on there. That is what provoked an awful lot of people to sign the petition and make their views heard recently”.599

The world field is in flux and witnesses changes with contestations and the deadlock of the negotiation track between the PA and the Israeli governments. The example of Mona Baker suggested a change in the atmosphere between the time she started a boycott in 2002 and the recent years. For example, she mentions an example of a person who criticized a Palestinian professor at an American University because of his call for a boycott; in a recent email she asked Baker to remove the news from Baker’s website because she is applying for jobs, which suggests that support for the BDS norms could stop to become a doxa.

The discussed example in the UK with cultural and academic boycott demonstrates a clear case on how the doxa worked. When the petition of April 2002 called for stopping privileging Israel with European scientific agreements and when Mona Baker took an initiative of boycotting academics from Israeli institutions and put the highest possible norm in the UK, this led initially to a massive reaction by the political actors and other institutions. As a report states:

Baker's decisions made her the target of attacks from both within and without academia. She was labelled an anti-Semite and a racist for allegedly "firing two academics" because of their race or nationality [...].

The pressure prompted UMIST [her university: the University of Manchester Institute for Science and Technology] to begin an inquiry into Baker's decision, even though it does not own the journals in question. [...] The outcry also led to an Early Day Motion in July (EDM 1590) in the House of Commons condemning Baker's action and stating that it "deplores discrimination against academics of any nationality, as being inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom, regards such discrimination as downright anti-semitic while pretending simply to be opposed to Israeli government policy... and calls upon UMIST to apologise for this disgusting act and to dismiss Professor Baker.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair took it upon himself to assure Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks that he will "do anything necessary" to stop the academic boycott, adding that the findings of the UMIST inquiry had to "send a clear signal" that boycotts will not be tolerated. 600

The university asked Mona not to come until the inquiry is finished. Mona refused to withdraw or apologize, and insisted on her move. She mobilized a human rights lawyer, and she got support from many persons including Jews to counter the anti-Semitism accusation. Ilan Pappe supported her publicly in a public lecture at her university. Many authorities wanted to set an example of Mona to prevent any momentum for the boycott, but she asserted her example of insisting on it. She kept posting on her website about diverse boycott initiatives and engaged in transnational connections in the US and Palestine to push for a momentum. At the end, the university inquiry was closed. She considered that she pushed the norm for its highest level inasmuch as negotiation on the norm took place between the initial moratorium and her boycott for any institutional affiliation. 601 Such resistance by Mona and her supporters sustained themselves in very hostile atmosphere back then.

It was the agency of some professors that pushed for the boycott norm, while they were distributed on a spectrum each with his/her habitus and capitals, trying to contest the doxa inside the political field and academic institutions. The disciplining act by various institutions was quick. Actually, the least with capital and not engaged in political activism to sustain pressure payed the heavier price such as a student at Oxford University who lost

600 Amina Elbendary, “Descending the ivory tower; op. cit.
601 Interview with Mona Baker; op. cit.
his scholarship in 2002 because he felt that he should morally support a boycott but did not fight back.\(^{602}\) Hilary and Steven argue that because of their previous engagement in politics, other than their more established academic positions, the support they gathered among professors allowed them to endure the pressure, hate mails and criminalization in discourse then, and to fight for the norm in media debates.

The *doxa* was practiced stronger against Mona Baker who had the foremost level of boycott in the UK among academics then, and her nationality as an Egyptian was brought up in much of the disciplining discourse. However, she could maintain the pressure by publicly gaining supporters from professors, consulting a lawyer, while she edited an academic journal that was not related to the university but related to her husband.\(^{603}\)

This differentiation in the academic sphere extends to the different academic institutions as well. SOAS has already witnessed historical transformations as it has already been engaged in African and Oriental Studies with the agency of many academics from diverse nationalities, and the anti-colonial and post-colonial academic activities that are common to them. It is not by chance that SOAS witnessed pioneering students and academics that pushed for the boycott norm (and at the latest vote at SOAS in 2015, it included students, cleaning workers, employees and professors that endorsed the BDS).

The “moral responsibility” got under pressure by the field in order to have “political currency” as a Palestinian SOAS-affiliated student (back then) wrote commenting on calls to boycott Israelis who are supporting Israel. This depends on the field. In the Arab field, such calls would be related to the largely intact initiatives of anti-normalizations. This is

\(^{602}\) Interview with Hilary and Steven Rose; *op. cit.* Yet- though not the focus of the research, students have been the most active in the academic circles though not discussed here, but it is worth pointing out that the quickly spreading Israeli Apartheid Week in university campuses since its inception in 2004 is a case to consider, but it has been collective political agency, though from the beginning disciplining students was at work since the early initiatives in North America.

\(^{603}\) Similarly, though it is not the focus of the research, students in North American universities, then some professors and their academic associations (especially those related to Stern interest, ethnic studies and indigenous studies), that have been most active in the boycott activists against Israel. Only two universities have engaged in selective divestments from companies related to the Israeli settlements or prison system. See for example the list of 10 years in the US: “BDS@10: Top 100 U.S. Victories!” , US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation website, 9 July 2015, via http://www.endtheoccupation.org/article.php?id=4503 <last accessed on 22 February 2016>
why PACBI opted for a compromise, taking into consideration each field’s forces even inside Palestine (distinguishing between areas inside and outside the Green Line).

On the EU level, even though the EU parliament is one of the bodies that moved in positions close to boycott (compared to the Council and Commission), the head of the parliament Martin Schulz said before the war in Gaza in 2014 that “there is no boycott” of Israel by the European Union, while he cited trade and scientific cooperation, adding: “The European Union defends the right of existence of Israel with all its means.”

The third level is a legal one. Various laws criminalize those who engage in or call for boycotting Israel, as is the case in the U.S., Canada, France, Australia among other states, and of course in Israel. For instance, BDS activists in France find themselves, frequently, under legal criminalization because of their calls for boycotting Israel or Israeli products from the settlements. Omar Barghouti, a leader in the BDS movement affirms the difficulty BDS activists for example in France. There, the call for boycotting Israel is criminalized under anti-discrimination laws. He goes on saying that the French sanctions and boycotts against South Africa, Sudan or Iran are not considered anti-discriminatory, but only in the case against Israel these laws are mobilized. Barghouti questions the democratic value in this. In June 2013, 45 European groups issued a statement of support for BDS activists in France, against “state repression”, because they were prosecuted.

Another level that could be added is that big INGOs avoid the “boycott” and sanctions calls against Israel, as the discussed examples of Oxfam, Amnesty International suggest. The “Made in illegality” campaign in Belgium in 2014, which calls not only for labeling Israeli settlements products but also not importing them, is practically a call for “boycott” without mentioning it because some established organizations would not join if doing so.

606 “ECCP stands in solidarity with French BDS campaigners facing state repression”; op. cit.,
607 Interview with Rabab Khairy; op. cit.
These four levels demonstrate clearly the close interrelation of the transnational and international in this case, enforcing the use of “world field” rather than separating the international from the transnational.

In relation to the doxa of non-violence

In relation to non-violence, the research explained that US governments proposed the “vision and division” of the conflict; who is the good player and who is the enemy (or terrorist). Historically, the PLO has been considered a terrorist organization amid close US support to Israel until the PLO complied with the Ronald Regan administration’s condition for denouncing violence in 1988 and to enroll in US mediated peace talks. Any Palestinian actor resorting to violence against Israel is threatened to be considered an enemy and a terrorist actor. Hamas and some Palestinian actors fit in this US category. The EU has followed this course of action during the second Intifada while still negotiating it. This is a major doxa in this field, which is important in relation to constraints that the BDS movement finds itself in and tries to contest.

The BDS movement is situated in different fields including the field in Palestine while also aiming at being effective in Northern societies. The norm non-violence is strongly believed in among the Palestine solidarity groups in Europe (as shown in already discussed examples: the UK Pal. Sol. Campaign). Similarly, the research of Hallward (2013: 19) in the North American context quotes a sentence by Stop the Wall Campaign, a forming body of BDS, which says that “the Palestinian Struggle cannot be simply defined as violent or nonviolent; it brings together a variety of strategies in its path of resistance to advance national goals (Stop the Wall Campaign, 2007: 11)”. Then, she quotes peace researchers including Michael Nagler saying that “nonviolence plus violence equals violence”, where all diverse acts of non-violence sum up to null.

In conjunction with the habitus of the discussed BDS actors, who mostly follow a non-violent way, the movement reacts in a special way to this doxa (on violence) by Israel and by the dominant positions in the world field of power. It is situated at the same time in the field of power in Palestine. As discussed previously, the major contesting actors in the Palestinian field during the second Intifada, which challenged the imposed doxa by Israel,
the US, EU and partially the PA, were resembled mainly by political factions. And as the example of Marwan Barghouti suggested, it sustained that armed struggle is legitimate mean in resisting occupation. The ways of resistance by Palestinian actors in using armed means has been a heated discussion, with different levels of discussion. The doxa is one of these levels related to the “symbolic violence” (following Bourdieu’s conceptualization). As El-Sakka (2015) pointed out, there is the “violence of non-violence” when this discourse is imposed in the field in Palestine.

As demonstrated in the third section of chapter four on the field of power in Palestine, many Palestinian NGOs, for example, challenged this doxa when the US conditioned aid to denouncing terrorism, which was directed against Palestinian factions in confrontation with the Israeli army during the Intifada.

The BDS movement follows a non-violent strategy by resorting to peaceful tactics of boycott, divestment and sanctions. It proposes a non-violent way without denouncing legitimate armed forms of resistance as expressed in moral constraints in Geneva Conventions for example. It makes an implicit contestation to the doxa while following it. Moreover, such a non-violent movement embraces actors- inside a non-violent movement- who could believe in armed resistance; instead of conditioning this doxa on them.

This non-violence, acknowledging the right of armed resistance, is different from the previously mentioned argument by Hallward (2013), which strictly refuses any violent form, in a Black and White division.

