Giordani, Paolo E. and Ruta, Michele (2010) Prejudice and Immigration. [Working Paper]. p. 40. (Unpublished)

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Abstract/Index

We study immigration policy in a small open receiving economy under self-selection of migrants. We show that the immigration policy choice aspects and is affected by the migratory decisions of skilled and unskilled foreign workers. From this interaction multiple equilibria may arise, which are driven by the natives' expectations on the size and skill composition of the incoming migrant population (and, hence, on the welfare effects of immigration). In particular, pessimistic (optimistic) beliefs induce a country to impose higher (lower) barriers to immigration, which crowd out (crowd in) skilled migrants and thus con�rm initial beliefs. This self-ful�lling mechanism sustains the endogenous formation of an anti or pro-immigration "prejudice".

Item Type:	Report / Paper (Working Paper)
Research documents and activity classification:	Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only
Divisions:	Department of Business and Management
Additional Information:	Revised version, June 2010.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Immigration policy, skilled/unskilled workers, small open economy, multiple equilibria.
MIUR Scientific Area:	Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy
Deposited by:	Maria Teresa Nistico
Date Deposited:	25 Nov 2010 07:54
Last Modified:	22 Apr 2015 00:13
URI:	http://eprints.luiss.it/id/eprint/750

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