What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Implication of Nash Bargaining Theory

Hey, John D. and Bone, John and Suckling, John (2009) What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Implication of Nash Bargaining Theory. [Discussion Paper]. p. 32. (Submitted)

[img]
Preview
PDF (Full text) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
198Kb

Official URL: http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~jdb1/3johns/mk4paper....

Related URLs:

Abstract/Index

This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects’ behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.


Item Type:Report / Paper (Discussion Paper)
Research documents and activity classification:Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only
Divisions:Department of Business and Management
MIUR Scientific Area:Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy
Deposited By:Barbara Scipioni
Deposited On:28 Oct 2009 12:52
Last Modified:28 May 2013 23:07

Repository Staff Only: item control page