Even Baramki, who believes in non-violence on both moral and strategic grounds, says that armed forms of resistance are a “sad but perhaps inevitable development” when he writes on Marwan Barghouti (Baramki 2010: 115):

That Israel’s growing brutality has pushed some Palestinians to go beyond those forms of resistance pioneered in Birzeit is a sad but perhaps inevitable development. One of today’s Palestinian leaders, Marwan Barghouti, whose studies at Birzeit were curtailed when he was forcibly expelled from the West Bank in 1987, embraced armed resistance on returning in 1994. After being jailed by the Israelis, he wrote in a January 2002 op-ed column in the Washington Post:

Israel will have security only after the end of the occupation, not before. ... I am not a terrorist, but neither am I a pacifist. I am simply a regular guy from the Palestinian

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As for example Rafeef Ziadeh stresses; interview with Rafeef; op. cit.
street advocating what every other oppressed person has advocated – the right to help myself in the absence of help from anywhere else.

G. (from the Health Committees UHWC) re-tweets, in Arabic, a sentence by someone else saying: “The non-violence that is promoted in Palestine is a colonial ideology aiming at disciplining the Palestinians in knowledge and thought, which resulted from the disciplining process that has accompanied Oslo [Accords]” 609 The quote does not say “non-violence is a colonial ideology”; rather, it says “[t]he non-violence that is promoted in Palestine” - though the quote has a broad generalization. Similarly, a leader in the movement like Omar Barghouti expressed dissatisfaction to the argument that criminalizes armed resistance and named it “white”, which provoked some transnational reactions against him. 610

*Fragmentation in the scale of world politics*

The mediation of the Global South, including regional Arab mediations, in these transnational routes empowered the BDS actors in their contestations and facilitated the adoption of ECCP to the BDS norms through the Basque route in Bilbao in 2008, as the research demonstrated.

In chapter four, fragmentation inside Palestine was discussed. Also, part of the new rules of the game in the world field of power has been another type of fragmentation trying to disconnect Palestinians from Europeans as well as disconnecting Palestinians from their regional context. The introduced anti-boycott laws in the US in 1976 impose fines on American entities that abide by the Arab boycott. The US (and Northern states in general) suggest linking Palestinian actors to them directly to mediate a negotiated solution. Though many European actors for Palestinian rights do not agree with this, they also feel the pressure and adapt to some rules of the game. For example, an activist I met in Belgium expressed that working with Arab official bodies in Europe would “burn them”, or that it is good that the Islamic Cooperation Organization does not take the issue of Jerusalem

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609 <accessed on 18 Nov 2014>. The quote is in Arabic.
610 Marivel Guzman; *op. cit.*
(during the wide demonstrations in 2015) seriously so as not to alienate Europeans. She said this though on normative terms she expresses pan-Arab sentiments.

Similarly, the coordinator of a Belgian Moroccan organization in Brussels expressed her organization’s isolation in issues of solidarity with Palestine. The researcher witnessed a demonstration in Brussels during the 2012 Gaza war, where few Belgian Moroccans were chanting for Hamas (which is on the European terrorism list). Some Belgian solidarity activists expressed their dissatisfaction. As a Palestinian activist in Brussels argues, Belgian Moroccans feel marginalized by organizers of demonstrations and their reactions get tempered as if to assert their presence. In an interview with a major activist in Brussels for the Palestinian rights, she expressed her surprise by the Palestinians inside the Green Line identifying themselves as Arabs.

In an increasingly uneasy relation in Europe between European Arab or Muslim communities and the wider citizens, it affects the association between Arab actors and Palestinians as risky for a movement that wants to mainstream in Europe and to be recognized as legitimate. Actually, in one major report by Stop the Wall published on the BDS movement site, written in English in a clearly academic style, the report distinguishes itself from the previous Arab official boycott policies (quoting authoritarian and corrupt regimes, not abiding to clear goals, interests over morality, some anti-Jewish instances by Saudi officials, etc.). The report also considers the anti-normalization circles in the Arab world would contribute to democratization (more than to be helpful for the Palestinian struggle).

The example of Stop the Wall’s report suggests that such boycott coming from authoritarian regimes “does little to present a moral framework for such solidarity work and can be viewed as a challenge to the essence of a boycott for Palestine”. For a movement that stresses much on the moral support of activists in Northern countries, some state that the Arab League boycott experience as a “boycott driven from above becomes

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611 Interview with Nadia Bournazough (Brussels, 27 March 2014).
612 In an escalation of the uneasy relations, few young persons (Belgian-Moroccans) held a slogan of ISIS in a sit in for Palestine in October 2015, where the organizers pushed them away from the sit in.
613 Interview with Mohammad Khatib (Brussels, 31 March 2014), in addition to frequent informal chats.
614 Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, “Towards a Global Movement …”; op. cit.
problematic when the states involved reflect little of the justice or morality”. Then, they quote an example of how the Arab League boycott could harm, saying: “One anti-boycott activist wrote in the 1970s: “The Boycott’s effectiveness will decrease in inverse proportion to the increase in public awareness of its activities and the methods by which the Boycott’s efforts may be rendered nugatory.” In brief, as such a report suggests, for the first time, “BDS initiatives are now widely pursued in Western societies, where Israel has historically been reliant upon continual support and backing”. Hence, the BDS movement – according to the report - does not want to affect its spread in Western societies with negatively perceived effects coming from the Arab League, or from anti-normalization movements that are affected by rulers. According to the report: “Given the pro-Palestinian rhetoric emanating from politicians and rulers in government, local boycott movements were able to deploy a similar boycott discourse to hold their leaders to account, and attempt to drive through changes from below”.

Such a report that was issued during a period of discussions between the BDS actors, and represent a line among other lines (i.e. the line of Ameer Makhoul from Ittijah who argued for more engagement with Arab circles), carries a generalization towards the Arab boycott and anti-normalization diverse circles (official and oppositional at the same time). For example, there are large differences between anti-normalization circles in different Arab countries. As to give two diverging examples, the Egyptian intellectuals that started the anti-normalization norm in Egypt and the Arab region came from opposing circles to the Egyptian regime and other Arab regimes. The actors from the first anti-normalization committee in Egypt are very different from the example of the Palestinian Adel Samara who was active in instituting the first anti-normalization committee in Palestine, or Ibrahim Alloush, the Jordanian-Palestinian professor who has been active in the Jordanian Committee for Resisting Zionism and Normalization. Both Alloush and Samara oppose some Arab regimes and support other ones, and engaged in critical writings against

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615 Ibid.
616 “[c]arry out the pro-Palestinian rhetoric that many Arab League governments deploy,” the report says.
617 Ibid.
618 They were leftists (usually with Arabist inclination), actors in feminist and social liberation issues, and established novelists (like Jamal Ghitani, Radwa Ashour and Latifah al-Zayyat). The head of the committee Abdel Azeem Anis was prisoned by the Royal Egyptian regime following the events in Egypt after Nakba in Palestine, fired from his teaching position at the university during Nassir’s period, and prisoned during Sadat regime.
Palestinian actors who played a role in the BDS movement, mainly for the reason of NGO funding. Their critical assessment for civil society funding, particularly from Northern countries, reach the level of considering these funders “the enemy of the [Arab] nation”, without distinguishing between them, according to a committee chaired by Alloush. In another major normative difference between these last actors is the example of refusing the “international legitimacy” (represented by the UN) while calling for the “national interest to be our sole and final reference”, which is a sharp normative difference with BDS actors. In addition, this contestation is energized by personalized critiques (carrying betrayal accusations’ tone) against some actors who are part of the BDS movement.

Yet, such line of reasoning and distinction does not draw a strict line with the Arab circles, but seeks the extension. The reference to the Arab anti-normalization norm is still part of the BDS norms and the position of actors inside the movement has its effect. Palestinian BDS activists still seek both the popular Arab anti-normalization activism and the Arab League’s boycott activation; hence, they show their differences from the previous Arab League boycott but refer to positive aspects in it, as the discussed report by Stop the Wall suggests. Also, they consider the policy of isolating Israel as not new, and seek its re-activation with a new dimension as the first BNC conference explicitly calls.

The “distinction” becomes more emphasized and exaggerated by some activists in the European field who seek an almost complete distinction, which is resisted by others. For example, an article emerging from the boycott circles in the UK recognizes the pro-Israel pressure in the world field on activists by realizing that “[s]upporters of Israel trying to counter the burgeoning boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement sometimes seek to paint BDS as a continuation of the Arab League boycott of Israel”. Then the article proceeds with some exaggeration in demonstrating the total differences between the previous Arab League’s boycott and the BDS, such as stating that the Arab League’s boycott could not exceed the Middle Eastern states (though it spread to most of Asia and Africa, and to some South American states and some Northern states like Japan), and that it lacked a moral basis (though it is about the liberation of Palestine and was linked to the

619 “Today's BDS is not the past Arab boycott campaign”, Al-Araby al-Jadeed (the English website), 4 August 2015, via http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/8/4/todays-bds-is-not-the-pasts-arab-boycott-campaign <last accessed on 23 February 2016>
whole wave of the Third Word anti-colonization atmosphere) and lack of adherence to international law (though it was discussed that it based itself on a specific position in understanding international law), or portraying it as only a state-driven policy, without understanding its Palestinian and Arab popular boycott roots since the 1910s or responding to a minimum of popular Arab beliefs in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, among other points.

Similar arguments come from a North American context in trying to defend the current BDS movement’s strategy and norms in distinction to the previous Arab boycott, instead of seeing continuity and changes in the new strategy as put together by Stop the Wall’s report. Abigal and Abu Laban (2009: 33-34) argue: “Three main interdependent features characterised the Arab League boycott: (i) its continued inability effectively to publicise the human (and human rights) dimension of the Palestinian plight after 1948, particularly in countries of the industrialised West; (ii) its statist, rather than popular, dimension which obscured how boycotts may be a form of peaceful resistance to colonialism and racism; and (iii) its regional, rather than international, dimension”. These arguments are not accurate, though they have some truth, as the anti-colonization and anti-occupation aspects are both related to the general humanizing aspect of the colonized people and are part of the comprehensive human rights norms (and sometimes there were direct references to human rights). The Arab norm “boycott” has been both a popular and statist norm as demonstrated previously, and it was both regional and international but inclined more to the Global South, which does not exclude it from the internationalist character.

