Strategic Interaction and Conventions
Paz Espinosa, María and Kovárík, Jaromír and Ponti, Giovanni (2010) Strategic Interaction and Conventions. [Working Paper]. p. 14. DFAEII Working Papers (No. 2010-07).
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The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.
|Item Type:||Report / Paper (Working Paper)|
|Research documents and activity classification:||Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only|
|Divisions:||Department of Business and Management|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Behavioral Game Theory; Conventions; Social Norms.|
|MIUR Scientific Area:||Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy|
|Deposited By:||Maria Teresa Nistico|
|Deposited On:||14 Dec 2010 12:36|
|Last Modified:||23 Apr 2013 13:24|
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