DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL JUSTICE: A FUSION OF HORIZONS

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SYNTHESIS

The dissertation is divided into an introduction, six chapters which are further divided into sub-chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction introduces the subject matter of the dissertation and presents my position on the subject matter. The first chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual differences between cosmopolitanism and statism, and discusses the methodological approach that will be used in the dissertation.

The second chapter is divided into six sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter presents an overview of cosmopolitanism and statism. The second and third sub-chapters discuss the views of two statists namely John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The third and fourth sub-chapters discuss the views of two cosmopolitans namely Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. While the sixth sub-chapter discusses Sebastiano Maffettone’s intermediary position between the cosmopolitan and the statist views.

The third chapter focuses on resource curse. It presents a descriptive analysis of resource curse in general, and then contextualises it in sub-Saharan Africa paying particular attention to the cases of Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The fourth chapter, relying on the descriptive analysis in the third chapter, provides a preliminary prescriptive analysis of resource curse. Then the fifth chapter extends the prescriptive analysis by examining the moral relationship between causality and responsibility on different levels in the context of resource curse.

The sixth chapter examines possible arguments against my attempt to fuse the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism. It reviews my hypothesis, recapitulates the key issues in the dissertation and then summarises the benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism. Finally, the concluding part of the dissertation disclaims the notion that my adopted fusion of horizons is a negation of cosmopolitanism and statism, and then reiterates my position on the subject matter of the dissertation.

In the introductory discussion, I presented an overview of the global justice debate. This is an introduction of the key issues that were presented such as whether principles of (domestic) distributive justice should be applicable to the global realm, the global justifiability of duties of justice, the sufficiency and appropriateness of humanitarian duties instead of duties of justice, minimalist and egalitarian arguments for global distributive justice, the contentions
concerning positive and negative duties, and the justifiability and un-justifiability of principles of global distributive justice in view of arguments based on realities of our world and realities of our human nature.

This introduction was aimed at giving us an overview of the global justice debate; it overviews the contentious arguments which would be dealt with in detail in the rest of the discussion. It is in the remainder of the discussion that how the issues discussed in this introduction fit into statism and cosmopolitanism would be evident, and it is in the remainder of the discussion that I would show how statists and cosmopolitans use such issues to argue for one perspective and against the other perspective.

In the first chapter I engaged in two kinds of discussion. In the first kind of discussion, I discussed the theoretical and conceptual differences between cosmopolitanism and statism. I preliminarily, but vitally, juxtaposed cosmopolitanism with statism. This was meant to achieve two objectives. First, it was aimed at giving us an overview of the various arguments cosmopolitans and statists use in defence of their perspectives. Second, it was aimed at showing us the large extent to which cosmopolitanism and statism are different, and the less extent to which they are similar.

The second kind of discussion was aimed at discussing the methodological approach on which the rest of the discussion (the remaining chapters) would be hinged. In this discussion, firstly, I presented the distinction between Ideal Theory and Non-Ideal theory, and then showed why Non-Ideal Theory, rather than Ideal Theory, is more appropriate for our justice-analysis in this dissertation. Secondly, Interactional Moral Analysis and Institutional Moral Analysis were explained. Then I showed why the two analyses, rather than one or none of them, will be used in our moral analysis in this dissertation. Thirdly, I discussed Levels of Analysis and explained why in the context of this dissertation I prefer to refer to it as Levels of Causality and Responsibility. Finally, I discussed Fusion of Horizons, explained my adoption of it from Hans-Georg Gadamer, and gave reasons for the adoption.

In the second chapter I engaged in four kinds of discussion. Firstly, I engaged in the preview of cosmopolitanism and statism to prepare for the rest of the discussion which is more detailed. Secondly, I presented the views of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. This was aimed at giving us a detailed elucidation of the statist perspective by looking at statism through the lenses of two prominent statists. Thirdly, I presented the views of Charles Beitz and Thomas
Pogge. As I did in the case of statism, this was also aimed at giving us a detailed elucidation of the cosmopolitan perspective by looking at cosmopolitanism through the lenses of two prominent cosmopolitans. Finally, I discussed the views of Sebastiano Maffettone in order to show us the possibility of creating an intermediary position between the cosmopolitan and the statist views.