However, what is new in this BDS wave is its less centrality in the regional Arab or Middle Eastern interactions, compared to the first three waves; either non-state or state actors. For example, the BDS website has been in English (without official Arabic one) until the year 2014.

Already, Arab states and societies have not largely initiated links with Israel and its legitimacy is still absent (with the official exceptions in Egypt and Jordan). This new wave of isolating Israel has been mostly targeting societies and states that have lagged behind other parts of the world through their supportive relation to Israel, which explains part of
the normative inclination to concentrate on Northern societies. As Omar Barghouti (2010) puts it: “Western civil society carries a unique responsibility to hold Israel accountable to international law due to the incomparable level of complicity of Western governments in sustaining Israel’s system of colonial and racial oppression through vast diplomatic, economic, academic, cultural and political support – all in the name of Western citizens and using their tax money. Deep complicity engenders profound moral responsibility. While several Arab regimes – including parts of the Palestinian Authority – are also colluding in the implementation of the Israeli-US agenda in the region, their impact is considerably less significant that of Western states in sustaining Israel’s three-tiered system of oppression”.

Yet, the discussed shifts in the world field on Palestine also contribute to the less centrality of regional connections, which has manifested itself in the US largely controlling the mediation process, setting much of the rules of the game and in giving the US the most say in how to resolve “conflicts”. As demonstrated, the PA has largely followed this pathway, though with alternations particularly during periods of the second Intifada, and it has affected the whole field. Diverse actors, which included actors to form the BDS, have been affected to various degrees.

However, the regional connections still play an important role. Links with the previous waves are still in function and contributed to the launch of the fourth wave since the Durban conference in 2001. These links depend also on the position of each actor in the formation period, as the research demonstrated. Major continuation exists such as the continued strategy of isolating Israel, anti-normalization norm, or in the mediation effects of Arab actors in the fourth wave.

Moreover, though the Arab official policies have largely abided by the boomerang route to Northern countries, there are still residuals of the old policies. With the exception of Jordan and Egypt, other Arab states still promote a basic boycott route and do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Additionally, even Mubarak’s Egypt showed some support to isolation policy when for example addressed by the Egyptian and Arab NGOs’ preparatory meeting for the Durban conference, or when the PA pushed for the ICJ’s advisory opinion in 2003 inside the UN-GA.
The Arab League started early comprehensive boycott and sanction policies towards Israel in the 1940s, which are still largely intact though in their minimum shape (with the exceptions of Egypt and Jordan). This policy peaked in the 1970s. Most Global South countries followed the boycott policy towards Israel, and the UN-GA issued its declaration of Zionism as a form of racism. European policies towards the issue started to change, slowly, starting from 1971. In 1982, major European states imposed arms embargo against Israel. During the first Intifada, the European Parliament recommended freezing scientific cooperation with Israel. However, and this is a major difference from the South African case, the Madrid talks in 1991 and the subsequent treaties with the PLO and Jordan (and earlier with Egypt) broke this accumulation towards imposing sanctions against Israel.

Again, starting from the late 1990s and the second Intifada, with the increasing disillusion by the Oslo process, incremental isolation policies towards Israel have been re-activating; even by the PA, official Arab boycott policy (i.e. resuming the meetings of the Central Boycott Office during the second Intifada), UN bodies (i.e. the ICI’s advisory opinion by the UN-GA). The European parliament called for arms embargo and freezing the EU-Israel Association Agreement in 2002 and 2009. The European Commission’s called for labelling the Israeli settlements’ products starting from 1998 and culminating in the 2013. Subsequent South American states cut trade or diplomatic relations with Israel since 2009. Turkey reduced diplomatic and other relations in 2010.

Additionally, diverse non-state actors’ boycott initiatives in Europe and divestments in the US have started in 2001. The transnational Durban conference in 2001 called for comprehensive sanctions against Israel. And, of course, the BDS norms emerged in Palestine and globally since 2005, among many other initiatives.621

The BDS movement, contrary to the position reached by the PLO leadership, was generally enthusiastic with the Arab revolutions. Already, it saw in the anti-normalization Arab circles potentials for the struggle for pluralist societies away from authoritarian and

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620 For example, initiatives for boycott during the second Intifada, the ICI’s advisory opinion, calls to the EU not to upgrade the Association agreement with Israel, boycott of settlements’ products in 2010, signing Rome Statute treaty in December 2014 in an inclination to sue Israel for war crimes at the International Criminal Court.

621 See: “BDS@10: A decade of effective solidarity with Palestinians”; op. cit.
neoliberal regimes. This is different from the latest PLO’s position on revolutions in Tunis, Egypt or Syria. The BDS- as a general line though with many differences inside-normatively wants to see deep changes in the Arab societies, which they consider would re-emphasize the Palestinian issue in the Arab societies and states.

Some of its coordinators (i.e. Ziad Shuaybi) have been active in the Palestinian youth mobilization in the West Bank during the Palestinian protests accompanying the Arab revolutions, which demonstrates that the BDS movement is a new force in the Palestinian society, as discussed in the field in Palestine. The BDS resembles somehow new leading generation though with its own differences in the more complicated Palestinian case under occupation and diverse authorities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The movement does not seek open confrontation with the Palestinian leaderships but contestation and coordination together.

Jamal Juma argues that the first most important agency is the Palestinian one, then the “Arab depth”, which complicates the boomerang pathway through Northern countries. He said in an interview to a Palestinian TV in Arabic in 2013, while commenting on states’ positions and the weak role of the PLO: “what strengthens Israel is that it does not feel real pressure from Palestinians first, from Arabs second, and from the Islamic world third [….] and from the international community. Israel has absolute support from the US. The UN is powerless, and Europeans do not have readiness to move, and all of this because we do not move as Palestinians. The initiative should be from a Palestinian initiative”. 622

Omar Barghouti wrote a letter “to Egypt” at the time of discussing his book launch on BDS in London in 2011. He spoke of Palestinians as Arabs. 623 Barghouti said in an interview in Arabic that “the causes of freedoms and democracy” and “ending dependency regimes” to the Western countries are “organically connected”. He added that “the Palestinian people will not gain the rights and freedom from the Zionist settler colonialism as the Arab peoples stay absented by the concern of bred, dignity and avoiding the evilness

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622 “Jamal Juma- the coordinator of the popular campaign against the wall and settlements”, Interview in the Palestinian TV al-falastiniyah (in Arabic), uploaded on 17 June 2013, via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdsIwO0xjmk <last accessed on 23 February 2016>
623 Barghouti’s book launch event in London; op. cit.
of the oppressive intelligence from the Ocean to the Gulf. The organic unity should be embodied in grounded struggles, not in slogans.” 624

Until writing this research; five BDS groups have been instituted in Arab countries, the latest in a central place like Cairo in April 2015. 625 The Egypt BDS groups utilize the previous wave of anti-normalization with the participation of Egyptian political parties and persons.

The BDS movement launched its official website in Arabic. The BDS Arab coordinator has shifted from inside Palestine to Amman, Jordan, to be able to better move in the region. 626 The BDS, with its partners, have been engaged since 2009 in campaigns in the Arab region, including the campaigns to boycott Veolia and G4S. 627 Rafeef Zaidah says that the BDS movement realized when initiating Arab campaign against global companies that these companies have been more affected and became more alarmed. 628 Some Arab states have caused companies serious losses due to BDS campaigns. Kuwait responded by the call of BDS directed to the Kuwaiti government and parliament to boycott Veolia, so Veolia was excluded from a contract with the municipality of Kuwait city, 629 while it is circulated that 50 companies have been blacklisted. Additionally, the Kuwaiti foreign ministry requested from the trade ministry to investigate the role of G4S Company in Kuwait after the Organization of Islamic Cooperation sent to the foreign ministry about the company and its role in serving Israel. 630

624 An interview at Al-Qabas newspaper; op. cit.
625 “BDS finally comes to Egypt”, Al-Araby al-Jadid (London; 5 April 2015), via http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/4/16/bds-finally-comes-to-egypt <last accessed on 23 February 2016>
626 Interview with Rafeef Ziadah; op. cit.
628 Interview with Rafeef Ziadah; op. cit.
629 Palestinian BDS National Committee, “Kuwait to boycott 50 companies over role in illegal Israeli settlements”, 27 October 2014, via http://www.bdsmovement.net/2014/kuwait-to-boycott-50-companies-12770 <last accessed on 23 February 2016>
630 “Kuwait: ‘the Trade’ [ministry] follows up companies dealing with Israel” (in Arabic), BDS blog [different from the BDS website: https://bdsarabic.wordpress.com], 19 October 2014, via http://tinyurl.com/hqdcxhx <last accessed on 23 February 2016>
Similarly, as indicated, the railway company Alstom (a targeted company by BDS activists that is engaged in Jerusalem project) lost a large contract in Saudi Arabia in 2011.

The interviewed Palestinian BDS actors assert that the BDS campaign should be part of a larger Palestinian strategy like re-habilitating the PLO, resistance strategy (preferably based on popular resistance) among other demands. Most interviewed actors in Brussels tend to see the BDS campaign as sufficient in attaining the Palestinian rights (with exceptions such as Mario Franssen from Intal).

Yet, though the research demonstrated that major forces in the world field of power on Palestine disconnect the Palestinian issue from its regional context (affecting non-state actors as well) it illustrates also how the formation period of the BDS movement witnessed wide regional Arab and European connections from below, especially during the time of the war on Iraq and the related activism by European anti-war movements that moved quickly to link the war on Iraq with the Israeli war on Palestine.

The BDS, normatively, hopes to re-link the Palestinian and Arab struggles. Commenting on the Palestinian Nakba marches, on 15 May 2011, which echoed the atmosphere of the then newly launched Arab revolutions, the BNC issued a statement saying:

The Arab Spring of freedom, democracy and social justice that is blossoming across the region was itself largely inspired by decades of Palestinian popular resistance against Israel’s settler colonialism, occupation and apartheid. This Arab Spring is today, in turn, inspiring Palestinian mass peaceful protests, after demonstrating that when the threshold of fear is crossed by enough commited activists and when there is a clear vision of a future free of oppression and subjugation any seemingly invincible oppressor can be overcome.

