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Chapter 1

Introduction: Post-Modern ‘Cultural Identity’ and Human Rights

In order to begin a discussion on Cultural Identity and Human Rights, I would first, rather prefer to place them in a mode within which this discussion is to take place -- a mode wherein we are able to locate the theoretical parameters of the concepts – Cultural Identity; and Human Rights. Initially, I would like to draw some attention into what it is in the terms ‘culture’, ‘identity’, ‘recognition’, and ‘rights’ as to their spheres of exercise in the debates of comparative public and private discourse. Subsequently, the terminology post-modern, rather as we also see post-colonial, in the later portions of my dissertation, is simply understood, as a deconstructed sense of the theoretical issues in question. Post-Modernism, and an array of literatures related to the theory of post-modernity and post-coloniality would be referred to in this Project, as to how the tools of this contemporary ‘ism’ is related to the practices of Multiculturalism and Human Rights in the long run.

Hence, I would like to begin by throwing some light on the conceptual relevance of the Politics of Identity. The Politics of Identity, being referred to in here, depends upon an ‘essential’ version of culture. The conception of culture brings forth, at least in its initial phase of formulation, an inherent notion of ‘recognition’ – indeed, the struggles for recognition and the dialogical phenomenon of recognition in the debates underlined by Political Theory. The struggles for recognition, and the identities that underlie these struggles, are identified as being too pluralistic, and diverse and they themselves are in motion to a quest for a more definitive-recognized Identity. Thus, Identity Politics could be seen in the light of an ongoing struggle for being an inherent part of the process of democratic politics, in pursuance of fulfilling the credentials of the ‘public’ norms of recognition.

1.1 Identity: Basic Tools and Constituents

As Jocelyn Maclure puts it -- ‘Identity politics must be thought of not only as struggles for recognition, but also as games of disclosure and acknowledgment. Accordingly, when we try to articulate the meaning of contemporary identity politics using the Hegelian language of recognition, we can but conclude that these struggles over “who we are” are means of enhancing self-respect and self-esteem (or dignity)’.

Thus, the politics of recognition, as one of the driving forces of public reason, which is inevitably a defining character of democratic societies, does not seem to detach itself with the former. Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult to claim limits of Identity just so within the limits of the ‘private space’. In order to lay more focus on the struggle for recognition we are indirectly guided towards its ethical values in terms of self-knowledge, self-respect and self-esteem, leading to an opening up of the ‘misrecognized’ identities; and a process of deliberation with other subjects of the State about what should count as a more appropriate form of recognition. Along similar lines, group rights, rather than entailing an ‘essentialised’ conception of culture, can be seen as an expression of dissent towards the prevailing mode of governance and as particular moments in the ongoing quest for self-determination.
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However, in addition to the quest for self-determination, comes into significance the much-significant right to self-determination. There will be instances in this Project as to further groundings of the theory of self-determination – as to the contextual exploration of and a comparative analysis of how self-determination assumes the societal context in which we aspire to delve into, on account of its particularistic nature. We will see in further sections of the Thesis as to the foremost grounding of self-determination, the usage to which it is being put into, its correlation with the existing theoretical contours and how this right, as a progressive mode, can claim an ‘identity’ of its own amidst the discourse of the grand theory of Human Rights.

Accordingly, Identity Politics can be thought of as manifestation in the political activity of trying to introduce new modes of being and also to distort or blur the structures of validity and legitimacy and to rearrange the configuration of the societal functioning. As every particular embodiment of justice means domination for some, Identity Politics point towards the undefined practice of freedom. Moreover, although normative political theory has greatly contributed to the understanding of contemporary struggles for recognition, Identity politics must also be thought as a democratic activity that always overpowers the categories of this Normative Theory.

As Anthony Appiah puts it -- ‘In my dictionary I find as a definition for “culture”: “The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought.” This is not, I think, quite right. There is, to begin with, no obvious incoherence in the idea of a non-human culture: we can reasonably speak of the culture of some primates or imagine, in science fiction, the culture of non-terrestrial creatures. But the definition surely picks out a familiar constellation of ideas. “Culture,” in one sense, does indeed name all the “products of human work and thought.”’

Hence, he refers to two tensions between the anthropologists’ idea of a culture and the idea of a civilization. First, there is nothing in the anthropologists’ idea that requires that the culture of a group should be a totality in any stronger sense than being what he called the mere logical sum of all the things they make and the actions they undertake. The second, connected, difference between what he calls the anthropological idea of culture and the idea of a civilization, is that the latter takes values to be more central to the enterprise, in two ways. First, the civilization of a group is centrally defined by its moral and aesthetic values: and the coherence of a civilization is, primarily, the coherence of those values with each other and, then, of the group’s behavior and institutions with its values. Second, civilizations are essentially to be evaluated.

Using Appiah’s disjuncture between the ‘culture’ and ‘civilizations’, we are led into deeply ingrained tools and analysis of what comes into being as to when we refer to something as ‘culture’, and the ethical differentiations it bears vis-à-vis a ‘civilization’. This already leads us into the exercise of practicing the usage of these concepts, in its particularity vis-à-vis a generality. Another connotation that can be derived from such a study could well take into account of laying the foundation for a relationship between anthropology and philosophy. As we will see in the further sections herein, as to how the conceptualization of something as ‘culture’ can lead us to thinking, and a re-thinking of these figures of political, social, economic and a cultural functioning.

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1.2 Conceptualizing Culture in Political Theory

As a follow-up to our discussion at hand, we now begin looking into the form of concept which this ‘culture’ is trying to acquire. A hint has already been made as to our perpetual efforts to avoid stepping into the ‘essentializing’ tendencies towards an understanding of these sociological terms. Though conceptualizing culture here would mean to know and be aware of the debates within a culture as well as outside a culture – the internality characterized by intra-culture differentiations, and an externality defined by a relation of a culture with another culture in its totality. Hence, putting ‘culture’ in this framework of Political Theory would be rather characterizing it in a framework wherein its relevance and practical implications might well be understood in the context of the dynamics of political behavior, a political setting – a politics governed by a set of rules and regulations of a particular kind of society we are trying to look into.

To reiterate Appiah again herein -- ‘Using the words “civilization” and “culture” to distinguish two ways of thinking about the products of human work and thought, I don’t claim that these words now mark that distinction in ordinary speech. I want to point out now that the move from the cluster of ideas I have labelled the concept of “civilization” to the cluster I have called “culture” was the result of arguments, not a simple drift of usage’.

A lot of violent and non-violent conflict-ridden history is a testimony to the fact that a ‘misrecognition’ or even a misunderstanding arising out of these differing tendencies leads us to rethink towards a solution, a re-worked solution towards an avoidance or a cropping-up of this conflict at least in the near future. We refer a lot of times, to the issue of ‘identity-crisis’; the crisis to be understood in simple terms not just in wake of a human persona but even which is characterized by a group-identity indirectly and inherently summing up the individual identities of that particular group. Thus, a set of pattern emerges where we are trying to reach a bird-eye’s view of the existence of different groups with different set of beliefs, customs, and practices; ultimately in its finality making a distinction between the ‘I’ and the Other’.

‘To see the Other as culturally different is no cause for applause and self-congratulation. . . . This marks not a moral nor an intellectual victory but a great trivialization of the encounter with the Other. . . . To say then that since we now see the non-European Other democratically as merely having a different culture, as being fundamentally ‘only’ culturally different, we have a more just idea of her, a less prejudiced and truer idea of her than did the nineteenth century who saw her on the horizon of historical evolutionary development, the Enlightenment who saw her on the horizon of ignorance, or the Renaissance who saw her on the horizon of the demonical, would be merely to reaffirm the Eurocentric idea of the progress of knowledge; i.e., it would be to instantaneously, retroactively, and totally transform this work from being an archaeology of the different conceptions of difference into being, once again, a history of the progress of anthropological knowledge and an affirmation and celebration of the teleology of truth.’ — Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology

Things have considerably changed in our historical and epistemic worlds and now culture has recommended itself as the conceptual site both of the critique of Enlightenment Reason, and of the assertion and security of the epistemological privilege of local knowledge. It is needless to
deny the virtues of this displacement. There is a concern to offer a doubt that what culture-as-constructed-meaning has inaugurated is really a new egalitarian era of knowledge-relations between the West and its Others.

Not to forget here, at this juncture, the relevance of knowledge-economy created by a generation of these tendencies as to how a culture can create and re-create a meaning or even subvert a meaning existing in its essential form. The distinction between the West and its ‘Others’ holds true to the extent when it is substantiated or justified by the creation of a version and a simultaneous creation of its ‘another’ version. To put it more explicitly, it is an Idea, a Contradiction which gives rise to a New Idea, wherein a direct lineage can be referred to Hegelian Dialectics in its basic form.

If we consider one expression of this new awareness of the relevance of culture for liberal-democratic theorizing, let’s say Amy Gutmann, someone close enough to the middle in the contemporary debate about multiculturalism who suggests that liberal democracies have become sites of controversy over whether and how its public institutions should recognize the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities. Hence, Gutmann refers here to the marginalized sections of the society who are indeed in a dire need to be recognized; the claims of who cannot be ignored at the behest of a dominant-prevalent stream of thought.

And she goes on to conclude: ‘Recognizing and treating members of some groups as equals now seems to require public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural particularities, at least for those people whose self-understanding depends on the vitality of their culture. This requirement of political recognition of cultural particularity—extended to all individuals—is compatible with a form of universalism that counts the culture and cultural context valued by individuals among their basic interests’.

Political culture is an attractive concept to characterize the specific preferences regarding politics in different political communities. However, it is a blurred concept because of the confusion between patterns of individual values and collective culture at the one hand, and the disputable separation between orientations and practices on the other. This contribution explores the potential of a Cultural Theory.

The main advantage of the concept ‘political culture’ is to point out that political behavior has to be seen in a cultural context. Political behavior is directed by interpretations and preferences. The notion of culture stresses the importance of meanings, interpretations, justifications and discourses and more generally of cognitive and affective factors. The main ambiguity is rooted in the dual use of the term political culture to characterize both individuals and society. Political culture refers alternatively to the patterns of values of individuals, and to the cultural characteristics of society. Hence, it does bear a distinction in the form of an individual capacity and the ‘generality’ presented to the said individual.

Hence, Political Culture does as well, renders itself to this duality and is trying to figure out itself within the binary concepts of Individualism and Communitarianism or in other words, Individual Rights and Group Rights. Though we will engage ourselves in a deep discussion as to the weighing-balance between the two, it would be pertinent to refer here, briefly, as to how

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Political Culture is intertwined in the debate between the two. But before indulging ourselves in that debate, let’s take a turn towards the final notion of my Project as to how these debates of ‘Cultural Identity’ are related to and have an impinging effect upon the discourse of Human Rights.

1.3 ‘Cultural Identity’ as a Determinant to Human Rights

‘Cultural Identity’ as a determinant to Human Rights is a third trajectory of this Project in the explanation of how the ‘cultural identity’ being referred to here, has an implication upon and gives us a reason to think it in terms of determining the Human Rights Discourse. What is already discussed in detail in the last section of this work is a post-colonial understanding to Human Rights, as to the works of Ratna Kapur, Upendra Baxi, and certain other references to highlight the aversion to the essentialist discourse, as I address it here.

In her articles on ‘Human Rights in the 21st Century’, Ratna Kapur mentions three normative claims on which the human rights project is based and exposes the ‘dark side’ of this project. She examines the larger context within which human rights has taken shape, and critiques the claim that human rights is a part of modernity’s narrative of progress; interrogates the assumption that human rights are universal, challenging its neutral and inclusive claims; and unpacking the liberal subject on which the human rights project is based and its correlating assumptions about the ‘Other’ who needs to be contained. She makes some tentative proposals as to how we can engage with human rights once its dark side is exposed. Hence, she unpacks three normative claims on which the human rights project is based and exposes its dark side.

These works inspire us to understand the issues, in particular the Human Rights Discourse, from a parallel-running perspective, wherein we make an attempt to study a phenomenon of social science discourse from a bottom-up analysis, rather than just top-down. Apart from highlighting the inherent-abstract power of the narrative in this approach, this approach makes us realize how important it is to study the symbols, tools and concepts in Social, Political and Cultural Theory from the vantage view-point of the ‘Other’ in its ‘answering-back approach’ towards the existing mainstream theories. Hence, through this dimension, we are able to complete the Project by adding onto the ‘Other’ which I had been explicating so far. This can also be seen in the light of the ‘Other’ being substantiated by the subjects, in the form of people, especially with reference to the ‘East-centric’ or a Third World Approach.

In the first section, she sets out the larger context within which human rights has taken shape, especially the claim that human rights is part of modernity’s narrative of progress - that is, human rights represents a step forward in the progress of human development and civilizational maturity. In the second part, she interrogates the assumption that human rights are universal, challenging its neutral and inclusive claims. In the third part, she examines the liberal subject on which the human rights project is based and its correlating assumptions about the ‘Other’, who needs to be contained. In the final part of the article, she makes some tentative proposals as to how we can engage with human rights once its dark side is exposed. The process of rejuvenating the ‘alienated’ subjects of the past into the liberal democratic state through the discourse of human rights represents, for her, the metamorphosis of a racist state into one that is caring and compassionate.

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Human rights become a site for reconciling moments of rupture and exclusion, and bringing the past into synch with the norms and values of liberalism, rather than bringing about a deeper interrogation of those norms and values. This belief in the transformative and progressive potential of human rights is contingent on an assumption that we have, as a civilized world, moved forward, and that the coming together of nation-states in the recognition of universal human rights is a critical part of the liberal project that seeks to advance individual rights and human desires. Thus, through Kapur we know not just the fallacies of liberalism but also how regressive this liberalism can be in the longer-run.

Hence, an indirect comment is made on this tendency towards possessing a world-view of liberalism personified predominantly in the West, including also a ‘general’ view which the West tries to portray without realizing the local-particularistic conditions in which the ‘Other’ is located. Though the mention of the fact as ‘dark side’ might be reflective of too critical a tendency on the part of Kapur to refer to as Human Rights as being totally on the gloomy-side, as degenerative, a dark reality seen in the eyes of East as something totally unrelated to the practices of the East. But more than its literal interpretation, there is an entire theoretical background that Kapur delves into in order to make us realize the significance of the ‘Other’.

Hence, this refers to an explanation based on the belief that history has an aim, a purpose and direction, together with an assumption that the world has emerged from a backward, an uncivilized era. There is this dark side to human rights work, which has been exposed by the postcolonial scholars, feminists and new scholars in international law. Thus, moving on from the theoretical contours we delve ourselves into the sundry other forms of literature, arts, music and painting that do have an immediate effect from an uncovering of the ‘latent aspects which Kapur helps us to do so, and which we will see once we delineate the conceptual parameters of our Project.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Traditions in Cultural Identity

As a matter of our first step in locating the concepts and providing a definition and a re-definition of the terminology of Political Theory, we begin step-by-step in identifying and questioning the significance of these terms. First, we make an attempt to define them, as is mentioned in the theoretical discourses, and then, we try to imbibe them in an inclusive sense as to how all these ‘individuated’ concepts relate to a bigger notion or a concept, leading to an entire set of Political Implications in Theory and Practice. Hence, let’s start defining and outlining as to what is indeed a Culture.

2.1 What is Culture?

‘An aesthetic of cognitive mapping – a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system – will necessarily have to respect this now enormously complex representational dialectic and invent radically new forms in order to do it justice.’¹ – Fredric Jameson in Postmodernism or the Cultural logic of Late Capitalism.

‘Culture’ can be taken to be as a term, symbolic of a bearer of cultural traditions and practices which are often found wanting for always a “little more” than their present status. What is it that a culture has that makes it representative enough to be deemed of more “space”, specifically in the context of a multicultural society? Does it need to be granted the space it demands? What is the basis of preference, if at all, of one culture over the other? These are some of the questions that I would attempt to answer herein.

To elaborate and give a further clarification to these questions, I put it in the following manner. Since traditions educate each other towards a way of a more peaceful community building, they bind the members of, not only the same community, but extend their harmony beyond its frontiers. Thus, I would locate the identity of a culture not only in its traditions and practices but also the effects and the imprints it bears upon the society around which it is thriving. This would lead us to re-locate the cultural identity based upon these reworked and reformulated criteria.

To begin speaking of cultural traditions is to first place them in a particularistic mode of expression. Each culture bears upon it the bearings of its historical tradition or legacy. In addition, it proposes some practices, some of which become institutionalized over a period of time. And some become a matter of practice even without the institutional recognition. Hence, a culture creates within itself a universal, that is, a universal within the particular culture. This is not to undermine the ‘particularity’ of a culture because essentially each one of them is distinct from the other, in one characteristic or the other.

As well, not to forget at this juncture, that ‘culture’ brings with it some forms of rights which are inherent in the individuals, in its concreteness and in the ‘culture’ as such, in its abstractness. The rights are tokens for an individual to exercise their well-being and to be a part of the entire social paradigm in which he/she is located. The ‘abstractness’ within the culture also imposes certain

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rights on the individual in the form of social rights or social obligations. An obligation becomes important when individuals possess a mutual right towards the well-being of each other. It is the common shared consciousness of all individuals within a ‘culture’.

To apply the ‘mutuality’ outside one culture is the beginning of my problematic. At this stage, we begin by working out the factors which promote Consensus, if at all, to ensure the existence of all. First, we locate the concurrences or conjectures among two or more cultures in order to arrive at the consensus. Then, we understand the differences between them and reach a position which is equally advantageous to all. That ‘position’ is not absolute, but relative to the context. How to reach the position is one of the larger aims for creating an all-inclusive society, at a consequential successive stage. Considering the increasing migration and the increased interchange among the communities in the contemporary milieu, there is a need for sustaining the interests of all for avoiding the possibility of a conflict, which resurfaces at any instance of contrasting ‘cultures’ unable to identify the linkages which are hidden among them. The cultural case-studies bring out in greater details the similarities and differences among them. It helps us to understand them from a perspective which, though I cannot claim to be different, but genuine and reasonable to gain greater knowledge. The physical proximity is a materialist interpretation of cultures, wherein one finds a lot of sameness among cultures spread among thousands of miles apart; the practices and styles do bear resemblance in most of the respects.

Moving on herein, from the paradigm of culture, we look into the dimension of Identity. To clarify here the notion of Identity, must be studied first in a separate sphere, and then at a later stage, we bring in the two trajectories of Culture and the Identity. Hence, let’s first look into this Identity and indulge ourselves into its single and the multiple ramifications, on the same lines as we did with the ‘Culture’.

II Identity, Identity formation and Identity Politics

Identity is a sociological construct. A construct, though not purely sociological, but economical, political, religious, ethnic, caste, also post-modern which originates in factors constant to the environment, but works in a flux over a period of time. It is usually personified, though not always, as animals do have an identity; a wild one. But the pertinent issue at stake is that of a personified identity, useful as a good starting point for the discussion at hand. Identity can be of differing types, as mentioned, could be social, political, economic, religious, linguistic and many more depending upon the context with which it is to be associated. Human Identity, at many times, works in overlapping conjunctures of varying identities manifest in a single personhood. Aspects of an identity vary also according to the geopolitical conditions and the notion of time.

The concept of Identity bears significance to the continual theoretical formulations of ‘identity’ as such, usually leading to a practice of one theory being subsequently challenged by the other. Also, practically, identity changes according to the context defining it as more a dynamic concept in practice than even in theory. In different contexts, identity can be defined in a number of ways. It may be defined primarily according to the socio-cultural and environmental factors that make an identity. In other words, the factors which make a way for the recognition of that particular Identity are the features that operate within a context, in which the identity is located. An Identity comes into being by a small number of contextual factors that add up to that identity.
It is an additive phenomenon that makes up for a consolidated identity. Though it is not just a summation of factors but bringing together of differently existing contextual factors that lead to an identity. It is ultimately formed out of the mixture of heterogeneous features.

Every feature or factor contributes to that Identity though there may always be a variance among the degree to which they exercise their influence. Also, at times, there may be a change in this degree among different factors which may lead to a state of one toppling the other, in the exercise of influence. The contextual features might be, depending upon the context, the features constituting the societal dynamic milieu, the economic upheavals, the ethnic belongingness, the religious connotation et al. These features can be taken to be as constitutive of a society as such, in which the identity is located. The context may be as wider feasible as possible, though for understanding its particular association with the identity, it is relevant to have a closer look at one or two dominant factors that lead up to an existence of this consolidated identity.

The use of Identity in politics is many-folded. One of the prominent among them being the case where identity is misrepresented or under-represented, which gives rise to a dire need for using Identity on a political front to bargain for a greater share in power-sharing mechanism. At times, it has also led to the creation of a separate state on the basis of specific linguistic identity or an ethnic identity, leading to creation of more separatist demands. It does embark upon a dangerous tendency of the fear of generating more separatist claims, leading to a more differentiated, decentralized though a fractured democracy. A centralizing force for a unitary policy does become relevant in such a circumstance when certain matters of common concern desire for a more universal and cross-cutting solutions. Hence, Identity works for both, the pros and cons of its contribution to a political system, especially democracy. However, in a totalitarian regime, the position of identity, as such, seems to be stifled by the single authoritarian ruler wherein it is a homological identity, without the existence of other varied identities.

Especially in the contemporary era of immigration, human personhood undergoes a, displaced identity wherein his/her identity shifts with the shifting of the physical location, thus bringing about a kind of complex identity. A citizen bears upon certain traditions from the previous country of residence and then accommodates himself/herself to the newly existing circumstances. There is a great attempt to find a middle path of existence which concurs with the existing reality, with a reflection of the past. This definitely, leads to a distortion of the essential identity, which had been in its existence and leads to a crisis state or situation. A situation where the human personhood being constant, there happen multiple identities overlapping and coinciding at one and the same time. This subsequently leads to the beginning of the dynamics, rather the beginning of the flux of the inherent conceptual trajectory of identity. This marks an important landmark point for a number of sundry other trajectories which lead to a kind of cultural displacement, being one of them. It is at this stage that ‘identity’ enters into a stage of its dynamic evolution of multicultural identity.

A similar instance can be recalled here by referring to this piece of literature by V.S. Naipaul named ‘The Mimic Men’. This novel brings out clearly the dilemmas of cultural displacement which the protagonist of this novel, Ralph Singh faces during the different phases of his life. Rather, it is a cultural experience which he indirectly undertakes in order to later realize the
feeling of ultimate disillusionment brought about by the shift in the ‘cultural contexts’\textsuperscript{1} of his life.

Briefly stating, the novel was written in a boarding house in London. It is a retrospect. It is a first-person account of Ralph's life, ranging over his childhood in the fictional West Indian island of Isabella, his university days in London where he meets and marries a white woman. Ultimately, it also depicts his somewhat successful business and political careers back in Isabella. Ralph Singh is a colonial character, an intelligent and sensitive person confused by the plural but unequal society in which he's raised, for whom identity is a primary issue.

One of the primary aims to bring in this literature is to showcase the effect of this ‘post-coloniality’ which we are already in subtlety introducing as to prove our point of how ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ which we discussed above are related and are already bearing a testimony to the existence of the literature reflective of a biographical sketch of a subject, wherein the subject is experiencing a changing identity at every facet of life.

Reflecting theoretically herein, briefly can be stated the conceptual significance of identity, in the words of Charles Taylor, in his essay ‘Politics of Recognition’. The following can be a good reference point for proceeding with the debate. Taylor, succinctly, puts up a view mentioning how the dynamics of an identity contributes to ‘authenticity’. As he says ‘……we are all aware of how identity can be formed or malformed through the course of our contact with significant others…..we have a continuing politics of equal recognition…..recognition plays an essential role in the culture that has arisen around this ideal.’\textsuperscript{1}

With Taylor in mind, we can foreground ourselves in bringing together the two trajectories – ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ in one bracket, and see how one can work out a relationship between the two.

\textbf{III Culture and Identity: An Exploration of a Relationship}

The evolution of an identity is always accompanied by the evolution of a culture. The cultural factors always mould, shape and reshape an identity. An identity is also a more explicit, personified expression of a culture. The ingredients of an identity are basically derived from the aspects of a culture itself. Culture is something to be understood in the sense of more than a lifestyle. It is a necessary part of a human bearing, including in the first instance traditions which human beings bear upon themselves. The practice of a cultural tradition may change over a period of time but the respect always remains for that particular tradition. It is the acculturation that assumes significance in respect of our discussion herewith. Through the means of acculturation, there is a need for reaching a compromise between the old inherent traditions and the newly acquired ones, without losing the respect and dignity for either of them.

Hence, an identity is affected by the externality of culture at any given point of time and in any given context. The existing political culture of a state, for instance, will affect the identity of a citizen in the nature of the characteristics of the political culture, say political participation, affecting the behavior of the newly emigrated citizens since the political culture of states is at variance with each other. Identity modulates at this point of time though it is not just one factor

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that reformulates the new identity but a number of other factors that shape or remold the new identity. It is the overarching framework of culture, the extending externality that makes it necessitated also in turn to be affected by the newly emerging identities. The culture makes an entry into the identity by appealing to its inherent characteristics, mentioned above and also some other factors. These factors account for the major portion, in terms of cultural traditions and practices primarily practiced within a specific community, which render it inevitable to enter into the identity. Secondarily, though, it might also be the positive effects thrown into gear by an inherent culture that permits an adaptation to a culture rather than being affected by them in the ‘necessity’ dimension. Hence, this leads to a consonance between the two – culture and identity – on the complementarities of culture improvising the identity. This occurs, basically through the doors opened in terms of a ‘thinking’ of an individual, ‘actions’ performed by an individual and the ‘responsibilities’ undertaken by an individual, wherein his/her identity is characterized by the outer culture which fulfils the desired function. To state it simply, culture completes the functioning of the organism of identity which had parts of vacuum, rather to be filled only by the culture. Thus, emerges a direct relationship between the two, in a way, culture directly affects the aspects of an identity, thus molding it or rather reshaping it to give a substantial sense to it, in a way of ‘completing’ the identity.

