Financial Intermediation and Equity Investment with Costly Monitoring
Di Giorgio, Giorgio (1999) Financial Intermediation and Equity Investment with Costly Monitoring. [Working Paper]. p. 18. Economics Working Papers (No. 410).
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This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.
|Item Type:||Report / Paper (Working Paper)|
|Research documents and activity classification:||Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only|
|Divisions:||Department of Business and Management|
|Additional Information:||The latest version of this paper has been published in "International Review of Economics & Finance", Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 27-43, April 2002|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Financial Intermediation, Costly State Verification, Constrained Pareto Optimality|
|MIUR Scientific Area:||Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy|
|Deposited by:||Maria Teresa Nistico|
|Date Deposited:||23 Nov 2010 08:10|
|Last Modified:||21 Apr 2015 23:13|
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