The large non-violent marches by Palestinian youth in the West Bank, Gaza, Damoun, Jaffa, Maroun er-Ras (Lebanon) and Majdal Shams (Syria) have put the refugees’ right of return back at the core of the question of Palestine. By crossing hitherto impenetrable Israeli lines, real and imagined, into the occupied Golan Heights young Palestinian refugees from Syria, in particular, were able to demonstrate to the world, like their brethren in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere had done, that the will to restore rights is mightier than all the swords, including Israel’s futile nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction.

Aside from the spreading Arab peoples’ revolutions and their ability to topple some of the most brutal dictatorships anywhere, these Nakba Day return marches were buoyed by the ongoing popular resistance to Israel’s illegal wall and colonies built on occupied Palestinian
territory and the fast growing global, Palestinian-led BDS movement that is scoring victories surpassing the most optimistic predictions.631

Chapter VII

Conclusion

In the various social movement theories discussed in chapter two, the focus is on how social movements and NGOs seek influence from Northern societies or governments. This is represented, for example, by the boomerang pattern and its different variations by Sikkink et al. This is manifested in the pathway followed by non-state actors seeking influential Northern powers, through the mediation of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ or international organizations situated there as well. This Northern connection is a main of focus in the theories of Tarrow.

The initial hypothesis of the research was that the BDS movement follows major aspects of the boomerang pattern but the movement complicates it. While proceeding in the research, it was startling to find out that the formation period of the movement is more than complicating the boomerang pattern of Keck and Sikkink. Consequently, the research argues that the BDS case does not fit in the discussed theoretical models, even though it follows dimensions in these theories.

1. Pathways

At the beginning, the researcher started investigating links between actors in Belgium and Palestine. I then found it helpful to stretch to the UK and look at the UN Durban conference against racism in 2001. I was later led by mid-way observations to navigate through transnational and international forums and spaces such as the World (and European) Social Forums and the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP).

It is as if there are hidden engaging side-ways through the initial proposed main pathway. Many of the actors who contributed to the formation of the BDS movement wanted to have a direct route into Europe (and North America) that has leverage on Israel, but the actors have been practically and/or normatively multi-pathways.

The formation period of the BDS movement followed a different pattern than the discussed boomerang pathway. Through the Global North, the boomerang is still part of the pathway to varying degrees depending on the period and type of actors involved. The
research concludes with nine points on the pathways in the formation period of the BDS movement in relation to this research (of course not the complete pathways since the research does not cover all regions and periods). The following points related to a major transnational movement are discussed in relation to social movements’ theories.

First of all, the spark of the new wave of isolating Israel internationally and transnationally was set up at the UN Durban conference against racism in 2001. The NGOs Forum (the same name for the Durban Social Forum) called for comprehensive sanctions against Israel, as it was the case during the South African anti-Apartheid struggle. They made an explicit call for instituting a global movement against Israel’s “new type of apartheid”.

The Global South pathway has contributed as well to lifting up the BDS norms transnationally and into Europe. After the Durban conference against racism in 2001, Beirut’s anti-war and alter-globalization conference in September 2004 was the first wide transnational network to endorse the B.D.S. norms, which came amid debates between Palestinian and European actors for the endorsement of the B.D.S. norms. Conferences of the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP) and World Social Forums’ assemblies were the following worldwide transnational assemblies to endorse the BDS norms (World Social Forum’s Anti-War Assembly and Social Movements Assembly in January 2005 and the civil society conference of the UN Committee on Palestine CEIRPP on 13 July 2005). Both the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP) and World Social Forums had strong roots in Global Southern actors. These conferences and forums had strong presence of European actors, and witnessed much discussion about the endorsement of the B.D.S. norms. There, many actors from the Global South (i.e. South African actors) had been pushing ahead for these norms.

Secondly, as demonstrated in chapters three and four, the Palestinian actors has re-initiated a new wide wave of boycotts against Israeli products during the second Intifada. These boycotts are part of the actors’ habitus or part of the Palestinian collective historical trajectories and repertoires that were related to the contestations in the field in Palestine. Actors behind the BDS call carried on the boycott norm from Israeli products during the second Intifada into Israeli institutions, and called for “anti-normalization” between the PA and Israel. This Palestinian path preceded and the transnational isolation policy.
The boycotts have been part of the Palestinian political developments. The actors behind the BDS movement saw in themselves a distinct Palestinian current. Not seeing this Palestinian pathway in forming a transnational movement means missing an important national pathway that is under-discussed by the mentioned theories.

In relation to the agency of the actors, Palestinian actors (i.e. Ittijah and LAW Society) had been very active in the preparatory process to the Durban conference in 2001 for adopting the apartheid analogy. Similarly, but through different Palestinian actors, the agency of the Palestinian actors (i.e. Badil, Stop the Wall and PACBI) has been strong in pushing hard for the endorsement of the B.D.S. This pushing ahead had occurred within the civil society conference of the UN Committee on Palestine (CEIRPP) – the first endorsement of the discussed norms in July 2005. It also occurred within the World and the European Social Forums, where the first endorsement occurred in January 2005 at the WSF.

Parallel to these conferences and forums, PACBI and UK academics set a small transnational assembly in December 2004 for the norms B, D and S.

In between these conferences (especially between September 2004 and July 2005), and related to them, the Palestinian actors were able to finally unify their priorities (i.e. between OPGAI and PNGO networks), and come up with a specific call on 9 July 2005 that boosted the B.D.S. norms transnationally.

Although Sikkink pays more attention to local agencies in later works (2005), as in the insider-outside model, the BDS movement does not fit in the last model. The open political opportunities locally and internationally are not that clear and there is a mix of open and closed opportunities with many limitations.

Thirdly, there is a strong regional pathway for the new wave of isolating Israel through boycotts and anti-normalization initiatives. The anti-normalization norm has a regional root and continuous call by Arab actors.

Moreover, the regional dimension sustained previous waves of isolating Israel and re-connected with a new wave. The Palestinian actors saw in the Durban conference another chance of re-initiating the previous wave that resulted in the UN-GA resolution of 1975 that equated Zionism with racism, which was a proposed resolution previously by a regional call. They were re-shaping the new wave into the new success of the anti-
apartheid struggle, and were re-initiating a previous Palestinian-regional wave that was connected mostly to the Arab regional agency and the Global South while having dimensions in the Global North.

This regional factor is also related to important mediations such as the Cairo conference by Arab NGOs in July 2001 in preparation for the Durban conference, or the Beirut anti-war and alter-globalization conference in 2004 that was the first transnational conference to endorse the B.D.S. norms.

The regional and certain Global Southern pathways have continued throughout the process to have a major role, not only as mediators, but also through boycotting (i.e. the non-statist Arab boycotts and anti-normalization initiatives during the second Intifada, South African boycotts by trade unions and academics, Alstom and Veolia companies under the warning of boycott by the Arab League in 2006).

The BDS first conference in 2007 recognized normatively the primacy of the regional Arab and Global South routes.

Fourthly, as the discussed cases in this research indicate the type of actors matter. The pathways followed by the components of the BDS movement, or actors leading to it, follow diverse pathways from one another though they have common pathways. Some actors who had important role in the pathway to Durban (i.e. Ittijah and Law Society) have been more connected to the regional Arab route beside South African and European or Northern in general. Other actors, such as academic circles, had closer links with academics in Europe or in Northern universities while also having connections to South African actors.

Discussed European actors in this research, who contributed to the encouragement of the BDS norms into Europe, were mostly actors who have already developed their pathways into the Global South while contesting rules of the game in the world field of power on Palestine. They did so through close links with Palestine (i.e. since the Israeli invasion in 1982 or the first Intifada) or Palestinian refugees and/or diaspora in Europe, Arab (i.e. anti-war on Iraq) or Global South issues contesting the dominant forces worldly (i.e. the previous South African anti-apartheid movement). As cases discussed in this research indicate, the less established actors in the Global North have been more inclined to push quicker and with enthusiasm for the BDS norms (academics, NGOs or individuals).
This escapes the generalization of “rooted cosmopolitans” concept proposed by Tarrow. As an ex-coordinator for the BDS movement in Europe indicates, though the movement has a mainstreaming aim in Europe, it could have the danger of losing the more supportive small actors who are the most enthusiastic for the BDS norms if it focuses on these established actors.632

The academic boycott route into the UK (also in France and the US among other countries) would be more direct through Palestinian-UK actors, but mediated also with less established Northern actors in relation to Palestine, to the Global South and to progressive circles (including British Jews), who contested domination worldly, as demonstrated above. However, as the example of Belgium demonstrated, or the reservations of some European solidarity groups for Palestinian rights to adopt boycotting Israel, the other routes to Europe have faced obstacles though they demonstrated potentials that attracted BDS actors. The Palestinian civil society actors would find help in the mediation of initiatives coming from the Global South besides mediation from less established European groups who have been engaged in boycott campaigns.

Moreover, the components of the movement in Palestine usually focus on Palestinian issues, while the BDS movement as a whole is an external extension for them.

Fifthly, the pathways leading to the formation of the BDS movement include primarily the agency of non-state actors, but they also include states, regional and international organizations, which have varying roles in this process. This dimension has manifested itself in the early contestations in the Durban conference (i.e. the South African government “to make history”, the Asia-Pacific preparatory meeting for the UN Durban conference in February 2001 proposing the apartheid analogy), in preparatory Cairo conference of July 2001 for the UN Durban conference, the process leading to the ICJ’s advisory opinion (appearing in the BDS call of 2005, the role of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) among other roles and mediations. This dimension also manifested itself in the occasionally encouraging role of European institutions such as the commission or the parliament in signaling potentials for bans, freeze of agreements with Israel and labeling Israeli settlements’ products.

632 Interview with Michael Daes; op. cit.
Yet, states and international organizations have contradictory roles. They have generally contributed to the fragmentation in the Palestinian fields; through Middle Eastern states, European member states, the EU and the US. Sometimes, they have tried to reconcile Palestinian actors, as Egypt and Saudi Arabia have tried to do since 2005 though with contradictions. The actors behind the BDS call relate to this fragmentation by tending to re-unite Palestinian actors.

