Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement & Leniency Program

Samà, Danilo (2008) Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement & Leniency Program. [Working Paper]. p. 13. (Unpublished)

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The present assessment focuses the attention on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements. The problem statement that follows is therefore: how can Law & Economics approach help competition authorities to achieve and realize this form of enforcement?

Item Type:Report / Paper (Working Paper)
Research documents and activity classification:Working Papers > Refereed Working Papers / of international relevance
Divisions:Department of Business and Management
Uncontrolled Keywords:Antitrust Law, Cartel Enforcement, Competition Law, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Law and Economics, Leniency Program, Oligopolistic Markets
MIUR Scientific Area:Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/06 Applied Economics
Deposited By:Danilo Sama
Deposited On:04 Mar 2011 18:28
Last Modified:24 May 2011 17:26

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