Squeezing Price Squeeze Under EC Antitrust Law

Faella, Gianluca and Pardolesi, Roberto (2009) Squeezing Price Squeeze Under EC Antitrust Law. [Discussion Paper]. Social Science Electronic Pub. p. 26. SSRN Working Paper Series (Unpublished)

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Abstract/Index

The Nature of Price Squeeze Abuses. A Taxonomy. The Limits of a Price Squeeze Analysis under Antitrust Rules. The US Experience. Price Squeeze Abuses in the EU. The Scope for a Price Squeeze Analysis under Antitrust Law: Some Critical Remarks. The Need for an Antitrust Duty to Deal. The Structure of the Cost-Based Test. Equally or Reasonably Efficient Competitor Test. The Application of the Equally Efficient Competitor Test in the Case of Different Costs or Differentiated Products. The Application of the Equally Efficient Competitor Test when the Supply of an Input to Competitors Entails Additional Costs. The Role of Efficiencies in the Assessment of Price Squeeze Abuses under EC Competition Law: Waiting for Godot.


Item Type:Report / Paper (Discussion Paper)
Research documents and activity classification:Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only
Divisions:Department of Law
Additional Information:The previous version of this paper ("Price Squeeze Abuses after linkLine and Deutsche Telekom") has been presented at the "Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics (EALE)", held on LUISS Guido Carli University (17th-19th September, 2009).
Uncontrolled Keywords:Antitrust, Unilateral conduct, Monopolization, Abuse of dominance, Price Squeeze, Margin Squeeze, linkLine, Deutsche Telekom.
MIUR Scientific Area:Area 12 - Law > IUS/02 Comparative Private Law
Deposited By:Maria Teresa Nistico
Deposited On:12 Jul 2010 14:35
Last Modified:18 Apr 2013 23:19

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