Moreover, as discussed in this research, states have contributed largely to the magnetic forces of the fields of following the US mediated route though making some contestations from time to time.

Sixthly, there are some times direct connections between the Palestinian and European actors, as the example of academics through the UK route indicates, or the boycott campaigns discussed in Belgium (i.e. Dexia Bank campaign). Whilst in other cases, there are mediated routes through transnational fora that push ahead for the BDS norms.

Moreover, as the research found out, openness in international opportunities even among transnational activists in solidarity with Palestine, especially in the Northern countries, is not that evident. The BDS movement had to push greatly for the endorsement of its norms. It would have been easier for the spread of the movement if does not adhere for example to the boycott of Israel and limits itself for boycotting Israeli settlements’ products. Hence, internationally, it is both open and closed opportunities.

Seventhly, there are continuous links between the different pathways: the Palestinian national/transnational, regional, Global South and North. Almost on no discussed dimension in this research, there have been actors only from a specific place, but always in relations between different places, though varying in degree depending on the event. Hence, it is neither a boomerang towards the Global North nor classical ‘Third Worldism’ or pan-Arabism, though dimensions of all are present. And the component of the mediation through the Global North embodies mediations through the Global South and regional ones besides of course the national factor.

For example, in the Durban conference against racism, the Palestinian, regional, South African and Global South components have been strong, while European and Global North components have been weak in pushing for the South African analogy. Yet, the
South African anti-apartheid experience was part of the recent past trajectory of European actors, which facilitated the analogy of apartheid in the Palestinian case. At the World Social Forums and their associated assemblies, all components have been strong though some are weaker depending on the event.

Moreover, the ‘scale shift’ and ‘transpositional’ concepts proposed by Tarrow and McAdam (2005) come close to the BDS movement’s shifts between the local boycotts and transnational ones. Yet, as the research found out, there are multi-positions in this scale shifts among the Palestinian actors and among transnational actors. As the research found out, there are different groups among the ‘movement of movements’; either in the previous trajectories of the components of the movement or in the groups forming it.

Eighthly, the targeted state in the proposed boomerang by Keck and Sikkink is not the same of the research case. The targeted state (Israel) does not consider most of the Palestinians as part of its state, but under occupation. The BDS actors do not use the boomerang component to pressure the PA, though it has effects on the PA, but to pressure Israel. Their relation with the PA is contestation and cooperation. Additionally, the Palestinian actors are transnational in different states.

Ninthly, the BDS movement still aims at a ‘boomerang’ through European and Northern actors and states, and they have major role in encouraging the BDS actors and pathway into the North. This is perceived important by BDS actors since the Northern states are generally close supporters to Israel and have leverage on it. This holds true besides the previously mentioned eight observations describing the pathways.

The discussed theories of Sikkink et al. and Tarrow et al. have important dimensions in trying to investigate the transnational pathways and aspects related to transnational movements such as mediations, the boomerang effect, scale shift, cycle of protests, among other dimensions. Yet, this major transnational movement does not fit in their proposed models.

The case of the formation of the BDS movement suggests that the world is simply a world with full meaning of the word, which is at least has major relational aspects from each continent. Even in a movement “that is intended to the outside” and aims at mainstreaming in Europe and the Global North to affect Israel, the pathways leading to this
aim are multi-pathways including the national, even when the relation of the movement with the national is still lacking behind compared to what it normatively aims. Moreover, pathways between different regions have been continuous and deep, as the case indicates, against the increasingly dominating “fortress discourses” or closing boundaries, which is accompanied usually by a focus on “our values” vs. “theirs”, which leads to the discussion of norms in the following section.

2. Norms

While transnational social movements literature, discussed in this thesis, focuses on HR values broadly, the case of the BDS movement suggests not only extending these values to political, social, economic and cultural dimensions in extended HR, but also links HR reference to a reference related to apartheid and colonization among others.

In Keck and Sikkink’s research (1998), their concentration is on how movements “frame” their values and norms into (supposedly) Northern-Universal values through the transnational and international links. Moreover, the tension between Northern social movements and Southern ones on certain issues appear in a sentence in the book. Keck and Sikkink were primarily interested in human rights transnational networks; they have not considered the transnational anti-apartheid movement in South Africa during the 1960s as part of their focus. As Thörn (2006) argues, the anti-apartheid movement cannot fit in their human rights paradigm though the anti-apartheid movement had clearly focused on mobilizing the issue of human rights. Thörn adds (p. 10):

As I see it, this is not to say that NSM [New Social Movements] theory has not contributed with valuable insights regarding contemporary collective action. However, it has to be de-linked from its Eurocentric implications. Social movement studies could thus benefit from integrating perspectives from postcolonial theory. Postcolonial studies have not only emphasized the presence of a colonial legacy in the context of the latest phase of the globalization process, but also the presence and influence of the de-colonization process and the politics of anti-colonialism on present-day politics.

Acharya (2012) prioritizes, in comparison to the discussed transnational social movements’ theories of Tarrow et al. and Sikkink et al., the role of local and national agencies in Global Southern contexts in interaction with Northern ones.
The movement and its components in this research try to infuse diverse values and norms: HR, international humanitarian law, anti-apartheid, B.D.S., “anti-normalization”, self-determination, anti-colonial, “freedom, justice, equality” among others, though with different weights to each value and norm, and depending on where. It also pushed during the whole ways for the three norms B.D.S. together.

It has been demonstrated (chapter four) that the core actors behind the BDS movement emphasized the *Nakba* narrative forming a consensus in the Palestinian narrative that frames the diverse Palestinian groups and as background for the proposed B.D.S. norms. Additionally, the right of return was part of the wide mobilization of the second *Intifada*, from political factions to NGOs, against the perceived unjust proposed solutions in Camp David negotiations in 2000. The proposed three rights in the BDS call in 2005 represent the three Palestinian groups that have been affected by “the ongoing *Nakba*” since 1948. They have rejected the norms of peaceful relations with the Israeli sides that do not recognize the core Palestinian rights. They have also rejected those international norms, embodied in funding and political and social programs, which propose peace divorced from “justice, freedom and equality” (a recurrent slogan for the BDS). This emphasis on the *Nakba* denominator, and its associated norms, has been carried on transnationally.

Major dimensions of Palestinian and Arab values and norms such as *Nakba* and “anti-normalization” are internalized by major European groups active for Palestine. They suggest that what happened in Palestine has been a major humanist catastrophe and should be named as such instead of the dominant discourse of “defending the existence of Israel”, “security of Israel”, “right of Israel to defend itself”, which regard Israel as the victim that is threatened by aggressive forces. However, this dominant discourse in official Northern circles has been witnessing changes. For example, the ex-head of the international law division for the Israeli army during the war in 2008-9 commented on two reports by the UN Human Rights Council’s regarding the wars in Gaza in 2008-9 and 2014: “Our efforts to persuade that we are the victim deemed a *priori* failure. It is a frustrating and difficult issue”.

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The Palestinian narrative and much of its associated values and norms became increasingly familiarized among transnational activists, academics and officials. For example, at the discussed SOAS conference in December 2004, Betty Hunter from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign said that the “Palestinian narrative is becoming known despite all the efforts of the pro Zionist lobby”. 634 Similarly, Badil commented on the World Social Forum’s session in 2006 saying: “awareness of the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 and the need to restore the rights of millions of Palestinian refugees, and a principled and rights-based global campaign of boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel until it complies with international law, have come to represent the global social movements' answer to the failure of international diplomacy in the Middle East”. 635 Additionally, the Land Day on 30 March, commemorating the protests that took place in 1976 among Palestinians inside the Green Line that became a national Palestinian day, became a rallying march at sessions of the World Social Forums.

This has been emphasized by interviews with BDS National Committee actors as well. For example, Rafeef Zaidah from the BNC agrees with this conclusion and argues that the BDS movement proposed a paradigm shift in solidarity movements from the dominant one in focusing on occupation in the 1967 land to the paradigm of the totality of Israeli colonization including the refuges and the Palestinians inside the Green Line. This shift entailed a leadership contestation on the priorities of solidarity with Palestine to be set by Palestinian actors themselves. 636 The ex-coordinator in Europe for the BDS, Michael Daes, asserts from his knowledge of European solidarity groups that it is common that the “white leftist leaders”, he argues, want to assert their version of solidarity with Palestine on Palestinians themselves. 637

As the research tracked, each pathway in the world field of power on Palestine emphasized already existing inclinations of the discussed actors in the habitus chapter. Each pathway encouraged further a specific norm or set of norms, with intersections

636 Interview with Rafeef Ziadah; op. cit.
637 Interview with Michael Daes; op. cit.
between them. The Palestinian developments, particularly in the second *Intifada*, re-emphasized the historical boycott norm and the *Nakba* narrative with its associated norms for the three Palestinian groups including the right of return of refugees. The South African route emphasized the anti-apartheid norm and made an analogy with Palestine, and called for “comprehensive sanctions” such as the previous experience. The Palestinian-Arab route re-emphasized the boycott as well as the anti-normalization norm. Northern actors encouraged the boycott (mostly partial boycotts) through early campaigns during the second *Intifada* and after the BDS movement.

The international organizations route, (through the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP), international human rights organizations, UN conference on racism or the ICJ) re-emphasized HR, international humanitarian law, which is also emphasized by encounters with Northern actors besides others (i.e. Arab HR organizations). The apartheid analogy is also related to an already existing UN convention.\(^638\)

The divestment norm came primarily from North America that has large investments in Israel, as aspects have been quickly pointed out in this research (but referred to conducted research on the issue). The associated assemblies of the World (and European) Social Forum, particularly the anti-war assemblies, re-emphasized the anti-colonial norm besides its Palestinian version such as anti-occupation, anti-transfer, etc., in addition to early endorsement for the BDS norms that further encouraged the actors to consolidate into a movement.