This leads to the new identity, a reformulated identity which is deemed to emerge in wake of the cultural necessities. To put it briefly, a culture necessitates the development of this new identity. This is so because what a culture propounds in theory, the identity performs it in action. This marks the beginning of a consensual relationship between the two, wherein the moment an identity reaches a stage of saturation or becomes static, culture does reshape it to a newer level of operationalization of the societal functions. An identity does become more used to the dynamic motion of rapid action where the culture lends it the features which make it durable to perform not only in a particular context but across many contexts. A reformulated identity is not dependent on any time conditions or so as it may change according to the need of the hour. By accepting the culture, it makes itself more vibrant and diverse to ensure its viability for as long as it possible. Hence, a culture sustains itself as long as the societal demands find their usefulness with the existence of this particular identity, which is already on its way to become universal.

Hence, to reflect Taylor here again, he gives us a political ontology that stresses the interactive component of individual identity-formation: As he says "Identities are formed in open dialogue, unshaped by a predefined social script..." To be sure, if identities are formed inter-subjectively and – all things being equal -- without a "predefined social script," it would seem that cultural rules and traditions, insofar as they govern interaction and set terms of self-identification, would impinge upon the ideal of authenticity, that is, unless they can be accounted for within this matrix of a struggle for recognition. In other words, cultural influences imposed on participants from the outside would be a form of misrecognition, and only those cultural identifications produced among the participants themselves as part of an ongoing dialogical process would count as authentic cultural substance. This seems to be a fair account of the development and maintenance of cultural goods in the context of Taylor's paradigm, but it runs into tension when one thinks about the boundaries of cultures.

Instead of entertaining a concept of culture that circulates and revitalizes itself among cooperating individuals in ongoing dialogue, Taylor does not address the relationship between
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The development of individual identity to an ongoing development of collective identity, but simply posits cultural substance as a given that can be identified independently of its participants. This leads to a rather absolutist and inaccessible concept of culture, one to which we can ascribe as a singular and homogeneous unity with determinate boundaries. ‘Cultural claims’ are left in want for an internal link to the claims of its members, and it is through this detachment that cultural substance comes to be an end in itself.

In his Quebec example, Taylor makes no assertion that French-Canadian culture develops and obtains its identity in dialogue with Anglo-Canadian culture, and vice versa. If anything, he seems to imply that any identity-influencing interaction would be an intrusion upon French-Canadian cultural identity; Anglo-Canadian culture is only treated as being abrasive to French-Canadian self-determination. "Creating" individual identities is a different matter from preserving, protecting, or recognizing already-existing individual identities of which a common cultural identification is the relevant part. As Fred Dallmayr points out in his ‘Dialogue Among Civilizations’ in the following manner, how an interaction between the culture and identity can be applied on a global level, we move forward to the next level of a new emerging identity. He says “As a result of historical sedimentations, “civilization” is an intricate, multi-layered fabric composed of different, often tensional layers or strands; moreover, every layer in that fabric is subject to multiple interpretations or readings, and so is the inter-relation of historical strands. In addition to this multi-dimensionality, one also needs to recall the embeddings of civil life in the web of what I call its corollaries or horizontal supplements.”

Now with the establishment of a deemed relationship between culture and identity, one can think of this ‘added’ notion of identity which is an accumulated concept of ‘learning’ and ‘unlearning’ techniques. Hence, invoking these multiple dimensions to the concept of Identity we can deduce a form of a new identity which is already on a path to being attained the status of it being ‘dynamic’. What we refer by this dynamic identity here is explained here underneath.

IV The Dynamic Identity

The new identity is characterized by the features, more than its dynamism. It completely changes its nature, according to the new demands of the time and culture, though still retaining the old features on which it is based. The change in this new identity, though gradual, comes over a period of time, in the way of completely transforming the old identity; hence metamorphosis, due to which it becomes adept to the new external, -physical, psycho social conditions. Its new features are more diverse depending upon the contextual culture which casts an inevitable influence on this identity. One of the foremost, primary features of this new identity, the most significant aspect of it all which characterizes it as new is the cultural tag that it puts on in a way of adapting the cultural features which distinguish it from the older one. The cultural identity that emerges therein is marked by the special cultural features of the externality in which the identity is located. As discussed above, it is the varied aspects of the culture – social, cultural, political et al – that distinguish it in respect of the ‘other’ cultures, the practices in these of the subsets of culture that do create a differential identity in contrast with the other ones. The kind of culture that gives rise to such an identity is the continuation of the already existing culture together with its adulteration or the modulation which rests itself in the identity, giving rise to further scope for its dynamic motion. This identity acquires the new features of the pervasive culture and renders
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itself to modulate according to this particular culture. An argument can also be made as to place this identity as a primary source rather than as a secondary. This is so because this emergent identity is more significant in rendering itself functional to the existing reality of the outer culture. In other words, it is more efficient and functional to work in accordance with the practices of the existent prevailing culture in the outer world. It is a specific functional identity.

The specific applications of this new identity are demonstrated in the adaptation of the new responsibilities toward the external cultural society. It is basically an all-inclusive identity. One of the primary aims of this new identity is to make it all-inclusive, rather it emerges as all-inclusive and not vulnerable to any exclusionary considerations, re-invoking the rhetoric that culture, identity are never used in the separatist sense. Taylor argues that the modern identity is characterized by an emphasis on its inner voice and the capacity for authenticity — that is, the ability to find a way of being that is somehow true to oneself. While doctrines of equality press the notion that each human being is capable of deploying his or her practical reason or moral sense to live an authentic life of an individual, the politics of difference has appropriated the language of authenticity to describe ways of living that are true to the identities of marginalized social groups. Hence, as he explicitly states in his “The Politics of Recognition”, “My identity is defined and located in relation to the other”. Thus, all proper conceptions of the self are dependent on social matrices. In order to understand the self, we must view it both in its relation to the good and in its relation to the other. This dialogical character, which implies a mutual interdependence, is not antithetical to one's ability to achieve individuality, but is rather a crucial aspect of it. Our awareness of this dialogical character, he argues, is a distinctive feature of the modern age, in which we are free to define ourselves and produce an "authentic" relation with the self, and in which we struggle to have our identities recognized in the context of our larger society.

Bringing into focus the larger society, and throwing some light again on the question of Multiculturalism and Immigration, we see how this dialogical identity is applied to the context of a right to recognition: recognition of a single or multiple identities, in any form existing concretely or in absentia.

For instance, Joseph Carens contends that ‘Quebec language policies and its official expectations of immigrants are morally defensible from the perspective of justice as evenhandedness because there are the sorts of demands that go hand in hand with a commitment to providing immigrants and their children with equal opportunities in Quebec and with the other rights and freedoms that a liberal democratic political community should provide to its members’1. Going a step further, to recall the words of Stephen Macedo, ‘while the commitment liberalism to individual freedom and equality is far more easily reconciled with group-based remedies for group-based inequalities than the critics of liberalism allow, the liberal commitment to freedom of association imposes limits on group recognition by insisting on intergroup openness and diversity’1.

With the thoughts of these two Political Scientists, we are led into the liberal thinking of co-existence is possible with the issue of Quebec, and how equality be guaranteed, in its basic form and spirit to each and every citizen of a Group or a Society. But we cannot forget here the diversity within a Group, which liberals have problem with, as to how a coherence within a

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Group be ensured considering the in-built factions and multiple differentiations. A bit detailed explanation and examination of the same can be seen in the following section.

**V. Culture, Identity and Rights**

Now at this stage, there arises a necessity to institutionalize the newly formed identity. The question arises as to - why to give this recognition in the form of institutionalization? What are the criteria of coding them? Which one shall we place one over the other? How can they be applied in specific societies? Can they be applied in multicultural societies? In what aspects can they be applied in multicultural societies? How are they useful? How is their application viable? Rather, what is their application? Briefly stating Taylor’s trajectories, here again, over the conceptual ‘identity’, who argues for a form of communitarians, that attaches intrinsic importance prima facie to the survival of cultures. In his view, “differential treatment for certain practices is sometimes justifiable on the ground that such treatment is important for keeping a culture alive”. Taylor goes as far as to claim that cultural survival can sometimes support basic individual rights, such as freedom of speech. Accordingly, he defends legal restrictions on the use of English in Quebec, invoking the survival of Quebec's French culture. Rights play a crucial role in shaping identity by organizing the recognition of self by others and by legal and social institutions. For Hegel, though, “legal rights lead to an abstract type of recognition based on the universality of the law. The concreteness of the person, alongside the respect bestowed by legal recognition, calls for the acknowledgement of honor and esteem”.

Hence, the resonance of Hegel that I see in debate on cultural rights is in the fact that the whole process of the actualization of the will can be taken as a foreground for laying the basis for actualization or realization of the conditions of cultural rights. Since, it is through this actualization that the will attains freedom; thus, granting cultural rights actualizes the freedom condition in the individuals of that particular group. Kukathas makes a direct assertion about the cultural health of ethnic minorities that seem to have suffered over the last decades. According to Kukathas, the communitarians and other critics account a great amount of reasoning for this to “the disdain for liberal thinking” – since it neglects communal interests and favors individual autonomy. As the communitarians put it, there is “no prospect of individuals abandoning their particular loyalties for a universalist humanism”. For Kukathas, however, there is a need to lay emphasis on the fundamental importance of individual liberty or individual rights and question the idea that cultural minorities have collective rights.

Hence, there is no need to depart from the liberal language as such, for Kukathas. But, as Kukathas points out, groups are changing with the environment and shift with the political context. Hence, this does not give sufficient basis for the granting of group rights. “Group formation”, Kukathas says, “is the product of environmental influences, and among these environmental factors are political institutions.” Infact, culture adds post facto content to a group identity. Also, collectives matter only due to actual individuals and ethical or moral evaluations of a community or collectives are based on actual individuals’ interests. Furthermore, as Kukathas claims, within a group there is a prevalence of subgroup conflicts and internal differentiations. Differences arise, in the first place, due to the variation in the interests of masses and elites. The congruence of their interests is like a rare phenomenon which is found wanting.
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for any sense of coherence or unity. This, specifically, poses a particular dilemma for cultural minorities seeking self determination, as within a minority, the right of self-determination for each individual is at different stands. Hence, Kukathas, in a way puts up a defense of liberal theory, which is generally concerned to avoid entrenching majorities or creating permanent minorities. As Vernon Van Dyke says “Individualism as destructive of minority cultures”, but Kukathas defends the liberal view by stating that since there is a conflict between the whole and individual members there does not come out any coherent or unified set of minority culture, rather cultural communities, at most times also run the risk of running into as electoral majorities, creating even further complications for the existence of minority cultures, as such.

As Kukathas puts it that even if cultural communities exist, they exist as voluntary associations. Hence, individuals should be “free to associate: to form communities and to live by the terms of those associations”; and it is this right of the individuals that gives a great deal of authority to the cultural communities. Thus, cultural groups are not “natural” but rather associations of individuals drawn together by history and circumstance and the group as such has no right to self-preservation or perpetuation, owing to its constantly changing dynamics. Now, we turn to another trajectory of this debate, specifically, which deals with the defensive liberal theory offered by Will Kymlicka which shows us the nature of liberal theory to be found compatible with a “culture”, in its conceptual manner. Kymlicka proposes liberalism which gives special weight to cultural membership, and also equal citizenship. For him it is the cultural structures that provide the context of choice for an individual in that culture. Hence, group interests have their basis in liberal concerns about choice and equality.

Rather, to be clearer, it is the cultural rights that protect individual autonomy. Kymlicka states his primary aim as the need for protection of the specific cultural “context”, since the context allows an individual to exercise his own choice consistent with the liberal principles of equality. Some clarification by Kymlicka is provided here when he states that different kinds of disadvantages require different kinds of rights, hence this lays sufficient grounds for special status for members of minority cultures. Moreover, a theory of special cultural membership or citizenship, rather a liberal theory of special rights protects autonomy of the individual whereas the internal structure of a culture restricts it.

Hence it is the membership in a culture which enables informed choice about how to lead one’s life. A theory is a deficient liberal theory if it lacks preconditions for making a meaningful choice, in other words which is not a sufficient system of minority rights. Thus, the liberal conception of minority rights has to accomplish a two-fold task of first identifying the rights and then imposing them in a culture in order to ensure equality among groups. Following the fundamental liberal principles and the liberal system of minority cultures, there begins a process of dialogue of liberal minority cultures with the more liberal majority culture based on the liberal principles of freedom and equality; hence, it is not “the path of interference” rather the “first step in starting a dialogue”. The culture, as such, for Kymlicka, does not have any fixed boundaries to begin with.

What constitutes the culture as such is the core, from which diverge other practices of the same like the lifestyles, for instance. If a culture is disadvantaged from a historical injustice, then there are means to rectify it. I agree with Kymlicka when he says that group rights as such need to be
accorded in order to rectify the disadvantage. But I disagree with him at a certain point when the problematic starts resurfacing in the light of Group Majoritarianism. Kukathas is right when he says that Kymlicka makes an interpretation of liberal principles, in its defense but halts after a point of time. He does not take into account the problems arising with a group, in terms of individual differences.

What I will attempt to do now is to rework the debate in this manner. I may take up an example. For example, the one related to immigrants in Europe, say Great Britain. For instance, there is large Indian Community therein. Hence, the moment differences arise between the cultural practices of Indians and the British, legislation has to be initiated to protect the cultural practices of the Indians. But even if you grant them (as in all Indians the same rights) another issue arises is that of people is belonging to different religions within India. Then the rights granted may favour the Hindu Indians and might not be useful to the Muslim Indians though they may be granted to them in the name of special rights granted to “Indians” as such. Hence, at this juncture Kukathas seems right when he asserts that collectives matter only because of the interests of actual individuals. Also his claim stands right here when he speaks of different disadvantages suffered by the individuals within the Same Group.

But this does not mean that in the name of individual-centric approach, group rights are not guaranteed at all. There are, for instance, many groups, which face disadvantages, and granting them same rights will act in their favor as their grievances, too, need to be redressed. But let’s see the debate if I put it simply in this manner. Hence, to come back to the debate that we started with, in order to ensure a good healthy environment for the cultural minorities and to ensure the protection of their cultural practices, Kymlicka and Kukathas, both offer a solution at different levels within the liberal framework. Kymlicka offers it in terms of Group or Cultural membership or citizenship, Kukathas even goes beyond Kymlicka, by proposing to see not only group differences as such. But rather the individual differences within a group.

Hence, for me, they do not appear at loggerheads with each other but rather can be seen as advocating different levels of problem-solving where Kukathas goes a step beyond or ahead of Kymlicka. However, as a matter of this debate, now we attempt to find ways to tackle them like this. In a multicultural society, we respect the life and dignity of each and every individual.

For instance, H L A Hart invokes rightly the natural right of all men to be free. But Kukathas completes his project by taking into consideration the conflicts which may arise in such a society. Still the problem remains unsolved for me because considering the fact that group identity keeps changing but to settle the matters in their instantaneous capacity, it is essential to legislate in order to avoid the conflicts. The context has to be a liberal wider society because what leads us out of this crisis is the integration of the minorities and assimilating them into the mainstream. At many times, cultural interference may be seen in the negative light but it is important to understand that interference is desired in order to protect the autonomy of the individual and save it from a particular cultural authoritarianism or totalitarianism.

This is one point where I disagree with Kukathas when he speaks about “cultural interference”. Kymlicka is partly correct when he mentions it as a “dialogue” rather than interference. But, to
state it more clearly, my position comes closer to Kukathas as he delves deeper into the crisis and for me individual interests are greater than the group interests as the problems do not stop at just granting group rights considering that all individuals face the same disadvantages within the group. There are, as a matter of fact, individual differences within the group, which might resurface to a conflict-like situation if they, as well, are not granted special rights. Hence, it might be said that in the process of debates, it comes out even more clearly on what is to be preferred over the other rather than making claims just in the superficiality of social – political terminology. The relation between culture and rights is a delicate one, where individuals cannot be ignored because both, the culture and rights can be realized through the concrete individual. The individual is a part of a culture but nevertheless he realizes his potentiality of life through the rights. The community, rather, can be seen is something which is not well-defined with bizarre or blurred boundaries. A group is a step towards a community but moving towards a community should again always be to avoid any entrenching tendency towards a majority community. The existence of a minority community leads even to a greater degree of a continuous state of opposition towards to a major community, which can explode any time.

Hence, the specificity of a “context” does assume importance even when granting special rights so as the rights are not rendered useless. But another aim could be stated here to be moving towards a greater sharedness, not to confuse this to accord to the liberal mainstream standards, but with the consent of all the individuals, which invokes a direct spirit of mutuality of freedom in a true sense. In the ultimate sense, post-modernists do assume significance because the attribution of figures such as “majority” and “minority” do themselves create the problematic, hence there is a need to do away with the “subject”. How this can be done is still a riddle in the long run of the formulation of political theory of the contemporary world.

Not to forget at this juncture, the “theory of natural rights” offered by H L A Hart ( one of the major legal philosophers of the twentieth century ) who has to say on one essential natural right, for which he makes a conditional assertion in the following manner. According to him, “If we can recognize the existence of at least one basic or natural right, it is the equal right to liberty, implied negatively as the basis for justifying interference in the freedom of others in order to protect the liberty of all persons.” Hence, Hart advocates the equal right of all men to be free; though as he says, “it is only the conditional assertion that if there are any moral rights then there must be this one natural right.” In order to state his point in an exemplary form, my freedom may be restricted in order to ensure equal freedom for those around me. Hart not only justifies the concept of negative liberty but restates it in the form of a natural right. Also, he makes a clarification as to the fact that this concept is to be made distinct from a right in relation to duty. Further justification and clarification can be understood when he lays moral grounds for “limiting the freedom of another person and for determining how he/she should act.”

He does this by working out the following formulations. First, there is an existence of special transactions or relationships among individuals which they enter into, in a kind of promise. Hence, they shift their moral position “from moral independence to moral relationship”. It is nothing but a voluntary transaction which men/women enter into in order to lay further grounds for “special” rights. These “special” rights are a basis for ensuring reciprocity among each other in respect of equal freedom. Also, when individuals surrender their rights to another, they partake a part of their capacity of freedom as to assure that all equally enjoy their own capacity
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to freedom. Hart thus accounts for “mutuality of restrictions”, besides promises and deliberations. In other words, a system wherein each follows his/her own restriction in the same and equal manner as the other. This, subsequently, leads to a structure of legal rights and duties, which men/women follow as co-operating members of the political society.

On the other hand, also to mention about the “General” Rights which come into being in their defensive use -- “General” Rights are based on the basic premise that all men are capable of choice, invoking rather again the principles of equality and freedom. Hence, to sum up Hart’s claim, the invocation of his conditional assertion comes out directly in the “General” rights since it brings forth directly equal freedom of all men to act freely according to their choice and “Special” rights invoke it indirectly, by making individuals first, partners in a special relationship or transaction and then exercising it according to the moral relationship. Thus, from a theoretical conjecture, it is the equal distribution of restrictions which leads to equality of freedom. This also calls for different standards of justice based on rights and liberties of the individual to be guarded against the vagaries of group power. The guard in this case is nothing but the political institution, which is also formed by the co-operating members of the political society (invoking Hart again here). But not to forget, that the formation of institutional mechanisms is contingent upon the significant power of groups within the polity. A neglect of a minority group will lead to a conflict otherwise.

Hence, with the coming in of the role of institutions, the complex phenomenology of ‘General’ Rights versus ‘Group’ Rights, needs to be well catered to, in order to realize the effectiveness of working out such phenomenon of social science, not just in academia but in practice. How well, and How far we have been able to relate these to a discourse of Human Rights, in a simple straightforward sense, is yet to be seen in the next section.

VI Culture and Identity, in relation to Human Rights

Amidst the significance of the institutionalization of the cultural-identity rights, the most prominent among them that emerges is the discourse of human rights. Human Rights, embodied in the spirit of the equal respect and dignity of human beings, safeguard and protect, at its utmost, the cultural identity fabric discussed here above. As was already stated, with regard to the special coding of the rights in the section above, this is how human rights imply in respect to the aforesaid conditions. Specifically, due to the changed circumstance, the changed cultural condition, it becomes pertinent to protect and safeguard the dignity of the human beings, in their capacity of adapting to the changing shifting contexts. This marks a beginning of the growth of the human rights networks, not only at the local level but also a global one. Before turning to my own conclusions and restating the significant implications for human rights, I would prefer to recall the following two comments by Micheline R. Ishay and Fuyuki Kurasawa.

According to Micheline R. Ishay, “With ever growing flows of migrants carrying different cultural values further and faster, along with the worldwide reconfiguration of economic production, globalisation, for all the dangers it has posed, has simultaneously opened new spaces for the progress of human rights. .....the formation of global human rights networks, abetted by the revolution in communications, has brought attention to the victims of wars, to the disabled, and to the plight of indigenous peoples.”

As Fuyuki Kurasawa puts it, “the belief that societies

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should forget the past in order to forgive, and offer an alternative according to which investigations and truth-telling exercises can establish a comprehensive and just record of severe human rights violations in transitional societies.”

Hence, at the outset, it can be stated that culture, identity and human rights have a direct collinear relationship; rather there exists a trajectory among the three, wherein one directly affects the other. Though much has been reflected upon the conceptual connections and the coherent paths of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’, it would be apt here to draw some serious ramifications for the theoretical practical implications of human rights. At a theoretical stage, it is the core relationship between the culture and identity, the emergence of a new identity and the practical application of the cultural identity that directly fits into the arena of human rights. What all human beings possess in the capacity of their natural right is what makes human rights feasible for the exercise of the rights by the individuals in the newly existing cultural milieu. To put it into practice, in the other stage, is by finding suitability in the demands put forth by the newly acculturated citizens being met by the human rights institutionalism; primarily, in its capacity to redress the human demands of being accepted by the new culture, the new society. It is the ultimate fabric of dynamic identity formation, the reformulation, which finds consonance in the granting of special privileges, the privileges demanded by the need of the hour, in the form of human rights.

As David Miller says in “Immigrants, Nations and Citizenship”, “Immigration, on a significant scale, is now and will continue to be a significant feature of political life in Western liberal democracies. The intense desire of the migrants to make a better life for themselves (often against the background of intolerable conditions in their home countries) combines with the economic needs of public and private sector employees in the receiving states to defeat populist agitation for highly restrictive immigration controls”.

Hence, to meet such a condition, it becomes a matter of primary importance for the existence of human rights, since it suits the criteria according to which immigration takes place, and immigration becomes inevitable, especially in the wake of growing multiculturalism in societies around the world. Individualism is part and parcel of classical liberalism. It is the individual that matters morally, and it is the individual for which liberalists postulate the right of an autonomous choice of its own way of life. But how does this connect to the fact that humans depend on others for both their physical and psychic survival? How does it connect to the fact that we pick our choices mainly from the role models that are available in society? Such are the questions that are discussed in ‘The Ethics of Identity’ by K. Antony Appiah.

The book starts off with a narration. Appiah begins by narrating the life of John Stuart Mill, who at the same time is the arch-defender of liberty and, through his own biography, conscious of the importance of a person's identity for a good life. But even personal identity involves social aspects, or so Appiah argues: "To value individuality properly just is to acknowledge the dependence of the good for each of us on relationships with others. Without these bonds we could not come to be free selves, not least because we could not come to be selves at all."

A collective identity is defined by Appiah as "the collective dimensions of our individual identities" -- and these collective dimensions of our individual identities "are responses to

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something outside our selves", "they are the products of histories”. Therefore, collective identities, in Appiah's eyes, are "scripts": "narratives that people can use in shaping their projects and in telling their life stories" -- and society is the big "scriptorium" where such notions are created and copied.

Not every collective term represents a social category: "There is no social category of the witty, or the clever, or the charming, or the greedy." Appiah argues that there is "a logical but no social category of the witty", because people who share this property of being witty "do not constitute a social group". But Appiah does not present an account of what is or is not to count as a social group. Thus his argument has a loose end here. Throughout the book Appiah is scarcely interested in groups as such, but rather in the individuals that belong to certain groups and how they see themselves. Sometimes, as in this case, it would have been helpful, had Appiah considered groups as collective entities in their own right. For Appiah, social categories are connected with social expectations: "Because we have expectations of the butler, it is a recognisable identity". According to Appiah, if "L" denotes a collective identity then L has the following structure: First, there is a term, i.e. "L", available in public discourse for the bearers of this identity. It suffices that there is "a rough overlap in the classes picked out by the term 'L' so there need be no precisely agreed boundaries". Second, this label "L" is internalised by at least some of its bearers. Third, there are "strong narrative dimensions" connected with this label. And fourth, there are "patterns of behavior towards L such that Ls are sometimes treated as Ls", both by people who consider themselves as Ls and by others: That someone is an L might be a reason for action, and therefore such collective patterns of identity matter for moral philosophy.

But among political philosophers there is no unanimity "whether autonomy is or ought to be a value in the first place". Is it not just another thing that is being exported from Western modernity? Does not the "talk of self-fashioning, self-direction, self-authorship" reflect "an arrogant insularity"? Is there not "a tension between tolerance and autonomy"? Appiah does not evade these questions. Although the concept of autonomy may stem from Western modernity, or so Appiah argues, the right to choose one's way of life freely is a value for itself, while diversity is of instrumental value only. He does not plead for a "preservationist ethic". If individual autonomous choices will lead to the extinction of certain forms of life, of cultures or languages, then the individuals still have the right to choose their own way of life. Individuals do not create their "theory of the good" isolated from society. Humans are raised by parents and educated in schools, which may be run or supervised by the state. Public education of the children matters for their individual choices when they are grown up. Now, if it is not possible not to influence children, which influences are to be chosen? He discusses at length the tensions between soul making and the purported neutrality of the state towards identities, and which kinds of identity may be justly disfavoured by the state and which may not. According to Appiah, the state may justly disfavour identities like being a terrorist, because this identity threatens the state's very existence.

