On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study
Herrero, Carmen and Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. and Ponti, Giovanni (2006) On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study. [Working Paper]. p. 42. CORE Discussion Papers (No. 2006062).
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This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating con icting claims: the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of these three rules. In addition, we let subjects play an additional game, that has the property that all (and only) strategy profiles in which players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. While in the first three games subjects' play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device, especially when we frame the game with an hypothetical bankruptcy situation. We also administered a questionnaire to a different group of students, asking them to act as impartial arbitrators to solve (among others) the same problems played in the lab. Also in this case, respondents were sensitive to the framing of the questions, but the proportional rule was selected by the vast majority of respondents.
|Item Type:||Report / Paper (Working Paper)|
|Research documents and activity classification:||Working Papers > Refereed Working Papers / of international relevance|
|Divisions:||Department of Business and Management|
|Additional Information:||The definitive version of the paper has been published in "Social Choice and Welfare", Vol. 34(1), Pages 145-179, 2010.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Claims Problems; Proportional Rule; Experimental Economics.|
|MIUR Scientific Area:||Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy|
|Deposited By:||Maria Teresa Nistico|
|Deposited On:||15 Dec 2010 15:25|
|Last Modified:||23 Apr 2013 14:45|
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