The European civil actors, World Social Forum and the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP’s fora also encouraged the norm non-violence. It is also part of the Palestinian actors’ *habitus*. Palestinian actors have been affected as well by other experiences including Gandhi in India (i.e. Mustapha Barghouti; see Corrao 2012), the European route re-enforced this norm. It is also a sort of *doxa* in the world field to resort to violent means, as explained in the previous chapter.

Yet, such norms have a Palestinian blend. For instance, international law is an arena of contention as well. Also, as discussed in this thesis, HR is endorsed by BDS actors -

\(^{638}\) As referd for example by Omar Barghouti (Lecture at the University of Gent; *op. cit.*). On the UN convention on apartheid, see: John Dugard, “Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (New York, 30 November 1973)”, The UN web, via http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html <last accessed on 22 February 2016?>
discussed in the case of academic boycott – in its totality. Similarly, international law is perceived critically in some cases, as the *Nakba* narrative suggests in relation to UN resolutions. In relation to the non-violence norm, the research demonstrates how the Palestinian actors have developed their own version. The movement follows a non-violent method while embracing and inviting wide Palestinian actors with diverse values and norms including those who believe in armed struggle. The non-violent movement resists at the same time the imposition of non-violence as a *doxa* by the world field of power on Palestine. It also recognizes the legitimate right of armed resistance to occupation. Core actors behind the BDS prefer the term “popular resistance” which entails wide and grassroots struggles through diverse peaceful ways.

Hence, the BDS movement does not frame its norms only in those related to Northern centers, but norms are from different regions including Northern societies. It is neither relativist norms (i.e. national or regional) that denies universalism, nor they are universal stemming from one region.\(^\text{639}\) For example, the BDS movement believes in the universal HR values, and insists on its totality that fit the Palestinian rights (i.e. not only liberal HR), as the discussion of cultural boycott in this research demonstrated. The movement also infuses HR values in other values. Norms are in dialogue from different regions and experiences, and try to constitute a coherent frame of norms. The BDS actors localize universal norms as they universalize local norms, and in between they are themselves mediators to other norms from different societies and regions. This is a sharp contrast to the increasingly spreading dichotomies of “our values/norms” against “others’ values/norms.

Therefore, the research started to investigate another school of literature in its later stage, which could account more fairly to world transnational movements. As said, one relevant research to this case is the ones proposed by Acharya (2011, 2012). He extends his notion of “norms subsidiarity” from international relations (2011) into discussing transnational social movements from India and Asia (Acharya 2012). By “norms subsidiarity”, he means “the process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (2011: 95).

\(^{639}\) For a discussion related to universalism vs. relativism, see Hanafi and Tabar 2005.
Relevant to the BDS case, Acharya (2012) points out to the two ways dialogue and influence, and how universal norms are “pruned” and “grafted” by local actors (in case of localization), and how they pick, reject and themselves diffuse norms (the latter in the case of subsidiarity).

Acharya proposes the “L-S framework” (Localization-Subsidiarity). In localization, local actors either adopt universal values without force, commerce or aid but by seeking out “foreign ideas that they find morally appealing or politically empowering” (2012: 2), or to “use foreign ideas as a frame to express local beliefs and practices” (3), or (a third act of localization) to transform the “formal shape and content of foreign ideas on the basis of the recipient’s own prior beliefs and practices” (3). Moreover, in localization, all local actors are affected; whether they are large or small. However, in subsidiarity, the weaker actors are more concerned, where they try to preserve their autonomy. In subsidiarity, there is an aspect of localization, but differently local actors are not only “norm-takers” but also rejecters and/ or makers, Acharya argues. In rejecting, they reject not the universal values but the norms of more powerful central actors.

Acharya’s research, and his discussed cases, comes closer to the discussed BDS case than the literature suggested by Sikkink et al. and Tarrow et al. The discussed actors to form the BDS movement rejected the imposed norms. As examples, they publicly rejected the conditionalities accompanied with US and European aid during the second Intifada. They also rejected the imposed rule of the game to reach a peaceful compromise through negotiations with Israel that entails major losses of rights, all the while internalizing universal values.

Yet, as the research indicates, structural factors such as the dominant powers and economy, which constitute major rules of the game, cannot be easily separated from actors’ normative beliefs. They reject major dimensions of the rule of the game and its doxa while accepting other dimensions that also corresponds to their habitus and normative beliefs.

Acharya demonstrates the importance of the regional dimension (as in the case of HR in the context of ASEAN), but his discussed cases are not related to how the multi-regional pathways converge, especially multi-regional interactions. He also mentions center-margin relations, Though the last point is related to the power question, Acharya’s research is more focused on the agency of dealing with norms by local actors, without much
discussion on the pathways and the transnational relational aspects. Additionally, he observes “multiple constituencies” of local actors rather than specialized “advocacy groups”, which echoes the finding of the research that stresses on multi-positionality as well. The developed pathways and norms, as the research case indicates, are multi-pathways including different regions in the world that entail diverse experiences, multidiffusional and multi-positional depending on the actors inside the wide movement (either the core Palestinian movement or its transnational extension).

3. **Discussing pathways and norms in the new wave**

The research went through transnational social movements’ literature, benefited from aspects of it and pointed out to limitations. Then, concepts by Bourdieu (also employed by IR scholars) were introduced for a better account of the agency and structures, while also pointing out to limitations in Bourdieu’s concepts. At the end, the research pointed out to another strand of literature by Acharya.

In explaining, the research followed different theoretical writings in light of the case (in an abductive methodology):

- The mediation dimension proposed by Tarrow et al. is important, as it help to demonstrate the multiple transnational mediators for the BDS movement, including the movement being a mediator for dimensions in the previous different waves of isolating Israel.

- The boomerang pattern proposed by Keck and Sikkink is important in opening a discussion on the transnational pathways and norms, and in pointing out to one possible pathway for the BDS movement among others.

- Bourdieu is employed in the field of power in Palestine to account for the development of the movement in relational terms in Palestine: the contestation of the rule of the game (i.e. mediation through the US) that included a considerable resistance to the forces of fragmentation in the field during the second Intifada. It also entailed accumulative coalition building, and the search for a new political current leading the Palestinian groups amid contestation and unity. The actors pushing ahead for the BDS norms have more strength in transnational links. This also explains why the Palestinian BDS activists- interviewed in this research-
consider the BDS campaign as a major tool that lead to the Palestinian rights but still lack other tools (i.e. a reformed and representative PLO, a liberation strategy, resisting the forces of Palestinian fragmentation). Moreover, the weight of the actors for form the BDS movement had related critically to more established Palestinian actors while trying to distinct themselves in a third political current in coalition with others. This last relational attempt to form a third current was informed by previous Palestinian attempts.

- The world field of power on Palestine (including the *habitus* or trajectories of actors as pointed out by McAdam or *repertoires* of action in social movements literature), accounts for the roles of states and non-state actors, international and transnational dimensions together, to understand the relational terms in world politics and the diverse contesting forces in the world field during the second *Intifada* in particular.

- From the beginning, the research was careful in taking account of the Palestinian agency and field besides the transnational/ international. This intersects with Acharya’s concern. The research found out that the Palestinian agency of actors to form the BDS movement has been strong in pushing for the endorsement of the BDS norms in Europe among other regions. Moreover, while concluding in the research, it is obvious that the initial caution from Bourdieu’s “conservative” account for the agency is emphasized; at least in the Palestinian case. There, the tradition of protest and revolting is strong. Another limitation to Bourdieu, which is resembled in the overemphasis on the ontological competition, is also emphasized. The research found out that the normative and practical aim of unity, amid contestation, is strong as well among Palestinian actors and between them and transnational actors.

- Moreover, the early vague observation of historical waves of protests as Traugott, Tilly, Tarrow, El-Mahdi and Trabulsi pointed out, combined with a current ‘cycle of protest’ with ‘scale shift’ between the local and the transnational as proposed by Tarrow et al., was re-asserting itself while proceeding in the research as an important component.
While proceeding in the research, the dimensions of historical repertoires, previous trajectories and subsequent waves of protests have been emphasizing themselves. This corresponds to both the habitus concept by Bourdieu as well as to social movements’ literature on historical repertoires. As Tarrow (1995: 91) concludes, “moments of madness [i.e. during revolutions] do not transform the repertoire of contention all at once and out of whole cloth, but contribute to its evolution through the dynamic evolution of larger cycles of mobilization”.

The research finds out that to understand the emergence of the BDS movement, it is appropriate to situate it in, and in relation to, subsequent boycott and isolating Israel waves but with new dimensions. This dimension accounts for the second Intifada event, and the habitus of new actors and forces and contestations in the fields. These dimensions help to understand the emergence of the pathways and norms. Moreover, repertoires are inscribed in historical waves; where each wave moves into changing world field of power on Palestine.

The boycott norm has been a historical Palestinian repertoire, which re-affirmed itself during the second Intifada. The strategy of isolating Israel through boycott tried in the new wave to ride a dormant wave of isolating South Africa apartheid, which gave it another dimension in a changing world field of power as well compared to the previous waves. Already, repertoires of boycott and sanctions during the previous wave of isolating Apartheid South Africa have still been present in the recent memory of actors around the world including European actors, which facilitated the transmission of repertoires from South Africa into Israel.

What additionally asserts this conclusion is that major BDS actors make explicit normative links with this contextualization, as discussed in the second section of the habitus chapter entitled ‘Historical waves of boycott’ (i.e. Stop the Wall report, Baramki’s opening speech at the BDS conference, Palestinian actors proposing to re-activate a pervious UN-GA resolution during Durban conference, …). Stop the Wall report re-quotes the UN-GA resolution of 1975 that equated Zionism with racism, which indicated that this new wave is not new in this regard.

This section traces the emergence of the new wave while concluding on the different analytical tools used in this research. As found out by the research, the historical boycott
strategy to isolate Israel or Zionist entities and trade (before establishing the state of Israel) has followed a pattern of consecutive *repertoires* and waves. The first wave had emerged inside historical Palestine in the 1920s. The initial popular Palestinian initiative of boycott found its way into the second wave that started a regional Arab route in the 1940s. Mostly the Global South countries have abided by the second wave but also companies and states from the North (such as Japan and Northern companies), besides calls from the PLO as a non-state actor. It has been mainly connected to the norms of self-determination, anti-colonial, regional (i.e. pan-Arabism) and Global South solidarity (i.e. Third Worldism, Non-Alignment Movement, etc.).