In his last chapter, Appiah argues for a position he calls "rooted cosmopolitanism". The rooted cosmopolitanism does not deny his roots in his own culture, but he is open-minded with regard to other cultures. Appiah puts it in the slogan that we should seek "conversation, not mere conversion". Within conversation, or so Appiah hopes, we could also convince members of other cultures of the value of human rights: not through conversion to universal principles, but through
conversation starting from shared intuitions about particular cases. The issues Appiah discusses are of philosophical interest and at the same time of political importance.

Hence, with the works of Appiah, we have been led into a world of dismay as to what is the ‘identity’ in its ultimate sense being referred to in here. In this chapter we started with a desired explanation of the concepts, later intertwining them, and then leading them to a course of Institutionalization, which ultimately leads us to a questioning of our own mode of thinking. This is where we make a mark or a turn towards post-modernism – a way where we are raising our eyebrows towards the course we had been into. A more explication of the same will be seen in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

The Dynamic Notion of Cultural Identity: A Reversion to the Essentialist Paradigm

We begin this chapter by first focusing on the philosophical grounds on which one could start making a base for a deconstructed sense of the term Cultural Identity. Already lending ourselves into a thinking of questioning the existing, we try to help ourselves by making some references to the ancient and contemporary Political Philosophers.

As for Homi Bhabha -- ‘Translation is the performative nature of cultural communication……..Cultural translation desacralizes the transparent assumptions of cultural supremacy, and in that very act, demands a contextual specificity, a historical differentiation within minority positions’. (Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 2004)

As follows, this would further on be the underlying basis of my argument herein where I argue for a case of cultural identity, which is dynamic, more than just ‘dialogical’ or ‘authentic’. This identity is in a flux, a displaced one, dialectical, capable of changing rather ‘reverting’ the essential nature of the group or community in which it thrives, adapting itself to the simultaneous and contemporary externality, being morally justified, and, in action, consonant with an alternative understanding of Human Rights. I conclude, a corollary of this 'dynamic cultural identity' rights is an altercation of human rights. Making further inroads for an explication of my argument, I proceed first by Hegel. I begin my reference to Hegel’s 'Philosophy of Right' and, it would be evident at least theoretically that how the establishment of 'right' is related to the building up of a dynamic notion of the implied cultural identity herein. More significantly, Hegel's 'right' finds its complementarily with this 'cultural identity' in two of the theoretical conjectures – (1) the dialectics (2) actualization of the will. Hence, these account for our preliminary Philosophical Foundation.

3.1 Philosophical Foundations

In the Preface of 'Philosophy of Right', Hegel mentions the importance of ‘philosophy’ in order to understand what is rational. As he says, “What is rational is real and what is real is rational”. Because, by philosophy we can understand what is the reason for the actual existing rationality. Hence, the trajectory has drawn here follow linearity from reciprocity of the "real" and the "rational", which comprises this ‘philosophy’. This already sows the seeds for the interaction between the identity a person ‘inheres’ and his immediate contact with the outer world; the inner self being the ‘rational’ and the outer world being the ‘real’. Hence, a human personal identity, herein, is a first step towards the development of this cultural identity as such. It indirectly implies the fitting in of this ‘philosophy’ into the framework of identity referred to, herein. Subsequently, he proceeds in the Introduction; to begin with the philosophy of right is the Idea of right, the Idea with capital “I”.

According to Hegel, the right is positive in general because it finds its expression in the law and it has validity in the state, sending out signals of Hegelian legal positivism. The origin of this right is in the will and the will, for Hegel, is not determined by anything. It is something infinite and blank and gains its actualization through the reality when it gets a definitive character
through its exposure to the outer world. Hence, for Hegel, it exists for itself when it has an object for itself. The will becomes a free will in the development of this Idea. The content of the Idea is its transcendental nature which supersedes the contradiction between its subjective and the objective element. Hence, for Hegel, 'A conception is equal to realizations.' Here again, undergoes the next step in the progression of cultural identity, since identity gets concretized, synthesized by this Idea, in the formation of a free identity, an identity which is free by the existence of its independent object which is unique to its own. It is this uniqueness, here again, which is determined by will of this identity, which is formed of the continuous interaction between the real and the rational.

In Part I, Hegel mentions about abstract right and property. For him, the abstractness has to be given a reality. Through property, the inward free will has to come into contact with the outer world in order to exist as an Idea. As he puts it, "I have the right to appropriation so as to own things which represent my actual will in them". My free will undergoes a transition and becomes actual will. "I possess my life and my body, like other things, only in so far as my will is in them". For Hegel thus, taking possession, use and alienation is what makes it a thing of property; the thing doesn’t have an end or belong to itself; it acquires the soul and will of the person after being owned. To reproduce it in terms of the 'cultural identity', it has been stamp-marked with ownership of the will, the abstract identity being converted into a real one, a realistically existing one in its spirit and substance; hence, a reproduction of the actually existing 'cultural identity' with the potential of being transcendental simultaneously.

While delineating the concept of wrong, this is something which stands in opposition to the principle of rightness. In a way, the right transcends itself from the implicit to the explicit. The fact that it was standing in negation to itself doesn’t hold any longer. Hence, according to Hegel, it cannot be called objective in its execution and universally valid because the right assumes the character of being particular which is explicitly at variance with the universal will. To state it in other words, this established cultural identity acquires a particularistic subjective character, as opposed to the objectively existing one. Though a debate could worth be undertaken here between the Universal-Particular, but I would prefer to restrict to the elements of the objective and the subjective.

Hence, the identity does acquire a subjective character herein as contrasted to the abstract, objective and the generalized one. Now the will is infinite not merely in itself but for itself. Hence, it is the subjective will which is now seen as actual freedom. The subjective will is something which has now acquired an outward existence. The externalization of the subjective will is the action. The cultural identity, thus, shifts itself from being objective to subjective; it lends itself in greater proportions to multiplicity of subjective relations; by continuous interaction with the outer world and by continuous inevitable effect created upon by the society around which it is thriving. Let us throw some light now on the Ethical life, which for Hegel is the concept of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness. ‘That the ethical order is the system of specific determinations of the Idea constitutes its rationality,’ as Hegel says. The individual is related to these laws and institutions as to the substance of his own being. In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom. Hence, for Hegel, Virtue is the ethical order reflected in the individual character. Ethical life appears as custom, and the substance of mind thus exists now for the first time as mind. The individual knows that his
particular ends are grounded in this same universal. In an ethical order individuals are actually in possession of their own inner universality.

The right of individuals to their particular satisfaction is also contained in the ethical substantial order. In this identity of the universal will with the particular will, right and duty coalesce. The ethical substance is the actual mind of a family and a nation. The concrete person finds satisfaction by means of others, and at the same time by means of universality. The livelihood, happiness, and rights of one are interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all. The system of the ethical order constitutes the Idea's abstract moment, its moment of reality. The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. The state is absolutely rational once the particular has been raised to consciousness of its universality. The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. The strength of the state thus lies in the unity of its universal end with the particular interest of individual.

Rights play a crucial role in shaping identity by organizing the recognition of self by others and by legal and social institutions. For Hegel, legal rights lead to an abstract type of recognition based on the universality of the law. Human rights move in this direction, by validating both the similarity of claimants with abstract humanity and their difference and uniqueness. But law's necessary generality cannot meet the demands for the full recognition of the postmodern self with its polymorphous desires and its complex struggles for recognition as a unique individual.

Hence, the resonance of Hegel that I see in debate on ‘cultural identity’ is in the fact that the whole process of the actualization of the will can be taken as a foreground for laying the basis for actualization or realization of the conditions of ‘cultural identity’; the dynamic cultural identity. Hegel does try to reason out the development of the Idea and the actualization of the Will on the basis of logic, which in fact seems good, in our analogy to understand and uncover the aspects of the dynamism in an individual will and action, subsequently leading to a collective will and action. Going a step further, I move toward a more appropriate defense of my argument in light of the narratives of Bhabha wherein I have equated Cultural Dynamism with Cultural Hybridity.

3.2 Dynamism as Cultural Hybridity

Bhabha looks more intriguingly into the "Postmodern Space", the "postcolonial times" and "the trials of cultural translation". He dismisses any sort of essentialisation, to begin with, and brings forth a reversion of the essentialist. Through the narratives and trajectories Bhabha employs, he makes intrusions into the path to incessant inevitability of cultural transcendentalism. Hence, Bhabha invokes the deconstruction of cultural identity through one of the post-modern techniques of "the trials of cultural translation". He does express a concern over the overdramatized images of "cultural identity" as presented by Charles Taylor. Hence, a critique of Charles Taylor is provided herein, by theoretical criticism of Taylorian dialogical identity, stating it in terms of a mere farce, a mere drama, as Bhabha says, since Taylor does ignore to a considerable extent the underlying layers of ambivalence which will be proved further ahead in the forthcoming paragraphs. Hence, Bhabha precisely invokes a need to move "beyond" this recognition of identity by the others, since even the others do not make a difference to this cultural identity by falling into this vicious circle of essentialising the self and the others, in turn.
Hence, to begin with, it is in the "Post-Modernism or the cultural logic of late capitalism" by Fredric Jameson that Bhabha primarily marks as his starting point in order to delineate the conceptual clarity of "ambivalence" as such, as understood in the frameworks of literary genre or in terms of theoretical references. The ambivalence he identifies in Jameson's thought is the 'renewed' surge of reverting internationalism by taking into account the varied cultural differentiation, the existence of this cultural hybridity, which questions the imposed transnationalism, in dire need of a reinvention. As Bhabha says "The historical difference of the present is articulated in the emergence of a third space of representation which is, just as quickly, reabsorbed into the base-superstructure division’. Hence, it is the implied significance of the ‘unrepresented’ which craves for a ‘temporal representation’ in the plethora of agencies of Trans and Multinational existentialities.

‘The liminality of migrant experience is no less a transitional phenomenon than a translational one; there is no resolution to it because the two conditions are ambivalently enjoined in the 'survival' of migrant life'. Here again, is made an attempt to gain greater precision of ‘ambivalence’ since a transition is inevitably accompanied by a translation. And it is this ‘cultural translation’ which solves the problem, to a considerable extent, of transnationalism, by making it more historically differentiated and invoking elements of cultural difference by giving space to the mis-represented. At this point, I would like to focus some attention on Fanon's take on Identity, as Fanon does make an impact, in this debate herein, being located in a "postcolonial" situation and stating things out from a perspective of the oppressed. He brings about a social and collective psyche in his post-colonial prerogative, wherein he makes an analysis through the varied existentialities of social and historical facts, thus providing further aversion to the understanding of the black and the white.

As Bhabha interprets it as ‘This image of human identity and, indeed, human identity as image – both familiar frames or mirrors of selfhood that speak from deep within Western culture – are inscribed in the sign of resemblance’. ‘Making further inroads onto the explication of this phenomenon of "cultural difference", is to state the differentially of these phenomenon in the minutest of their existence. It is the difference which functions as a first step towards the introduction of this "colonial nonsense", which is banished from the perspective of the existence of these hegemonic discourses.’

One of the significant outputs generated out of this "cultural difference" is the deconstruction of the coloniality, the colonial discourse as such, and what emerges from the dispersal of work is the language of a colonial nonsense that displaces those dualities in which the colonial space is traditionally divided: nature Vs culture, chaos Vs civility. Hence, further more than doing with the traditional divisions, it induces this 'cultural difference'. Hence, for Bhabha, it is this 'in-between' culture which forms a part of the significant portion of the 'human culture' in its spirit and substance. Thus, so far, we have seen the reversion to this cultural identity in the form of the theoretical conjecture (Hegel) and further nuances through the post-modernist approach undertaken by Bhabha, who even goes a step ahead by claiming this human differentiation and equating it with the displacement of truth. As he says, ‘It is the displacement of truth in the very identification of culture, or an uncertainty in the structure of ‘culture’ as the identification of a certain discursive human truth’.
Thus, sundry other narratives furnished by Bhabha make a further claim and a viability for the explication of my argument in a more coherent manner more than just its literary implications. With Bhabha, we have been able to identify the ‘difference-approach’ not just in its literal sense but also in its practical implications. Through Bhabha, we have been able to put forth, atleast in theory, that a multiplicity of narratives does verify a ‘voice’ which is not just a homogenous voice but a voice of a ‘multiple-identity’. To further relate to these trajectories by Bhabha, we can see how well it is complimented by Literature, which here we discuss a bit in detail.

The tool I would use here is a work of literature by V.S. Naipaul named “The Mimic Men”. With Naipaul, I introduce the debate in two of the more significant aspects herein (1) displacement of Identity (2) Cultural contexts. This novel brings out clearly the dilemmas of cultural displacement which the protagonist of this novel, Ralph Singh faces during the different phases of his life. Rather, it is a cultural experience which he indirectly undertakes in order to later realize the shift in the cultural contexts of his life. Furthermore, I would throw some light on the narratives depicted in this novel, which in turn would indicate at the concern for search of an ‘identity’.

3.3 Literature and Post-Modernism

V. S. Naipaul's novel *The Mimic Men* is the memoir of protagonist Ralph Singh. It is a first-person account of Ralph's life, ranging over his childhood in the fictional West Indian island of Isabella, his university days in London where he meets and marries a white woman. Ultimately, it also depicts his somewhat successful business and political careers back in Isabella. Ralph Singh is a colonial character, an intelligent and sensitive person confused by the plural but unequal society he's raised in and for whom identity is a primary issue. Ralph admits himself that his feelings, his actions, his life fit in within these 'patterns.' Now, I would make an attempt to analyze how Ralph's sense of alienation, and his struggle with a sense of personal identity, and his inability to connect with others are linked as various expressions of Ralph's sense of loss and disconnectedness.

Though Ralph's public life is significant since it echoes the complexities and contradictions inherent in decolonization and post-colonial nationalism; at the heart of Ralph's fictional life in *The Mimic Men* is the story of how and why this sense of personal incompleteness grows to almost destroy him. Ralph is not unaffected by the corruption he perceives all around him. In fact, apart from all the external disorder, Ralph comes to realize that the "chaos lies all within him". Ralph indicates elsewhere that many of his struggles with a sense of identity began during his childhood. His reactions to many of the events in his childhood are similarly characterized by disassociation and emotional withdrawal. He refuses to identify with his family's history in the island. Ralph accepts the Western European view of the world as the only correct one rather than one possibility among many.

Ralph's conscious and imaginative identification with Britain and the West affects him psychologically in a number of interrelated ways. He conceives of himself as protected by the West, since he thinks he is one of their own, and imagines an "eye" that watches over him. Just as he disassociates his concept of home from Isabella, Ralph projects authority away from himself toward a symbolic, disembodied "eye" representing the watchful and superior culture.
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This projection slowly begins to tap his sense of will and engenders the feeling of helplessness that corrupts him more as he grows older. And, as he grows, Ralph finds instead that London does not welcome him, he is not in his rightful place after all and he fails to integrate into the ideal culture presented to him through books. From childhood Ralph had disowned Isabellan history and culture, yet he doesn't find a place in British society either.

Ralph's ultimate reaction to both public and personal events is emotional and physical withdrawal. Though his confused sense of identity contributes to an emotional distance between himself and others, further difficulties and a culmination of events intensify this tendency. At one point Ralph writes that he throws himself into various activities because they link him with the ‘real’ world and distract him from his internal reality. But fear becomes the mediator between the external and internal, fear of the external propelling him inward where he discovers he has no resources with which to meet it.

But what Ralph really fears is that the world around him is real. The confusion and disorder is incomprehensible to someone who wants, who needs at an emotionally primal level, the ‘simple and ordinary.’ He has rejected the cultural traditions of his people and with them, any comfort of traditional religious teachings. Ralph reflects on what he hopes to achieve by writing of his life: "It was my hope to give expression to the restlessness, the deep disorder, which the great explorations, the overthrow in three continents of established social organizations, the unnatural bringing together of peoples who could achieve fulfilment only within the security of their own societies and the landscapes hymned by their ancestors, it was my hope to give partial expression to the restlessness which this great upheaval has brought about". But he realizes he cannot do this because, as he says, "I am too much a victim of that restlessness which was to have been my subject".

And it is interesting that while Ralph sees so clearly the difficulties facing those who want to change the political and economic conditions in Isabella, he focuses mostly on the pathetic nature of their plight rather than on the British rationalizations and responsibilities for constructing and maintaining the colonial situation. Hence, this leaves us, at the top of mounting disillusionments of varied human cultural experiences but still forges its way into understanding the core concept of cultural identity, not in the separatist sense but in the cooperative sense. Especially in the context of multiculturalism, the concept assumes significance in working out the dynamics of a culture-laden existence.

With this picture of Ralph, one is drawn into the complexities of a human personhood – hence, the deep effect an externality can cast upon the internal human condition. The non-adjustment dimension clearly shows us as to how fluid is this identity, is it the ‘real, existing’ identity that we are and that we wish to talk about? With Ralph’s immigrant experiences, and his personal emotional dilemmas, we can rather decipher that if ‘this’ happens to ‘one’, ‘it’ can ‘happen’ to anyone, simply following the logic of human transferability. But of course, we cannot deny the human subjectivity herein, in order to reflect the larger goals of our Project. How do we revert the essential is still the central concern of our Project.

3.4 Reversion to the Essentialist Paradigm

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In its final moment, we will be able to see as to how and in which manner, is this ‘reversion to the essential’ possible, as a matter of fact. We use the work by Upendra Baxi, which does go on to justify our previously mentioned claims of understanding and reverting the essential sense or a discourse – referring herein particularly to the discourse of human rights.

Reiterating Baxi here whose quest is of interest to look into this complex dimension of human differentially? As he asks this question ‘Do identities get universalised all over again in positing a universal bearer of human rights, obscuring the fact that identities may themselves be vehicles of power, all too often inscribed or imposed?’ Hence, to examine the work of Baxi here, is to state the two primary facets of what he discusses in his "The Future of Human Rights" – (1) Suffering (2) the theory of ‘resistance’. It is through these two aspects that Baxi puts forth a case for a more justifiable human rights, the contemporary Human Rights as he calls it.

For Baxi, Suffering takes more as a centre stage for an understanding of the concept of Human Rights. Hence, he indirectly invokes here the same rhetoric of taking into consideration more acutely the ‘bottom-up’ approach to Human Rights. Through Suffering, Baxi explicitly states the viability and productivity of the existing Human Rights from the viewpoint of those who suffer rather than granting rights in vacuum as is the mainstream discourse of Human Rights, in the contemporary scenario. Thus, I state Baxi here as one of the significant steps for marking this reversion to the essentialist paradigm, since he combines precisely the dynamic cultural identity phenomenon with the discourse of the contemporary Human Rights.

Through the Theory of ‘resistance’, Baxi again claims to offer an understanding of the underlying predominance of resistance as a subject-matter rather than the ‘convenient’ policymaking which lacks the spirit and the strength of credibility for the populace. Moreover, by coining this terminology for the academic understanding Baxi lays grounds for reverting the theory of the continuous, imposed, hegemonic institutional decision-making, and putting forth a more widespread, acceptable, and a viable concept of Human Rights, which is more humanised and more people-friendly, in a layman’s terms.

Drawing all these trajectories, as averting or reverting to the essentialist paradigm of Cultural Identity, I recall Amartya Sen ‘The illusion of cultural destiny is not only misleading, it can also be significantly debilitating, since it can generate a sense of fatalism and resignation among people who are unfavorably placed.’ Though Sen’s reference here may not be mistaken for the theoretical-ideological interpretations, I merely use it for a clarity on my position towards ‘cultural identity’. Also, as an effort for greater understanding I quote Carens, who makes a case for a contextual understanding lending it a more vivid character by saying ‘…..an even closer attention to context will lead to a richer, more complex, and ultimately more satisfactory theoretical account…..an ideal of evenhandedness’.

And not to forget Ratna Kapur at this juncture, ‘Revisiting the colonial encounter is critical in order to understand the limitations and possibilities of human rights in the contemporary period. It is essential for human rights advocates to embrace this history. Assertions about the universality of human rights simply deny the reality of those whom it claims to represent and speak for, disclaiming their histories and imposing another’s through a hegemonising move. Thus, the liberal tradition from which human rights have emerged not only incorporates
arguments about freedom and equal worth but — and this is the core of my argument — it also incorporates arguments about civilisation, cultural backwardness, racial and religious superiority. Further human rights remain structured by this history. This dark side is intrinsic to human rights, rather than something that is merely broken and can be glued back together. There are at least three different ways in which the ‘Other’ has been addressed in relation to rights discourse. The first is through the assumption that the difference can be erased and the ‘Other’ tamed and assimilated through some form of cultural or racial strip. The second is to treat the difference as natural and inevitable. And finally, there is the response that justifies incarceration, internment or even annihilation of the ‘Other’ because of the threat it poses. These are not rigid and absolute categorisations, but frequently overlap and leak into one another’ —Ratna Kapur, The Dark Side of Human Rights.

Hence, Kapur rightly states that we need to move beyond debates between the universal character of human rights and their historical particularity. The human rights project will remain circular and non-productive if we linger in the debate about transcendence and immanence. Secondly, there needs to be a reorientation in human rights scholarship and education. Human rights advocates, including feminist scholars, have failed to adequately centre and interrogate the colonial trappings and ‘First World’ hegemonic underpinnings of this project, and frequently ignore or exclude the non-west from the conversation. Analyzing human rights from a postcolonial perspective provides an enriched perspective of how the terrain has operated and the politics of inclusion and exclusion that it has sustained and even justified.

It is not only useful, but critical, for human rights scholars and advocates to consciously drawing on the experience of the postcolonial world. This is obligatory in order to revise both our thinking and understanding of human rights that has been so dominated by Western pontificating about the project, tied down to liberal utopian visions, or claims that human rights are something needed only ‘over there’, in the developing, less civilized world. ‘To draw on the experiences’ requires understanding and learning from the postcolonial engagement with rights that are informed by the legacies of the colonial encounter. It is, after all, in the postcolonial world where the dark side has been most obviously played out. Finally, a major shift in the location of the project, who is telling the story and how the story is told, can provide a different and critical trajectory from which to view human rights.

Thus, this briefly leads us to think of this discourse of Human Rights from a deeply critical perspective, a critical thinking as to how the importance of a context does assume significance – the context here refers to a simple analytical trajectory of how Human Rights can very well come from ‘below’ – how they can be grounded on a more democratic ground and how they can be more widely based upon a more wide-ranging concerns of human capacities, rather than just being reflective of a single, homogenous and a hegemonic discourse, which is, a discourse of the West. Hence, Kapur it very succinctly as to how there needs to be an increasing reshaping and a remolding of these Human Rights in light of the larger concerns of the humanity, wherein a ‘literal’ sense of humanity be taken into consideration rather than just mere superficial one.

We can see these in exemplary forms also in some narrations by other scholars, for instance Judith Butler. Butler proposes two different kinds of claims that have circulated recently, representing a culmination of sentiment that has been building for some time. One has to do with
an explicitly Marxist objection to the reduction of Marxist scholarship and activism to the study of culture, sometimes understood as the reduction of Marxism to cultural studies. The second has to do with the tendency to relegate new social movements to the sphere of the cultural, indeed, to dismiss them as being preoccupied with what is called the ‘merely’ cultural, and then to construe this cultural politics as factionalizing, identitarian, and particularistic. She presumes that to link individuals to such views runs the risk of deflecting attention from the meaning and effect of such views to the pettier politics of who said what, and who said what back.

It is, she would argue, impossible to perform a convincing parody of an intellectual position without having a prior affiliation with what one parodies, without having and wanting an intimacy with the position one takes in or on as the object of parody. Parody requires a certain ability to identify, approximate, and draw near; it engages an intimacy with the position it appropriates that troubles the voice.

Hence, these are some reflections of Butler that we can refer to here in order to reflect and further delve into the theoretical parameters of how thinking inherently leads to an ideological formulation.

One of my consistent efforts to bring together the works of such scholars is to unpack a plethora of normative claims which I have been claiming since the beginning of the presentation of my arguments. These will be highlighted more clearly to the next set of claims made by Fraser.

In Fraser’s recent book, *Justice Interruptus*, she rightly notes that ‘in the United States today, the expression ‘identity politics’ is increasingly used as a derogatory term for feminism, antiracism, and anti-heterosexism.’ She insists that such movements have everything to do with social justice, and argues that any left movement must respond to their challenges. Nevertheless, she reproduces the division that locates certain oppressions as part of political economy, and relegates others to the exclusively cultural sphere. Positing a spectrum that spans political economy and culture, she situates lesbian and gay struggles at the cultural end of this political spectrum. Homophobia, she argues, has no roots in political economy, because homosexuals occupy no distinctive position in the division of labour; they are distributed throughout the class structure, and do not constitute an exploited class: ‘the injustice they suffer is quintessentially a matter of recognition’, thus making their struggles into a matter of cultural recognition, rather than a material oppression.

Both ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ become part of ‘material life’ not only because of the way in which it serves the sexual division of labor, but also because normative gender serves the reproduction of the normative family. The point here is that -- struggles to transform the social field of sexuality do not become central to political economy to the extent that they can be directly tied to questions of unpaid and exploited labour, but also because they cannot be understood without an expansion of the ‘economic’ sphere itself to include both the reproduction of goods as well as the social reproduction of persons. If one continues to take the mode of production as the defining structure of political economy, then surely it would make no sense for feminists to dismiss the hard-won insight that sexuality must be understood as part of that mode of production. But even if one takes the ‘redistribution’ of rights and goods as the defining moment

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of political economy, as Fraser does, how is it we might fail to recognize how these operations of homophobia are central to the functioning of political economy?

