Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
Cabrales, Antonio and Miniaci, Raffaele and Piovesan, Marco and Ponti, Giovanni (2008) Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts. [Discussion Paper]. Koebenhavns Universitet, Oekonomisk Institut, Denmark. p. 51. Discussion Papers (No. 08-06).
|PDF (Full text) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader|
Official URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/Research/Publications/pink/2...
This paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market. The experiment is designed as a sequence of three phases. In the first two phases, P1 and P2; agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns, together with their beliefs. In the last phase, P3; four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, each agent selects one of the available contracts (i.e. he "chooses to work" for a principal). Production is determined by the outcome of a simple effort game induced by the chosen contract. We find that (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices in all phases of the experiment. Since the available contracts display a trade-off between fairness and strategic uncertainty, we observe that the latter is a much stronger determinant of choices, for both principals and agents. Finally, we also see that social preferences explain, to a large extent, matching between principals and agents, since agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar social preferences.
|Item Type:||Report / Paper (Discussion Paper)|
|Research documents and activity classification:||Working Papers > Refereed Working Papers / of international relevance|
|Divisions:||Department of Business and Management|
|Additional Information:||The definitive version of the paper has been published in "American Economic Review", Vol. 100(5), Pages 2261-2278, December 2010.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Social Preferences, Team Incentives, Mechanism Design, Experimental Economics.|
|MIUR Scientific Area:||Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy|
|Deposited By:||Maria Teresa Nistico|
|Deposited On:||14 Dec 2010 15:08|
|Last Modified:||23 Apr 2013 13:55|
Repository Staff Only: item control page