This second wave has started to weaken after the mid-1970s and 1980s, and the Arab states inclined more towards the weight of the world field on Palestine. The third wave has emerged in protest to the deterioration of the second wave. The oppositional anti-normalization with Israel norm has emerged in reaction to the Arab regimes (Egypt, the PA, Jordan among others). The third wave linked the isolation policy of Israel with oppositional demands inside each state. This wave insisted on all Palestinian rights of full liberation and kept the issue alive, and it also largely adopted the previous norms of the official Arab policies related to anti-colonial pan-Arabism and rejecting the post-colonial conditions of dis-integrating from the Palestinian issue with the self-interest of the regimes. Though this third wave of anti-normalization, part of the diverse oppositional forces inside each Arab state, have contributed in keeping the whole Palestinian rights alive, it failed until now to translate these norms into the Arab official body since regimes stayed largely intact through the last wave of Arab protests was a serious attempt for change, but has not caused change until now. In addition, the third wave has affected the Arab regime’s boycott policies when it re-gained energy with the fourth wave during the second *Intifada* and wide boycotts inside in Palestine. The Arab Boycott Office has resumed meetings since 2001 annually until 2006, after it has halted since Oslo accords. Finally, the third wave constitutes many diverse actors who differ in their orientations. Some of them intersect with the BDS campaign and join forces together and others have more distance.

The first, second and third broad waves (that still incorporate other waves within each long-term wave) have not stopped to function across the decades. Sometime, they
weaken, and then arise depending on Palestinian or other events. With the second *Intifada*, the three waves got more momentum to varying degrees. Wide Palestinian boycott initiatives that had been advocated by the coordinating body of the second Palestinian *Intifada* besides other diverse actors from NGOs, unions and others, have spread in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; hence, re-mobilized the first wave. The third wave, represented by the oppositional Arab anti-normalization initiatives in diverse Arab countries got momentum again starting from the new millennium. The second wave, represented by the Arab League’s Central Boycott Office, resumed its meetings since 2001 to follow up its old policies though with much less momentum (culminating in some Arab countries such as Qatar and Mauritania freezing relations with Israel in 2009). Also, some states have sought isolating Israel as the discussed preparatory regional meetings (i.e. Tehran regional meeting in January 2001) for the UN Durban conference in 2001. There, the apartheid term appeared among the regional states’ meeting.

In Durban conference of 2001, the Palestinian actors sought re-initiating the UN-GA resolution of Zionism as racism, but adapted to the anti-apartheid norm, or re-merged in the previous wave of South African anti-apartheid. The recent success of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, with its previous links to Palestinian actors and actors from around the world including Northern actors, and the existence of UN conventions against apartheid, have all contributed to the new analogy of anti-apartheid.

Residuals of the previous repertoires and waves, including major part of its norms, with new momentum from rising national or transnational actors contesting the world powers (i.e. South Africa and Brazil, the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP, World Social Forum, transnational Palestinian networks, European and global anti-war movement and European solidarity groups with Palestine), besides the Palestinian new agency during the second *Intifada*, would initiate dispersedly (not necessarily in coordinated progressive line but via somehow zigzag routes) the next fourth wave that started its spark in Durban. In this spark, the Palestinian issue was infused in other global issues such as the call for an apology and compensations for slavery and colonialism among many other issues that were mainly called by Global South actors, and then moved
to join forces with alter-globalization, anti-war, international humanitarian law, among other issues.

In a similar way, the research of Thörn (2006: 5) on the South African anti-apartheid movement, argues, that the present ‘global civil society’ has historical links with post-World War II period that the anti-apartheid movement was part of, which produced a political culture that the current movements incorporated. He adds:

This political culture can be understood as part of an increasing globalization of politics, taking place predominantly after the Second World War. In this historical context a new, global political space emerges, constituted by three interrelated phenomena: (a) the new media which creates new possibilities for global communication, the creation of (b) transnational networks of individuals, groups and organizations, made possible not only through the new media, but also by face-to-face interaction facilitated by the new possibilities of travel. Not the least important, these networks must also be seen in the context of de-colonization and post-colonial migration and (c) the rise and consolidation of new ‘global’ organizations and institutions.

In the new wave of isolating Israel, there are evident potentials in the Global North including Europe, which attracted some Palestinian actors, who are already inclined through their trajectories and transnational social and cultural links, to consolidate these initiatives in Northern societies that have remained lagging behind in the three previous waves.640 What encouraged this contestation in Europe and Northern societies is also explained in the shift of the weight of the world field on Palestine into the US and Northern powers, while at the same time making contestations against this magnetic force such as the European anti-war and alter-globalization actors. Hence, actors follow aspects of the rule of the game while contesting it at the same time in different dimensions: contesting the

640 Additionally, the internet as a tool of communication has been highly helpful as a mediator and diffuser, though the research does not explicitly focus on. For example, Omar Barghouti mentions that one difference between the South African anti-apartheid movement and the current BDS movement is easier current tools of communication. (See: Barghouti’s book launch event in London; op. cit.). The statements, news, periodicals newsletter have their websites like PACBI, BDS, Stop the Wall, Badil, Al-Shabaka, the Electronic Intifada, the UK PSC website, among many others, and sometimes in four languages (i.e. Stop the Wall). From the first transnational spark in 2001 in Durban conference, there was an Arab news room (Palestinians were part of), which had been publishing daily updates. Similarly, the academic boycott petitions signed since 2002 have been circulated online. Much of this research would not have been possible in this time limit without the ample electronic resources where the researcher can find interactions in conferences (i.e. UN-CEIRPP, WSFs and ESFs), with detailed content of discussions, names of participants, diverse declarations, workshops and plans.
doxa in the world field while adapting to part of it, and following diverse routes from the Global South and North.

As the core groups to form the BDS call came from specific social and cultural positions in Palestine, who have considerable weight inside Palestine relationally but not in a dominant position, they try to resemble social movements critical to both large NGOs and Hamas and Fateh, but invited all into a coalition and “joining forces”. They also enlarged the “civil society” concept to include NGOs, unions, academics, and political currents. The discussed European actors that were more welcoming to these new norms—that already they were promoting some of them—have also come from specific groups and individuals in connection to Palestine, Global South issues (including the previous South African anti-apartheid) and/or anti-war, besides being mostly less established actors and usually coming from progressive circles, while they want to mainstream the norms in Europe.641 Also, there were different Palestinian groups, each playing a role in the process of forming the BDS movement, with common and different position-takings.

The fourth wave has started in the new millennium with different dimensions than the previous ones, mostly coming from Palestinians linked with transnational actors, and mediated by Arab and Global South actors in the Durban process of 2001, through a process of interactions, amid cooperation and contestations, which culminated in the explicit endorsement of the BDS norms by wide transnational actors at the African regional civil society declaration at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in Cape Town in July 2004 (after PACBI’s call in April 2004), the Beirut transnational anti-war and alter-globalization conference in September 2004, then at the anti-war assembly (and less explicitly at the social movements assembly) at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegri in January 2005, then at the civil society conference at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee CEIRPP (in Geneva in July 2005) after the BDS call in July 2005. Such endorsements were repeated at WSFs and civil society conferences at the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) in the following years.

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641 Though it is not a region of focus for this research, the Toronto experience where the Israeli Apartheid Week has been initiated in 2004/5 has been largely initiated by Palestinian refugees or in diaspora, as Rafeef Ziadah affirms and generalizes it to other places though with varying degrees (Interview with Zaidah; op. cit.)
On smaller but important scale, a mainly British-Palestinian academic endorsement (with other transnational participants) occurred on the academic level in London in December 2004, following PACBI’s call in the spring of 2004. On the European-Palestinian transnational level, the first coordinated European endorsement occurred in Geneva (with ECCP participation) in May 2006, and then it became established in a Basque meeting in October 2008. In October 2006, already a newly established Coalition against Israeli Apartheid, in Toronto, has organized a transnational conference on the BDS norms with 600 attendants.642

This is in terms of endorsements in the new millennium, but in terms of processes providing potentials, though limited and contradictory, which attracted the Palestinian actors into the transnational circles, there have been numerous campaigns across different regions, as discussed in London and Brussels’ early boycott campaigns in 2001 and 2003 (amid new potential of further change in Northern public opinions towards Palestine). And this wave of boycotts continued after the BDS call, which was paralleled by boycott initiatives, calls for sanctions, anti-normalization calls in different cities around the world, from the Arab region, the US and South Africa for example. These discussed forces attract to diverse routes across the globe, and demonstrated diverse magnetic forces for the actors behind the BDS movement.

These attractions to the world field, in all directions, which characterizes the fourth wave included international and regional bodies, as the case of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee (CEIRPP) suggests, the Arab League, or official European institutions that have not mentioned boycott or sanctions but gave indicators of the possibility of freezing privileged agreements (i.e. the EU-Israel Association Agreement) or arms embargo as the European parliament has called for in 2002), or labeling Israeli settlements’ products in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (as the European Commission has raised the issue since 1998 and culminated in 2013 and then in 2015). These potentials by official European bodies attract to the Boomerang pattern, though they are the most conservative bodies among the discussed ones in this research or compared to Southern American states for example. Yet,

642 “600 Attend Landmark BDS Conference in Toronto”, The Electronic Intifada, 10 October 2006, via https://electronicintifada.net/content/600-attend-landmark-bds-conference-toronto/653 <last accessed on 23 February 2016>
the European bodies (and the US) are crucial in relation to the support of Israel, and any shake in this support might directly affect Israeli bodies.

Moreover, Global Southern actors have been prime mediators and facilitators for the BDS norms to be adopted by wider European actors for Palestinian rights, in a complex process and multi-directional routes, and for the sake of these routes themselves (i.e. South African and Brazilian states to change their policies in relation to Israel) or to contribute in the diffusion of these norms in Northern countries.