Fraser’s most important disagreements — and the most fruitful for discussion — turn on how precisely to realize this shared project of reclamation and integration. She states – ‘We hold divergent views of what precisely constitutes the enduring legacy of Marxism and the still relevant insights of socialist feminism. We also diverge in our respective assessments of the merits of various poststructuralist currents and in our respective views of how these can best inform social theorizing that retains a materialist dimension. Finally, we disagree about the nature of contemporary capitalism.’ Central to her framework is a normative distinction between injustices of distribution and injustices of recognition. To be misrecognized, in her view, is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down on, or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It is rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer in social life — not as a consequence of a distributive inequity (such as failing to receive one’s fair share of resources or ‘primary goods’), but rather as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem.

In her conception, therefore, misrecognition is an institutionalized social relation, not a psychological state. In essence a status injury, it is analytically distinct from, and conceptually irreducible to, the injustice of mal-distribution, although it may be accompanied by the latter. Whether misrecognition converts into mal-distribution, and vice versa, depends on the nature of the social formation in question. In pre-capitalist, pre-state societies, for example, where status simply is the overarching principle of distribution and where the status order and the class hierarchy are therefore fused, misrecognition simply entails mal-distribution. Normatively, however, the key point is this: misrecognition constitutes a fundamental injustice, whether accompanied by mal-distribution or not. And the point has political consequences. It is not necessary to show that a given instance of misrecognition brings with it mal-distribution in order to certify the claim to redress it as a genuine claim for social justice. The point holds for heterosexist misrecognition, which involves the institutionalization of sexual norms and interpretations that deny participatory parity to gays and lesbians. Opponents of heterosexism need not labour to translate claims of sexual status injury into claims of class deprivation in order to vindicate the former. Nor need they show that their struggles threaten capitalism in order to prove they are just.

Butler’s first argument appeals to some indisputable facts about the harms currently suffered by gays and lesbians. Far from being ‘merely symbolic’, these harms include serious economic disadvantages with undeniable material effects. In the United States today, for example, gays and lesbians can be summarily dismissed from civilian employment and military service, are denied a broad range of family-based social welfare benefits, are disproportionately burdened with medical costs, and are disadvantaged in tax and inheritance law. Equally material are the effects of the fact that homosexuals lack the full range of constitutional rights and protections enjoyed by heterosexuals. In many jurisdictions, they can be prosecuted for consensual sex; and in many more, they can be assaulted with impunity. It follows, claims Butler, from the economic and material character of these liabilities, that the ‘misrecognition’ analysis of heterosexism is mistaken.
From my perspective, therefore, the material harms cited by Butler constitute paradigmatic cases of misrecognition. They reflect the institutionalization of heterosexist meanings, norms, and constructions of personhood in such areas as constitutional law, medicine, immigration and naturalization policy, federal and state tax codes, social welfare and employment policy, equal opportunity legislation, and the like. What is institutionalized, moreover, as Butler herself notes, are cultural constructions of entitlement and personhood that produce homosexual subjects as objects. This, to repeat, is the essence of misrecognition: the material construction through the institutionalization of cultural norms of a class of devalued persons who are impeded from participatory parity. In another sense, moreover, the definitional argument accomplishes very little. Butler wants to conclude that struggles over sexuality are economic, but that conclusion has been rendered tautologous. If sexual struggles are economic by definition, then they are not economic in the same sense as are struggles over the rate of exploitation. Simply calling both sorts of struggles ‘economic’ risks collapsing the differences, creating the misleading impression that they will synergize automatically and blunting our capacity to pose, and answer, hard but pressing political questions as to how they can be made to synergize when in fact they diverge or conflict. Empirically, therefore, contemporary capitalism seems not to require heterosexism.

With its gaps between the economic order and the kinship order, and between the family and personal life, capitalist society now permits significant numbers of individuals to live through wage labour outside of heterosexual families. It could permit many more to do so — provided the relations of recognition were changed. Thus we can now answer one of the questions posed earlier: the economic disabilities of homosexuals are better understood as effects of heterosexism in the relations of recognition than as hardwired in the structure of capitalism.

The good news is that they do not need to overthrow capitalism in order to remedy those disabilities—although we may well need to overthrow it for other reasons. The bad news is that they need to transform the existing status order and restructure the relations of recognition. The question of what should replace functionalism bears on Butler’s third argument against my redistribution/recognition framework. This argument is deconstructive.

Fraser seeks to delineate two elements which comprise a broad notion of modern justice, namely: redistribution and recognition. Redistribution is the ideal result of demands based on socioeconomic injustice, whilst recognition is the ideal result of demands based on cultural or symbolic injustice. Fraser notes, importantly, that these two conceptions of justice are merely analytically, but not practically, distinct. The particular dilemma with which Fraser is struggling is the “redistribution-recognition dilemma” wherein justice for specific types of groups (“bivalent collectivities”) requires both redistribution and recognition. Furthermore, Fraser deconstructs possible remedies into affirmative (outcome correcting, structure conservative), and transformative (structure correcting) types, noting that the ideal solution to the demands of “bivalent collectivities” would be redistributive-transformative as well as recognizing-transformative.

Hence, without further clarification, we are inevitably drawn into the trajectories of how deconstructed meanings can become in the understanding of an analysis of minority social movements or any kind of social phenomenon. By bringing in the claims of Butler and Fraser,
though they are both trying to move around the same concept or a lineage of collectivities and groups, but a difference in their understanding, which are reflective of concrete manifestations of differential groups or paradigms of a society, are themselves leading us to believe successively at every stage as to how it is in a basic-form the ‘local’ which goes on to form the so-called ‘global’. To see this in rather other effective forms, we see how Jung has reflected upon the ‘Indigenous’ in order to prove the credibility of our Project at hand. Hence, the narratives, now it seems, do not just exist in the abstract, they do bear concrete foregrounds in making a large estimate for the researchers.

3.5 Indigenous Politics: The Post-Colonial Discourse

Courtney Jung’s *The Moral Force of Indigenous politics* gives an account of the formation of an indigenous political identity in Mexico, situated within a constructivist variant of liberalism that provides a structuralist explanation of the formation of groups which also grounds the basic nature of the State’s obligations to the political identities that mobilize on the basis of these groups. In doing so, Jung succeeds in avoiding the difference-blind neutralism and the difference-centric multiculturalism. The nature of the State’s obligation to particular groups is grounded in the extent to which it constitutes the group itself through structural exclusion, the injustice of which is grounded in the very rights that the State has promised to enforce. Jung’s “critical liberalism” allows liberal-democracies to apply principled remedies to injustices that are true to the phenomena, to the particularity of the group’s claims.

Jung’s book intervenes into theoretical debates surrounding multiculturalism and indigenous rights in favor of “group” rights (as opposed to neutralism) but in a way that preserves liberalism from the pitfalls that have occurred in other defences of group rights which tend to fetishize difference and lend normative weight to culture as such vis-à-vis the protective and restitutive role of the State. Much theory tends to argue that the normative status of a group is given by its status as a cultural group or societal bloc distinct from that of the majority population. Culture (or ethnicity) being, for such theorists the framework within which an individual’s life and dignity find meaning and coherence, it is incumbent upon liberal democracies, committed to respecting the dignity of the individual, to recognize the status of the culture or ethnicity, and provide for the means of its reproduction. Jung rightly points out that in many cases, the separate status of a culture or group is in many respects the product of the State’s own structural exclusion/oppression (obvious in the case of African Americans, but also implicit in the very category of indigenous); the obligations of the State are therefore connected to the nature of that very structuring, not to the group as such. Furthermore, by framing the obligation as an obligation to culture or ethnicity as such reproduces the “difference-blindness” of classical liberalism at the level of culture, and privileges cultural remedies over and against others that may be equally, if not more merited. Culturalism, case of the indigenous in particular, can be a straitjacket which limits the possibilities of restitution.

Furthermore, the conception of culture and ethnicity as the necessary condition for the individual’s dignity slips into highly illiberal territory. Jung provides an alternative account that situates the claims of groups within the structural formation of inclusion and exclusion in the access to power and status within States. This simultaneously strengthens the case for state responsibility of actual injustices whilst removing the pernicious implications of previous
accounts of responsibility. The effect of critical Liberalism, the approach upon which Jung’s work is based, is to provide a “politics of difference” that is not only targeted to where it is actually needed, but can also make perfect sense of group claims within the normative horizon of liberalism’s commitment to the equal dignity of the individual; the trigger for the liberal democratic state’s responsibility to groups is its failure to live up to its own liberal foundations in having constituted a group itself through exclusion or oppression.

My only concerns with Jung’s work are with certain perceived implications of Critical Liberalism for liberalism as a normative theory of politics. Jung concedes that the core of the approach that she chooses to apply in grounding the “moral” force of indigenous politics is that “blindness to injustices … is a permanent feature of social and political life”, and that “all of the ways in which states might organize access to power … are ultimately arbitrary and often pernicious”. I believe this insight carries great force and has yet to be disproven, but it must be difficult to sustain the “moral force” of a normative theory if it admits to being impossible to achieve even in principle. Theoretically we can admit to the never ending dialectic of injustice and restitution that results from the attempt to actualize universal principles in an imperfect world, but in practice the struggle for justice is motivated by a vision of repose. Critical liberalism would seem to foreclose the grand struggle as a viable possibility (and, looking back on the 20th century, this is perhaps for the best); if justice can only be achieved for the particular injustice(s), then successful struggles are necessarily particular and targeted in scope, however much they are motivated by the failed promise of universal ideals. Furthermore, as a constructivist theory, Critical Liberalism seems to ground the obligations of the liberal state in rights already promised, making it a potent immanent critique of liberal democracies, but it does not attempt to persuade the non-liberal world, or provide a firm foundation for liberal principles. Of course, if it attempted to do this it would not be Critical Liberalism, but Liberalism.

Jung seeks to argue the case for “reframing indigenous and other social group claims in ways that are logically consistent with the origins and social character of such groups and more responsive to the needs such groups have as a consequence of the ways they have been shaped”. In general terms, Jung’s position is that identities are constructs and that such identities are shaped both by the agency of their constituents as well as the structures within which the constituents and groups operate.

Therefore, there are two entities subject to scrutiny: i) Social groups and their identity, as well as ii) the structure within which these operate (a state, generally). These two entities though are, and are recognized as such by Jung, profoundly interconnected one to the other. Ultimately, it is important to note as well that in her assessment, Jung is driven by the pursuit of justice and equality within a liberal context, and therefore the poignancy of identities as constructs rests in their value as a ‘political resource’ (they serve as a locus of political traction with which to identify and redress inequities).

In undertaking this study, Jung inevitably enters the theoretical debate that addresses questions/problematic on minority rights and pluralism within liberal (in the theoretical sense) democratic societies. Are liberal values more effectively and accurately espoused by adhering to a principal of negative rights distributed equally between all citizens, or would this better be done by positive rights that actively compensate for peripheral social groups’ otherwise unequal
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standings? This debate has become generally characterized as one between, respectively, the “privateers” and “protectionists”. Rather than a binary though, Jung sees similarities between these two approaches, in that both privateers and protectionists root themselves in a universal ‘essentialism’ of human identity, and that both therefore, albeit for different reasoning, “support the exclusion, or exemption, of cultural groups from democratic politics”. Rather than enter this traditional debate at hand, Jung effectively transcends it by arguing that the notion of culture and identity as a construct should be carried forth with to the full extent of its logic, whereby “culture itself is a process and outcome” and is not stable nor universalistic/essentialist.

As constructs, Jung goes on to clarify that identities find their real purpose in the fact that humans build around these a “public and political salience”. This though is not a haphazard process; states in fact demark value and political salience onto certain identities and are therefore responsible for structuring a polity’s identity landscape. “Identity is not only the source of politics; it is also the effect of politics”, a polity’s power dimensions/relations are reflected through its identities, and logically, identities can therefore serve as a point of leverage and traction around which to enforce, or contest, such power relations.

Jung is interested in contesting inequitable power relations. ‘Membership rights’, she argues, are a means by which minority rights can be afforded to individuals within certain groups and in a manner that is soundly in line with liberal philosophy. The case study that demonstrates how this can be done is that of the indigenous of Mexico’s Chiapas state. There, as per her book’s ‘case, and as per the above, indigenous identity has been reframed “in ways that are logically consistent with the origins and social character of such groups” (as a construct) in order that they be “more responsive to the needs such groups have [thereby helping to alleviate injustice]”. Identity therefore can be understood as an artefact shaped by historical/political conditions as well as one shaped through the efforts of its constituents agency (hard work).

Jung goes into great detail in explaining how identity has been shaped in Chiapas by Mexico’s political history, how conditions have altered the landscape in which the identities operate (whether the fall of communism, state tactics of patronage, the rise of neo-liberal ideology and practice), and the agency which has shaped identity from bottom-up through hard work. This Chiapas-specific content though, if one seeks theoretical, broader meaning, is but a vehicle for the abovementioned arguments. Ultimately, some concerns I think do arise naturally in the process of adopting such an orthodox constructivist understanding of group identity. Culture, notes Jung, does indeed “sometimes”, in “some places”, play an important role as a “mediator of human identity”. However, this as aspect of culture vis-à-vis identity occurs unreliably and cannot be banked on in understanding the nature and political traction of identity. In this way, the constructivist reasoning Jung uses seems to land on its own ‘essentialism’, one shaped by the material parameters of power and socio-economic value. Such parameters together form the “crosshairs of a particular historical movement” through which identity such as that of indigenous in Chiapas is formed and acted upon.

On a final related, final, and interesting note, it is also plausible that through the elimination of the cultural elements of identity—though perhaps tactically better equipping indigenous groups in attaining greater ‘material’ equity in the face of the neo-liberal project—the indigenous effect
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a change that would, in fact, strongly favor the neo-liberal project’s long-term advances of political and economic liberal ‘homogenization in uniformity’ of all peoples/individuals.

Hence, through the ‘potent’ force of the ‘Indigenous’, Jung has been able to show as to the varied dimensions to the Indigenous – how the Indigenous act and react upon themselves and for the others in a manner to forge a more vivid, vibrant discourse of their development; a development not only in economic terms but also in terms of its mental capacities, which does come out as an effective and especially in the contemporary arena of International Politics a significant force for change or a reform of the society, a polity or an economy.

Contrary to the above-mentioned paradigms, Will Kymlicka, in ‘The Politics of Multiculturalism’, considers the risks and damage caused by equivocating different minority groups within the same ‘multicultural’ terminology. Nancy Fraser’s “From Redistribution to Recognition?” divides the aspirations of minority groups into traditional socio-economic redistribution, and novel demands for recognition, examining the tension and interference inherent in these goals. Charles Taylor, “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition”, demonstrates how two processes in the modern liberal condition, the collapse of social hierarchies and the quest for individualized identity, have resulted in two contrasting positions: a politics of universalism and a politics of difference, each calling for different approaches to pluralism, recognition, and the valuation of difference and different cultures.

Kymlicka’s article is the most uncontroversial and the least substantive. His concern lies with the generalizations in debates over multiculturalism – both in the claims of advocates and detractors regarding its effects and regarding its classification of minorities. While he believes the terminology chosen is unimportant, a differentiation must occur between ‘national minorities’ and multinational states on the one hand, and individual or familial immigrants and polytechnic societies on the other. While both national minorities and immigrant communities identify with a nation different from the majority culture, their experience of history, relationship with the state or majority culture, and demands for rights and recognition therefore, diverge dramatically. That immigrants, who largely desire to integrate themselves into a new culture, should be considered analytically distinct from national minorities, who have often had that culture imposed upon them, should be commonsensical.

Fraser aims similarly to subdivide approaches to pluralism, but from the standpoint of post-socialist social movements. Where the Marxian conception of ‘class’ led to demands for socioeconomic redistribution, the new era of ‘identity’ requires ‘recognition’. In large part, recognition is necessary to address negative self-esteem and violence imposed through denigratory reflections of relationships of power, often linked to Hegel’s original Master-Slave dialectic. While Fraser’s deconstruction of the struggle for justice into demands redistribution and recognition, and through affirmative or transformative approaches, is not intuitively obvious, it only engages with straw men. Very self-aware that no prototypical ‘culturally marginalized’ or ‘socioeconomically marginalized’ exists, and similarly no purely ‘affirmative’ or ‘transformative’ approach is implemented, Fraser plods forward. Her overgeneralizations continue, claiming that affirmative measures will reinforce group differentiation while transformative ones erase these lines. This seems questionably applicable, if not outright false.
'Queer politics’ and ‘socialist revolution’ are seen as approaches for transformative recognition and redistribution respectively. Historically, however, queer politics have highlighted the divide between ‘mainstream’ heterosexuality and those demanding queer recognition. The Soviet Union, similarly, was unable to implement a society in which class was “out of business” as a category. This is not to say their attack on institutionalized categories is not warranted – only that in its idealized form it is patently difficult and potentially destructive.

Fraser’s dismissal of affirmative policies is similarly weak. She argues that ‘surface’ recognition or redistribution will leave sociological structures in place, requiring further adjustments in future. This will lead to a perception that the marginalized group is actually being overly benefited. In turn, once demands for recognition are raised this will ‘pour oil on the flames’. Not only does the possibility of historically marginalized groups being overwhelmingly perceived as unfairly assisted seem unlikely, there is no reason for Fraser to assume redistribution will precede recognition.

In Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor examined two different approaches to the politics of equal recognition: the politics of universal dignity, which origin from the collapse of social hierarchies, the basis for old concept of "honor" and the politics of difference which origin from a notion of individualized identity, and we called it "authenticity". There is a conflict between "the politics of universal dignity" and "the politics of difference". While the former supports the non-discrimination through being difference-blind, the latter believes the value of any different identity is equal and different identities deserve equal recognition, but not necessarily equal treatment. The former criticized the latter that it violates the principle of non-discrimination and the latter criticized the former that first, it negates identity by forcing people into a homogenous mold that is untrue to them. And second, the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. The second critique is actually raising the idea of multiculturalism. Taylor fundamentally supports the multiculturalism which assumes all the culture have the equal value. Taylor believes this assumption is just a start of the analysis. "Fusion of horizons", is operating through our developing new vocabularies of comparison, by means of which we can articulate these contrasts, should be taken into account. However, Taylor just raised this idea without a deeper analysis of how it works. He said "what the presumption requires of us is... a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions. What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many 'multiculturalists' -- as well as their most bitter opponents—in its grip."

Again reflecting Kymlicka in The Politics of Multiculturalism, he believes there are two broad patterns of cultural diversity. National minorities wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies because their culture arises from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state. Ethnic groups, which culture arises from individual and familial immigrations, wish to integrate into the larger society, and to be accepted as full member of it. What's more, both of these patterns can be distinguished from "new social movements", in which people have been
marginalized within their own national society or ethnic group. All liberal democracies are multinational which is composed by national minorities or poly-ethnic which is composed by ethnic groups or both. He discussed three important ways in which democracies have responded to the demands of national minorities and ethnic groups. First, in most multination states, the component nations are inclined to demand the self-government rights, a form of political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction, so as to ensure the full and free development of their cultures and the best interests of their people. Second, immigrant groups demand the poly-ethnic rights which intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society. At last, national minorities, ethnic groups and other non-ethnic social groups are increasingly interested in the idea of special representation rights which are often defended as a response to some systemic disadvantage or barrier in the political process which makes it impossible for the groups' views and interests to be effectively represented.

In *From Redistribution to Recognition*, because of the struggle for material equality and recognition, two analytically distinct understandings of injustice, Fraser assumes that justice today requires both redistribution and recognition as the approaches to eliminate injustice. The redistribution is the remedy for economic injustice which requires a political-economic restructuring of some sort while recognition is the remedy for cultural injustice which requires the cultural or symbolic change. Since redistribution tends to promote group differentiation and recognition tends to undermine it, these two kinds of claim stand in tension with each other. They can interfere with or even work against each other. People who are subject to both cultural injustice and economic injustice and need both remedies will face this contradiction which is called redistribution-recognition dilemma. Then she examined alternative conceptions of redistribution and recognition: affirmation and transformation. Affirmative remedies for injustice aims at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them while transformative remedies aim at correcting inequitable outcomes by restructuring the underlying generative framework. By combining the approaches together, we get four pairs of remedies to solve the redistribution and recognition dilemma.

Charles Taylor's work provided us a new perspective to analyze multiculturalism. I doubt whether we can achieve the "fusion of horizons", because it requires deconstructing our current culture system which is the very basis of "fusion of horizons". However, it can be regard as a ultimate goal of multiculturalism research and a standard to find out fallacies of other analysis. Will Kymlicka analyzes multiculturalism from the perspective of the origin of cultural groups while Nancy Fraser analyze multiculturalism from the perspective of the root of injustice. However, both of them failed to achieve the ultimate horizon. Especially in Fraser's well organized and coherent work, I found she ignored the point that socialism is also constructed by the powerful group. Socialist-feminist redistribution and deconstruction of women could lead to the problem that women may be suppressed by the ideology of class, a masculine ideology. Chinese Cultural revolution is a perfect instance of the combination of Socialist-feminist redistribution and deconstruction of women. What we can see is that women did get some equality but were suppressed in a greater masculine socialist structure. The same happens in the racial problem. Deconstruction of a certain identity under the current normative horizon would harm the unity of the group and cover the inequality among groups.
Comparing with other approaches, the combination between socialism and deconstruction of cultural politics may be the best way to finesse the dilemma for the bivalent collectivities. But it still has its own defects.

In *The Politics of Multiculturalism*, Kymlicka defines and differentiates what he identifies as “multination states and polyethnic states”. In doing so, he identifies what he sees as marked differences in the way that these groups are founded and maintain existence. Multination states, for Kymlicka, are formed by absorbed, often Indigenous groups that share a language and are often granted distinct rights or claims to language and land within the given territory. This is in contrast to polyethnic states, which normally have a non-homogenous citizenry and large immigrant populations that usually speak the dominant language of the state in which they reside. While it is possible for an immigrant group to become a national minority, this is not the norm. These groups often band together to remain distinct from the hegemonic culture of the state. Kymlicka identifies three ways that minority groups may wish to ensure the accommodation of distinct group rights. These measures are, “self-government rights”, “polyethnic rights”, and “special representation rights”. Self-government rights are described as Kymlicka as being presented as “inherent” and therefore, “permanent”, which would perhaps put self-government at odds with progressive liberal modes of thought.

Polyethnic laws are presented as being involved in “exemptions” from laws, often for the preservation of religious practices and seek to preserve distinct cultural norms that are perhaps at odds with the states prescribed modes of being. Polyethnic rights are also seen as a permanent measure, meant to preserve distinct cultural aspects, rather than eliminating differentiations. Group representation, in contrast to polyethnic rights and self-government rights, are seen as temporary measures meant to provide an advantage for minority groups so that they may gain an equal footing with the state's dominant society.

While not the focus of the text, Kymlicka recognizes that there has been neglect in the recognition of national minorities in the past, due in a large part to the colonial history of many Western state. This practice, says Kymlicka, infers a sort of inferiority toward noncolonial histories, cultures and heritages This relates directly to the article by Taylor, who discusses the political importance of recognition in states. Taylor identifies his thesis by stating “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them reflects a confining, demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. This thesis identifies the importance of recognition in societies and locates meaning and identity not within the individual alone but presents it as a complex relationship between the individual and others. When studied in this manner, recognition becomes the duty of not only individual and groups who are marginalized, but a problem that affects and is effected by the greater whole. So in contrast to Kymlicka, Taylor focuses not on the liberal individual but instead on a state or society as a whole.

Recognition, for Taylor, does not rest in an easily universalizable set of principles to which a group can subscribe. Taylor illustrates that a critique of policies that seek to absorb minority groups rather than preserve distinctions by stating “the supposedly neutral set of differenceblind
principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture as it turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form”. This points to the greater problem of non-recognition in a society. Policies which do not offer recognition may be masking discriminatory actions under the guise of difference-blindness. Like Kymlicka, Taylor describes modes used to preserve differences in Canada. But rather than identifying broad modes that identify how groups obtain these rights, Taylor focuses on particulars drawn somewhat from First Nations but focused mainly on moves made by Quebecois to preserve their language and culture. By illustrating the problems presented by liberal policies that point toward universal goals for a homogenous culture, Taylor points to issues that these liberal democracies may face, stating “the rigidities of procedural liberalism may rapidly become impractical in tomorrow's world”. Therefore, we must move toward a politics which recognizes the worth and dignity of other cultures, not based on a preexisting colonial (or non-colonial) modes of judgment but toward “the ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident”.

Much like Taylor, Fraser also focuses on issues of recognition. However, Fraser chooses to focus on the intersection of inequalities and a lack of recognition of or respect for minority cultures. Fraser sees the enmeshment of inequality and disrespect within Western culture and seeks to nuance and problematize these issues, showing that they are not mutually exclusive, but rather form a complex relationship that cannot be disentangled. Fraser points out that the analytic approaches to economic and cultural injustices often aim to separate these two issues. However, Fraser seeks to show the intimate relationship between these two issues and states “overcoming class exploitation requires restructuring the political economy so as to alter the class distribution of social burdens and social benefits’. In showing the relationship of these two issues, there can be a move toward policies that treat both of these endemic issues in contemporary societies. She identifies both affirmative and transformative modes of redistribution as ways in which the dilemmas of recognition are being broached, and states that “affirmative remedies can have the perverse effect of promoting class differentiation, transformative remedies tend to blur it”.

