Experimental Evidence on English Auctions: oral outcry vs. clock

Hey, John D. and Gonclaves, Ricardo (2007) Experimental Evidence on English Auctions: oral outcry vs. clock. [Discussion Paper]. p. 26. (In Press)

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Abstract/Index

This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an open outcry auction, where bidders are allowed to call their own bids. We find that (i) bidding behaviour is di¤erent in each type of auction, but also that (ii) this difference in bidding behaviour does not a¤ect significantly the auction prices. This lends some support to the equivalence between these two types of auction. The winner's curse is present: overbidding led to higher than expected prices (under Nash bidding strategies) in both types of auction.


Item Type:Report / Paper (Discussion Paper)
Research documents and activity classification:Working Papers > Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance only
Divisions:Department of Business and Management
MIUR Scientific Area:Area 13 - Economics and Statistics > SECS-P/01 Political Economy
Deposited By:Barbara Scipioni
Deposited On:28 Oct 2009 11:43
Last Modified:28 May 2013 23:08

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