The BDS movement has not abandoned any wave, and it is affected by all of them. It institutionalized itself to have a leading and guiding role transnationally in the fourth wave starting from the second Intifada. It is part of the first wave represented by Palestinian boycotts and tries to mobilize it. It calls on Arab states to take measures and stop its complicity. Its first national conference in 2007 had two major recommendations related to coordination with the Global South and Arab initiatives (part of the third wave), while incorporating the Arab anti-normalization in its norms (with adaptations as discussed in the UK case). The recommendation of the 2007 first BDS national conference called in relation to “the Campaign in the Arab World” to: “Seek cooperation and coordination with anti-normalization committees in the Arab world; Lobby for re-activation of the Arab-League boycott committee; Raise the profile of BDS in the mainstream Arab media”. This conference had a focus on Northern countries as well. Lately, the BDS movement has two coordinators: one in Europe and one in the Arab region. When the Arab field was re-mobilized, especially during the first two years of the Arab revolutions, the Palestinian actors have been pulled to it.

At the same time, the mentioned report by Stop the Wall (published on the BDS website), distinguishes itself from the previous Arab official boycott policies, while considers the anti-normalization rhetoric in the Arab world – affected by the regimes’ as

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644 The BDS Steering Committee, “First Palestinian Conference for the Boycott of Israel (BDS)”; op. cit.
the report argues—would contribute to democratization (more than to be helpful for the Palestinian struggle).645

In Europe, the core Palestinian actors to form the BDS call have been contesting while also seeking coordination with transnational solidarity actors to assert their norms as well as their reference to Palestine solidarity. They have been contesting major rules of the game and doxa, while at the same time adapting to some pressures, as the adaptation of the anti-normalization and the discussed developments of cultural boycott, or the recognition of “context-sensitivity” and “gradualness” as the compromise reached in Bilbao in 2008 indicates. Moreover, they give a priority to the Global Northern route, which follows aspects of the rule of the game while contesting its doxa (i.e. boycott).

In the anti-normalization norm, PACBI and the BDS movement have chosen to be in multi-positions, which correspond to different fields. It is discussed how the norm has adapted somehow amid relational aspects with Northern actors. In the Arab field, as Samia Botmeh, from PACBI and BDS, says, the BDS movement abides by the Arab standards of “anti-normalization” when it comes to Arabs. These standards in each Arab country could be higher than the BDS guidelines, she explains.646 Similarly, PACBI’s guidelines provide different contexts for anti-normalization inside Palestine, in the Arab region and around the world, which in a way suggests neither neglecting any pathway nor any wave.

The Palestinian actors, in the fourth wave of isolating Israel, sought to extend this strategy when they saw potential in Northern societies and even in some European official institutions. They extended the advocated norms from the previous waves of the strategy of isolating Israel to norms that have “political currency” in the centers of the world field on Palestine. This includes HR, non-violence, international humanitarian law including UN resolutions and the Fourth Geneva Convention, all of which correspond to their habitus. They have not explicitly recognized Israel, but rather left it open (i.e. the “rights-based approach” in addition to a compromise between Palestinian actors), while at the same time seeking to isolate Israel and insist on UN resolutions related to the right of return of

645 Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, “Towards a Global Movement …”; op. cit.
646 Interview with Samia Botmeh; op. cit.
refugees and to the equality norm. Thus, these norms have been extended and infused with other norms, as explained in the previous section.

From this perspective of historical waves, it bases the movement not in the literature of the boomerang model or “rooted cosmopolitan” concept, but in the line related to waves of contesting an unresolved issue.

This thesis finds out that a transnational movement is related to national, regional and transnational historical waves of protest. Yet, the new wave has its blend as well that corresponds to the agency of new actors and changing structural factors related to changing fields.

In resemblance to the South African anti-apartheid movement, it passed through diverse periods, amid South African waves of protests/revolts. As Klotz research demonstrates (1995: 5), “[m]any opponents to [the South African] apartheid adopted sanctions in the 1950s and 1960s- and the wide-ranging acceptance of economic restrictions by 1986 cannot be explained merely as the result of a sudden awareness of apartheid. Despite world condemnation after both the 1960 Sharpeville and the 1976 Soweto uprisings, the West refused to adopt sanctions before the 1980s” (as also Klotz’ table summarizing the phases of sanctions: Klotz: 5).

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<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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Table 1: the phases of sanctions in South Africa (Klotz: 5)

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<td>Japan</td>
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The South African case has its own differences, as some argue that Israel enjoys more privileged position by superpowers, or that Israel is harsher than the South African Apartheid since it is based on wide settlement project accompanied by subsequent expulsion of Palestinians and continuous “transfer” policies to outside or inside Palestine. Moreover the accumulation in the Palestinian case has been interrupted by the Oslo agreements period. Yet, a new wave has been re-initiated after around a decade of Oslo agreements, after the major failures in the peace talks, to continue the accumulation of the previous waves with a different emphasis. This time the movement aims to integrate European and Global Northern actors (among others) as partners in their global movement.

Further questions

This research discussed the different pathways that have been followed during the formation period of the BDS movement. The formation period emphasized diverse pathways and witnessed the infusion of diverse norms in general or in the attempt to diffuse to Europe. The question remains open in relation to what pathways, and associated norms, the movement follows normatively and practically, after it was formed.

Already, the BDS movement emphasized explicitly the South African and Global Northern routes for instance. This thesis concentrates on the formation period of a movement that still has momentum and receives endorsements. It would be interesting to see in the following period what pathways the BDS movement would emphasize and what new pathways it follows (if any) in other regions, and how are the pathways and norms of the BDS movement compare to the South African anti-apartheid struggle?
This thesis is about one movement. In order to generate more generalization, it is important to investigate, in a future research related to norms and pathways, other transnational movements. In particular, the South African anti-apartheid experience is a relevant one. A future comparative research on other transnational movements would shed more light on the shared and different pathways that transnational movements follow across different regions in world politics.

A comparative study about regional boycott norms would highlight the effects of places/regions on norms. Related to the last point, it is relevant to see if transnational actors from different regions (i.e. Europe, the Arab region, South Africa, South America, India and North America) would increase their coordination or would they shy away from such coordination since they could perceive such a coordination hinders them through the weight of the power in their society(ies). Also, it would be relevant to see how the diverse norms are localized in each area, and how local norms from each region are adopted by others.

Another relevant area to investigate is how a transnational movement maneuvers between less established actors- which pushed for the BDS norms and encouraged it- and more established actors since the movement seeks to be endorsed by mainstream bodies in order to have an effect. It is also a question of emphasis on non-state actors vs. statist actors.

This thesis indicated the importance of European actors - who have relations with the Global South for instance - to the BDS movement. A major area of investigation for the future is the relation between the BDS norms and ethnic groups. Ascending Jewish actors, in particular in Europe and North America, who are critical to the Israeli policies constitute a relevant case. Additionally, the relation between people of color and the Palestinian actors is another area of investigation. Recent developments in North America suggest developing relations between Black Americans, or indigenous peoples, and BDS actors. In particular, it is inspiring to see how transnational - ethnic groups extend relations to other continents while interacting with a transnational movement that is active in such regions (i.e. Latinos in North America and South American actors).
Finally, this researched movement suggested overlapping waves of protest transnationally (i.e. from South Africa to Palestine). Much of the literature on social movements that discusses waves of protest focuses on consecutive national waves. A comparative study on the relation between transnational waves of protest, including the national ones, would contribute to the literature of transnational movements in world politics.
List of interviews

Interviews with actors in Belgium:

Kasia Lemanska (Brussels, 11 December 2012)
Nadia Farkh (Brussels, 3 March 2014)
Frank Barat (London via skype, 4 & 5 March 2014)
Jan Dreezen (Brussels, 5 March 2014)
“Sophia Abdallah” (Brussels, 7 Mar 2014)
Mario Franssens (Brussels, 10 March 2014)
Jaida (Brussels, 11 March 2014)
Nathalie (Brussels, 12 March 2014)
Bilal (Brussels, 14 March 2014)
Aneta Jerska (Brussels, 17 March 2014)
David Cronin (Brussels, 18 March 2014)
Meryam Vandecan and Numan Othman (Brussels, 19 March 2014)
A. P. (Brussels, 24 March 2014)
Pierre Galand (Brussels, 25 March 2014)
Rabab Khairy (Brussels, 27 March 2014)
Nadia Bourmazough (Brussels, 27 March 2014)
Yvette V. (28 March 2014)
Leila Shaheed (Brussels, 31 March 2014)
Mohammad Khatib (Brussels, 31 March 2014)

Interview with actors in Palestine:

Issa A. (Brussels, 8 March 2014)
M. Asmar (Brussels, 24 March 2014)
R. Saleh (Brussels, 17 Nov 2014)
D. G. (Brussels, 18 November 2014)
Ingrid Jaradat (Brussels, 19 November 2014)
Sergio Yahni (Brussels, 19 Nov 2014)
Samia Botmeh (Palestine via skype; 4 December 2014)
Lisa Taraki (Palestine via skype; 5 December 2014)
Mustapha Barghouti (London, 6 June 2015)
Iyad Burnat (London, 17 June 2015)

Interviews with actors in UK:

Rafeef Ziadah (London, 18 August 2015)
Hilary and Steven Rose (London, 21 Aug 2015)
Mona Baker (Manchester, 24 August 2015)
Betty Hunter (North UK via phone, 31 August 2015)
Michael Daes (London, 1 September 2015)
Naomi Wimborne-Idrissi (London, 7 September 2015)
Ewa Jasiewicz (London, 15 September 2015)
Andrew Kilmartin (London, 20 September 2015)

Other interviews:

S.H. (active in PACBI (Beirut, 6 January 2014)
Samah Idriss (Beirut, 10 January 2014)
Loretta Mussi (Rome, 23 April 2014)
Stephanie Westbrook (Rome, 17 May 2014)
Mjriam Abu Samra and Sharif (Amman, 25 June 2014)
Aurora (Brussels, 7 October 2014)
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PACBI website <http://pacbi.org>

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PCHR’s annual reports <http://pchrgaza.org>

Resist <http://www.resist.org.uk>

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