Transformative redistribution tends to re-think the current ways of identifying and relating to other groups, replacing traditional dichotomies with a rich, complex and ever-evolving understanding (or dismantling) of cultural relations. While transformative approaches appear to be endorsed by Fraser, ultimately the conclusion of the article is that “the redistribution-recognition dilemma is real. There is no neat theoretical move by which it can be wholly dissolved or resolved”. This conclusion does not negate, nor minimize the necessity for a re-thinking of cultural and economic relations.

The articles of Kymlicka, Taylor and Fraser serve to give a greater understanding of societal (and economic) relations and the necessity for policy and societal shifts in attitudes toward minority groups. As we move toward societies that are increasingly heterogeneous, there must be accommodation and recognition of those with whom we share our space and coexist. The articles highlight several approaches with which we may attempt to move toward more positive inter-cultural interactions, and identify gulfs between minority and hegemonic groups that cannot be ignored. The readings for this week broadly focus on questions of recognition and multiculturalism. Reading Taylor, Kymlicka and Fraser in sequence served to complicate my
existing views on multiculturalism and brought to light many of the challenges – theoretical and empirical – inherent in the politics of multiculturalism and recognition.

Charles Taylor articulates a pro-multiculturalists argument in his piece *The Politics of Recognition*. Taylor points out that the multiculturalists thesis centres on misrecognition. He examines the theories of Rousseau, Kant, Herder and Hegel to trace how identity recognition has become a vital human need. Taylor believes we construct our personal identity through dialogue with ourselves and with others. In considering the practical implications of these theories, Taylor asserts that recognizing difference in modern states means ending discrimination and second-class citizenship in these states.

Will Kymlicka puts forth a self-described liberal theory of multiculturalism in his book *Multicultural Citizenship*. Kymlicka discusses two types of states – multination and polyethnic – and the barriers to recognition that exist within each. Typically, multination states are comprised of different groups with distinct cultures, many of which Kymlicka suggests, may deserve autonomy or self-government rights. By contrast, polyethnic states are comprised of different immigrant groups who possess distinct cultures and demand recognition within the confines of the liberal state. Kymlicka asserts that to test the liberality of a societies’ immigration policy, one can examine how it defines the concept of national membership. A liberal state, according to Kymlicka, will define national membership as a question of integration rather than as a question of descent. While, I agree with Kymlicka that this should be true of liberal states, I fail to see how he can promote a form of particularize such as the politics of recognition and liberal integration policy for immigrants in the same theory. To me, these two concepts are fundamentally at odds with each other. Finally, Kymlicka articulates three forms of group-differentiated rights – self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights, which, unless they are temporary measures, I disagree with. In a liberal society, the principles of equality and universalism should hold and any differentiated treatment seems to me, to be very unjust.

Fraser argues that in the post-socialist age, questions of culture triumph over questions of class and as such have become the mobilizing force for group politics. She believes this is problematic and that the development of a critical theory of recognition needs to be established in order to redress this imbalance. She believes that economic and cultural injustices reinforce each other dialectically, producing a vicious circle of cultural and economic subordination. The dilemma is that those fighting against cultural injustice are attempting to promote differentiation and seek recognition, while those fighting against economic injustice are aiming to promote a greater sense of unity and seek redistribution. Affirmation, which aims to correct inequitable outcomes without disturbing the existing societal framework, and transformation, which aims to correct inequitable outcomes through the reconstruction of the existing societal framework, are approaches to remedy these injustices. Four scenarios are put forth by Fraser based on the recognition-redistribution/ affirmation-transformation dichotomies she outlined. These are the liberal welfare state, socialism, mainstream multiculturalism and deconstruction. She asserts that the liberal welfare state is compatible with mainstream multiculturalism and that socialism is compatible with deconstruction. Ultimately, Fraser concludes that the combination of socialism and

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deconstruction will provide the best results because it covers a wide variety of intersectional
cenarios in its approach.

While Taylor believes his critics would call the politics of difference an exercise in undue
favouritism, my issue with Taylor’s argument centres on his approach to recognition. I think he
focuses too much on the cultural side of recognition, while failing to take into account the
socioeconomic implications that distinct cultural minorities often face. Indeed, while he does not
share this view, Kymlicka asserts that opponents to multiculturalism argue that it ghettoizes
minorities and impedes their integration into mainstream society. If Taylor were to focus on
these types of problems his work would have greater practical implications. This is because he
would ensure that socioeconomic imbalances take primacy over matters of cultural difference.
And this, I think, is more in line with liberalism in its most pure sense.

Kymlicka is also guilty of limiting his treatment of the politics of recognition and the groups that
should be represented by this kind of politics. Indeed, Kymlicka explicitly states that he will not
consider the groups that fall under the ‘new movement’ group of politics. Most problematic,
Kymlicka asserts that those who are marginalized based on ‘new movement’ categories are
marginalized by their own national society or group. So, both Kymlicka and Taylor leave out
questions of gender, sexual orientation, race and class thus ignoring the intersectional forms of
discrimination that many immigrants face. In my opinion, Nancy Fraser gives this question more
due than either Kymlicka or Taylor. Indeed, in considering a four-scenario intersectional
mapping of approaches to cultural and economic injustice, Fraser makes it her project to examine
the best way to rectify the types of injustice that people living at the margins of mainstream
society often face.

In the “Politics of Recognition”, Charles Taylor discusses how the need for recognition is
predicated on identity, which he defines as “a person’s understanding of who they are”. Concern
for acknowledgement of one’s identity is a modern phenomenon, related to two social
transformations. First, democracies have dismissed the concept of honour (which is necessary
exclusive to certain individuals), and replace it by the notion of dignity (which equally applies to
everyone). The second change that has made the new preoccupation with identity salient is the
development of the idea of “authenticity”, according to which individuals are endowed with
“inner depths” that make them singular. Taylor argues that the development of authenticity as an
imperative of being true to one’s self resulted from the decline of hierarchies, which specified the
content of a person’s “identity” in function of her social position. Therefore, recognition of one’s
identity is not anymore given by the common acceptance of social roles, but must be earned in a
continuous dialogue with others. For Taylor, the concern for recognition is not limited to private
identities, but has entered the public sphere as well. Taylor identifies a tension between two
types of demands, similar to the one underlined by Nancy Fraser in the principle of universal
equality paradoxically leads to the recognition of the particular. “The universal demand powers
an acknowledgment of specificity”. Whereas the politics of universal dignity aims at eliminating
inequalities in a difference-blind manner, the politics of difference seek to maintain and protect
group’s distinctiveness. For Taylor, a strict liberal politics that insists on the procedural respect
of uniform rules is in fact inappropriate for a society that pursues collective goals such as
“survival”. Ultimately, cultures that “have provided the horizon of meaning for a large numbers
of human beings” deserve to be recognized as valuable and to be protected. If Taylor illustrates
how the concept of identity has developed historically without apparently endorsing it, in the end, he does not question the legitimacy of this concept as a basis for politics. Moreover, it may well be that cultural groups in Western societies use the language of recognition and rights to secure their religious practices, for example, without this constituting an attempt to have their identity acknowledged.

In the chapter “The Politics of Multiculturalism”, Will Kymlicka seemingly attempts to dispel some common misinterpretations of multiculturalism in the public debate. He argues that there are in fact two modes of incorporation of minority groups, each of which entail different legitimate claims and corresponding political solutions. Multinational states integrated into their realm independent nations that formerly governed themselves. Kymlicka defines nations as entities possessing political institutions, that are located on a given territory and that possess a distinct culture. For their part, poly-ethnic states are formed by a large fraction of immigrants that voluntary joined the country. Unlike Taylor, recognition does not derive from the equal worth of cultures that would be depreciated if not granted proper acknowledgement. Rather recognition is based on political relations of cultural groups to the larger society. Different historical modes of integration require “special group-specific measures for accommodating national and ethnic differences”: “(1) self-government rights; (2) poly-ethnic rights; (3) special representation rights. Both Taylor and Kymlicka solely address questions of political/cultural rights in their discussion of recognition, which is symptomatic of a tendency in society to make the “struggle for recognition” “the paradigmatic form of political conflict in the late twentieth century”.

Fraser identifies a tension between, on one hand, recognition, which encourages group differentiation and, on the other, redistribution, which aims at eliminating inequalities between groups. In search for a solution to the dilemma between redistribution and recognition, Fraser attempts to elaborate a politics that reconciles the two (or rather, save the former from disqualification). While she admits that both types of inequalities intersect in actuality, Fraser analytically distinguishes between the two in order to articulate two sets of remedies: affirmation and transformation. In the domain of recognition, affirmation endorses existing categories, but tries to valorise them in subverting their pejorative content. In contrast, transformation seeks to deconstruct group identities. Similarly, affirmation does not aim at modifying the economic structure, but at providing welfare-state measures that ensure a better redistribution without eliminating socio-economic groups created by the economic system. Alternatively, transformation, which can be associated with socialism, seeks to alter “the social division of labour” and eliminate classes themselves.

Fraser’s main argument is that the project that allies transformation in both the realm of redistribution and recognition is the more apt at addressing the dilemma. I believe the tension on which Fraser builds her entire argument could have been more elaborated. For example, it may easily be argued that differences between groups must initially be acknowledged to overcome corollary economic inequalities (see for example the case of Brazil as discussed by Anthony Marx). Similarly, economic distribution does not have for goal “to abolish race” but to reduce the inequalities between “races”, so that they become economically irrelevant even if they may (or may not) This response argues that multiculturalism is caught in a bind despite attempts to resolve its flaws. First, it outlines the case for a politics of recognition. Next, it raises and
resolves the tensions that Taylor and Kymlicka identify with multiculturalism. Finally, it shows that Frasers critique of multiculturalism strikes multiculturalism at a more foundational level that Taylor or Kymlicka has resolved, but her solution is less acceptable to the affected groups. Thus, the politics of recognition is caught between a difficult battle for a solution that fixes its flaws, or an easy solution which keeps them.

The case for a politics of difference is made by Taylor. He suggests that an individual’s authentic identity is not entirely self-determined, but formed exogenously by societal group recognition. Thus, he suggests that the misrecognition of one’s identity by society, such as with liberalism’s universal application of rights, is oppressive and undermines an individual’s flourishing. Therefore, Taylor advocates for multiculturalism’s support for group identity to promote the societal affirmation of the individual’s self. While this argument for recognizing identity is useful, Taylor and Kymlicka find problems in it which they attempt to resolve. Taylor raises the tension between multicultural group rights and liberal individual rights. While the bulk of his essay argues for necessity of difference, he still believes in some liberal conception of equality rights, such as habeas corpus. Thus, he examines whether liberalism is always homogenizing or whether it can co-exist with multiculturalism. In the end, Taylor’s resolution is that while liberalism is inhospitable to difference, variants of the liberal model that calls for defending certain fundamental rights, but allowing flexibility on others, can allow multiculturalism’s politics of difference and liberal equality rights to coexist.

Kymlicka problem with the “multiculturalism” is that it is too ambiguous. That is, the above defence of the politics recognition makes it appear that every minority should be afforded equal recognition of their distinct identity. Kymlicka suggests this harmfully downplays the stronger group rights that should be accorded to national minorities as compared to that of ethnic immigrant minorities. Indeed, he claims the lack of this distinction and the subsequent belief that “New World” countries, such as the US, are entirely immigrant nations have led to the denial of indigenous people’s right to self government. Thus, Kymlicka’s resolution is to define the differences between national minorities, with a legitimate claim to a distinct self-governing society, and ethnic immigrant minorities, who should largely integrate into the dominant culture’s society.

Despite Taylors and Kymlicka’s defence of multiculturalism, Fraser’s discussion on recognition and redistribution raises two challenges to multiculturalism. Her first challenge is that multiculturalism only deals with recognition but not redistribution. This is a problem because some “bivalent” groups, such as gender and race, require both. Yet, this creates a dilemma as the two solutions work in contradictory fashions; recognition solidifies difference but redistribution undermines it. Thus, in general, it appears that race cannot be addressed by multiculturalism as the redistributive remedies that race socioeconomically requires, contradicts the cultural need for differentiation.

Second, Fraser further nuances her criticism to show that even if redistribution and recognition are reconciled to not have conflicting goals, multiculturalism is still problematic. She does this by separating affirmative with transformative remedies. Both remedies deal with injustices. But while affirmative remedies do not change the underlying structural framework, transformative remedies undermine it. Thus, affirmative remedies are coherent if applied to both recognition
and redistribution in so far that both remedies maintain difference; this she states would be multiculturalism and the liberal welfare state. However, affirmative remedies are incoherent in so far that the affirmative redistribution creates societal stigmatization due to the perception of unfairly benefiting from the larger society. Thus, even if redistribution and recognition do not work in contradictory fashions via having both remedies be affirmative ones, this creates the additional problem of stigmatization due to affirmative redistribution.

Consequently, Fraser believes transformative redistribution and remedies (economic socialism and cultural deconstruction) would overcome contradictory goals by focusing on undermining differences, as well as not result in stigmatization. The principal drawback she sees however is that socialism and deconstructionism are too removed from the interests and identities of people of colour. In conclusion, multiculturalism is caught in a bind. On one hand, as Taylor emphasizes, the discourse of recognition that is the basis of multiculturalism is comfortable to us because it is the result of certain historical developments. But multiculturalism suffers from the foundational contradiction that Fraser raises. On the other hand, Fraser’s conception of transformative remedies overcomes the problems of multiculturalism more so than Taylor and Kymlicka have addressed. Yet, unlike multiculturalism, socialism and deconstructionism is far removed from what society is comfortable of working towards.

Will Kymlicka, in “The Politics of Multiculturalism,” engages with the “multicultural question.” He critiques public multicultural discourse for merging different types of minorities into one lump conception in the minority/majority dichotomy. He prefers a clear differentiation of cultural diversity and corresponding types of minority groups: National minorities, consisting of previously autonomous and independent collectivizes which are (implicitly; forcefully) amalgamated into a larger state; and mass immigration, leading to a consolidation of these peoples into “ethnic groups” and “polyethnicity.” For Kymlicka, most states are multinational; they consist of both national minorities and “ethnic groups,” and these diverse groups must, somehow, feel allegiance to the state for the survival of this. The challenge, then, of multiculturalism is the incorporation of these minority groups – national minorities and “polyethnicity” - into this larger state in a feasible and just manner. He concludes that liberal democracy and the corresponding protection of (individual) rights is the best way to go about this.

Charles Taylor’s arguments result, like Kymlicka’s, from his critique of multicultural discourse and the politics of this. Unlike Kymlicka, however, Taylor does not engage with this multicultural question through ‘mere’ terminology. Instead, he examines linkages between identity and recognition, and the relational (or dialogical) nature of these. Two differing, and temporally specific, notions of the identity-recognition relations are examined: The “politics of universalism” and the “politics of difference.” The first arose from a collapse of historically specific conceptions of “honour” as rooted in hierarchical social structures to a focus on “dignity,” and the universality of this concept as pertaining to all people (read: men) equally. The shift from honour to dignity entailed the “equalization” of rights and entitlements among and across men, leading to the universality of this approach to recognition. It rests on a “difference-blindness,” and related focus on the commonality of (hu)man existence and sense of self (i.e., identity). Contrastingly, however, is the focus on the particularity of (hu)man experience and existence. A “politics of difference” emerged, where the recognition of difference, or

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particularity, is vital for due recognition. While both, Taylor argues, are centered around the issue of respect, and correspondingly I would venture, justice, these two “politics” are clearly in conflict with each other. Particularly concerning is the perversion of the former (universalistic principles of recognition) through the reproduction of inequality and non-recognition under the guise of universalism. This is to say, universalistic principles of “difference-blindness” enables the imposition of hegemonic conceptions of identity and recognition onto “minorities.” I find this similar to previous discussions on “race-blindness” and gender; the notion of ‘going beyond our differences’ to the ‘essence’ of humanity enables the gross marginalization, and here, non-recognition of those who do not necessarily fit into this hegemonic ideal.

This issue of recognition and the universal/particular dichotomy is taken up by Nancy Fraser. Her chapter “From Redistribution to Recognition?” presents our current societal structure as “postsocialist,” with a shift from redistribution (economic equality) to recognition (identity recognition) as the main arena of conflicts. Group identity, cultural domination and cultural recognition replace class identity, (economic) exploitation and socioeconomic redistribution in the political struggle(s) for justice and equity. Two sources injustice are presented: (1) socioeconomic injustice, connected to the socioeconomic structure of society, and hence the politics of redistribution, and (2) cultural-symbolic injustice, connected to the production of social meaning in representation and interpretation, and hence the politics of recognition.

Fraser does concede that this distinction is analytical, yet builds upon this her argument for different remedies for the two types of injustices. These then come into conflict with each other, and result in the redistribution-recognition dilemma. This dilemma is due to the oppositional nature of the two modes of remedying injustice; recognition tends to promote “group differentiation” (particularity) while redistribution aims to eliminate this (universalism). Fraser goes on to illustrate how remedies may be conceptualized as affirmative or transformative. The former involves rectifying the outcomes of inequality, while the latter involves rectifying the processes/structure of inequality. Again, the issue of universalism/particularism is present in the discussion; Fraser argues that affirmative remedies promote group differentiation; transformative remedies promote the “destabilization” of differences. She concludes that the most feasible way of dealing with injustice and the redistribution-recognition dilemma is a combination of affirmative/transformative remedies dependent upon the type of injustice; whether it is socioeconomic or cultural in nature.

Although she states that injustices and the struggles to rectify these are intersectional, her analysis is highly, and problematically, paradigmatic. I find the dichotomy of universalism and particularism fascinating in the debate of minority/majority relations, recognition of identity, and the just acknowledgement and engagement with human differentiation (perhaps; individuality?). This tension is inherently foundational to Taylor’s and Fraser’s discussions. Kymlicka’s chapter, however, does not engage with the dilemma in the same way; his treatment of group-specific rights (self-government rights, poly-ethnic rights, etc.) is based on a particularistic understanding of (group) identity. I remain, however, unconvinced of the superiority of either universal or particular approaches to just human coexistence, relations, and (relational) identities. While the readings illustrate considerations stemming from this dichotomy, none of them are sufficiently convincing regarding how to understand others, and thus ourselves, in “multicultural” society.
Hence, with this detailed comparative study of Taylor, Kymlicka and Fraser, we have been able to look into the much existent factors of the differences in discourses, out of which comes out a more justificatory position of the post-colonialists’. Hence, even if there might be debates on the questions of Multiculturalism, the very concepts are being questioned, as to the efficacy and the ensured long-lasting credibility of such concepts especially at a time when we have come out free of the colonial rule; but to raise the question as to how free be us in the minds. In the debates above, we have discussed at length about the Poly-ethnicity, but we can see a clear distinction as to the grounding of ethnicity in these issues, and then we can aim toward a poly-ethnic platform. A further in-depth analysis of a statement of anti-essentializing tendency is explained in the next section.

3.6 Other Anti-Essential Dimensions

The very interesting insight about the relation between certain mechanisms of representation, recognition and redistribution and the logic of power between the governmental actions, allows me to raise a question about the concept of “identity”. According to Jung, “the Mexican Revolution did not merely mobilize a peasant base, it set out to create a peasantry, both materially, through land distribution, and epistemologically, through the formation of class consciousness”. Through the reading of Mexican history, we testify various ideas (or strategies?) related to the indigenous identity: in the colonial era the racialized society originated the República de indios and its autonomy; the liberal component of the independence movement abolished the separated status of the Indians; the Mexican Revolution incorporated indigenous people into the farmer’s class; finally, contemporary efforts point toward a renovated importance of the indigenous identity and their cultural richness. All of these strategies are related with some forms of propriety, some understandings of the notion of “Indian”, etc.

My first reaction would be related to the idea of disempowerment: the history of the relations, definitions and even progresses of Mexico’s most vulnerable group answers to a logic of disempowerment, in the sense that every strategy of representation, redistribution or recognition ends up silencing the group’s capacity to counteract political establishment. Of course, this framing process is not absolutely evil, as Jung correctly notices: “They make the public sphere more manageable, less chaotic than it could be if literally everything were subject to contestation”. Anyway, I think that government needs are, finally, the motor of this strategies and framings. But, aren’t this government’s strategies (often) unavoidable? I mean, doesn’t government define such strategies as a kind of reaction against change? When something disturbs the status quo, and the original understandings and definitions cease to be effective, government’s reaction appears in the form of these strategies. So, although every government is granted with some kind of liberty (or choice) to carry on some strategies while avoiding others, they seem also fettered by the force I have called “change”. My question is, then, how (if so) can we sculpt healthier meanings of “identity” by understanding the structure of change? And more important, can governments anticipate change, or the latter imposes upon the former? I would like, finally, to ask Jung a marginal question. I noticed that she didn’t explore the Zapatista insurrection of 1994. I believe that this guerrilla shocked the government and forced some important changes (in the sense I have described above) in the relationship between the indigenous people and the government. So, why to leave his movement aside?
When reading Foucault and those he has influenced, like Judith Butler, it sometimes seems to me that the image of humanity he presents us with is somewhat like those poor sods bound up in Plato’s cave, except this is a cave without any way out. Forgive this conceit, but for me it captures some of the difficulties we had last week with Foucault’s eventalization of history and his concomitant refusal of normative categories. Judith Butler, at times, seems to want to have it both ways; she calls into question the reality of agency, but they seems to shy away from the consequences of this move. To my mind, this emerges most forcefully in her treatment of subjectivity. Butler contends that a subject, any given ‘I’, is not merely ‘situated, but constituted’ by “organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements, those matrices of power and discourse that produce me as a viable ‘subject’.” These principles and discourses do not merely preside over the subject’s coming-to-be, shaping and molding the individual through the (always contingent and haphazard) process of self-articulation, but rather permeate and constitute the individual.

Butler contends that the implication of this problematization of subjectivity “is not the advent of a nihilistic relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, rather, the very precondition of a politically engaged critique.” I am not persuaded by her qualification. For one, the word ‘critique’ is revealing in several ways. If any subject position is at all times pervaded by dominant discourses and power relations, what is it that critiques? It seems at times that the ‘contestations’ Butler writes of are performed by competing principles and contrasting grammars, and the human beings that are the carriers of these overriding structures are merely the tools through which these battles are conducted. Moreover, it is telling that Butler writes here of ‘critique’ and not dialogue. Admittedly, in any dialogue, the terms of any debate are framed in some way that will favor some positions over others, and will condition, in some sense, the outcome. Yet I’m not sure that a notion of critique alone grounds the sort of political ends that Butler has in mind. For one, persuasion and education begin to appear as power-relations - for the former, the victory of one voice over another, and for the latter, the insidious domination and silencing of alternate voice. I’m not denying that these are often, perhaps almost always that - but I worry about this tendency to elide the differences between forceful coercion, and communication, persuasion, and judgment. Figuring power as the be-all and end-all of human phenomena - rather than a merely dominant phenomena that tends to overrule all things - seems to foreclose the possibility of fostering human judgment and allowing for communication between solitudes.

A politics that is only critique, and no dialogue, a democracy of agonisms and contestations, seems in this way to endanger the radical democratization and transformation that Butler seems to aspire to. For this means that the call for a more radical democratization, for a transformative politic is yet another form of contestation, another claim to power. What grounds this call, by what standards can we call this good? Followed to its conclusions, an emphasis on agonism and contestation alone tends to disregard the content of what it is that is contested. How do we adjudicate between these claims, or should we? How do we ground even the claim that contestation itself is good? I don’t mean to sound too harsh; I think Butler’s work often forcefully articulates the genesis of subjectivity, underscoring the ways in which it is something that comes to be, rather than is already.
Jung’s work follows in this path, effectively unearthing the genealogy of these contingent categorizations of humanity and convincingly arguing for their insidious political consequences. Yet I wonder about the ontological grounds of this critique. Jung writes that “The terms in which we articulate justice claims also work to sustain hegemonic political projects. This... points primarily to the ways in which the politics of representational, redistribution and recognition act as constraints on (autonomous) political agency.” I think this captures something essential about the mechanisms of power and its political consequences. Yet in the end, unlike Butler, Jung appeals to agency, and stakes a normative claim on its behalf. I think this points to the inconsistency or a problem in Butler’s work that I attempted, rather crudely, to sketch above; she problematizes agency itself, but wants to strive for the liberation of agents-that-are-not-agents; she wants to depict political engagement as a critique, as a permanent realm of contestation, but neglects the ways in which this assertion relies on the normative force of her particular contestation- that this sort of agonism is itself a good thing. I worry that this valorization of contestation, in and of itself, might lead us to disregard the content of this contestation, and thus abdicate the responsibility to consider and adjudicate between these claims, so as to come to some sort of political consensus, no matter how provisional.

Butler and Jung ask us to look conceptualization and theorizing as similar types of practice which constitute forms of domination and containment. Butler is thus concerned with foundationalism in political and social theorizing, if I have it right, because foundationalism must necessarily impose universal standards upon theories which necessarily exclude persons and practices. As such, such foundations must be always left open to a process of critique and reflexivity: “I am not doing away with [universalism], but trying to relieve the category of its foundationalist weight in order to render it as a site of permanent political contest.” Jung applies and builds upon this approach in her case study of indigenous politics in Mexico by looking at how concepts usually thought of as related to justice were used to reinforce state power at the expense of the indigenous population.

