Social vs. Risk Preferences under the Veil of Ignorance
Frignani, Nicola and Ponti, Giovanni (2008) Social vs. Risk Preferences under the Veil of Ignorance. [Working Paper]. p. 14. Università degli studi di Ferrara. Dipartimento di economia, istituzioni, territorio. Quaderni (No. 08/2008).
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This paper reports experimental evidence from a series of a simple Dictator Games in which, randomly matched in pair, subjects choose repeatedly one out of four alternatives involving a pair of fixed monetary prizes, one for them and the other for an anonymously matched subject. While in some treatments player position (i.e. the identity of the best paid agent) is known in advance before subjects have to select their favorite option, in one treatment subjects choose under “the veil of ignorance”, only knowing that either role is equally likely. Finally, we also collect evidence from another treatment, in which the same options correponds to binary lotteries, in which subjects may win one prize or the other with equal probability.
|Item Type:||Report / Paper (Working Paper)|
|Research documents and activity classification:||Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only|
|Divisions:||Department of Business and Management|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Social Preferences, Risk Preferences, Functional Identification.|
|MIUR Scientific Area:||Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy|
|Deposited by:||Maria Teresa Nistico|
|Date Deposited:||16 Dec 2010 15:06|
|Last Modified:||22 Apr 2015 00:13|
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