In this chapter, cosmopolitans and statists argued, in effect, that their respective perspective is at once necessary and sufficient for global justice. There might be particular and simple cases of global justice in which cosmopolitanism or statism alone might just be at once necessary and sufficient. Nevertheless, generally cases of global justice are usually complex, and in these cases neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is at once necessary and sufficient. One of such complex cases is resource curse. So, the next chapter would focus on resource curse which is a typical complex case of global justice or global injustice which reflects the absence of global justice within some specific spatio-temporal circumstances and events.

In the third chapter I engaged in the descriptive analysis of resource curse. Generally, I descriptively analysed the distinct nature of natural resource wealth, and the connection between natural resource wealth and overlapping curses. Particularly, I described the nature of resource curse in Sub-Saharan Africa. Then I especially analysed the nature of resource curse in Nigeria, Angola and DRC. Firstly, I dwelt on the Nigerian context in which I analysed the main economic (the Dutch disease) and the main political economy (rent-seeking) aspects of the Nigerian resource curse, conflicts, corruption and transparency, and negative externalities – namely pollution. Secondly, I dwelt on the case of Angola in which I analysed why Angola is a rich country with poor people. Finally, I dwelt on the case of DRC in which I analysed why the situation in DRC is What is that Ought Not to Be.

To reiterate, the dissertation is not a work on case studies. Furthermore, the work in this chapter is not case studies in the narrow or strict sense of the term. The quasi-case studies are for illustrative purposes. Comparatively, the Nigerian case is extensive or very long while the Angolan and DRC cases are short. The Nigerian case is extensive because it is my main illustration. The Angolan and DRC cases are short because they are aimed at corroborating the Nigerian case. In other words, the Nigerian case is only important because it is illustrative, and the Angolan and DRC cases are only important because they corroborate the Nigerian case. Together, the three cases aid the contextualisation of my descriptive analysis.
In the fourth chapter I engaged in the preliminary prescriptive analysis of resource curse. I discussed the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of the activities that cause resource curse. Despite the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of the activities that cause resource curse, I identified the different causal roles played by different agents, and thus attributed causal responsibility to the agents.

Analysing the agents on different levels, the chapter started with the ‘individual level’ in which the causal roles of individuals were analysed. This was followed by the ‘collective level’ in which the causal roles of collectives were analysed. The next levels were the ‘corporate level’ and the ‘state level’ in which the causal roles of corporations and the state were respectively analysed. Finally, the causal roles of the global institutional order was analysed at the ‘global institutional order level.’

The fifth chapter was engaged in the extended prescriptive analysis of resource curse. In the extended prescriptive analysis, the moral relationship between causality and responsibility on different levels in the context of resource curse was examined. First and foremost, the chapter provided a resolution to some moral quandaries concerning causal roles that are contributory rather than necessary or sufficient, or necessary and sufficient. Secondly, it provided a resolution to some moral quandaries concerning degrees of responsibilities in relation to contributory causal roles. Finally, it discussed the primary and secondary applicability of cosmopolitanism and statism to resource curse.

The sixth chapter reviewed my hypothesis, recapitulated the key issues in the dissertation and summarised the benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism. It discussed the plausibilities and implausibilities of fusion of horizons. Firstly, it examined the arguments for implausibility namely mutual exclusivity, incompatibility, relativism, neutrality and aerial view. Then secondly it presented the argument for plausibility which says that fusion of horizons accommodates the complexity of resource curse. In other words, this chapter examined possible arguments against my attempt to fuse the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism.

In view of the review of my hypothesis, recapitulation of the key issues in the dissertation and the summarisation of the benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism which I did in this chapter, the concluding part of the dissertation would make one further and final clarification. This clarification was aimed at resolving a possible misconception.
There might be a possible misconception that my adopted fusion of horizons is a new perspective on global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. But the concluding part of the dissertation disclaimed the notion that my adopted fusion of horizons is a new perspective on global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. Finally, it reiterated my position on the subject matter of the dissertation.