Jung’s fascinating study bespeaks the power and advantages of such an approach. Yet, it seems as though this take must ultimately reckon with its own premises. That is to say, if we are to leave the foundations of our theories open to contest and questioning, how does the theorist, even the most critically-minded theorist, proceed? It appears to me as though there are un-interrogated premises in each of these pieces regarding the abhorrence of arbitrary power and the virtues of radical politics. Butler takes it as a given that we are “committed to democratic contestation within a postcolonial horizon,” and Jung seems committed to challenging containment strategies in the name of “transformative politics.” Are we to leave these premises open to contest as well? How are we to know “containment strategies” as necessarily detrimental? Put differently, even a theoretical approach committed to ongoing and perpetual interrogation of foundations must itself be grounded in some position from which to interrogate. It seems that this position can only be maintained by either falling into a constant paralyzing project of reflexive critique or by ultimately not following the project to its conclusions, picking a radical position, and critiquing the status quo from there.

Now we turn to James Tully, one of the foremost voices on Post-Modernism, who states politics are first and foremost activities of disclosure and acknowledgment—that is, identity politics are primarily (a) practices oriented toward the public unveiling of an identity-related difference that

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has been neglected, distorted or silenced by the majority, and (b) demands addressed to this majority to acknowledge the disclosure of this non-recognized identity. The principle which underpins the politics of disclosure is not primarily dignity, self-respect or self-esteem, but freedom: the democratic freedom to compete for the modification of the current structure of recognition as our identities change in the course of the very process of identity criticism and disclosure. This freedom of bringing something new to the public realm can be re-described as what William Connolly appropriately calls “the politics of becoming.” The politics of becoming problematize and transform the often sediment “politics of being” (the current structure of recognition).

For Tully, the inter-subjective and agonic activity of disclosure and acknowledgment is “an intrinsic good of modern politics” and should therefore “be examined in its own terms, rather than as a failure of recognition”. Even when the acknowledgment takes the form of a politics of non-recognition, as was the case for gays and lesbians for numerous years, the politics of disclosure remains utile and productive for two main reasons. The first reason is that disclosure initiates a session of public deliberation around the contested form of recognition.

Public deliberation, as we will see, fosters specific civic virtues that are much needed in conditions of moral and cultural pluralism. The second reason is that disclosure acts as a kind of public catharsis: it forces minorities to convert their alienation into public argumentation rather than into private frustration any settlement, as Tully points out, “will always involve varying degrees of the injustice of misrecognition and non-consensus. The rules of recognition will always be a structure of domination for some and dissent will be inevitable”.

From this vantage point, the “goal of undistorted and unrestricted recognition” that Honneth sets forth for his “social theory with a normative content” appears to be problematic even as a regulative ideal. Similar to Chantal Mouffe, Tully is aware that a partially or reasonably unfair decision ought to be taken at some point in the deliberative process. This decision “is taken in the face of disagreement and dissent, and the dissenters may turn out to be correct in the long run” Consequently the ethical Tully sums up, in a free and open constitutional democracy we will always be in a position of beginning again: entering into discussions and negotiations over reasonable demands to modify some existing rule of the global system, and being prepared to acknowledge and respond to the voices of dissent that will inevitably arise in turn in response to the last reconciliation. Constitutional democracy must be seen as an activity, a system of discursive practices of rule following and rule modifying in which diversity is reconciled with unity through the continuous exchange of public reasons.

The politics of recognition, as one of the driving forces of the “continuous exchange of public reasons” characteristic of democratic societies, do not seem to be withering away. It has become increasingly difficult to advocate for the confinement of identity within the limits of the private sphere alone. Nevertheless, this concept is, at least in its customary understanding, if with difficulties. Contemporary political struggles are too plural, convoluted and unpredictable to be theorized as quests for substantive and definitive recognition. Focusing on the activity of fighting for recognition directed our attention to the virtues (in terms of self-knowledge, self-respect and self-esteem) of disclosing un-recognized identities and of deliberating with other citizens about what should count as an appropriate form of recognition.
Along similar lines, group rights, rather than entailing an essentialized conception of culture, can be seen as the expression of disapproval and dissent toward the prevailing mode of governance and as particular moments in the ongoing quest for self-determination.

Accordingly, identity politics can be thought of as concrete manifestations in the present of the unending political activity of trying to introduce new modes of being, to disrupt the sedimented structures of validity and legitimacy and to rearrange the configuration of the social imaginary. As every particular embodiment of justice means domination or some, identity politics point toward the undefined practice of freedom rather than to the conceptualization of a comprehensive theory of justice. Moreover, although normative political theory has greatly contributed to the understanding of temporary struggles for recognition, identity politics must also be thought as a democratic activity that always evades the categories of normative theory. Recognition may lead to awareness of the injustices being suffered, and support for temporary affirmative action to restore liberal universal rights.

This has left precious little space for Taylor, whose examination of Quebec’s place in Canada within a broader discussion of identity, recognition, and the critiques from the ‘politics of difference’ to liberal ‘blind’ policies is the most insightful. Taylor rescues liberalism from two poles: the Rousseauian ‘general will’ and a strict Kantian universalism that leads to ‘procedural’ equality. The former requires a narrow political program, lest it justify the ideological menace of the Jacobins. The latter, particularly prominent in American constitutional frames, ignores the discriminatory effects of \textit{prima facie} equal laws, and does not allow for collective goals. Instead, he endorses a third way – a liberalism unquestioningly attached to fundamental liberties, but willing to weigh ‘cultural survival’ as a collective and necessary public good. This approach, I believe, is a subtle endorsement of liberalism like Canada’s, as enshrined in the Charter’s principle of ‘reasonable accommodation’.

Taylor brings liberalism into the contemporary era. His understanding of the central role of identity, and the dialogical process of its formation, is an improvement on the Enlightenment individual – rational, unattached, and atomistic. He recognizes the undeniable trend towards pluralism and diverse societies, and acutely maps the emerging conflict between individuals and groups dedicated to their ‘difference’ and a liberal state that (blindly) maintains its ‘blind’ policies are just. Nevertheless, he resists the slide towards relativism and nihilism. In fact, Taylor argues for a robust defence of liberalism as a value system. “All this is to say that liberalism can’t and shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a fighting creed. The hospitable variant I espouse, as well as the most rigid forms, has to draw the line” Liberalism is not value-neutral. A ‘politics of universalism’ will cause friction with an emergent ‘politics of difference’. Despite these criticisms, Taylor shows that liberalism needn’t roll over. In fact, it is capable of justly handling the complexity of pluralism in today’s world.

With the bringing in of these differing moves towards the support of my main argument here, lies underneath a tendency to make an attempt to apply these divergent perspectives into practice. Hence, by making an analysis of and covering aspects from the Hegelian tradition to James Tully, this is reflective of a trend of sorts toward a questioning the existing; hence, the challenge now lies in how to make an application of such a Theory into Practice. This is yet to be
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seen in the context of existing discourses on Human Rights, before I turn towards the Conclusions.
Chapter 4

Implementation: Application of ‘Cultural Identity’ to the Discourse of Human Rights Legislation(s)

As discussed briefly about the challenge to apply in practice the theories mentioned in the three chapters, we arrive at a stage wherein I make an attempt to put this in the form of an experiment in this chapter. We study here the concept of Inter-Culturalism rather than Multiculturalism, we start by outlining some basic aims and objectives and then highlight the action-oriented tasks as to what we analyzed in the perspective of a dynamic cultural identity, how we put it into practice at the level of a conglomeration of European Nations. Thus, here is a form of Project Proposal in lieu of the Implementation and Application of the discourse in question.

4.1 Inter-Culturalism: A European Experiment

The Contextual Reference -- Intercultural Dialogue and Cross-cultural Mediation

Overall Objectives: Improving Intercultural skills and competence of students  Strengthen cooperation between social partners  Strengthen connection between education and labor market  Intercultural Dialogue and cross-cultural mediation at workplace  Intercultural Dialogue among Nations and a more close-knit civil society  Education pursued through Intercultural Dialogue  Cross-cultural imprint in the work place  A well enriched civil society  Significant contribution to EU Global Citizenship  Shift in the profile of the Youth  Showcasing of this implied inter-culturality by the media  Contribution to the rectification of Inter-generational problems  An alternative Identity solution

Specific Objective: Promotion of inter-culturalism among youth through education, labor sector, media and the civil society

Relevance of the Action: Ideals and values of a multicultural environment  Civil Society Organizations  Local Authorities  Government Bodies  University Training Institutes  Cooperation Agencies (Donors)  Private Sector

Implementation: An Introduction -- Description of the Action and its Effectiveness:
Visits to Migrant Centers  Special Focus on Inter-generational activities  Hold symposia on youth from different cultural backgrounds  Workshop for an alternative critical media paradigm  Inculcate common universal values/ideals through a widespread Charter  Replicate models of a considerable successful multicultural work-place  Create innovative recreational activities among all age-groups  Organize lectures on Multiculturalism from an academic perspective  Undertake case-studies of multicultural societies ( also through video conferencing )  Set parameters for other organizations/institutions

Methodology: Monitoring and Evaluation, Ethnography, Open Interaction, Inter-generational

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Activities Experiential understanding and empirical analysis Principle of specialization and efficiency, based on differential human capacity Transport, personnel for administering the recreational activities, stationery, managerial tasks, well versed researchers on conducting surveys, analysis of indicators Post-colonial Perspective; the concept of 'demandingness'; the 'hybrid' theory of Justice


Cultural Case Studies: Unity in Diversity (India): Cultural Diversity, Active European Citizenship, Culture and Creativity as sources, A stronger voice for Europe in the world.


After a brief introduction to the Project Proposal, we analyze the phenomenon in light of some examples of a case-study of India as an exemplar in establishing 'Unity in Diversity. And subsequently, we look into the academic-theoretical traditions again herein, to grasp in the popular mainstream the aspect of Multiculturalism and Immigration.

4.2 Theoretical-Practical Evaluation

UNITY IN DIVERSITY – A CASE STUDY OF INDIA

Cultural Diversity in India does have a potential for developing Active European Citizenship, wherein Culture and Creativity are taken as sources for forging a stronger voice for Europe in the world. Furthermore, the phrase is widely used to describe India, which is home to a multiethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious society. The subcontinent's long and diverse history has given it a unique eclectic culture. The philosophy is the underlying pan-Indian philosophy echoed in textbooks throughout India.

India's diversity has always been recognized as a source of its strength. When the British ruled India, women and men from different cultural, religious and regional backgrounds came together to oppose them. India's freedom movement had thousands of people of different backgrounds in it. They worked together to decide joint actions, they went to jail together, and they found different ways to oppose the British. Interestingly the British thought they could divide Indians because they were so different, and then continue to rule them. But the people showed how they could be different and yet be united in their battle against the British.

In his book The Discovery of India Jawaharlal Nehru says that Indian unity is not something imposed from the outside but rather, "It was something deeper and within its fold, wildest

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tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged." It was Nehru who contained the phrase, "unity in diversity" to describe the country India. India being the largest democracy in the world with a civilization more than five thousand years old boasts of multiple cultural origins. The cultural origins of the Indian subcontinent can be traced back to the Indus Valley Civilizations, the remains of which are cherished even today. Since the late 16th century India was under the influence of the British Empire until 15th August 1947 the day when India gained independence. India is a land of diverse cultures, religions and communities. There is great diversity in our traditions, manners, habits, tastes and customs. Each and every region of the country portrays different customs and traditions. But though we speak different languages yet we are all Indians. 'Unity in Diversity' has been the distinctive feature of our culture. To live peacefully has been our motto and this motto has helped us to achieve independence. As history tells us that there has been active participation from people of different caste and religion. In our struggle for freedom people from different communities participated keeping one thing in mind that they all are Indians first. But unfortunately this peace and understanding among different communities has been endangered lately. India at present is facing many problems. The biggest of these is the problem of communalism. In their personal fight they are destroying their life only. In fact, it is the biggest threat to humanity and to the unity and integrity of the country.

People from different background and culture participated in India's struggle for freedom. The national leaders, particularly Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, Azad and Bose had coined the slogan unity in diversity There are numerous others who were also involved. Be it Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Jain and Sikhs everybody had a single identity of being an Indian. It should be understood that all of us have multiple identities religious, linguistic, cultural, and regional and caste identities. No one can claim single identity. One who demands single identity i.e. national identity does not recognize the reality but during India's struggle for freedom no one thought in that manner they just thought of India's independence. Modern India presents a picture of unity in diversity where people of different faiths and beliefs live together in peace and harmony. Still today also India remains one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world.

As India has always been considered as the country of Unity in Diversity, this is the land with Unity in Diversity. India is a land of different religions and communities. There is great diversity in our manners, habits, tastes and customs. We speak different languages and yet we are all Indians. "Unity in Diversity" has been the distinctive feature of our culture. India being the largest democracy in the world with a civilization more than five thousand years old boasts of multiple cultural origins.

A lot of festivals are celebrated with a great zeal in India in spite of all whether the festival is Hindu oriented or Christian or whatever. This is Unity in Diversity of different festivals. All religions are treated equally in spite making any partiality to anyone of a specific religion. All religions are given equal preference. Thus India is diverse in its religions. Different Languages are spoken in different regions. Different cultures and different traditions are followed by different people of different regions. Thus we can say that Modern India presents a picture of unity in diversity where people of different faiths and beliefs live together in peace and harmony and world peace is the only motto of all Indians. Culture can be defined as a combination of
beliefs, values and attitudes that is shared amongst a population of people. Cultures can encourage creativity and they can seriously hinder them.

Enabling beliefs

We hold beliefs about many things, but in creativity three important areas are important: beliefs about possibility, beliefs about other people and beliefs about ourselves.

Beliefs about people

If I believe that people are generally selfish or are out to get me, then I will take a defensive stance when others are around and will not offer ideas that I believe will be criticized. I may also take the same approach towards them. Thus a Mexican stand-off is created, where neither of us will be creative, for fear of being criticized. If, on the other hand, I believe that people are basically thoughtful and caring, even though they may not always act that way, I will be more willing to take a chance with them. I will also be supportive of them, thus enabling them to be creative and encouraging them to do the same for me.

Beliefs about myself

If I believe that I am not creative, that it is a skill beyond me, that I am inferior to others or must conform at all costs, then even if others encourage me, I will be loathe even to be privately creative in my thinking. If, however, I believe that, given the chance, all people are creative - although some may be differently creative from others - and that I can be creative as the next person, then I will feel empowered to offer ideas whatever the situation. Cultures that embody beliefs that enable and encourage creativity will get just that. This need not mean setting fires all over the place, and other beliefs and values, such as the importance of balancing today with tomorrow, or the criticality of customer satisfaction, may effectively channel our thoughts and actions.

Beliefs about possibility

If I am given a crazy suggestion and think it crazy then I will treat it as crazy and nothing else. If I believe in black and white and less about shades of gray or colors in between, then I will see just black and white in everything. Perception is reality, at least inside our heads, and limited beliefs about what is possible will constrain our creative thinking. On the other hand, if I believe that all thing are possible, even though I may not achieve everything I set out to do, I will accomplish far more than if I believed in impossibility rather than possibility.

Supportive values

Values are social rules that regulate our behavior, telling us what is more or less important, what is right and wrong, good and bad.

Negative values

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Values that say 'first achieve your personal objectives' will lead to people putting work above other people. Values that say 'first, obey the boss' will lead to people looking fearfully towards their superiors and keeping their heads down for fear of being chastened. Values that say 'don't rock the boat' will lead to people being risk-averse and avoiding dangerous ideas.

**Creative values**

On the other hand, values which say 'work together' or 'it is good to explore ideas' or 'managers should support the development of employees' or 'we must build tomorrow's company as well as sustaining today's business' will legitimize innovative thinking and action, and lead to people who value creativity and making use of ideas.

**Progressive attitudes**

Attitudes are the externalization of combinations of beliefs and values. They signal to others our intent and enable them to adapt accordingly. Attitudes that care only for short-term gain or cultural conformance send signals that discourage innovative thinking. Disapproving frowns or worse signal the punishment that transgressors may receive. More progressive attitudes signal interest in ideas and approval of innovation and creative thinking. Even if ideas are not implemented, their originators are rewarded with admiration for their cognitive efforts.

**Visible signs**

Artifacts, signs and symbols of culture are all around us.

**Artifacts**

Artifacts are the physical things that are found that have particular symbolism for a culture. They may even be endowed with mystical properties. The first products of a company. Prizes won in grueling challenges and so on are all artifacts. Artifacts of creativity may be instances of previous successes and failures. Failures are important as learning opportunities and may be thus imbued with special meaning.

**Symbols**

Symbols, like artifacts, are things which act as triggers to remind people in the culture of its rules, beliefs, etc. They act as a shorthand way to keep people aligned. There may be many symbols around an organization, from pictures of products on the walls to the words and handshakes used in greeting cultural members from around the world. Creative symbols include artwork, architecture, furnishings and other aspects of the environment. Frivolity and intrigue appear on desks and walls.

Since we are already undertaking a study of theoretical-analytical paradigm of Inter-Culturalism and its relation to Human Rights Discourse, here are a set of Contemporary Issues, which could, directly or indirectly, relate to the process in question -- Contemporary Critical Issues: Modes of

"Understand the differences; act on the commonalities."1 - Andrew Masondo, African National Congress “The minister of national identity…..is also the minister of immigration”

With a reference to these statements is reflected a tendency to develop an all-inclusive approach in creating a better understanding of the issues of identity and culture. However, one cannot dismiss the significance of academic analogies and references in awakening us to think and be more widely-read on the issues of Multiculturalism and Immigration.

EVALUATION IN ACADEMIC TERMS

Academic References and Relevance:

First, I would like to make my own analysis as to why and what is the importance of these academic references to work in consultation with these Projects. Through these academic references, one can deduce the evaluation of this Project in terms of how relevant is this Project by undertaking a brief study of academicians, which have produced work based on Cultural Theories and Case Studies. Some of them are discussed herewith. First, I would like to discuss the need for these academic inputs and the relevance of this Intellectual Culture. Intellectual Dialogue and the Creation of a Culture: In the production of a body of knowledge, intellectuals create a 'culture', which is unique of them. Considering the contemporary Information-driven Age, the role of intellectual 'culture' cannot be denied in the creation of a knowledge-based society, or even, knowledge economy. One of the primary contribution can well be attributed to the exchange of ideas among the intellectuals, leading to a conflation of the knowledge-driven paradigm in the 'public'. Hence, this can also be accounted to the after-effect of an intellectual exchange, consequently leading to its recognition, by its implementation in the public, in its societal-pragmatic paradigm; the intellectual exchange based upon engagement in critical assessment, thus leading to remodulation of the existing, the essentialist. This after-effect of intellectual exchange is the pin-point of this paper, making it indispensable for reverting on what is 'dialogue' in the essentialist mainstream sense. This 'dialogue' is particular to the intellectuals, with an aim of creating an impact, not in its universality, but in its immediate particularity, the particularity around which it is thriving.

The first reference made here is by an Indian Scholar, Gurpreet Mahajan.

‘Rethinking multiculturalism’

Plural, diverse and multicultural are terms commonly used to describe societies that comprise of different religions, races, languages and cultures. In everyday conversation these words are applied interchangeably, the assumption being that each of these expressions represents the same thing – namely, the presence of many, different communities. While it is true that plural, diverse

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and multicultural point to the existence of ‘many’, it is less realized that they embody three quite distinct conceptions of ‘many’. The idea of multiplicity and difference that they incorporate are dissimilar in significant ways. Far from being synonyms they are discrete concepts with distinct meanings, contextual parameters and symbolic spaces. It is this dissonance in meaning that we need to apprehend if we are to understand both the discourse on multiculturalism and its relevance in contemporary political theory.

While pluralism indicates the presence of differences, and tries to ensure legal equality for all the communities, multiculturalism goes beyond that. By pointing out that culture-based discrimination continues even when legal equality is ensured, multiculturalism has radically redefined the democratic theory. It has challenged the prevalent notions of citizenship and tolerance by promoting cultural diversity.

The book by Parekh examines existing multicultural alternatives and tries to reconcile cultural rights with individual freedom. The author raises the issue of group equality by examining whether different communities occupying the same social space have the same status in the public domain. This is important as inequality often coexists with degrees of social and legal pluralism. Collective cultural participation does not mean the absence of hierarchy. It exists in the form of authority of the dominant community and the symbols of its power. This book speaks of issues that are central to democracy. The author has taken up new issues and has attempted to provide a framework within which the rights of the minorities may be discussed.

She has raised a whole set of important questions about heterogeneous public culture as against a homogeneous national culture, about political and civil rights of the minorities and about discriminatory state policies. The author argues that individual rights and community rights must go side by side.’

The second significant reference is by Lord Bhikhu Parekh. An important book that deals with vital social and political issues based on the Indian experience Bhikhu Parekh (Indian, based in London – Member, House of Lords, Westminster Parliament) Bhikhu Parekh's *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* sets out to design paths for multiculturalism understood both as political theory and a framework for political practice. The past decade abounded in works on multiculturalism and the challenge it poses for the concept of society and its self-understanding; on cultural diversity and intercultural relations (including the dynamics of hegemony and recalcitrance); on social cohesiveness and collective identity; on the integrity of culture and processes of hybridization; and, last but not least, on the traditions of political thought nurtured in academia and implied in the structures of authority that contemporary western democracies have developed. Parekh's account of multiculturalism is located, then, on the highly contentious ground of debates within liberalism and presented from such perspectives as post-Marxism, postcolonialism, race theory and feminism, and from a wide range of disciplines: philosophy, political theory, cultural studies, cultural anthropology, and pedagogy.

Parekh's book, set against the background of these current debates, is immediately distinguished by its coherence and lucidity. In the situation when so many critics bemoan the impossibility of arriving at a consistent language of analysis - not to mention a coherent perspective - in their
efforts to embrace the complexity of multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh manages not only to maintain the focus and order of analysis, he also succeeds in reading multiculturalism from within the liberal tradition and against it at the same time. This paradoxical agenda is Parekh's most consequential contribution to the multi-culturalism debate. Where other attempts to spin the yarn of multiculturalism out of the tradition of liberalism, albeit in most cases salutary, would leave us with more unease about the assumptions concerning the respectability of cultures, shared supra-particularist values, the nature of human nature (as a primary context for stating the rights of individuals and groups), and the most unfortunate and necessary question of tolerance (of difference and diversity), Parekh's analysis addresses these tender spots in the theory of multiculturalism, and, even if not quite resolving them, it proposes possible ways of handling them in practice.

'Multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities. The norms governing their respective claims, including the principles of justice, cannot be derived from one culture alone but through an open and equal dialogue between them. . . . By definition a multicultural society consists of several cultures or cultural communities with their own distinct systems of meaning and significance and views on man and the world. It cannot be therefore adequately theorized from within the conceptual framework of any particular political doctrine which, being embedded in, and structurally biased towards, a particular cultural perspective, cannot do justice to others’.

A commitment to cultural pluralism

All societies today are culturally heterogeneous in different degrees. Thanks to such forces as industrialization, the easy mobility of goods and people, and the global reach of the multinational media, members of even the most traditional and isolated societies are daily exposed to new ways of life and thought. The influence on their language, aspirations, patterns of consumption, life-styles, self-understanding and innermost fears is often so subtle and systematic that they do not even notice it. A culturally homogeneous society whose members share and mechanically follow an identical body of beliefs and practices is today no more than an anthropological fiction.

In some societies cultural heterogeneity is not a result of contingent external influences but communally grounded. These societies include several more or less well-organized cultural communities, each held together by a distinct body of ideas concerning the best ways to organize significant social relations and lead individual and collective lives. Such societies are rightly called multicultural. While all societies today are culturally heterogeneous, not all of them are multicultural.

Cultures derive their authority from different sources, of which two are currently the most important. Some cultures are based on and derive their authority from religion, and demand respect deemed to be due to religion. Some others are ethnically based, and demand respect because they are bound up with the life and history of specific ethnic groups. In yet others ethnicity and religion are integrally connected and provide a complex source of legitimacy. This means that multicultural societies could be multi-ethnic or multi-religious or both. Since ethnicity and religion are different in nature, multi-ethnically constituted multicultural societies
raise different kinds of problems to those raised by multi-religiously constituted multicultural societies. However since they are both multicultural, albeit in their own different ways, some of the basic problems they raise are broadly similar in nature. Multi-culturalism is not new to our age, for many pre-modern societies such as the Roman empire, medieval India and Europe, and the Ottoman empire included several different cultural communities and coped with the diversity in their own different ways.

**Anne Phillips (London School of Economics)**

Public Opinion in recent years has soured on Multiculturalism, due in large part to fears of radical Islam. In Multiculturalism without Culture, Anna Phillips contends that critics misrepresent culture as the explanation of everything individuals from minority and non-western groups do. She puts forward a defense of multiculturalism that dispenses with notions of culture, instead placing individuals themselves at its core. Multiculturalism has been blamed for encouraging the oppression of women-forced marriages, female genital cutting, school girls wearing the hijab. Many critics opportunistically deploy gender equality to justify the retreat from multiculturalism, hijacking the equality agenda to perpetuate cultural stereotypes. Phillips informs her argument with the feminist insistence on recognizing women as agents, and defends her position using an unusually broad range of literature, including political theory, philosophy, feminist theory, law, and anthropology. She argues that critics and proponents alike exaggerate the unity, distinctness, and intractability of cultures, thereby encouraging a perception of men and women as dupes constrained by cultural dictates.

Opponents of multiculturalism may think the argument against accommodating cultural difference is over and won, but they are wrong. Phillips believes multiculturalism still has an important role to play in achieving greater social equality. In this book, she offers a new way of addressing dilemmas of justice and equality in multiethnic, multicultural societies, intervening at his critical moment when so many Western countries are poised to abandon multiculturalism.

**What are the fallouts? EXPECTED OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS – ACTIONS**

**Relevance of the Action**

The problem of conflict arising due to the lack of communication among the personnel at workplace, and in the institutions of learning, contributing to a lack of coherence in policy decisions gives rise to the need for framing such a proposal. The relevance of this proposal would account for the far-reaching effects of a culturally-sensitive Organization, in the long run, and to work in a more emancipated environment, in the short run.

