Cooperation in Dividing the Cake
Dall'Aglio, Marco and Branzei, Rodica and Tijs, Stef H. (2008) Cooperation in Dividing the Cake. [Discussion Paper]. Tilburg University, The Netherlands. p. 22. CentER Discussion Paper Series (No. 2008-101).
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Official URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id...
This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the division.
|Item Type:||Report / Paper (Discussion Paper)|
|Research documents and activity classification:||Working Papers > Refereed Working Papers / of international relevance|
|Divisions:||Department of Business and Management|
|Additional Information:||Posted on SSRN Working Paper Series on 8th December 2008. The latest version of this paper has been published in "TOP", 2009, 17 (2), pages 417-432.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Fair Division, Cooperative Games, Maximin Partition|
|MIUR Scientific Area:||Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-S/06 Mathematics for Economics, Actuarial Studies and Finance|
|Deposited By:||Maria Teresa Nistico|
|Deposited On:||22 Nov 2010 14:01|
|Last Modified:||29 Nov 2010 19:41|
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