Large newsvendor games

Montrucchio, Luigi and Scarsini, Marco (2006) Large newsvendor games. [Working Paper]. p. 30. Carlo Alberto Notebooks (No. 15).

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Abstract/Index

We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. We consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game, and we show that in a game with a continuum of players, under a nonatomic condition on the demand, the core is a singleton. For a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases.


Item Type:Report / Paper (Working Paper)
Research documents and activity classification:Working Papers > Refereed Working Papers / of international relevance
Divisions:Department of Business and Management
Additional Information:The definitive version of the paper has been published in "Games and Economic Behavior", Vol. 58(2), Pages 316-337, February 2007.
Uncontrolled Keywords:Newsvendor games; Nonatomic games; Core; Balanced games.
MIUR Scientific Area:Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-S/01 Statistics
Deposited By:Maria Teresa Nistico
Deposited On:21 Dec 2010 11:29
Last Modified:21 Dec 2010 13:01

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