The target groups are institutions of learning, schools and universities, and also International Non-Governmental Organizations. Furthermore, they would include Civil Society Organizations, Local Authorities, Government Bodies, University Training Institutes, Cooperation Agencies, Donors, Private Sector and Media Organizations. Now, we attempt to delineate the description of various actions to be undertaken under this Project, with simultaneously underlining their importance and repercussions they hold, for fulfilling the stated Objectives and Aims.
Description of the Actions and their proposed significance

Visits to Migrant Centers

Migrant Information Centre provide a range of services for migrants and refugees living especially in the suburbs of any big town in Europe. They usually aim to provide information and help on issues related to aged care & disability, child care, employment, English classes, volunteering, family support, health, housing, migration and youth services. They also provide facilities for meetings; information on migrant communities and support groups; computer, fax and photocopying facilities and support for clubs and community groups.

Special Focus on Inter-generational activities

Intergenerational programs are activities that bring together individuals of different ages as partners to explore, study, and work towards a shared goal. These activities foster cooperation and promote interaction among generations including children, youth and older adults. Programs can be youth serving older adults, older adults serving youth, or youth and older adults serving together. Some examples of intergenerational programs are: youth teaching seniors or providing chore service; older adults mentoring youth or providing childcare; and children, youth and older adults performing in a community theater group or working to improve the natural environment.

Certain priorities would be given to environmental health hazards that affect older persons by: Examining the environmental impact of an aging population in a smart growth context. Encouraging civic engagement among older persons in their communities to reduce environmental hazards.

To succeed with this the participation of older adults is critical.

Many older adults give of their time to improve quality of life for themselves, their families and their communities, including protecting the environment.

Hold symposia on youth from different cultural backgrounds

The symposium will offer field trips and presentations on a wide variety of topics. There will be something for everyone’s interest! Presenters will be university faculty and graduate students, students, biologists, foresters, geologists, activists, artists, writers, and educators that represent a diversity of perspectives. The activity would be undertaken in the following manner, and with the following objectives: Designed and/or implemented by one or more students. Demonstrate initiative, creativity, and commitment by students on behalf of environmental education, scientific research, and/or environmental protection.

Demonstrate collaboration with other students, classes and/or community members.

Workshop for an alternative critical media paradigm

Contrary to the illusion that media only ’mediate’ what goes on in rest of society, the media's representational power is one of society's main forces in its own right. From this perspective,
media power is an increasingly central dimension of power in contemporary societies. Far from media simply being there to guard us against the overwhelming influence of other forms of power, media power is itself part of what power watchers need to watch. On this view, if we cannot imagine a society where media power is the first mover of social action, media power remains a very significant dimension of contemporary reality. In short, media power is an emergent form of social power in complex societies whose basic infrastructure depends increasingly on the fast circulation of information and images. It is with this view that a workshop on an alternative critical and constructive media paradigm will be conducted under this Project.

**Inculcate common universal values/ideals through a widespread Charter**

Subsequently, a widespread would be adopted in wake of institutionalising these ideals such as Democracy, Human Rights and Justice. This is so because in carrying out the actions and the expected outcomes, these are some universal values that run through these activities and they reinstate the need of these values to be incorporated in situations which are particular in some location or general, implying their wide significance in sultry other situations and circumstances. Replicate models of a considerable successful multicultural work-place. The nature of our workplaces has changed. We have moved away from the monochromatic makeup of our offices to one that is now colored by team members from all over the world. With this new multicultural make-up come differences in cultures which in turn bring differences in areas such as communication styles, approach to time, managerial styles and a plethora of other cross cultural differences.

Cultural awareness is now crucial if multicultural teams within businesses are going to maximize their potential. Although cross cultural differences do not always cause obvious problems, it is their more subtle manifestations that can and do lead to a lack of clear communication and poor performance.

**Why is Cultural awareness necessary?**

Cultural awareness is important to help members of a multicultural team identify where things may be going wrong or how to best leverage their differences. Without some sort of formal cross cultural awareness training it is difficult for multicultural teams to identify areas that need attention. Cultural differences manifest in many ways. Within a multicultural team, a person's cultural background will impact how they act and behave. There will be differences in areas such as communication, attitude to towards conflict, approaches to task completion and decision making styles. Unless people come to realize these differences between them through cultural awareness, problems can continue and even intensify.

**Cultural awareness in a multicultural workplace**

Building real cross cultural synergy is only accomplished through properly considered cultural awareness training. However, below are some suggestions for working in multicultural workplaces:

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Building your cultural knowledge: Try and learn a bit more about other cultures and countries. Information is easily found on the internet and in books. You can also ask your colleagues. Start to build some sort of cultural awareness.

Treating people as individuals: Information in other cultures is usually based on generalizations. This means that the information will not apply to every single member of that culture. Be aware of this and try and deal with people as individuals.

Implementing your cultural knowledge: If you have discovered some useful information about a culture that is represented in your multicultural team put it to the test. It is only by putting these things into action that you will come to see the benefits and learn more.

Withholding assumptions: Try to avoid jumping to conclusions about people. One of the first rules of cultural awareness is refraining from assuming one way is wrong and one is right.

Avoiding blame: Blame is simply not constructive. When you see a situation break-down rather than apportion blame, pick the situation apart with your 'cultural awareness glasses' on and see what the cultural mechanics were. This helps resolve issues and act as a precedent for the future.

Listening actively: Active listening is another cornerstone of cultural awareness. Rather than listening to people you should really pay attention to the words used, the way it is said, the context and also read between the lines.

Relaying your knowledge: Work with colleagues in your multicultural team to relay knowledge to one another. Help build up the skills set of the team. Create innovative recreational activities among all age-groups. An intergenerational activity program is one way to encourage physical activity among older adults. These programs can involve partnerships among students, older adults, academic institutions, and the local community. All partners must cooperate in order to provide an effective program. The overall goals of an older-adult activity program using students as volunteers, for example, could be (1) to positively affect the well-being of older adults; (2) to provide an opportunity for older adults to participate in a physical activity program that improves their quality of life; and (3) to provide an opportunity for students to learn about aging and history. Strategies for initiating an intergenerational activity program would include planning and development, orientation and training, implementation, and evaluation.

Organize lectures on Multiculturalism from an academic perspective

The Lectures, symposia and workshops will be conducted on Multiculturalism, in theory and practice to educate the youth on the contemporary relevance of Intercultural and Multicultural values and ideals, so as they incorporate the same in their day-to-day life and also impart on others around them, the similar values, resonating the need to live in this free multicultural environment, and open up the society to greater acceptance and viability of multiculturalism in practice.

Undertake case-studies of multicultural societies (also through video conferencing)
Multiculturalism was adopted as official policy, in several Western nations from the 1970s onward, for reasons that varied from country to country. The great cities of the Western world are increasingly made of a mosaic of cultures. Government multicultural policies may include: recognition of multiple citizenship (the multiple citizenship itself usually results from the nationality laws of another country) government support for newspapers, television, and radio in minority languages support for minority festivals, holidays, and celebrations acceptance of traditional and religious dress in schools, the military, and society in general support for music and arts from minority cultures programs to encourage minority representation in politics, Science, Engineering, Technology, Mathematics, education, and the work force in general. enforcement of different codes of law on members of each ethnic group (e.g. Malaysia enforces Shari’a law, but only for a particular ethnic group). Hence, this includes undertaking case-studies of different countries in order to understand well the delicacy and sensitivity of a particular society, and create an environment of vibrant multiplicity of existing differing societies under one mosaic of Interculturality.

4.3 EU-UN Legislation

BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION

In order to lay grounds for the Background and Justification of the Project, it is pertinent, first, to consider the provisions made in lieu of Intercultural Dialogue and Mediation, in the Official Documents of the European Union (EU) Conventions and Agreements. They are stated here in the form of the Title of the Agreement and subsequently, its appropriate provisions. They are, as follows:

Council Conclusions on the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States, 20 November, 2008 'As a comprehensive and consistent approach establishing specific strategies with regions and countries outside the Union with a view to clarifying objectives and approaches in the area of cultural relations; these strategies will in particular be tailored to the features and sustainable development prospects of their cultural sectors, to the state of cultural exchanges with the Upon and to their economic and social situations.'

UNESCO: Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 20 October, 2005

Policy Decision : Celebrating the importance of cultural diversity for the full realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universally recognized instruments.
Policy Decision : To reaffirm the importance of the link between culture and development for all countries, particularly for developing countries, and to support actions undertaken nationally and internationally to secure recognition of the true value of this link.
Article 2 : Cultural diversity can be protected and promoted only if human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, information and communication, as well as the ability of individuals to choose cultural expressions, are guaranteed. No one may invoke the provisions of this Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or guaranteed by international law, or to limit the scope thereof.

Article 2: The protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions presuppose the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures, including the cultures of persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples.

Article 4: “Cultural expressions” are those expressions that result from the creativity of individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content.

Article 4: “Interculturality” refers to the existence and equitable interaction of diverse cultures and the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual respect.

European Union: Council conclusions of 22 May, 2008 on Intercultural Competences ’the development of a lifelong learning perspective which includes the acquisition by all citizens of the key competences most relevant to intercultural competences and most likely to foster an appreciation of cultural diversity as a core value.

4.4 Relevant Action Plan

METHODOLOGY OF THE PROJECT

Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring is the systematic collection and analysis of information as a project progresses. It is aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of a project or organization. It is based on targets set and activities planned during the planning phases of work. It helps to keep the work on track, and can let management know when things are going wrong. If done properly, it is an invaluable tool for good management, and it provides a useful base for evaluation. It enables you to determine whether the resources you have available are sufficient and are being well used, whether the capacity you have is sufficient and appropriate, and whether you are doing what you planned to do.

Evaluation is the comparison of actual project impacts against the agreed strategic plans. It looks at what you set out to do, at what you have accomplished, and how you accomplished it. It can be formative (taking place during the life of a project or organization, with the intention of improving the strategy or way of functioning of the project or organization). It can also be summative (drawing learning’s from a completed project or an organization that is no longer functioning). Someone once described this as the difference between a check-up and an autopsy.

Ethnography

Ethnography is perhaps the most important and most widely used qualitative mode of inquiry into social and cultural conditions, not only in the academic social sciences, but also increasingly in organizations and activities outside the university as well, from PARC to the Federal Reserve. There is no single definition of ethnography or uniform practice of ethnographic method, nor should there be: ethnographic practice responds and adapts to the field situation. As Marilyn Strathern has written, ethnography, through participant-observation, interviewing, and other qualitative techniques, is a "deliberate attempt to generate more data than the researcher is aware
of at the time of collection," and is thus eminently suited to the study of unpredictable outcomes, complex emerging social formations, and technological and market change.

Open Interaction or Jestership

The most powerful application of the jester concept is the creation of a culture of jestership in an organization. If the creation, acceptance, and support of jesters can be made a cultural norm, the entire organization wins. An association that makes jestership a priority for its staff can create an environment in which each staff member feels a responsibility and accountability to help their fellow staff members eliminate blind spots and is committed to do so in a way that is effective, supportive, and positive.

So where to start? First, share the concept of corporate jestership with your staff, and ask for their support in making it come alive within your association. Ask each one of them to concentrate on developing skill at discovering, acknowledging, and addressing their own blind spots.

Your staff will quickly discover that the very nature of blind spots make them difficult to illuminate by oneself. Even though your staff might have some wonderful self-reflection, they probably won't see anything but the faint traces of their own blind spots unless they involve other people. Sitting alone in an office or cubicle just thinking about what they don't see won't produce much revelation. Encourage your staff members to examine, ponder, and discuss jestership with each other. As some of your staff make a personal commitment to jestership and their own blind spots fall away, they will start to appear different. Others will begin to recognize in them new abilities, insights, and understanding. Those that did not commit to the idea of being a jester at first many soon show a new interest. Help them. Encourage them.

Once you have a critical mass of staff members pursuing the ideals of jestership, you can encourage them to step into the jester role more publicly. This requires taking on a more open and active role as a jester in the association. Encourage staff members to speak their mind more often in staff meetings, invite them to challenge the status quo, and even encourage them to illuminate any blind spots you might be exhibiting. Remember to encourage and reinforce staff to take on this role with care, creativity, and grace; it can be very tricky or even dangerous if entered into haphazardly. Ask your staff to choose when and how to step into the role of jester and to always do so in a way that makes others feel valued and esteemed. Give private feedback as to the way they are being perceived by others as they try to take on the mantle of jester. It may seem a little daunting at first, but the more you continue to support and encourage genuine jester behavior, the more it will occur. As more staff participate, jester-like thought and behavior will spread throughout the association. At some point, if enough people adopt the paradigm, you will see a shift in the entire organizational culture. Staff will be more likely to be honest and open in discussions. They will be more forthcoming in sharing perspectives that differ from those of the majority opinion. They will be open to feedback and to aggressively addressing blind spots others help them discover about themselves and more likely to give you valuable feedback as to your leadership. Walking around a transformed organization, you will wonder just what happened. The truth will be that you happened. You made a leadership commitment to bring jestership to your association.

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As the concept of the corporate jester is embraced in your association, you should make sure it is noticed, supported, and enshrined. Look for ways in which processes and policies can support it. Make sure new staff understand what it is. Help those who have not completely adopted it to start seeing it as a cultural expectation. Organizations that exhibit this level of cultural jestership are rare, interesting, and engaging environments to be a part of, and they are extremely successful at what they set out to do. I challenge you to make your association an example of one of them. So, are you ready? Put on your multicolored cap and get started.

**Inter-generational activities**

Intergenerational connections are magic. But anyone who has worked in an intergenerational program knows that magic takes work. If our goal is to develop meaningful connections, we can’t simply put different generations in a giant blender and hit the mix button. We need to prepare and take time to be thoughtful, intentional, and respectful. At the heart of the social compact is the understanding that our civil society is based on the giving and receiving of resources across the lifespan. We all need and, in turn, are needed at different stages of our lives. Intergenerational work demands that we recognize the inherent strength of each generation and the need we all share to be connected. Intergenerational work is about building bridges not barricades. It is about what is possible when we view people of different generations as pure potential ready to engage, not left behind to wait. In a world of easy isolation and quick, impersonal media connections, intergenerational approaches are proving once again to be not just nice, but to be necessary. Whether addressing a pressing community need, tutoring a child, teaching an older person to surf the Internet, or sharing a community building, the generations are meant to be together. Our communities and country are better served when we encourage the connection and benefit from the magic.

**Experiential understanding and empirical analysis**

The synergies generated out of dialogue and mediation; as in the fabric of dialogue and mediation, in other contexts and scenarios such as ecological, economical, other sectors of mutual interaction and reciprocity.

**Analytical methodology – improvisation**

Method validation is the process used to confirm that the analytical procedure employed for a specific test is suitable for its intended use. Results from method validation can be used to judge the quality, reliability and consistency of analytical results; it is an integral part of any good analytical practice. Analytical methods need to be validated or revalidated before their introduction into routine use; whenever the conditions change for which the method has been validated (e.g., an instrument with different characteristics or samples with a different matrix); and whenever the method is changed and the change is outside the original scope of the method.

**Principle of specialization and efficiency, based on differential human capacity.**
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Efficiency is an economic theory that states that the greatest benefit to society of any action is achieved when the marginal benefits from the allocation of resources are equivalent to the marginal social costs of the allocation. The principle of specialization means that in a bureaucracy all business assign certain people to complete certain tasks in order to have more productivity. This will maintain all bureaucracies to remain the same. Transport, personnel for administering the recreational activities, stationery, managerial tasks, well-versed researchers on conducting surveys, analysis of indicators The dynamic attitude, not static, even the stakeholders' perception will change, facts will change the inherent values.

A New Theory of Justice

Ever since the idea of constitutional justice has achieved the status of public domain, political parties, governmental departments, communities, groups, chambers of commerce, consumer sections, sectional movements – all look to constitutional recognition on their respective stands on justice as the mark of final approval. All other ideas of justice – moral, ethical, psychic, political, and economic – have given way to the most abstract form, the idea of constitutional justice. It is argued that the justice bearing provisions in the constitution are not to be understood as isolated dots; together with liberty-bearing provisions they are to be considered as an independent coherent domain with strictly determined connections with the entire domain of politics – leading, setting standard, evaluating the latter. As consequence of the preceding assumption, in this distinct domain of constitutional justice, we find the whole meaning of the constitution absorbing all history, at times all politics. This is a situation where we find a relatively robust tradition of judicial decision-making with the constitution as its warrant subsuming popular decision-making and popular politics to which the constitutional language hitherto had been less important. Our political practice has conceded authority over questions addressing the basic issues of a political life – to a trans-temporal practice of juridical language, called in a complete lack of humor, basic law. The rich political concept of justice suffers deficit in a double absorption: justice subsumed under law, and politics subsumed under constitutionalism. The result is the emergence of what can be termed as the emergence of governmentised justice, in a context where the justice bearing provisions in the constitution have to depend too much on the governmental procedures of justice. I am to show in this paper how in post-colonial India the emergence of the justice-seeking subject is marked by the presence of the two forms of justice - governmental and popular-political.

Democracy in a Multi-lingual Community, as an approach

Languages and their diversity represent a significant problem concerning the delimitation of political communities, which I define as a group of individuals that are, or would like to be, bound to the same destiny, and that has developed, or would like to develop, common rules and institutions. In this context, political communities do not necessarily coincide with territorial states; they can equally be autonomous sub-state units, as is the case with several federal systems or even not territorially contingent communities. The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between language and political community. This has become an increasingly important issue since linguistic minorities have become more demanding in claiming new rights. At the same time, the interconnections between different peoples have increased substantially as a consequence of economic and social globalization.
The problem of language is particularly relevant for those political communities that are, or aim to be, democratic. Popular control requires that, in fact, each individual had the opportunity to exercise this control and that the decision-making is carried out in the languages known to all the citizens. Hence, equality implies that all the citizens, regardless of their commands of languages, can effectively participate in the political arena. If these conditions are not fulfilled, democracy is hampered.

Is a common language a prerequisite for the formation of a political community? History has shown that multilingual communities can prosper and grow: both the Roman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire accommodated peoples speaking a variety of different languages: but neither of these Empires was democratic. Therefore - and more specifically - can a political community be multilingual and democratic at the same time? John Stuart Mill argued that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist”. This project aims to re-examine this question both theoretically and empirically.

In fact, many democratic communities have managed to flourish in a multilingual context. Countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and India are even taking advantage of the fact that different linguistic groups comprise them. In these countries, the variety of languages has been preserved, although some efforts have been made in order to allow each linguistic community to also acquire the other’s language as a second one. Multilingual countries have often opted for federal systems, which were considered an important condition to preserve variety. The most fascinating case of multilingualism today is represented by the European Union. It is here that a major integration process is taking place without making any attempts at imposing a common language (as it would generally happen in a nation-building process); instead, more value is given to language diversity. A comparison between multilingualism in India and in the European Union will be attempted.

THE VIABILITY OF STAKEHOLDERS

The importance of Stakeholders in this Project on 'Intercultural Dialogue and Cross-Cultural Mediation' is made viable with the holding of Information and Training Sessions, with Intercultural Dialogue, and promoting the fabric of Multiculturalism, in the backdrop. The primary aim would be to benefit Africa from this Intercultural Dialogue, we aim to bring about. Potential Stakeholders include ITC – ILO, Turin, ETF, Turin, Development Workers, CSOs, Peace-keeping Operations, NATO, International Civil Servants, Ministry of Cooperation and Development, Private Sector Employees (Firms investing in Africa) with AfromediaNet as the Executive Agency.

Trainers will include Members of Ladies' Panel, Journalists (AfroMediaNet), University Researchers, Former Interns and Fellows (AfroMediaNet). A deemed training of trainers on Intercultural Dialogue. (also including International Relations/Global Development), functionality from Brussels (Organisations’ Personnel), will be planned as the first major step for bringing together of Intercultural Approach, in a more concretised, coherent manner for stating

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clearly the terms which will be followed upon by, in the forthcoming workshops/Conferences on the promotion and sustenance of Interculturalism in Institutions and other sectors of society.

**Keywords:**
Development Workers (as a part of CSOs), Military Peace Keeping Operations, for instance NATO, International Cooperation Officers (specializing in International Affairs), Private Sector Companies investing in Africa.

### 4.5 Application to Institutional Frameworks

**PROJECT DESCRIPTION**

**Overall Objectives:**

**Enhancing Intercultural skills and competence of students**

One of the primary objectives of the project is to enhance the Intercultural skills leading to a greater competence among the Students of all disciplines in the Universities of Europe/European University Institutes. By Intercultural, we refer here, to the coming together of different cultures contributing to a more widespread plethora of skills such as learning, attitude, responsiveness to situations and others, which are based on the required intercultural exchange among students. This will lead to an enrichment of the academic life of students, by complementing it with this cultural dimension. Hence, this Intercultural fabric is a necessary component for the generation of a health-multifaceted young student, giving a variegated tinge to his/her personal and academic-cultural life.

**Strengthen cooperation between social partners**

In the development of a well-being of a multicultural community, the diverse roles of social partners is of utmost importance. Through this tool of Intercultural Dialogue, and subsequently cross-cultural mediation, the grid of social mobility will be strengthened. Explicitly, the social partners such as the State, the Civil Society Organizations and other non-state actors, will act more in a synchronized, coherent line of functionality. In other words, this dialogue, by harnessing on the principles of a conversation between different cultures, will lubricate the process of a more active cooperation among these social partners, by moving beyond their own frontiers and limitations. It will help in streamlining the trajectory of thought and actions among different societal partners committed to a single goal or to resolve a particular given crisis situation.

**Strengthen connection between education and labor market**

In the journey of considering the imprints of this Intercultural Dialogue, the next stage, which is pertinent, is the bond or a strong connection between the education and the labor market. How this will come about is the following: the intercultural dimension is already based on the underlining principle of the breakdown of cultural stereotypes, hence, leading to an increased exchange among the different social sectors, especially education and the labor, since the two
have a close interconnection in a way of education contributing to the labor and vice-verse. An open, multicultural educative human being will make a significant, different, authentic contribution to the labor ethic and a well-versed labor ethic will create significant parameters for the educative standards in reciprocation.

**Intercultural Dialogue and cross-cultural mediation at workplace**

One of the important objectives of this Project is the promotion of Intercultural Dialogue and cross-cultural mediation at the workplace in any or every Organization of Europe, rather the effects of which could also be replicated in other continents as well. The development of the intercultural skills, the solidarity of the social partnerships, and the strong connection between education and the labor market, would contribute to an ideal organization, a workplace incorporating the basic principles of this kind of dialogue and mediation. A workplace based on free and mutual exchange of cultures, reciprocity of cultural lineages and geared towards resolution of conflicts on an impartial basis, rather considering an equal and the opinions of all (from different cultures) especially in the resolution of a particular crisis situation.

**Intercultural Dialogue among Nations and a more close-knit civil society**

Considering the increased Intercultural exchange of the above-mentioned features, what leaves us herewith, is the situation wherein, it is the State and the non-State actors who will garner this Project to higher levels of functioning and applicability. This will provide considerable aid in promoting the values and ethics of Inter-cultural Dialogue at cross-cultural as well as transnational level, giving them a greater leverage and a greater profundity in everyday working of sultry other Organizations across all continents, thus making it a truly Multicultural and Multinational phenomenon.

**Education pursued through Intercultural Dialogue**

The facet of education, pursued through Intercultural Dialogue, is differential and unique, in the sense of its essential character of promoting an appreciation of different cultures through well placed. Educative tools in the institutions of learning such as the schools and the Universities. This can come about by inculcating a sense of shared understanding and mutual reciprocity among different cultures. This sense can come about only when certain tools such as intercultural activities, learning of intercultural attitudes and such other forms of interculturality are implemented through appropriate teaching lessons, which move beyond the text-learning and induce an intercultural discipline among the teachers and the students.

**Cross-cultural imprint in the work place**

In the work place, the first aim is to avoid any possibility of conflict arising out of the presence of staff of an office, from different cultures. A well-versed intercultural education would contribute to a well-versed intercultural work force. In the work place, in any institution or an Organisation, it is pertinent to consider this fabric of interculturality by employing the employees from different cultural backgrounds, and to inculcate a spirit of a joint force irrespective of any race, creed, colour, region etc. A cross-cultural work place is a significant factor in the successful
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working of an Organisation, in its functionality and in its spirit. Through the exchange of intercultural factors of producing knowledge, an organisation can definitely benefit from the innovative techniques and tools produced even during the course of any Project or work in progress, where all work together and are jointly responsible for any event or action.

A civil society composed of primarily all the Organizations or Institutions under the name of 'non-state actors' is a well-enriched civil society when it is based upon this notion of interculturality spread among different actors in the social sector. Hence, one of the primary aims, to make a better civil society definitely comes to be based upon the fabric of this network of a close-knit intercultural civil society, where the actors work in an environment which is rid of all stereotypes, prejudices, biases and in close connection with each other within an Organization and also, outside in explicating the dynamics of multiculturalism. Hence, a well enriched civil society can set further parameters in stating this intercultural dimension as an indispensable feature for the formulation of any work force in an Organization and to inculcate a spirit of commonality and sameness in sultry other scenarios.

The factor of Interculturality is one of the primary factors in the contribution to the EU Global Citizenship. By Global Citizenship, we refer here to the more concrete, coherent EU citizens as the bearers of EU fraternity and solidarity, rather than ending up in divisions and fragments. Global citizens can effect change in the following manner. We cannot stop terrorism with more and better security and weapons alone. We must seek to change how people conceive their roles in society. We may understand the science of climate change, but understanding how to change ourselves is another matter. The Global Citizenship programme provides students with a deeper understanding of the cultural and political dimensions of change, and of their potential role in developing a conception of citizenship geared to the needs of a rapidly globalizing world.

