The European Commission's Case Against Microsoft: Fool Monti Kills Bill?
Pardolesi, Roberto and Renda, Alberto (2004) The European Commission's Case Against Microsoft: Fool Monti Kills Bill? [Working Paper]. LUISS Guido Carli. Law & Economics LAB. p. 69. LE Lab Working Paper (No. AT-07-04).
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The recent decision issued by the European Commission against Microsoft raises legitimate concerns under many respects. First, the way the Commission handled the whole proceeding highlighted all the impasse that characterizes antitrust authorities when dealing with complex cases from the high-tech world. Secondly, the Commission's decision adopted a mistaken approach to interoperability, confusing it with perfect emulation of Microsoft's copyrighted source code. Thirdly, the Commission showed little or no attention to the economics of technological leveraging in dealing with the media player market, and ended up awkwardly mimicking the rationale upheld by the US District Judge in the "browsers war." We conclude by calling for more sound economic analysis at the European Commission, and suggesting what possible solutions could have been endorsed, which would significantly improve the level-playing-field in the server software and in the media player markets, without hindering incentives to invest and consequently stifling innovation.
|Item Type:||Report / Paper (Working Paper)|
|Research documents and activity classification:||Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only|
|Divisions:||Department of Law|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Antitrust, intellectual property, Microsoft, interoperability, technological leveraging, essential facility|
|MIUR Scientific Area:||Area 12 - Law > IUS/02 Comparative Private Law|
|Deposited By:||Maria Teresa Nistico|
|Deposited On:||10 Dec 2010 16:45|
|Last Modified:||25 May 2013 15:20|
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