The significant shift in the profile of the youth can come about by facilitating youth participation and intergenerational partnerships in global decision-making. This can be furthered by supporting collaborations among diverse youth organizations; and providing tools, resources, and recognition for positive youth action.

Technology has made the media the most important immediate influence on opinions and understanding in the industrialized world and has significantly heightened media impact in the developing countries as well. Media has a powerful capacity to encourage global awareness thereby promoting cross-cultural understanding, tolerance and acceptance of ethnic, cultural, religious and gender differences in communities across the globe. By disseminating messages that create and reinforce negative stereotypes and perpetuate misconceptions, the media frustrates dialogue and works against mutual understanding.

The media is, therefore a crucial arena for challenging prevailing attitudes regarding the many “others” across the globe. Individuals do not simply hold intellectual beliefs about peoples in distant lands, but rather, they have strong emotional responses to divisions that are perpetuated in the media. One critical example is the influential idea of the clash of civilizations, which has spread out of the domain of news journalism and into all other forms of media. At the same time, while appreciating the significant power of the media, it is important to recognize that people around the world can have an impact on the media. Where the media grossly distorts or
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withholds information, civil society may be able to take action such as barraging the media with letters or emails or boycotting the media corporations responsible for disseminating caricatures and misrepresentations. Hence, the role of media besides being more open and interactive, is also under constant scrutiny and check by the public to push media in order to play a constructive role in the society.

Specific Objective

Promotion of inter-culturality among youth through education, labor sector, the media and the civil society

Keeping this specific objective in mind, one can identify the specific goal, with which this Project aims to be associated and work for, in a single, coherent direction. The basic aim is to promote interculturality among the youth through the institutionalised sectors as mentioned above. In each of these institutional frameworks, all attempts would be made therein, to promote features of cross-cultural interaction among the youth. Hence, this accounts for the specific objective of this Project, which arises out of all the overall general objectives mentioned above. Furthermore, it would be seen that how this Interculturality comes to be complemented with the concept of Human Rights, in theory and in practice, in the subsequent stages of its formulation. Thus, a trajectory would be attempted to be drawn wherein, this significant parameter of Interculturality finds its companion and follows steps in consonance with the Human Rights Phenomenon

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In the development of a well-being of a multicultural community, the diverse roles of social partners is of utmost importance. Through this tool of Intercultural Dialogue, and subsequently cross-cultural mediation, the grid of social mobility will be strengthened. Explicitly, the social partners such as the State, the Civil Society Organizations and other non-state actors, will act more in a synchronized, coherent line of functionality. In other words, this dialogue, by
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**Intercultural Dialogue among Nations and a more close-knit civil society**

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different cultures. This sense can come about only when certain tools such as intercultural activities, learning of intercultural attitudes and such other forms of interculturality are implemented through appropriate teaching lessons, which move beyond the text-learning and induce an intercultural discipline among the teachers and the students.

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**A well enriched civil society**

A civil society composed of primarily all the Organizations or Institutions under the name of 'non-state actors' is a well-enriched civil society when it is based upon this notion of interculturality spread among different actors in the social sector. Hence, one of the primary aims, to make a better civil society definitely comes to be based upon the fabric of this network of a close-knit intercultural civil society, where the actors work in an environment which is rid of all stereotypes, prejudices, biases and in close connection with each other within an Organization and also, outside in explicating the dynamics of multiculturalism.

**Significant contribution to EU Global Citizenship**

The factor of Interculturality is one of the primary factors in the contribution to the EU Global Citizenship. By Global Citizenship, we refer here to the more concrete, coherent EU citizens as the bearers of EU fraternity and solidarity, rather than ending up in divisions and fragments. Global citizens can effect change in the following manner. We cannot stop terrorism with more and better security and weapons alone. We must seek to change how people conceive their roles in society. We may understand the science of climate change, but understanding how to change ourselves is another matter. The Global Citizenship programme provides students with a deeper understanding of the cultural and political dimensions of change, and of their potential role in developing a conception of citizenship geared to the needs of a rapidly globalizing world.

**Shift in the profile of the Youth**

The significant shift in the profile of the youth can come about by facilitating youth participation and intergenerational partnerships in global decision-making. This can be furthered by supporting collaborations among diverse youth organizations; and providing tools, resources, and recognition for positive youth action.
Showcasing of this implied inter-culturality by the media

Technology has made the media the most important immediate influence on opinions and understanding in the industrialized world and has significantly heightened media impact in the developing countries as well. Media has a powerful capacity to encourage global awareness thereby promoting cross-cultural understanding, tolerance and acceptance of ethnic, cultural, religious and gender differences in communities across the globe. By disseminating messages that create and reinforce negative stereotypes and perpetuate misconceptions, the media frustrates dialogue and works against mutual understanding. The media is, therefore a crucial arena for challenging prevailing attitudes regarding the many “others” across the globe.

Individuals do not simply hold intellectual beliefs about peoples in distant lands, but rather, they have strong emotional responses to divisions that are perpetuated in the media. One critical example is the influential idea of the clash of civilizations, which has spread out of the domain of news journalism and into all other forms of media. At the same time, while appreciating the significant power of the media, it is important to recognize that people around the world can have an impact on the media. Where the media grossly distorts or withholds information, civil society may be able to take action such as barraging the media with letters or emails or boycotting the media corporations responsible for disseminating caricatures and misrepresentations. Hence, the role of media besides being more open and interactive, is also under constant scrutiny and check by the public to push media in order to play a constructive role in the society.

How well have we been able to deduce a relationship between the theory put forth and its impact on the Project credentials, can be analyzed in the Conclusion, which highlights apart from the bridging gap between theory and practice, other ethical ramifications to preserve such an identity.
Chapter 5

Conclusion: Moral Justification to Preserving ‘Cultural Identity’

In conclusion, we juxtapose a situation where we try to posit a view of this dynamic cultural identity in light of the fact that how morally valid it is, to preserve this identity. What are the grounds on which we should claim a right to preserve this identity rather more implicitly than in any other fashion.

As Thomas Nagel puts it --‘I believe it is most accurate to think of rights as aspects of status—part of what is involved in being a member of the moral community. The idea of rights expresses a particular conception of the kind of place that should be occupied by individuals in a moral system—how their lives, actions and interests should be recognized by the system of justification and authorization that constitutes a morality. Moral status, as conferred by moral rights, is formally analogous to legal status, as conferred by legal rights, except that it is not contingent on social practices. It is a universal normative condition, consisting of what is permitted to be done to persons, what persons are permitted to do, what sorts of justifications are required for preventing them from doing what they want, and so forth.’ Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, no. 2. (Spring 1995).

Hence, there are primarily three categories in which we can distinguish the moral claims to preserve this identity. We start with the category on ‘Status, Respect and Dignity’.

5.1 Status, Respect and Dignity

Colin Bird advances two main claims. The first is that once we understand the way in which the concept of respect characteristically functions, He suggests that we can make sense of the idea of respect for “identity” or “difference” only by threatening the sort of egalitarianism. So here, the aim is to expose a more general tension between egalitarianism and identity-based conceptions of respect. The second claim is that even the sort of egalitarianism involved in Kantian ideals of respect for persons is itself parasitic on a presupposed status hierarchy. In order to forestall any misunderstanding on this score, he wishes to make it crystal clear at the outset that this second claim asserts a conceptual hypothesis, not a substantive criticism. That is, in claiming that the concept of respect may be bound up with a certain sort of hierarchy even in the context of Kantian “equal respect,” I am neither denying that the Kantian position is genuinely egalitarian nor somehow attempting to undermine it. I am merely seeking to uncover a property of the conceptual mechanics that hold ideals of equal respect in place. If successful, my argument identifies a feature of our notion of equal respect, not a reason to reject it. We are accustomed to contrasting equality and hierarchy; but there can be equality within hierarchy, and this, he suggests, is exactly how it is with our concept of equal respect.

These considerations reveal that despite the important differences Darwall identifies between the two kinds of respect, an affinity between respect and hierarchy persists even in the case of Kantian moral recognition respect. Implicit in the idea that something is reckonable is the idea that it rates highly in some presupposed rank-order of considerations bearing upon deliberation. So to say that authoritative instructions, or the special moral standing of persons as ends in
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themselves, are worthy of respect is to imply that they are particularly impressive considerations, capable of pre-empting or “trumping” others. Respect as a deliberative disposition therefore involves a sensitivity to the relative urgency with which reckonable considerations command our attention and the order in which some of them pre-empt others. He puts himself in a position to address the issues raised, where he asks why it seems so natural to characterize the deliberative disposition celebrated by Kantians as a form of “respect” for persons. ‘To say that we should be respectfully disposed toward persons in thinking about how to act in a given case is to recognize the way in which their presence commands our attention and exerts control over our choices. The “proper thinking” required by the Kantian disposition of respect for persons, then, is a matter of recognizing, in proper order, the sources of reasons to which our judgments must submit.’

Conversely, to be an object of this sort of respect is to be in a position to invoke one’s own personality as grounds for expecting others to (not) act in certain ways and for pre-empting some of their possible choices in a defined range of cases. On this view, moral persons bear a form of authority before which suitably “respectful” others (to use a famous Kantian metaphor) “bend the knee.” To see how this appeal to the generalized other can still explain identity based oppression, consider the way in which multiculturalists often stress the “dialogical” structure of identity formation. Thus Charles Taylor notes that My sense of who I am is partly a function of how I am defined within a context of discourse. When that discourse “mirrors back to me a confining, or demeaning or contemptible picture” of who I am, I become the target of a certain kind of disrespect.

But here, the liberal will deny that the problem consists in a failure on the part of the participants in this discourse to “respect my identity,” as if my identity was an independently reckon worthy consideration to which the discourse was somehow responsible for attending. Rather, the problem seems to lie in the process of identity formation itself, for it is this that creates the demeaning self-image along with the associated stigma. From this angle, the contempt to which the bearer of this stigma is subject is wrong, not because their “social identity” is not being appropriately respected, but rather because in such cases their socially constructed identity precludes their recognition as a civic equal. If we construe the problem in these terms, the appropriate remedy would seem to be to encourage people to set aside the victim’s social identity, for in this sort of case it is the source of the problem rather than its solution.

After all, the objections offered here apply to any conception that calls for respect for an “identity,” and on this point liberals and multiculturalists ultimately find themselves in the same boat. This reply assumes that the liberal account of equal respect is itself based upon a call to respect people in virtue of some aspect of their identity. This assumption undergirds the familiar characterization of the dispute between liberals and multiculturalists as a debate over whether people are owed respect in virtue of what they share or in virtue of what differentiates them.

Thus it has become common to summarize the debate in terms of a confrontation between views that focus on “sameness” or “difference.” On this construal, when liberals call for “blindness to difference” they are attempting to bracket all those features of peoples’ identities that differentiate them from each other. Respect for Benhabib’s “generalized other” turns out to involve respect for a residual common identity. If this is an appropriate way to characterize the liberal position, then the same problems I have exposed in the multiculturalist idea of respect for
particular identity would seem to infect the liberal view as well. The fact that certain identities are shared rather than differentiating does not automatically make them unambiguously reckon worthy. So if identity per se is a practically indeterminate consideration, this indeterminacy is just as likely to disturb liberal accounts of equal respect as multiculturalist ones.

For example, one’s citizenship very often becomes a part of one’s identity—citing my citizenship may legitimately serve as part of an answer to the question, “Who am I?” This is the case even though strictly speaking to be a citizen of a country is primarily to enjoy a status vis-à-vis other citizens and noncitizens. But from the fact that a status claim may generate an identity claim it doesn’t follow that we can’t distinguish between them, nor that claims about status entail claims about identity. Bypassing identity in this way allows liberals to avoid the problems and unclarities inherent in the idea of respect for identities and differences. For the principle “treat individuals in accordance with their status” is far less likely to be indeterminate in the way that treatment “in accordance with identity” seems to be. The reason is that a person’s status can be directive in something like the way that authority claims are: that is why it makes sense for Kantians to talk of individuals’ dignity (which is of course a status) as commanding attitudes of respect. Status can be directive like this because to enjoy a certain status just is for there to be an expectation that others treat one in certain ways. Thus one way to describe a person’s status is to supply an inventory of their rights, privileges, and the various other legal and moral claims they may make upon institutions and other individuals.

Moreover, status admits of comparison such that the treatment one person can expect to command can be judged against that which others can expect to command. Comparisons of this kind allow us make sense of equalities and inequalities of status. Neither of these seems true for identity. A person’s identities and differences don’t generate automatic expectations about how they are to be treated: discursive or deliberative interaction with features of people’s identity is inevitably open-ended and unruly. Further, since accounts of identities and differences will be assemblages of propositions shot through with historical contingency and cultural incommensurability, it’s hard to see what sense can be attached to the idea of “equalizing” the recognition of identity and difference.

Finally, it is important to remember that in daily life agents are embedded within a dense network of status hierarchies, many of which are highly stratified and inegalitarian. These are both manifestations of social power and conduits through which power flows - for, as argued here, to have a certain status is to be in a position to command treatment of certain kinds from others. It is quite reasonable, then, to think of the ability to be respected in this way as a form of power and control. If we are going to make an issue about the importance of “equal moral/civic status” we need an account of how it relates to the much more tangible forms of status surrounding agents in their professional, personal, cultural, and institutional routines along with the relations of power they reflect. But we currently lack any canonical or agreed basis for translating claims about equal “moral/civic status” into defensible judgments about legitimate status divisions in this other less abstract settings. Rawls’s argument about the need to give a certain priority to the interests of the least advantaged groups in society remains a pioneering gesture in this direction.
Thus for him, a representative least advantaged person who does not receive the highest share of primary goods that his society’s economy could in principle bear is the victim of a certain kind of disrespect. In failing to do the best for her that economic circumstances permit, her fellow citizens fail to reckon properly with her moral status. But such conclusions have not gone unchallenged, and have met particularly strong resistance from those who claim also to be committed to the project of respecting individuals’ equal moral status before all else. The substantial disagreement between proponents of equal respect about what should be counted as fundamental forms of disrespect or impermissible status - inequality implies that our understanding of “equal respect” is underspecified relative to the (various) concrete political conclusions it is mobilized to support. These considerations, along with the arguments of this essay, suggest that it is time for egalitarians to leave behind the politics of identity and reflect more deeply on the politics of status. Any investigation of this social phenomenon has to embrace the assumption that the use of specific words and structures within the context of a certain discourse reflects each group’s support of its own political interests, cultural norms, or theological beliefs and attempt to discredit those of the other group. It also presupposes that a linguistic investigation will provide an in-depth understanding of these conflicts and that a careful selection of linguistic expressions will contribute to the conflict’s management, resolution, and even avoidance.

5.2 Reducing Intra-Group Conflicts

Putting some light on the Intra-Muslim Conflicts, the global Muslim community consists of people who have different cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. This phenomenon may result in minor or major intra-Muslim conflicts characterized by linguistic expressions designed to present, either overtly or covertly, opposing positions that may have a considerable impact on certain conflicts. Hence, there is a need for extensive research that analyzes the implications of such linguistic representations within the context of how language can influence the initiation, spread, management, or resolution of intra-Muslim conflicts. Its influence is also recognized in reconciling social affairs and rectifying broken relations.

Linguistic representation, in its capacity as a semantic symbol that conveys concepts, positions, and values, becomes a factor in both intra- and inter-Muslim conflicts among social groups. Its functions cover initiating enmity and turning a foe into an ally (and vice versa), thereby causing anarchy or war; stirring up social relations; and suspending, stopping, or avoiding anarchy. Ambiguous terms and slang may lead to conflict through a pragmatic interpretation or how the various linguistic groups or sub-cultural groups understand their connotations. Thus, a language of conflict emerges to represent action and reaction to the conflict in question. The effects of linguistic representation upon intra-Muslim conflicts become clear when we analyze the role played by linguistic expressions in conflict situations. How the language of conflict is used, however, depends upon the situation and the positions of each group’s members. In addition, some aspects of linguistic expression may symbolize certain aspects of intra-Muslim conflicts.

Representing a conflict through language is not restricted to those who speak the same language, for it also exists among speakers of different languages. Such conflicts may be caused by clashes over regional cultural norms, conflicting religious beliefs, and conflicting political interests. Linguistic expressions of intra-communal conflicts among groups are fuelled by intolerance,
failure to reach a compromise, a conflict of interest, heightened tension in relations, or a state of war. The influence of linguistic expressions among rival groups extends to relations between individuals and nations, due to socio-cultural and religious factors. As a result, the ensuing reactions to expressions used to denote some groups, tribes, races, or members of certain religious sects reflects one group’s inner feelings and perceptions of other groups. The paper investigated the linguistic representation of intra-Muslim conflicts by analyzing the features, factors, strategies, and implications of utilizing linguistic expressions. The discussion and analysis reveal the impact of how linguistic representation is designed and then used to initiate, manage, reduce, or resolve intra-Muslim conflicts. The study confirms the role of linguistic representation in fostering good relations and mending worsening relations among Muslims, as well as in avoiding intra-Muslim conflicts and attaining a greater understanding of others. It also reveals the significance of studying the spoken and written discourses used in specific cases in order to examine the role of linguistic representation in certain stages of such conflicts. Constraints in preparing an extensive project on this subject lie not only in data collection, due to the many language communities involved, but also in isolating expressions of interpersonal conflict and prejudice from actual linguistic representations of conflicts among different Muslim groups. Other constraints lie in the classification of terms according to their utilization and implications, as well as in the likely cultural impact of language upon the project.

5.3 Intergenerational Justice

A political society is intergenerational. Citizens are born into a pre-existing polity that in most cases will continue to exist, perhaps for many generations, after they are dead. They obey laws and act in the framework of institutions that were brought into being by past generations, and their government makes laws that will affect the lives and relationships of future generations. ‘We the people’ consists of a procession of citizens through time. But most citizens do not merely conceive of themselves as people who happen to share a territory and institutions with people of the past and future. They regard themselves as inheritors of a history and a political tradition. They understand themselves and their political actions in a historical framework that connects the deeds of past generations to their own deeds and to aspirations for the future of their society. They see themselves as carrying on a tradition, maintaining a valued institution, righting a historical wrong, or continuing a struggle to achieve a national ideal. They honor their nation's dead, or the dead of other communities to which they belong, and make sacrifices for posterity. They preserve their heritage and pass it on to future generations. Their government makes agreements and incurs obligations which succeeding generations are supposed to honor. Intergenerational relationships, and the obligations and entitlements that go with them, are central to the moral fabric of a political society. A nation for them is, in essence, a trangenerational polity: a society in which the generations are bound together in relationships of obligation and entitlement.

It is often claimed that issues of justice between generations are special. Still, there remains a lot of work to do, namely, in identifying these special features and their normative implications. This is particularly important with respect to the possibility of intergenerational obligations and the content of such obligations. In this Introduction, we will simply adumbrate some of these features, inviting attention to some of their implications. The various chapters will then develop several of these points in greater detail. The unique features that distinguish issues of justice
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between generations from other issues of justice are often at the heart of key challenges. For example, some of these features potentially threaten the possibility of intergenerational obligations. Consider the fact, harmless enough at first glance, that future people do not exist today. The non-existence challenge implies that obligations can only make sense when they are owed to people who actually exist. People who did exist in the past or who could exist in the future would thus not qualify as rightful recipients of such obligations. Another distinctive and problematic feature is rooted in the fact that the composition of future generations (that is, whether it be Paul or John who comes into existence) depends in many cases on our own actions. This, of course, leads to the famous non-identity challenge.

Thus, in deciding what to bequeath to our great-grandchildren, additional uncertainties obtain, such as whether their own parents will fulfill their own obligations toward them, how many children our grandchildren will have, and how technological evolutions will transform society. Complicating these issues is the fact that both overlap (or the lack thereof) and relative remoteness in time can have different sorts of consequences depending on the theory one adopts. There are additional factors that will affect either the possibility of obligations of justice between generations or the content of such obligations, again with different impacts stemming from the application of different theories. Consider, for example, the ability of a theory to come to terms with an indefinite number of generations. Uncertainty regarding the number of generations is especially problematic for aggregative theories. If one cares about fairly dividing the intergenerational cake of well-being, it is important to know how many guests will be present at the table. Moreover, a non-ideal theory of justice needs to address the problem of noncompliance by both earlier generations and future generations. If earlier generations did not respect their own intergenerational obligations, should this affect the extent to which present generations ought to comply with these obligations? And should the likelihood of future noncompliance have an impact on the content or very existence of our own intergenerational obligations? Similarly, the sequentially of generations not only generates dependence on the behavior of earlier or later generations, but it also entails, for example, asymmetries of knowledge associated with variable time location (that is, someone tends to have more information about facts and events that are contemporaries to her than about those that would be remote in the future or in the past). Finally, as mentioned earlier, time distance (or remoteness) as such (in addition to time location and the absence of overlap per se) also has implications, not only in epistemic terms (greater uncertainty about what is remote), but also in motivational terms. This is exhibited by the fact that we may care more about our close relatives than about our distant ones.

As noted, these challenges do not affect the various theories in the same way, nor does each of these difficulties affect all types of intergenerational relations (with past or future generations, with overlap or without). For example, some theories depend less than others on the existence of an overlap. And we should not lose sight of the fact that justice between neighbouring generations is not, as such, a negligible field of investigation, as those insisting on justice between non-overlapping and remote generations may too quickly assume. Some theories are also less demo-sensitive than others, in the sense that they will render the content of our intergenerational obligations less dependent on the size of the next generations. And furthermore, some theories need to refer to obligations toward dead people in order to justify obligations toward future people, whereas others do not. In short, in studying the normative implications of each of the specific features of intergenerational relations, it is crucial to understand that...
different theories of intergenerational justice will interpret each of the aforementioned characteristics differently. Moreover, what the particular implications are will also be important in assessing the relative consistency of various theories of justice. If a standard theory fares better than another in accounting for our intuitions of justice in the intergenerational realm, then this can be used as an argument in favor of this theory in general.

Before moving to a presentation of the chapters of this volume, let us also explain what areas of the ongoing debate in intergenerational justice we do not cover. To begin with, we will not be looking at our obligations toward dead people, nor will we address issues of historical injustice understood as determining what one community owes another today as a result of what their respective ancestors did to each other in the past. These issues are important when we consider the history of slavery in the United States, the various forms of dispossession forced upon the aboriginal peoples of several continents, the inflicting of countless atrocities on those of Jewish ancestry and on Gypsies during World War II and, more recently, the significance of historical emissions of carbon dioxide. At the other end of the spectrum, we shall also leave aside the Jonassian issue of possible justifications for guaranteeing that future generations will continue to exist (as opposed to determining what we owe them if we can anticipate that they will exist). Furthermore, issues of justice between age groups, in so far as they can be separated out from issues of justice between birth cohorts, will not be taken up either. Social sciences tend to use a distinction between cohort effects and age effects.

For example, it may be strictly due to age effects that a group of people suffers from deficient audition or poor memory. Whatever the cohort, people at the age of 90 tend not to have auditive capacities or memory abilities which are as sharp as those of people aged 20. Yet, it may also be the case that in comparing people at the same age from different birth cohorts (for example, those in their 40s born in 1920 compared to those born in 2000), some proper cohort effects may occur, for instance due to the intensive use of headphones at a young age in recent times, or to lesser memorization habits. It is often assumed that the difference between cohort effects and age effects may be linked to two distinct realms of justice, though this is far from certain. Yet, at the very least, this age-group/birth-cohort distinction should certainly not be confused with the distinction between overlapping and non-overlapping generations. Cohorts (that is, groups of people born at the same time) can overlap or not. Issues of justice between cohorts do not necessarily need to involve non-overlapping generations only. Conversely, when facing overlapping generations, issues of justice do not necessarily need to be analyzed in terms of justice between age groups. Here, we will limit ourselves to issues of justice between birth cohorts, be they overlapping or not.

Moreover, members of communities have a moral interest in maintaining practices and institutions that enable legitimate lifetime-transcending demands to be made and fulfilled. This argument can be extended to include transgenerational obligations that people have as members of political societies. Transgenerational obligations arise in this context since members of political societies will have lifetime-transcending interests. As such, they will also have a moral interest in the maintenance of practices and institutions that facilitate the making and fulfilling of lifetime transcending interests and that provide for the conditions that make the flourishing of these practices possible.

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This understanding, it is argued, diffuses the non-identity problem, for this account allows for the possibility of committing wrongs against future people without harming them. It also raises the issue, however, of how we ought to understand our relation to those who will live in the distant future. In the context of contractualism, valid principles for the regulation of behavior must be justifiable to anyone on grounds that she cannot reasonably reject whether or not she currently exists. This means that even if we do not stand in any concretely characterisable relation toward future human beings, we do stand in a morally relevant relation to them, for those decisions that we make now, decisions that have implications for the quality of life likely to be available to them, must be justifiable to them by means of a principle that no one can reasonably reject.

Finally, it is noted that the contractualist account developed here is identical to the one used in understanding interpersonal obligations that those living now owe one another. To the extent that this account is convincing, it implies that most of the interesting questions concerning obligations to future generations are not foundational in the sense that their justification is *sui generis*. Rather, the interesting questions are substantive. We need to enquire further into how best to specify our obligations to future people, given the special features of intergenerational relations.

Hence at the outset it can be explained that the three dimensions of ethical politics find complementarity with the dynamic notions of cultural identity. Thus, a justification of such a cultural identity is credible on these moral ethical grounds. Therefore to conclude and to put in an open ended form we need to continuously engage ourselves in such a notion of identity laden with dynamic, changing and the questioning facts and values.
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